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 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the most common interpretation of Milgram’s findings is that participants 
did not wish to harm the learner, the motives generated in this paradigm may well  
have been more mixed or ambivalent in many participants.  Unfortunately, the manner  
in which people actually regard the act of punishing others when they make mistakes 
 . . . has been virtually ignored in discussions of the obedience research.  However . . . 
harming is a widely accepted form of child discipline . . . . Most people are hardly 
unequivocally opposed to the use of physical punishment under absolutely any  
circumstances.  That a majority approve the use of capital punishment in this country  
[the United States] might serve as another illustration—Miller (2004, pp. 198-199). 
 
 
. . . if humanity can survive the violence of our age, [our descendants] might consider  
us as late barbarians—Elias (1991, pp. 146-147). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
Abstract 
 
 
Two leading Holocaust historians, Yehuda Bauer and Christopher Browning, have in recent 
years independently asked how so many ordinary Germans (most of whom in the 1930s had 
been moderately anti-Semitic) could become by the early 1940s willing murderers of Jews.  
Social psychologist, Stanley Milgram, had years before been interested in finding answers to 
similar questions, and to that end in the early 1960s carried out his widely debated “Obedience 
to Authority” (OTA) experiments at Yale University.  Drawing on previously unpublished 
material from Milgram’s personal archive at Yale, this thesis investigates how Milgram 
developed his research idea to the point where, by the time he ran his first official experiment, 
he was able to convert the majority of his ordinary subjects into torturers of other people.  It is 
argued that Milgram’s experiments were in themselves structured as a bureaucratic 
microcosm, and say less about obedience to authority, per se, than about the ways in which 
people in an organisational context resolve a pressing moral dilemma.  The thesis uses insights 
gained from Milgram’s experimental innovations to assist in answering the question posed by 
Bauer and by Browning, focusing on the Nazis’ progressive development of mass killing 
methods, from 1941 to 1944, during Operation Barbarossa and Operation Reinhard.  It is 
shown how these methods were designed to diminish perpetrators’ perceptual stimulation, in 
order to make the “undoable” increasingly “doable”, in ways that were later reflected in 
Milgram’s development of his own experimental methodology. 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
 
Whatever necessary detachment historians may bring to their research, the gnawing horror of the 
firing squads and the gas chambers intrudes.  There is a dimension of understanding here that 
eludes us—Headland (1992, p. 205). 
 
 
1.1 A Brief Overview of the Thesis  
 
During World War Two the Nazi regime organised, and Germans directly 
participated in, a genocidal event more commonly referred to as the Holocaust, which 
ended the lives of about six million Jews (and many others deemed threatening and/or 
“inferior”).  Although non-Germans were heavily involved as direct perpetrators, ordinary 
Germans from “all walks of life” could be found at every level of implementation from 
instigation, management, innovation, through to direct participation (Browning, 1998, p. 
xvii).  Regarding participation, consider, for example, the nearly 500 ordinary men of 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 who were directly involved in the killings of about 38,000 
Jews (Browning, 1992, p. 142).  These everyday Germans, who were not carefully selected 
to undertake these tasks, clearly demonstrated a disturbing capacity to repeatedly engage in 
lethal acts of violence.   
 
Although the intense anti-Semitism of the many Ukrainians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians more directly involved in the killings is undisputed,1 somewhat surprising is 
Bauer’s (2001, p. 31) point: 
 
a high proportion of [Nazi] Party members were not extreme antisemites; rather, 
they shared an antisemitism that one could define as pervasive, yet not necessarily 
murderous, perhaps even ‘moderate’.  But it was not only the membership of the 
Nazi Party that may have been ‘only moderately’ antisemitic.  This kind of 
moderate antisemitism was shared by a considerable part of the German 
population, although its pervasiveness is difficult to estimate.  
  
Many other scholars agree (also see Bankier, 1992, pp. 72, 84; Heim, 2000, p. 320; 
Johnson & Reuband, 2005, p 284; Kulka, 2000, p. 277) with some suggesting that most 
Germans felt rather “indifferently” about the fate of their Jewish victims (Browning, 1998, 
p. 200). 
 
The puzzling implication of this conclusion is that the murderous yet ordinary 
members of, say, Reserve Police Battalion 101, were arguably a fairly representative 
                                                 
1
 Relative to Germany: “In eastern Europe, anti-Jewish feelings were very much stronger” (Bauer, 2001, p. 
31). 
 2 
sample of men drawn from a wider population of moderate anti-Semites.  This reality led 
Bauer (2001, p. 103) to ask his “real question”.  That is, if upon the Nazi regime’s ascent 
to power in 1933 about 57 percent of the electorate supported non-Nazi parties who were:  
 
either anti-antisemitic or only moderately anti-Jewish (that is, they opposed even 
the relatively moderate step of disenfranchising the Jews), how did it happen that 
by 1940-1941 the overwhelming majority of Germans became a reservoir of 
willing murderers of Jews?  That is the problem (Bauer, 2001, p. 103). 
 
Soon after Bauer, Browning (2004, pp. 428-429) asked the same question. 
 
Driven partly by a desire to comprehend the Holocaust, American social 
psychologist Stanley Milgram (1963, 1974) undertook his Obedience to Authority (OTA) 
experiments in the early 1960s.  In the Baseline condition Milgram demonstrated that most 
(65 percent) of his also ordinary (albeit American) subjects would inflict seemingly 
intense—perhaps even lethal—electrical shocks on a completely innocent person.  The 
OTA Baseline condition was replicated a decade later in West Germany, producing an 85 
percent completion rate (Mantell, 1971, p. 101).  
 
More recently, Miller (2004, p. 196) pointed out: “Milgram’s results could be 
likened to the Holocaust itself.  Both scenarios revealed ordinary people willing to treat 
other people with unimaginable cruelty . . .”  Extending upon this, it could also be argued 
that another commonality between the OTA experiments and the Holocaust is that both 
proved capable of rapidly transforming large proportions of ordinary (Browning, 1992, pp. 
47-48; Milgram, 1974, p. 6), and arguably indifferent people into willing inflictors of 
harm.  With this commonality in mind, what this thesis suggests is that a similar question 
to that asked by Bauer could perhaps be directed at the OTA experiments.  That is, how did 
Milgram transform his also ordinary and indifferent subjects into willing torturers of other 
human beings?  Most readers of the OTA experiments find it disturbing that 65 percent of 
Milgram’s subjects completed the Baseline experiment, just as they are appalled that small 
bands of ordinary Germans could shoot and later gas tens of thousands of other human 
beings in a single day.  But because these were the end results, what might prove 
particularly instructive in answering Bauer’s question is to delineate the start-to-finish 
journey that enabled Milgram to arrive at his destination.  Seeking an answer to the 
question of how Milgram arrived at his end result/s—how he discovered to get most of his 
ordinary and indifferent subjects to do what they did—might prove fruitful in shedding 
new light on Bauer’s and Browning’s question of how ordinary and indifferent Germans 
were rapidly transformed into willing executioners.   
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1.2 Central Aims 
 
This thesis aims to unravel the research journey that enabled Milgram to ostensibly 
convert most of his ordinary subjects into torturers of other human beings.  The thesis then 
seeks to demonstrate how Milgram’s experiments may offer insights and potential clues 
with which to answer both Bauer’s and Browning’s question about how ordinary mildly 
anti-Semitic Germans became willing executioners.  The response will necessarily be 
partial, since Bauer’s and Browning’s question invites such a multi-faceted and complex 
analysis that the question itself borders on being rhetorical.  Attempting to draw 
connections between Milgram’s and the Nazi regime’s journeys of discovery are inherently 
problematic: these are two unique historical trajectories separated by three decades of time 
and space.  The thesis will nonetheless attempt to draw connections (and highlight 
differences) between both events. 
   
The thesis also aims to provide a new theoretical interpretation of Milgram’s 
results.  Central to this interpretation is uncovering why most subjects completed the 
Baseline experiment and then showing how they could bring themselves to do so.  This 
interpretation will focus on psychological factors (the individuals’ resolution of a moral 
dilemma) and sociological factors (such as those inherent in the bureaucratic process).   
 
These aims are important for three key reasons.  First, Bauer’s and Browning’s 
questions remain unanswered.  Secondly, Milgram’s own explanation for his results has 
been rejected and no comprehensive alternative exists.  Thirdly, if successful in 
demonstrating a theoretical connection between Milgram’s experiments and the Holocaust, 
this thesis would counter the contemporary view held by many scholars that the OTA 
experiments have been relegated to only having minor explanatory power with regard to 
the Holocaust (Fenigstein, 1998b, p. 71).  Achieving these aims will ensure that this thesis 
makes an originally significant contribution to the Milgram-Holocaust-related literature.      
 
 
1.3 Key Research Questions  
 
To achieve these central aims, the thesis will answer the following five questions 
(which shape its structure): first, how did Milgram rapidly transform such a large 
proportion of his ordinary subjects into willing torturers of other human beings?  Secondly, 
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what was Milgram’s explanation for his results?  And, thirdly, with reference to the 
Holocaust, what was the scholarly reaction to the OTA research programme and to the 
explanation Milgram provided for his results?  Milgram’s explanation for his own results 
encountered a number of substantive criticisms.  These criticisms give rise to the fourth 
question: does a more robust explanation exist?  If so, finally, can aspects of both 
Milgram’s method of discovery, in conjunction with the alternative explanation presented, 
be generalised towards shedding new light on Bauer’s and Browning’s question as to how 
moderately anti-Semitic Germans were converted into willing executioners of Jews?  
 
 
1.4 Chapter Overview  
 
This thesis comprises twelve chapters.   
 
Chapter One provides a general introduction and overview of the aims and research 
questions of the thesis.  
 
Chapter Two presents the specific methodological approach/es used by the thesis.  
 
Chapter Three provides a focused review of the historiography of the Holocaust, 
Milgram’s place within it, and contextualises both in regard to Bauer’s “real question”.  
 
Chapter Four delineates the influences and events that contributed to the conception 
of Milgram’s idea for undertaking the OTA study.   
 
Chapter Five addresses the first key research question: how did Milgram discover, 
by his first official experiment, to get most of his ordinary subjects to inflict what they 
believed to be potentially lethal shocks on another human being?   
 
With the intention of answering the second key research question, Chapter Six 
provides an overview of Milgram’s results, and the theoretical explanation he provided for 
them.   
 
Chapter Seven answers the third key question by presenting the scholarly reaction 
to the OTA research programme, with particular emphasis on the wider response to 
Milgram’s theory and its purported relationship to the Holocaust.   
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After illustrating the contested nature of Milgram’s explanation, Chapters Eight and 
Nine address the fourth key research question by providing an alternative theoretical 
interpretation of Milgram’s results.  Central to this explanation is uncovering why most 
subjects completed the Baseline experiment and then showing how they could bring 
themselves to do so.   
 
Chapters Ten and Eleven apply the findings of the previous questions—Milgram’s 
method of discovery in conjunction with the alternative explanation for his results—to 
Bauer’s and Browning’s question of how moderately anti-Semitic Germans became 
willing executioners of Jews.  Particular attention is paid to the discovery of the killing 
techniques and their gradual refinement, application, and advancement.  Chapter Ten 
provides a brief overview of the historical events leading up to 1941 and then explores the 
evolution and implementation of the Nazi regime’s mass-shooting campaign during the 
invasion of the Soviet Union—Operation Barbarossa—from 22 June 1941.  Chapter 
Eleven explores the evolution and implementation of the mass-gassing technique 
developed from 1941 onwards during what became known as Operation Reinhard—the 
extermination of the Polish Jews (and others).2   
 
Finally, Chapter Twelve summarises the key findings and conclusions of the thesis.  
 
                                                 
2
 While there were many categories of victims other than the Jews during the Holocaust, this thesis focuses 
on the historiographical material relating to the extermination of the Jews (and explains why almost exclusive 
attention is paid to this category of victim). 
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Chapter Two: Methodological Approach 
  
 
Answers are always anywhere anyone asks—Tony B. Anderson (2007, p. 6). 
 
 
Beyond the fabric there is not only the loom and the weaver but also the weaving.  Beyond the social 
pattern there is the play of forces emanating from the endless interaction of group and environment.  
By studying the fabric alone we could never understand the process of weaving, and we will never 
come to grips with the problem of social causation by studying its contemporary resultant 
patterns—Robert MacIver (1933, p. 145, as cited in van Krieken, 1998, p. 27). 
 
 
The methodological approach of this thesis is addressed in four main sections.  The 
first section presents the author’s journey into the PhD candidacy and key intellectual 
influences.  The second section presents the research strategies employed and the sources 
of data.  The third section provides an overview of the intricacies of the data-collection 
process.  The fourth section explains how the data was analysed.3   
 
 
2.1 The Author’s Journey into the PhD Candidacy 
 
In the late 1990s, the author was completing a Master of Arts (MA) thesis in 
criminology at Victoria University of Wellington (VUW) under the supervision of Dr. 
Reece Walters.  The thesis basically explored the question of whether or not the removal of 
firearms in New Zealand would decrease, increase or have no effect on the rate of 
homicide (Russell, 2000).  The thesis argued that because guns are specifically designed, 
with the pull of a trigger, to inflict massive wounds instantaneously, while also providing a 
level of physical detachment that the other most common alternative methods/weapons 
(knives, bludgeoning objects, physical beatings, and strangulation) cannot, guns are likely 
to be physically and psychologically easier with which to kill.  As Levin and Fox (1985, 
pp. 58-59) wrote: “A gun distances the killer from his victims.  Not only effective as a 
deadly weapon, it is psychologically effective for those who don’t want to get their hands 
dirty.”  At the other end of the repugnance continuum and in relation to one of the rarest 
types of violent offenders in society who derive immense pleasure from the killing 
experience, Levin and Fox (1985, p. 58) add:    
 
Among serial murders that are sexually inspired, the use of a gun is, in fact, 
remarkably rare.  For those killers, physical contact is so crucial to satisfying their 
murderous sexual impulses that a gun robs them of the pleasure they receive from 
killing with their hands. 
                                                 
3
 As human subjects were not involved in this thesis, there was no need to seek approval from Victoria 
University of Wellington’s Human Ethics Committee.   
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For the vast majority in society, however, the act of killing is very unlikely to be construed 
as a pleasurable experience.  And the easy availability of firearms may therefore increase 
the violent potentialities of the more squeamish in society who, despite their violent 
intentions, might struggle getting their “hands dirty” in the absence of such weapons. 
 
The conclusion of the thesis was that, in all probability, the removal of guns in New 
Zealand would likely cause the rate of homicide to decrease because, although those with a 
preference to kill with firearms may hold malevolent intentions, some indeterminable 
proportion would prove physically and/or psychologically incapable of doing so in their 
absence. 
 
 While writing the MA thesis, similarities between the shock generator used by 
Stanley Milgram (1963, 1974) during his Obedience to Authority (OTA) experiments and 
firearms technology became increasingly obvious: with the flick of a trigger/switch both of 
these instantaneous means of inflicting harm enabled the users of these devices to avoid, as 
Levin and Fox put it, having to get their hands dirty.  As suggested in the MA thesis, 
perhaps the physical detachment offered by firearms and the shock generator elevated the 
violent capabilities of those using such devices and might go some way to better helping 
explain Milgram’s surprising results (Russell, 2000, pp. 154-167)?   
 
After completing the thesis the author continued exploring the psychology-of-
violence research area and read a book called On Killing: the Psychological Cost of 
Learning to Kill in War and Society (Grossman, 1995).  Milgram (1974, p. 157) observed a 
positive correlation between “physical distance” separating his subjects from their victim 
and the completion rate.  Building on this observation, Grossman (1995, p. 98) noted that 
the greater the physical separation offered by certain military weapons in distancing 
military personnel from their victims, the less stress/trauma soldiers tended to experience.  
For example, killing with a bayonet (which necessitates close proximity) is likely to 
generate greater psychological distress in military personnel than when killing with a 
firearm used from a mid-range distance.  And killing with a firearm used from mid-range is 
more stressful than killing with a long-range ballistic missile.   
 
Daniel Goldhagen’s (1996) Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and 
the Holocaust ended with a conclusion that conflicted sharply with those of both Grossman 
and the author’s research.  Arguably, methods of killing could not have been important 
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during the Holocaust because Goldhagen had apparently demonstrated that intense hatred 
of the Jews was a sufficient cause of the perpetrators’ actions (a level of hatred that saw 
ordinary Germans engage in primitive, gratuitous, and cruel acts of lethal violence).  At 
that time, the author had not read anything on the Holocaust, a topic that had not 
previously caught his attention as it does those much closer to this catastrophe (he being 
neither Jewish nor German).  Starting with Goldhagen’s book, the journey into what turned 
out to be a fascinating and profoundly complex research area began. 
 
Although Goldhagen paid critical attention to the theories of other Holocaust 
scholars, he made no reference to the psychology or science of killing literature 
(Grossman, 1995; Holmes, 1985; Marshall, [1947] (2000); Shalit, 1988; Watson, 1978).  
What was striking about the multitude of examples of lethal violence Goldhagen used to 
demonstrate that hatred was a sufficient cause of the Holocaust was that there were only 
six examples where a direct physical connection could be established between a German 
perpetrator, their weapon, and victims’ body.  It was clear that the application of the 
psychology of killing literature might provide a valuable contribution to Holocaust 
research.   
 
Over the next few years the author read many books on the Holocaust and through 
student networks, was eventually encouraged in 2003 to present the various accumulating 
inchoate ideas to Professor Bob Gregory at VUW’s School of Government.  A keen 
friendship developed, and under his tutelage, the author was introduced to Max Weber’s 
work on bureaucracy, an area of research that (in conjunction with VUW criminologist 
Professor John Pratt’s lectures on sociologist Norbert Elias), have had a profound influence 
on the direction of this thesis.  Two years later we co-authored an article on the OTA 
experiments, bureaucracy and the Holocaust titled Making the Undoable Doable: Milgram, 
the Holocaust and Modern Government (Russell & Gregory, 2005).  Professor Gregory 
then suggested the author further explore, as a PhD thesis, some of the ideas mentioned in 
our paper (with him agreeing to be the primary supervisor).  Dr. Simone Gigliotti, a Senior 
Lecturer in history at VUW specialising in the Holocaust, agreed to be the secondary 
supervisor.  In May 2006 the author enrolled as a PhD candidate at VUW’s School of 
Government.   
 
 
2.2 Research Strategy and Sources of Data 
 
Question One: To explore/understand how Milgram converted ordinary and indifferent 
 9 
subjects into willing torturers, the author draws upon a methodological approach 
recommended by sociologist Norbert Elias.  Influenced by MacIver’s above epigraphic 
statement, Elias (1987, p. 226) believed that in order to understand the social intricacies of 
any phenomenon—such as how Milgram (or even the Nazi regime) converted ordinary 
people into torturers—one must observe carefully the transformation of this phenomenon 
over time.4  As discussed, many laypersons are aware and disturbed that 65 percent of 
Milgram’s subjects completed the Baseline experiment, just as they are that relatively 
small bands of ordinary Germans proved capable of shooting and (later) gassing tens of 
thousands of men, women and children in a single day.  But it is important to note that 
these were the end results.  Instead of focusing on the frightful end results, it is the 
intention of this thesis to adopt the Eliasian approach of developing a narrative that 
delineates, from start to finish, Milgram’s OTA research journey from the influences that 
led up to the conception of his research idea through to data analysis.  However, doing so 
is made difficult by the fact that Milgram’s (1963, 1964b, 1964c, 1965a, 1965b, 1974) 
publications reveal little of how he developed his OTA paradigm/procedure.  These 
publications understandably tend to be dominated by descriptions of his experimental 
procedures and their (end) results, and provide little insight into the method of discovery 
he relied upon that generated both.   
 
Delineation of Milgram’s research journey draws upon three main sources of data.  
The first and main source involved the collection of potentially relevant documents from 
his personal archive—the Stanley Milgram Papers (SMP)—held at the Sterling Memorial 
Library at Yale University.  The second source came from other researchers’ interviews 
with Milgram where he occasionally reflected upon and divulged insights into his research 
journey.  The final source of journey-related material involved Milgram’s (1963, 1964b, 
1964c, 1965a, 1965b, 1974) own, albeit rare, disclosure of such matters.  
 
Question Two: Milgram’s (1974) book Obedience to Authority is the main source of 
information used to explain the results of the OTA experiments. 
 
Question Three: A review of the literature was undertaken to answer the third question 
regarding academia’s reaction to Milgram’s explanation for his findings.  
 
                                                 
4
 When stating this Elias (1987) really had much longer term processes in mind: “The understanding of 
human societies requires . . . testable theoretical models which can help to determine and to explain the 
structure and direction of long-term social processes” (p. 226). 
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Question Four: In attempting to develop a stronger interpretation of Milgram’s results, the 
thesis drew upon the research strategy of armchair induction.  Armchair induction is where 
“researchers apply inductive methods of textual analysis for the purposes of theory 
development” (Heaton, 2004, p. 14).5  In doing so, a variety of sources of information were 
drawn upon, including the OTA results, documentary evidence obtained from the SMP, 
other publications by Milgram, and various secondary sources (including the theoretical 
accounts, contemplations, and insights of other authors).  It is important to note that 
although the author disagrees with key foundations of Milgram’s (1974) explanation for 
his results, his theoretical insights have nonetheless had a major influence on the eventual 
conclusions drawn in answering this question.  
 
Question Five: The final section of the thesis applies the insights obtained from the 
preceding four research questions to better understand two case studies.  Case study one is 
Operation Barbarossa and the Nazi regime’s mass-shootings of Soviet Jewry.6  Case study 
two is Operation Reinhard, the gassing of the predominantly Polish Jews.  It is intended 
that these two case studies will provide a lens through which to view the Nazi regime’s use 
of similar methods of discovery to that later inadvertently relied upon by Milgram.  Both 
case studies will draw from a wide variety of secondary source materials published by 
Holocaust scholars.   
 
In terms of scholarly and theoretical influences, the thesis employs the Eliasian 
methodological approach of observing phenomena over time.  Also, in the reinterpretation 
of Milgram’s results and throughout the Holocaust case studies, Max Weber’s theoretical 
insights on bureaucracy, the division of labour, and specialisation have repeatedly been 
drawn upon.   
  
 
2.3 Approach to Data-Collection 
 
In addition to a literature review of publications on the OTA research and 
Holocaust, data was also sourced from the SMP.  The SMP, as outlined in the Guide to the 
Stanley Milgram Papers: Manuscript Group Number 1406, covers the period 1927-1986, 
though the bulk of the papers are post-1960.  The archive is arranged in five series: 
General Files (1954-1985); Studies (1927-1984); Writings (1954-1993); Teaching Files 
                                                 
5
 For more information on armchair induction see Thorne (1998). 
 
6
 Case study one will focus mostly on the mass-shootings undertaken by the Einsatzgruppen squads, but will 
also look at massacres by the Order Police Battalions, Heinrich Himmler’s Kommandostab, and other SS 
units. 
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(1960-1984); Data Files (1960-1984).  These papers, which capture Milgram’s prolific 
academic career, highlight his work on OTA, television violence, urban psychology, and 
communication patterns within society.  The archive is the gift of Milgram’s wife, 
Alexandra Milgram. 
 
In September 2006 the author spent two months at Yale University in order to view 
the OTA-related material.  Although only a small proportion of the 158 boxes specifically 
related to the OTA experiments, this still amounted to a significant number of folders filled 
with numerous documents—textual and non-textual (drawings, pictures and even a few 
boxes of audio tapes).  Priority was given to examining those boxes headed with titles that 
appeared most likely to provide rich data and information on the OTA experiments.   
 
The aim was to identify material shedding any light on Milgram’s start-to-finish 
research journey, from the influences that led up to the conception of the OTA research 
idea through to his analysis of data.7  With the alternative interpretation of Milgram’s OTA 
results in mind, the author collected copies of all documents that, in his view, reinforced or 
conflicted with the line of argument advanced in Russell and Gregory (2005), of which this 
thesis is, in part, an in-depth extension.   
 
 
2.4 Data Analysis: Documentary Analysis and Case Studies 
 
Documentary Analysis:  
 
Approximately 300 documents of interest were identified in the SMP and were 
thematically divided into categories.  After comparing and contrasting the material 
obtained with other contributions to the OTA literature that also drew on material from the 
SMP—like Blass (2004) and Fermaglich (2006)—these documents were analysed with the 
intention of building Milgram’s start-to-finish research journey.  
 
In terms of the potential limitations applicable to documentary analysis, Scott 
                                                 
7
 The boxes pursued included: Box 1 (folders a-f); 1a (folders 1-15);  Box 13 (folders 181-194); Box 17 
(folders 243-257); Box 21 (folders 326-339); Box 43 (folders 124-129); Box 44; Box 45 (folders 130-162); 
Box 46 (folders 163-178); Box 47 (folders 179-187); Box 48 (folders 188-203); Box 55 (folders 1-22); Box 
56 (folders 23-46); Box 59 (73-87); Box 61 (folders 106-125); Box 152; Box 153 (audio tapes); Box 154; 
Box 155 (audio tapes); Box 156; Box 157.  (It should be noted that some of the clearly relevant boxes—
particularly from the Data Files section—could not be accessed due to privacy restrictions and will not be 
released until 2060—unless one is willing to pay for its “sanitising” by Yale staff.)  Lack of funding 
precluded this author from pursuing this possibility, although it was possible to access some of this 
previously restricted material because other researchers had earlier paid for its sanitising.  
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(1990, pp. 19-35) has warned that the validity/accuracy of such material should always be 
treated with caution.  Scott recommends that the validity/accuracy of documentary 
materials should be assessed using the following criteria: Authenticity (are the documents 
genuine?), Credibility (are they free from errors and bias?), Meaning (is the meaning 
unambiguous and free of hidden meanings?), and Representativeness (are the documents 
typical?).  In terms of authenticity, being the gift from Milgram’s widow to Yale 
University where the OTA experimental programme was undertaken, the documents held 
at the Sterling Memorial Library are very likely to be genuine.  Some of the documentary 
material portrays Milgram casting himself in a bad light or, from an ethical perspective, 
incriminating himself.  As Blass (2004, p. 117) has argued, this material does not seem to 
have been produced with an audience in mind, which indicates its probable credibility.  
Many of Milgram’s on-going experimental notes were recorded in clear simple typed 
prose.  However, for those handwritten documents which were sometimes difficult to 
decipher, two independent transcribers were sought.  Overall, the author was confident that 
the meaning of the material was unambiguous.  Being the only and actually quite large 
repository on Milgram’s academic career, it could be argued the archive is more than 
representative of his work on OTA.   
 
 
Case Studies: 
 
A narrative delineating the two Holocaust case study’s respective start-to-finish 
journeys was based on secondary literature.  In terms of potential limitations, the case 
study approach is most vulnerable to the credibility/persuasiveness of the generalisations 
that disseminate from or, as in the case of this thesis, to it.  The two case studies involved 
two of the three most relied upon methods of killing Jews—shooting and gassing.8  Due to 
the word restraint limits of a PhD thesis, there was not the space to go into the kind of 
detail that the admittedly complex Holocaust history demands (and thus, the lack of 
extensive detail surrounding the case studies must be considered a limitation of the present 
thesis). 
 
Due to much of the material used in these two chapters being based on perpetrator 
statements made in documents translated into English during and, in post World War Two 
testimonies, after the genocide, an obvious limitation of this thesis stems from the risk of 
mendacity and prevarication.  After World War Two, most of the perpetrators gained a 
notorious reputation for revising their egregious pasts to suit their more precarious present: 
                                                 
8
 The third main method—starvation/deprivation—is also, albeit briefly, discussed.   
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potentially being executed or incarcerated.  However, because the perpetrator statements 
used in this thesis were largely concerned with the actual processes of engaging in 
genocide, this author has interpreted them as being credible.  The reasons for accepting 
many (but certainly not all) of these statements as probably credible are that, first, they are 
inherently self-incriminating (Westermann, 2005, p. 170).  What are the chances of a 
person lying when, as one perpetrator admitted, for example, that “Shooting the Jews is 
easier than shooting the gypsies [sic]” (Benz, 1999, p. 86).  Having said this, the author 
was alert to inherently incriminating statements that nonetheless tried to present 
themselves in a more positive light.  Secondly, there appeared little to gain after the war in 
admitting to having directly engaged in genocide (other than perhaps relieving oneself of 
the burden of carrying such secrets within).  Thirdly, in terms of the processes of mass 
slaughter, some of the perpetrators’ admissions can be verified by bystander and survivor 
statements.9  Finally, such statements are accepted as likely to be credible because they 
have frequently been deemed as such by a variety of independent scholars of the 
Holocaust. 
 
Although the author tries, where possible, to understand how ordinary people could 
do what they did, this should not be mistaken as sympathy.  There is much merit in the 
words of Browning (1992, pp. xvii-xviii), who was also confronted by this problem:     
 
Another possible objection to this kind of study concerns the degree of empathy for 
the perpetrators that is inherent in trying to understand them.  Clearly the writing of 
such a history requires the rejection of demonization.  The policeman in the 
battalion who carried out the massacres and deportations, like the much smaller 
number who refused or evaded, were human beings.  I must recognize that in the 
same situation, I could have been either a killer or an evader—both were human—
if I want to understand and explain the behavior of both as best I can.  This 
recognition does indeed mean an attempt to empathize.  What I do not accept, 
however, are the old clichés that to explain is to excuse, to understand is to forgive.  
Explaining is not excusing; understanding is not forgiving.  
 
Finally, with respect to the theoretical component and case studies, the author was 
at all times alert to the Confirmation Bias, which is where one reinforces their 
preconceptions and ignores all conflicting information.  The author was therefore sensitive 
to any counterfactual data. 
 
Having presented the research problem, central aims, research questions and 
methodology, the following chapter will provide a more comprehensive review of the 
                                                 
9
 If there were conflicting accounts on any issues, the author either alerts the reader to their existence or does 
no include them. 
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historiography of the Holocaust, Milgram’s place within it, and contextualises both in 
regard to Bauer’s (then Browning’s) “real question”. 
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Chapter Three: The Problem of “Ordinary Monsters” and 
the Holocaust—a Review of the Literature 
 
 
Milgram’s obedience experiment is the single greatest contribution to human knowledge ever made 
by the field of social psychology, perhaps psychology in general—Muzafer Sherif (as cited in 
Takooshian, 2000, p. 10). 
 
 
These experiments are so vile, the intention with which they were engaged in is so vile, that nothing 
these experiments show has any value . . .—Bruno Bettelheim (as cited in Askenasy, 1978, p. 131). 
 
 
3.1 The Holocaust: a Brief Overview 
 
In 1933 the Nazi party led by Adolf Hitler gained political ascendancy in Germany.  
As promised in its manifesto, the new regime almost immediately focused on the 
“Beseitigung” (which somewhat ambiguously can mean removal or elimination) of those 
who many of its leading party members believed were the cause of all Germany’s ills: the 
Jews (Dawidowicz, 1990, p. 195).  The Jews were held responsible for the Reich’s poor 
economic state and, more importantly, for Germany losing World War One (along with the 
great loss of German lives and land).  The Nazi regime’s strategy for Germany’s 
resurrection was to re-arm and go to war to at least recuperate the confiscated lands.  To 
secure the plan’s success it was necessary, so they believed, to ensure that no Jews lived in 
or near this expanding border.   
 
Initially the Nazis encouraged the German Jews to emigrate elsewhere.  Emigration 
was encouraged by way of legislation that made daily life for the Jews increasingly 
unbearable, in conjunction with other more aggressive attempts at intimidation.  In terms 
of the latter, in 1938 a Nazi party radical instigated a nationwide pogrom against 
Germany’s Jewish community which, due to the widespread smashing of shop-front 
windows, infamously became known as Kristallnacht (Crystal Night or Night of the 
Broken Glass).  Thousands of Jews were then rounded up and sent to concentration camps, 
where their release became dependent upon their agreeing to leave Germany.  This pogrom 
failed to generate much public support and the disorderly behaviour and wanton vandalism 
disgusted many German “onlookers” (see Bankier, 1992, p. 72; Browning, 2004, pp. 9-10, 
428; Kershaw, 1983, pp. 262-263).  Although by the late 1930s many of German Jewry 
were keen to leave, due to other nations’ prejudices about and/or restraints on the 
immigration of those often without capital (or assets that the Nazis had frozen), most 
refused to accept any or, at best, only small numbers of Jews.   
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During the lead-up to and especially upon going to war, the geographical borders of 
Germany underwent rapid expansion (perhaps to an even greater degree than many Nazis 
had previously envisioned).  With these recently appropriated territories often having large 
Jewish populations that no other nation outside the Reich’s expanding border were likely 
to accept, the Nazi regime’s “Jewish problem” grew.  After the continual failure of initial 
plans to resettle Jews to the island of Madagascar and later to other equally or even more 
inhospitable locations, many Holocaust historians agree that during the second half of 1941 
the Nazi regime instead decided to exterminate all the Jews within the then-expanding 
German sphere of influence.  Many Jews had already died of starvation and disease in the 
ghettos, but to exterminate all the Jews, mass-shootings began and were soon followed by 
the use of gas chambers.  Upon Germany’s defeat in 1945, about two-thirds of all the Jews 
in Europe—a figure approaching six million people—had been killed (Marrus, 1988, p. 
24). 
 
 
3.2 Introduction to the Problem of “Ordinary Monsters” 
 
The vast majority of perpetrators in these mass killings were not zealous Nazi 
ideologues but were more likely to have been moderately anti-Semitic everyday Germans 
from all walks of life.  Hilberg (1961), in his landmark study The Destruction of the 
European Jews,10 wrote: 
 
The bureaucrats who were drawn into the destruction process were not different in 
their moral makeup from the rest of the population.  The German perpetrator was 
not a special kind of German . . . . However one may wish to draw the line of active 
participation, the machinery of destruction was a remarkable cross-section of the 
German population [italics added] (p. 1011). 
 
It was after observing the 1961 trial in Jerusalem of former mid-ranking SS bureaucrat 
Adolf Eichmann, however, that philosopher Hannah Arendt came to a similar but far more 
controversial conclusion.  In conflict with the Israeli prosecution’s depiction of Eichmann 
as a sadistic monster, Arendt (1963) saw not only an ordinary man who was “neither 
perverted nor sadistic . . . [but] terribly and terrifyingly normal” (p. 253).  Eichmann, she 
argued, was best understood primarily as a passive recipient of orders, which he sought to 
carry out in the most efficient and competent way possible.  He was the quintessential so-
called desk murderer.  Arendt (1963, p. 231) coined the term the “banality of evil” to 
                                                 
10
 Hilberg’s contribution is a meticulous overview of the phases that the Nazi bureaucratic machinery of 
destruction passed through in implementing the regime’s ultimate aim of killing all the European Jews.  The 
four increasingly radical phases of the destruction process he identified were the definition of the victims, 
expropriation of their property, their physical concentration/deportation and finally their extermination. 
 17 
capture the reality of such ordinary and normal mid-level managers or petty administrators.  
Their complicity in the organised pursuit of malevolent purposes flowed not from any 
personal monstrosity but from their thoughtless incapacity to empathise with others, their 
inability to balance technical with moral competence, and their desire to achieve 
advancement by impressing their organisational superiors.  The influences generating 
Arendt’s perspective could be traced backwards in a straight line through earlier 
intellectuals from C. Wright Mills to Hans Speier back to Max Weber (Thad Allen, 2005, 
pp. 259-260).  Nonetheless, the consequences of implying Eichmann was no monster saw 
Arendt (a Jewish émigrée of German descent) encounter intense and vitriolic criticism 
largely at the hands of an outraged Jewish community.     
 
 
3.3 Stanley Milgram and the Obedience to Authority Experiments 
 
Despite this reaction, soon afterwards the controversial concept of the “banality of 
evil” was, or so it appeared, being independently reinforced by an experimental programme 
headed by a young social psychologist by the name of Stanley Milgram (1963, 1974).  
While exploring the area of obedience to authority (OTA), Milgram (an American Jew of 
Hungarian/Romanian descent) had demonstrated in a controlled laboratory setting that, 
when ordered by an authority figure, more then half of his ordinary American subjects 
were willing to inflict what they were led to believe were potentially lethal electric shocks 
to a person locked in another room.  
 
Although he undertook more than a score of experimental variations, Milgram’s 
(1963) first and widely read publication on the topic of OTA presented the procedure and 
eye-catching results from his first official experiment, termed the Remote condition.  The 
Remote condition involved an actor posing as a potential subject.  He entered a laboratory 
and encountered an apparent scientist wearing a grey lab-coat (in fact, another actor, 
hereafter called the experimenter).  The ostensible subject was then introduced to a waiting 
naïve, and actual, subject.  The experimenter then told both the actual and supposed subject 
that the experiment they volunteered to take part in was designed to investigate the effects 
of punishment on learning.  They were then told that one person was required to be the 
teacher and the other the learner.  The selection was pre-arranged to ensure that the 
actor/subject was always made the learner, and the actual subject the teacher.  The actual 
subject (now teacher) watched as the experimenter strapped the learner—a 47-year old 
man whom most observers found “mild-mannered and likable” (Milgram, 1974, p. 16)—to 
a chair and attached an electrode to his arm.  Clearly, the learner was unable to terminate 
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the experiment by taking flight.  The learner was informed that the subject/teacher, using a 
microphone from another room, would ask them questions regarding a word-pair exercise.  
The learner was to attempt answering these questions by pressing one of four switches on a 
device that would electronically transmit his answer to the subject.  The subject was then 
taken into an adjacent room and placed before what was referred to as the shock generator.  
There were 30 switches on the shock generator, aligned in 15-volt increments from 15 to 
450 volts.  Switches were labelled in groups ranging from “SLIGHT SHOCK” leading up 
to “VERY STRONG SHOCK”, followed by “DANGER: SEVERE SHOCK”.  The final 
two switches (435 and 450 volts) were menacingly labelled “XXX” (Milgram, 1974, p. 
28).  To increase the credibility that the shock generator was indeed what it appeared, the 
subject was given a sample 45-volt shock.  Then the subject was instructed by the 
proximate experimenter to give the learner a shock for each incorrect answer proffered; 
and each incorrect answer warranted for the learner a shock one level higher than its 
predecessor.  In actuality, no shocks were administered, though most subjects did not know 
this at the time (Milgram, 1974, pp. 171-172).  
    
Upon starting, the learner responded with a set of predetermined answers, 75 
percent of which were purposefully incorrect.  Due to the requirement to inflict a shock 
one level higher than the previous incorrect answer, acquiescent subjects found themselves 
advancing up the switchboard and rapidly delivering shocks of increasing intensity.  Any 
signs of hesitancy by the subject to continue, implied or overt, were met with the 
experimenter calmly responding with one or several of the following prods:  
  
  Prod 1: Please continue, or, Please go on. 
Prod 2: The experiment requires that you continue. 
Prod 3: It is absolutely essential that you continue. 
  Prod 4: You have no other choice, you must go on (Milgram, 1974, p. 
   21). 
 
If at any time the subject expressed concerns about the learner’s well-being, the 
experimenter informed them: “Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent 
tissue damage, so please go on” (Milgram, 1974, p. 21).  If at any time the subject 
attempted to clarify the lines of responsibility, the experimenter would confidently assert: 
“I’m responsible for anything that happens to him.  Continue please” (Milgram, 1974, p. 
74).  Upon any subjects reaching the 300 and 315-volt shock switches, the learner was 
instructed to bang suddenly on the wall separating the two parties and thereafter fall silent.  
Any concerns by the subject regarding the learner seemingly wanting to discontinue were 
met by the experimenter stating: “Whether the learner likes it or not, you must go on until 
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he has learned the word pairs correctly.  So please go on.  (Followed by Prods 2, 3, and 4, 
if necessary.)” (Milgram, 1974, p. 22).  The sudden absence of any further answers to the 
subject’s questions and the accompanying silence implied that something had gone terribly 
wrong and that the shocks had, at least, probably rendered the learner unconscious.  The 
experimenter then instructed the subject to treat all subsequent unanswered questions as 
incorrect and accordingly inflict a shock at the next level.  Any further resistance was again 
met with as many prods as necessary to secure the subject’s continued obedience.  In the 
absence of any categorical acts of defiance, the experiment was eventually deemed 
complete upon the subject having administered three successive 450-volt shocks.  The 
completion rate was surprising: 26 out of a sample of 40 subjects (65 percent) inflicted 
every shock.   
 
Although the Remote condition was the first and probably most widely read of 
Milgram’s many experiments, it was the result of a subsequent experiment, the so-called 
Baseline condition, that perhaps attracted most popular attention, largely because it 
featured predominantly in a film he later produced titled Obedience: a filmed experiment 
(Milgram, 1965c).  The Baseline condition was very similar to the Remote experiment 
except that the learner mentioned before starting that he had a mild heart condition, and the 
learner’s “pain” was this time unambiguously conveyed by way of increasingly intense 
verbal protests and eventually screams (actually via a tape recording).  For example, at 120 
volts the learner was heard from the adjacent room to say “Ugh!  Hey, this really hurts” 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 56).  If the subject continued to obey up until the 270-volt switch, the 
learner, in obvious agony, was heard to scream: “Let me out of here.  Let me out of here.  
Let me out of here.  Let me out.  Do you hear?  Let me out of here” (Milgram, 1974, pp. 
56-57).  At the 300-volt switch the learner refused to answer and instead responded with 
agonised screams.  From the 345-volt switch onwards he went totally silent.  As in the 
Remote condition, the experimenter then commanded the subject to treat all unanswered 
questions as incorrect and accordingly inflict a shock at the next level and continue to do 
so until three successive 450-volt shocks had been administered.   
 
Milgram (1974) beforehand described the procedure from one of his early 
experimental variations11 to, among other groups, 39 psychiatrists, who then predicted that 
only about 0.001 percent or one subject in a thousand—a “pathological fringe” (p. 31)—
would administer the highest shock on the board.  Although the Baseline experiment was 
                                                 
11
 The experiment in question was the Voice-Feedback condition, the second official experiment, which was 
the same as the Remote condition, except the learner’s verbal reactions could be heard throughout. 
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for subjects likely to have been an even more harrowing experience, it elicited the same 
completion rate: 26 out of a sample of 40 subjects (65 percent) inflicted every shock.   
 
The obedient subjects were later asked why they continued to inflict the shocks.  
Most pointed out that they personally wanted to stop but the experimenter’s persistent 
demands that they continue, frequently in conjunction with his repeated assurances that the 
responsibility was all his, apparently left them with little choice but to go on.   
 
 
3.4 The Milgram-Holocaust Linkage 
 
While Milgram (1974, p. 175) acknowledged that there were “enormous 
differences” between the Holocaust and his own laboratory experiments, he was quick to 
generalise beyond the laboratory doors when noting how the “just following orders” 
justification was used both by his subjects and many of the Nazi war criminals at 
Nuremberg and at subsequent trials.  Other scholars sensed this potential connection 
between Milgram’s results and the Holocaust,12 which Miller (2004, p. 194) termed the 
“M-H linkage”—the Milgram-Holocaust linkage.  Milgram later came to believe that both 
the Nazi perpetrators and his obedient subjects were strongly influenced by a “common 
psychological process”, and was at pains to understand how a perceived need to obey 
ostensibly legitimate orders from a higher authority translated into individual action 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 175).  Central to his explanation of this psychological process was his 
notion of the agentic state, in which “the individual no longer views himself as responsible 
for his own actions but defines himself as an instrument for carrying out the wishes of 
others” (Milgram, 1974, p. 134).  Milgram (1974, p. 146) did not suspect this was an 
excuse or alibi and thought that, in actuality, the obedient subjects were being honest when 
believing themselves to have been mere instruments of a higher authority and they 
genuinely did not feel responsible for their actions:    
 
For a man to feel responsible for his actions, he must sense that the behavior has 
flowed from ‘the self.’  In the situation we have studied, subjects have precisely the 
opposite view of their actions—namely, they see them as originating in the motives 
of some other person.  
 
As subjects so frequently pointed out themselves: “ ‘If it were up to me, I would not have 
administered shocks to the learner’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 146).   
 
                                                 
12
 See Bauman (1989), Blass (1993, 1998), Browning (1992, 1998), Hilberg (1980), Kelman and Hamilton 
(1989), Miller (1986), and Sabini and Silver (1982). 
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The one variation in Milgram’s basic experimental procedure that proved 
particularly influential in promoting entry into the so-called agentic state was the Peer 
Administers Shock condition.  In this condition subjects were ordered to perform the 
subsidiary task of only directing the questions to the learner while another subject (actually 
an actor) administered the shocks for any incorrect answers.  In comparison to the Remote 
and Baseline experiments, this variation resulted in a substantial increase in the completion 
rate, with 37 out of 40 subjects (93 percent) passively continuing to carry out their 
prescribed role while the actor administered every shock.  Post-experimental interviews 
with these obedient subjects often revealed they did not believe their involvement made 
them in any way responsible for the learner being shocked, with them blaming the shock-
administering peer.  Yet, as the results surrounding the earlier variations demonstrated, 
when subjects had to shock the learner themselves, those who were obedient were then 
more inclined than defiant subjects to shift the blame to either the experimenter or learner 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 203).   
 
Milgram believed that the Peer Administers Shock variation may have captured, in 
the controlled laboratory setting, the potentially destructive bureaucratic process along 
with its inherent characteristic of the division of labour.  He described the “fragmentation 
of the total human act; no one man decides to carry out the evil act and is confronted with 
its consequences” (Milgram, 1974, p. 11).  In directly connecting this experimental 
variation to the Holocaust and the Nazi regime’s use of the disjointed bureaucratic process, 
he argued: “The person who assumes full responsibility for the act has evaporated” 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 11).  With the potentially destructive bureaucratic process in his sights, 
Milgram (1974, p. 11) generalised beyond the confines of his laboratory: “Perhaps this is 
the most common characteristic of socially organized evil in modern society.” 
 
Clearly Milgram had been influenced by Hilberg’s (1961) painstaking delineation 
of the intricacies of the Nazi regime’s destructive bureaucracy (which Milgram indeed 
referenced in his book).  Similarly, Milgram specifically saw merit in the explanatory 
power of Arendt’s controversial concept of the “banality of evil,” which he saw as being 
fully consistent with his own explanation (a connection that is not all that surprising 
considering Milgram’s undergraduate education was in political science, which would 
have equipped him to draw links between his experiments and governmental systems). On 
the basis of what he had found, Milgram explicitly endorsed the general utility of Arendt’s 
“banality of evil” thesis, which he believed came “closer to the truth than one might dare 
imagine” (Milgram, 1974, p. 6).   
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However, other scholars have also documented the occurrence of gratuitous acts of 
brutality by Holocaust perpetrators.  Their research has produced a body of literature that 
raises pressing questions about the validity of depicting “ordinary” bureaucrats apparently 
indifferent to the horrific human consequences that flowed from their banal paper-
shuffling. Particularly prominent was Bernd Naumann’s (1966) Auschwitz, which 
documented the 1963-1965 trial of a score of SS men who served in this infamous labour 
and extermination camp.  The preface to this book was somewhat ironically written by 
Arendt herself (as cited in Naumann, 1966, p. xxiv), who candidly stated in reference to 
some of the evidence the book went on to present: 
 
No one had issued orders that infants should be thrown into the air as shooting 
targets, or hurled into the fire alive, or have their heads smashed against walls; 
there had been no orders that people should be trampled to death, or become the 
objects of the murderous ‘sport,’ including that of killing with one blow of the 
hand. 
 
Such gratuitous examples of cruelty stood in stark contrast to Milgram’s and her own 
theories regarding supposedly indifferent perpetrators just passively following orders.  
However, for his part, it seems that Milgram regarded such evidence as, at best, 
complementary to his position, or, at worst, largely irrelevant.  It was, he argued, typical of 
modern bureaucracy, even when designed for destructive purposes, that “most people 
involved . . . do not directly carry out any destructive actions . . . . Any competent manager 
of a destructive bureaucratic system can arrange his personnel so that only the most callous 
and obtuse are directly involved in violence” (Milgram, 1974, pp. 121-122).  In Milgram’s 
view, most of the perpetrators were ordinary unthinking bureaucrats, acting purely 
instrumentally and who simply had carefully selected thugs inserted at the end of the 
hierarchical chain to do the dirty work.  But this conclusion conflicted sharply with 
Hilberg’s (1961) assertion that across the destructive bureaucratic chain the perpetrators 
were “a remarkable cross-section of the German population” and not, therefore, “a special 
kind of German”.  And after the publication of Browning’s (1992) book Ordinary Men: 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, it became clear that 
Milgram’s assumption that carefully selected perpetrators—“the most callous and 
obtuse”—did the hands-on dirty work was patently wrong—as reflected in the title, these 
executioners were “Ordinary Men”.   
 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 consisted of less than 500 Germans who were based 
in the annexed Polish territories (Browning, 1992, p. xv).  The battalion originated from 
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Hamburg, one of Germany’s least nazified cities, and the rank and file comprised mostly 
those from the lower social classes, who were least likely to support the Nazi regime 
(Browning, 1992, pp. 47-48).  Except for the oldest, none had any military experience and 
were more or less the dregs of the armed forces pool.  With respect to their ordinariness, 
Browning (1992, p. 48) argued: “The men would not seem to have been a very promising 
group from which to recruit mass murderers on behalf of the Nazi vision of a racial utopia 
free of Jews.”  In relation to what turned out to be the battalion’s first mass-shooting in 
early 1942, the leading authority in the field, Major Trapp, did not demand but, in conflict 
with Milgram’s assumptions, “made an extraordinary offer: if any of the older men among 
them did not feel up to the task that lay before him, he could step out” (Browning, 1992, p. 
2).  Browning (1992, pp. 71-74) pointed out that the small proportion that did not want to 
participate could and eventually did avoid having to partake in shooting duties (about 10 to 
20 percent).  Although the men who remained initially struggled with this task (many were 
soiled with blood, bone, and brain matter), most quickly acclimatised to the tasks ahead 
and “became increasingly efficient and calloused executioners” (Browning, 1992, p. 77).  
These ordinary men directly participated in the mass-shooting of at least 38,000 Jews 
(Browning, 1992, p. 142).  After carefully analysing the evidence, Browning concluded 
that the most common motivational force to participating in the gruesome work was 
probably peer-pressure/conformity, whereby many did not want to be seen among their 
comrades and/or leaders in the field as shirkers.  Although Browning’s account conflicted 
in many ways with the OTA experiments, he still saw significant similarities: “many of 
Milgram’s insights find graphic confirmation in the behavior and testimony of the men of 
Reserve Police Battalion 101” (Browning, 1992, p. 174).   
 
Although criticism of Milgram’s thesis was mounting, it was Goldhagen’s (1996) 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (HWE) that perhaps 
most powerfully undermined the plausibility of any M-H linkage.  Based on the same 
archival material as Browning’s study, the difference in the title hinted at a very different 
conclusion: Browning’s “Ordinary Men” were much more specifically believed by 
Goldhagen to have been “Ordinary Germans”.  Due to the intense furore generated in 
scholarly circles by this single contribution to the literature, it is necessary to present what 
Goldhagen believed caused the Holocaust, the evidence he used to support his explanation, 
the ensuing academic response, and why—irrespective of their criticisms—HWE posed 
such significant problems for the contributions of Milgram and other scholars.   
 
From the outset Goldhagen (1996, p. 9) boldly declared:  
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Germans’ antisemitic beliefs about Jews were the central causal agent of the 
Holocaust.  They were the central causal agent not only of Hitler’s decision to 
annihilate European Jewry . . . but also of the perpetrators’ willingness to kill and 
to brutalize Jews.  The conclusion of this book is that antisemitism moved many 
thousands of ‘ordinary’ Germans—and would have moved millions more, had they 
been appropriately positioned—to slaughter Jews. 
 
Immediately striking is how this theory stands in stark contrast to the “most fundamental 
lesson” emanating from Milgram’s (1974, p. 6) study of “ordinary people, simply doing 
their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible 
destructive process.”  On what grounds did Goldhagen base his assertions? 
  
Goldhagen presented two arguments that he believed reinforced the above theory.  
Based on a variety of sources, Goldhagen’s first argument was that, particularly from the 
nineteenth century, a virulent strain of eliminationist anti-Semitism spread throughout 
Germany.  By the early 1930s this strain of anti-Semitism had not only become pervasive 
throughout German society—it rapidly intensified to the exterminationist level.13   
 
Following this was Goldhagen’s second argument: after the Nazi regime had given 
its consent during World War Two, this uniquely German strain of exterminationist anti-
Semitism caused ordinary Germans willingly and directly to engage in the mass slaughter 
of Jews.  Goldhagen supported his second argument with a litany of brutally 
unsophisticated acts of violence that ordinary Germans staffing the primitive police 
battalions, work camps, and death marches more than frequently volunteered to inflict 
upon Jews.  The following quote is a typical example of the kind of evidence repeatedly 
presented: A former police official testified that those serving with him “ ‘were, with few 
exceptions, quite happy to take part in shootings of Jews.  They had a ball!,’ their killing 
was motivated by ‘great hatred against the Jews; it was revenge’ ” (Goldhagen, 1996, p. 
396).  Based on the evidence lending support to these two main arguments, Goldhagen felt 
confident in asserting that a uniquely German strain of murderous anti-Semitic hatred (in 
conjunction with a regime bent on annihilation) was, on its own, a “sufficient” cause of the 
Holocaust (Goldhagen, 1996, p. 417).   
                                                 
13
 Goldhagen’s (1996) evidence included nineteenth century anti-Semitic political commentaries (p. 60), 
community petitions against Jewish emancipation (pp. 61-62), accusations of Jewish ritualistic murders (pp. 
63-64), the views of prominent anti-Semitic polemicists (pp. 54, 64), anti-Semitic pamphleteering (p. 68), 
and anti-Semitic electoral voting patterns (pp.75-76).  Goldhagen tried to differentiate between this 
apparently swelling nineteenth century anti-Semitic “eliminationist mind-set” (p. 71) with what by the 
twentieth century had developed into an “exterminationist one” (p. 71).  He posited the existence of an 
exterminationist mind-set by providing early twentieth century examples of blatant anti-Semitic 
discrimination (p. 83), riotous attacks on Jews (p. 84), and a brief overview of Hitler’s anti- 
Semitic-related “meteoric” (p. 85) rise in the electoral polls. 
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How, then, was Goldhagen able to suggest his overall theory was a sufficient cause 
when other scholars long before him, including Milgram, had presented a variety of 
alternative theories that they more cautiously promoted only as necessary conditions 
contributing to the cause and eventual extent of the Holocaust?  To clarify, in the 
Holocaust historiography there exists what Goldhagen (1996, p. 379) describes as 
“conventional explanations”.  The conventional explanations he presented were that the 
German perpetrators were coerced into killing; were unthinkingly obedient in following 
orders; pressured to conform due to social psychological influences (such as peer-
pressure); motivated by prospects of personal advancement; and finally, due to the 
fragmentation of the killing process, they did not comprehend the total implications 
stemming from their individual actions (Goldhagen, 1996, pp. 379-385).  It would appear 
that the reason Goldhagen was able to promote his overall theory as a sufficient cause of 
the Holocaust was due to a rebuttal he presented that challenged the veracity of all the 
conventional explanations.  According to Goldhagen, his rebuttal exposed a flaw in an 
underlying assumption that all the above conventional explanations took for granted.  
Goldhagen’s (1996, p. 385) rebuttal was that each of the conventional explanations 
“assumes that the Germans were in principle opposed (or would have been had they not, 
supposedly, been rendered ‘indifferent,’ numbed by their institutional circumstances) to the 
mass slaughter of Jews, to a genocidal programme [italics added].”  The institutional 
circumstances that Goldhagen discussed were ones that other scholars believed both 
diminished opposition and promoted indifference and were side-effects generated by the 
modern bureaucratic administrative and technological machinery of destruction.  However, 
Goldhagen’s second argument appeared to demonstrate that many of the perpetrators in the 
unsophisticated killing institutions did not feel indifferently towards their Jewish victims.  
He also demonstrated that in these unsophisticated killing institutions (and thus in the 
absence of the more modern machinery of destruction), the perpetrators did not oppose the 
slaughter of their victims.  Goldhagen therefore believed the evidence he presented in 
favour of these two arguments placed the plausibility of all the conventional explanations 
and their apparently necessary conditions in a sudden state of doubt.   
 
Although this criticism was generally directed at the contributions by scholars 
including Stanley Milgram, Hannah Arendt, Christopher Browning, and indirectly, 
Zygmunt Bauman, with its specific focus on attacking theories expounding the centrality 
of the Nazi regime’s bureaucratic machinery of destruction, Goldhagen (1996) had his 
sights set on the leading figure of “Raul Hilberg, who can be seen as an exemplar of this 
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sort of thinking” (p. 385).  Nevertheless, having just swept Hilberg, his many supporters, 
and all of their necessary conditions aside, as far as Goldhagen was concerned, the path 
had been cleared of all the obstacles inhibiting his theory from being the most plausible.  
This is why Goldhagen felt confident in concluding that a uniquely German brand of 
murderous anti-Semitic hatred (in conjunction with a regime bent on annihilation) was, on 
its own, a sufficient cause of the Holocaust.   
 
How successful, then, were Goldhagen’s two arguments (and the evidence they 
were based upon) in supporting his overall theory?  Goldhagen completely failed to 
persuade the vast majority of specialist academics with the first argument surrounding his 
historical account of Germany’s unique strain of exterminationist anti-Semitism.14  Critics 
highlighted the existence of contradictory evidence.  For example, Goldhagen could not 
adequately explain why German society in the nineteenth century emancipated a Jewish 
population that his book argued they actually hated and wanted to eliminate (Bartov, 
1996b, p. 34; Finkelstein, 1997, p. 51).  Also, Goldhagen’s historical account of German 
anti-Semitism could not explain with sufficient force why other nations with demonstrably 
more violent historical relations with their Jewish communities, like the Soviet Union, had 
not tried to exterminate this minority (Finkelstein, 1997, p. 41; Hilberg, 1997, p. 724) nor 
why this supposed hatred suddenly seemed to disappear after World War Two (Bartov, 
1996b, p. 34; Finkelstein, 1997, p. 44).  The consequences of these types of criticisms saw 
most of Goldhagen’s more senior peers conclude that his historical account of German 
anti-Semitism both before and/or during the Nazi regime was simply “unhistorical” (Stern, 
1996, p. 129).  
 
However, Goldhagen’s second argument that ordinary Germans frequently and 
willingly volunteered to engage in and inflict upon Jews cruel acts of violence emerged 
relatively unscathed from academic criticism.15  In fact, although Browning (1998, p. 192) 
was highly critical of Goldhagen’s first argument and overall theory, in clear support of his 
second argument he pointed out: “On several issues Goldhagen and I do not disagree: first, 
the participation of numerous ‘ordinary’ Germans in the mass murder of Jews, and second, 
the high degree of voluntarism they exhibited.”  However, Browning (1998, p. 192) also 
pointed out that, due to the findings of his 1992 book and the much earlier contributions of 
scholars like Hilberg: “neither of these conclusions is a new discovery in the field of 
                                                 
14
 See Aschheim (1996), Bartov (1996b), Bauer (2001), Browning (1998), Finkelstein (1997), Finkelstein 
and Birn (1998), Hilberg (1997), Stern (1996), and Traverso (1999). 
 
15
 See Birn (1997, p. 199) for a criticism of Goldhagen’s second argument.   
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Holocaust studies.”  With a sting of derision, Bartov (1996b) succinctly captured the main 
message he took from HWE in the oxymoronic title of his book review: if Goldhagen was 
right, the perpetrators must have been “Ordinary Monsters” (p. 32). 
 
Because Goldhagen’s second argument emerged largely unscathed from significant 
academic criticism, it would seem to this author that, despite its debatable originality, it 
still reinforced his attack on all the conventional explanations.  Regardless of this success, 
most of the specialist historians still rejected Goldhagen’s overall theory.  This was 
because they questioned how a uniquely German brand of anti-Semitic hatred could have 
caused the Holocaust when, in the first place, historical evidence is incapable of 
substantiating the claim that German society was virulently anti-Semitic.  The majority of 
historians are of the opinion that most Germans, even within and particularly beyond the 
Nazi party, might more accurately be described as mildly anti-Semitic, even to the point of 
feeling “absolute indifference to their [the Jews] victimization” (Bankier, 1992, p. 84).  
 
In response to the flood of criticism undermining the plausibility of his first 
argument, Goldhagen (1996b) has stated: “Even if some would conclude that I am not 
entirely correct about the scope and character of German anti-Semitism, it does not follow 
that this would invalidate my conclusions” (p. 40).  With conviction, he maintains: “The 
central part of the study, about the perpetration of the Holocaust, logically, can stand on its 
own and must be confronted directly” (Goldhagen, 1996b, p. 40).  Most, however, believed 
his inaccurate portrayal of German anti-Semitism invalidated his conclusion and it was for 
this reason Hilberg (1997) argued: “By the end of 1996 . . . much of the academic world 
had wiped Goldhagen off the map” (p. 725).   
 
Based on the tone of his late 1996 article A Reply to my Critics: Motives, Causes, 
and Alibis, it is not difficult to sense Goldhagen’s frustration.  He believed HWE had not 
only rendered all the conventional explanations redundant, with regards to the actual 
perpetration of the crime (and unlike the other explanations), he provided a theory that was 
consistent with nearly all of the facts—the perpetrators were cruel so they must have hated 
the Jews.  But what really appeared to grate on Goldhagen (1996b, p. 39) was that “my 
critics say that my explanation is wrong without providing any coherent alternative.”  
Instead of rebutting Goldhagen’s explanation, many of his critics simply chose to ignore 
the existence of his contribution.  In fact Goldhagen’s harshest adversaries like Hans-
Ulrich Wehler (1998, p. 93) dismissively described HWE as a “thorn in the flesh”, a semi-
permanent nuisance whose confounding influence on the discourse might hopefully 
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dissipate with time (sooner preferred over later).  Similarly, Hilberg (1997, p. 728) argued: 
“Thus the cloud that Goldhagen created will hover over the academic landscape.  It will 
not soon disperse.” Goldhagen (1996b, p. 39) issued his critics a challenge: “if some deem 
my explanation simplistic, then they must demonstrate that a better one exists.”  This 
challenge would appear to derive from Goldhagen’s belief that none of the conventional 
explanations are able to account for the cruelty his thesis evidenced.  Goldhagen (1996b) 
then derided those who instead choose to overlook the probable importance of his thesis by 
arguing: 
 
Not a single critic even attempts to account for the perpetrators’ cruelty with its 
specific features; not a single critic provides any explanation of his own for the 
voluntarism and the zeal of the perpetrators (p. 39). 
 
Unable to provide Goldhagen with an adequate rebuttal to this point, prominent 
critics of his first argument and overall theory could only agree.  For example, Browning 
(1998) has stated: “Goldhagen is quite correct that cruelty in the Holocaust . . . is an issue 
that scholars have not dealt with at length” (p. 208).  Bauer’s (2001) view is similar to 
Browning’s in that, although he believes “Goldhagen’s discussion about [anti-Semitic] 
norms that did not exist is useless” (p. 103), in relation to the controversial book’s point 
surrounding the issue of cruelty, he conceded: “He is right to emphasize this aspect 
because not enough has been said about it” (p. 102).  Irrespective of this concession, 
however, just like Browning, Bauer (2001, p. 102) still sides with Hilberg: “ordinary 
people were guided by the bureaucratic machine.”   
 
With respect to Goldhagen’s valid point regarding the issue of cruelty, Hilberg’s 
“wiped . . . off the map” statement gives one the impression that HWE has somewhat 
unfairly been fast-tracked to oblivion.  This may not be too surprising considering the 
somewhat obvious problems Goldhagen’s issue of cruelty poses for Hilberg’s influential 
thesis.  Initiated by Hilberg (1961), prominent scholars like Arendt (1963), Bauman 
(1989), Rubenstein (1978) and—central to the present study—Milgram (1974) have all, to 
varying degrees, argued that the potentially destructive bureaucratic process accentuated 
the eventual death toll because it provided the vast majority of the perpetrators with a 
necessary psychological buffer.  As Hilberg (1961, p. 1024) said: 
 
It must be kept in mind that most of the participants did not fire rifles at Jewish 
children or pour gas into gas chambers.  A good many, of course, also had to 
perform these very ‘hard’ tasks, but most of the administrators and most of the 
clerks did not see the final, drastic link in these measures of destruction. 
 
Hilberg and his many adherents are of the opinion that the segmented, routinised, 
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depersonalized, and thus bureaucratised killing process enabled most of the perpetrators to 
avoid feelings of sympathy and personal responsibility for their victims’ deaths.  However, 
Goldhagen’s argument that the perpetrators who actually undertook the shootings were 
ordinary would question the necessity of this buffer inherent to the bureaucratic process.  
The importance of this buffer is questioned because if those at the “final drastic link” in the 
bureaucratic process were “ordinary” Germans yet capable of the grisliest of deeds—what 
would have stopped the “normal”16 desk murderers from engaging in the very same 
behaviours in the absence of the bureaucratic process?  More explicitly, those perpetrators 
who delivered the coup de grace—just like those blinkered to the final drastic link—were 
ordinary, average, and therefore generally representative of wider German society.  The 
psychological buffers provided by the division of labour inherent in the bureaucratic 
process, according to Goldhagen, were therefore unlikely to have been a necessary 
condition contributing to the cause and eventual extent of the Holocaust. 
 
HWE may have highlighted potential weaknesses with Hilberg’s thesis, but it all 
but truncated the M-H linkage.  That is, although like Browning (1992) and Naumann 
(1966) before him, Goldhagen argued that the perpetrators frequently and willingly 
volunteered to undertake the grisly shootings, he also went a step further.  Goldhagen 
provided an example of lower-ranking Nazis disobeying orders from the highest authorities 
to stop killing.  Such counterfactual information powerfully indicated that the perpetrators 
may not have been, as Milgram’s theoretical framework assumed, externally manipulated 
into participating.   
 
HWE has generated an academic impasse with a minority in support and a majority 
who have rejected its ambitious assertions.  Nearly all historians agree that Goldhagen’s 
(1996) first argument surrounding his historical account of anti-Semitism in German 
society is untenable.  Nevertheless, very few dispute Goldhagen’s second argument that, 
with regard to the Jewish victims, many ordinary Germans volunteered to engage in 
cruelty.  Importantly, the survival of his second argument maintains the potential validity 
of the criticism he directed at all the conventional explanations. 
 
Treating the less disputable aspects of Goldhagen’s thesis with the kind of respect 
some of his undeniably valid points deserve, it was at this point in the historiography that 
Bauer incisively cut to the crux of the problem that HWE was ultimately incapable of 
overcoming but was at least willing to confront.  That is, Bauer (2001, p. 103) asked his 
                                                 
16
 See Arendt (1963, p. 22).  
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“real question” of how what appeared to be a mostly moderately anti-Semitic society like 
Germany in the early 1930s became, by the early 1940s, willing murderers of Jews?  
Reinforcing Bauer’s question and juxtaposing the 1938 Kristallnacht pogrom with the 
mass murder of Jews in Eastern Europe three year later, Browning (2004, p. 429) asked: 
“How in three brief years had ‘ordinary’ Germans been transformed from ‘onlookers’ 
squeamish and disapproving of vandalism, arson, and assault into ‘willing executioners’ 
who could perpetrate mass murder with unfettered violence [italics added]?” 
 
Taking into consideration the previously discussed commonality shared by the Nazi 
regime and Milgram, that both proved capable of rapidly transforming large proportions of 
ordinary people into willing inflictors of harm, perhaps a similar question to Bauer and 
Browning’s could be directed at the OTA experiments?  That is, how did Milgram so 
rapidly transform his also ordinary and indifferent subjects into willing torturers of other 
human beings?  Seeking an answer to this question of how Milgram persuaded his ordinary 
subjects to do what they did might prove fruitful in providing an answer to Bauer’s (then 
Browning’s) former question.  Thus, a potentially fruitful methodological approach to 
addressing Bauer and Browning’s question as to how during the Holocaust ordinary and 
indifferent people could so quickly become willing executioners might be to unravel the 
journey Milgram traveled that led to what is arguably his research’s ostensibly similar end.   
 
The following two chapters will address this first key research question.  That is, 
initially focusing on influences that led to the eventual invention of the OTA experiments, 
how did Milgram so rapidly transform such a large proportion of his ordinary subjects into 
willing torturers of other human beings? 
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Chapter Four: The Development of Milgram’s Obedience 
to Authority Experiments 
 
 
Part of Milgram’s genius, as reflected in his past research, was to identify questions worth pursuing 
and then, if needed, invent methods suited for them—Blass (2004, p. 240).  
 
 
It is not unusual for those scholars largely critical of the Obedience to Authority 
(OTA) research programme to still concede to having been impressed with aspects of 
Milgram’s work.  One example was Marcus (1974, p. 2) who, after writing a largely 
negative review of Milgram’s monograph, went on to conclude that the experimental 
programme was “devilishly ingenious, cleverly thought out, and—whatever one thinks of 
them—extremely provocative and probably important.”  How did Milgram come up with 
an idea that, as Miller (1986, p. 1) has argued, became “perhaps the most widely cited and 
provocative set of experiments in social science”?  This chapter will present a narrative on 
the key influential events, experiences, and people most likely to have contributed to the 
eventual conception of Milgram’s widely respected research idea.  It would appear that the 
influences were many and varied, and the earliest can be traced as far back as Milgram’s 
early childhood. 
 
 
4.1 Stanley Milgram: Beginnings and Early Influences 
 
The Nazi regime came to power in Germany in January 1933.  Several months 
later, on 15 August in the Bronx in New York City, Stanley Milgram was born into a 
working class Jewish family.  His Hungarian father and Romanian mother strove hard to 
maintain a successful small bakery and cake-decorating business.  There were three 
characteristics that might best describe the young Milgram: he was bright, imaginative, and 
very curious (Blass, 2004, pp. 1-5).  From an early age he showed a keen interest in a wide 
variety of scientific pursuits ranging from mixing sometimes explosive chemical 
concoctions to later, at age 15, creatively designing a dual-jet-propelled crank shaft that 
“uses centerfigual [sic] force” (Tavris, 1974b, p. 75).  As he himself said: “I was always 
doing experiments; it was as natural as breathing, and I tried to understand how everything 
worked” (Tavris, 1974a, p. 77).  
 
Life for young Milgram was not without a more solemn side: throughout his 
childhood “Stanley was very much aware of his family’s worries about Nazi Germany.  
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His father had family living in Europe, and he and [his mother] Adele followed 
developments there closely on the radio” (Blass, 2004, p. 8).  Although understandably 
commonplace among Jews living in the post-war era, this awareness of what from the 
United States was the geographically distant persecution of the European Jews appears 
nonetheless to have extended into his formative years.  This sensitivity is evidenced in his 
rather precocious 15 August 1946 Bar Mitzvah speech:  
  
As I come of age and find happiness in joining the rank[s] of Israel, the knowledge 
of the tragic suffering of my fellow Jews throughout war-torn Europe makes this 
also a solemn event and an occasion to reflect upon the heritage of my people—
which now becomes mine (Blass, 1998, p. 49). 
 
It was perhaps no coincidence that, first, by only two weeks, this speech preceded the 
verdict of the widely publicised ten-month-long Nazi war-crimes trial in Nuremburg, 
Germany.17  And, secondly, relatives (in-laws) who directly survived the Nazi 
concentration camps stayed in the Milgram household during 1946 (Fermaglich, 2006, p. 
100). 
 
Milgram went on to attend the Bronx’s James Munroe High School where, with 
interests as diverse as stagecraft in school productions and a role as the editor of the school 
newspaper, he developed and nurtured creative talents he would later in life come heavily 
to depend upon.  As editor of the school newspaper the teenage Milgram reveals a 
fascination with the more destructive and morbid side of human affairs: “my first article in 
1949 was on the effects of radiation on the incidence of leukemia in the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki survivors” (Tavris, 1974a, p. 77).   
 
In the same year at James Munroe High there was an acquaintance of Milgram’s by 
the name of Philip Zimbardo, who would later undertake another (in)famous social 
psychology experiment: the 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment.18   
 
After high school Milgram enrolled at New York City’s Queens College where he 
“fell away” from the pure sciences of chemistry and biology and instead ended up 
majoring in political science with a minor in the arts (Tavris, 1974a, p. 77).  As an 
                                                 
17
 Assuming his Bar Mitzvah was held on the exact date of his thirteenth birthday, the above speech would 
have been delivered on 15 August 1946.  The judges first meet for the Nazi war-crimes trial in Nuremburg on 
29 October 1945.  Sentences were passed on 1 October 1946 (Marrus, 1997, p. 257). 
 
18
 In this study subjects were randomly assigned in a mock prison as either prisoners or guards.  The 
experiment had to be abandoned prematurely after spiraling out of control (Zimbardo, Haney, Banks & Jaffe, 
1973).   
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undergraduate, Milgram developed a fascination with foreign lands, peoples, and their 
cultures.  This interest was reflected both in his becoming president of the university’s 
international relations club and his decision in the summer of 1953 to embark on a lone 
backpacking tour of France, Italy, and Spain.  During this trip Milgram honed his ability to 
speak French fluently, enrolling in a one-month language course at the Sorbonne, in Paris 
(Blass, 2004, pp. 11-12).  
 
Before completing his BA with honours at Queens College in 1954, Milgram had 
already been accepted into Columbia University’s graduate programme at the School of 
International Affairs.  However, before graduating he had become increasingly frustrated 
with political science’s then predominantly philosophical approach (Blass, 2004, p 13).  
Simultaneously, the young scholar became interested in social psychology and began 
considering the possibility of studying this relatively new and exciting discipline.  Before 
long, Milgram decided to apply for a place in Harvard’s Department of Social Relations 
graduate programme (Blass, 2004, pp. 13-14; Tavris, 1974a, p. 77).   
 
In his 12 April 1954 Harvard application, Milgram pointed out that it was “Periods 
of war I find particularly interesting” (SMP, Box 1, Folder “a”, Titled: “Correspondence 
1954”).  However, it was in his scholarship application to the Ford Foundation that he 
more specifically indicated where some of his interests in war lay:  
 
My estimates of my ability to undertake sustained, independent research was 
boosted by my writing, last semester, an honors paper (of formidable dimensions) 
entitled ‘The French Press Under the German Occupation,’ which seems not a 
particularly difficult task until one learns of the paucity of secondary source 
material and the unassembled and scattered conditions of primary sources (SMP, 
Box 1, Folder “a”, Titled: “Correspondence 1954”).   
 
Before entering Harvard, the crimes of the Nazi regime were already engaging his 
intellectual curiosity.   
 
Never having previously studied psychology, Milgram’s application to Harvard 
was rejected.  However, during the summer of 1954 a determined Milgram swiftly 
remedied this deficiency by enrolling in and completing six courses (five of which were in 
psychology) at three local New York City colleges.  Financed by his subsequently 
successful scholarship application to the Ford Foundation, Milgram was soon after 
accepted into Harvard University (Blass, 2004, pp. 14-16).   
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4.2 Harvard University and the Influence of Solomon Asch 
 
At Harvard’s Department of Social Relations, Milgram was exposed to a number of 
highly regarded intellectual figures and a wide variety of their stimulating and cutting-edge 
ideas.  In reference to scholars such as Talcott Parsons and Henry Murray, but especially 
Jerome Bruner, Roger Brown, and his eventual mentor, Gordon Allport, Milgram 
commented that: “Men of uncommon wisdom ran things at the time, and created a climate 
in which ideas and excellence found ready support and encouragement” (Tavris, 1974a, p. 
77).  It is not difficult to appreciate that this was just the kind of environment in which a 
hungry, fertile, and creative young mind like Milgram’s was likely to thrive.  
 
In Milgram’s first two years at Harvard the topic of national characteristics and 
stereotypes increasingly captured and stimulated the young scholar’s imagination.  This is 
evidenced by the following quotation, taken from Milgram’s first-year lecture notes when 
Allport, a world-renowned social psychologist, presented his class with an overview of one 
particular study that cross-culturally performed a discourse analysis on a sample of 
German and American plays:    
 
Allport – 20 ’55  Cross cultural method – National Character . . . . 
  
CONTENT       [Indecipherable name] performed content analysis of 
ANALYSIS OF  45 German and 45 American plays produced in 1927,  
   GERMAN PLAYS. analyzing content, themes. 
German plays much more about men than women, 
much more ideological, social.  American plays centered on 
private problems – German hero has 
ideological  rendezvous with destiny – must disregard personal 
destiny   problems.  In American drama, hero is successful  
character-  because his character changes.  In German plays, ending 
Fullfilment [sic] may be tragic but his character is fulfilled (SMP, Box 17, 
Folder 256, Titled: “Harvard University: Social Relations 
Department Course Notes 1954”). 
 
In the left-hand margin of this document is a rather large asterisk uniquely underlined with 
three bold lines (signalling what one would assume to be an area of particular interest 
and/or importance).19  It is suspected that this purposefully highlighted section of 
Milgram’s lecture notes, as emphasised in capital letters, may signal an extension of what 
                                                 
19
 With respect to Milgram’s two lecture books held in the archive (SMP, Box 17, Folders 256 and 257, 
Titled: “Harvard University: Social Relations Department Course Notes”) the young scholar occasionally 
highlighted, with an asterisk, passages of what one would assume were his areas of interest and/or 
importance.  However, only the above quotation had an asterisk boldly underlined three times. 
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was at the time the young scholar’s incipient intellectual curiosity surrounding Germany 
and the ignominy of its recent past.  The following year Milgram enrolled in a course 
headed by Roger Brown, where he read a hundred or so articles and books on the topic of 
national characteristics and stereotypes (Blass, 2004, p. 31).   
 
A particularly influential figure on Milgram at Harvard was a visiting scholar by 
the name of Solomon Asch.  Asch was prominent in social psychology for having 
undertaken a deception-based study termed the Group Pressure/Conformity experiment 
(Asch, 1958).  This experiment involved an instructor who informed eight men who were 
seated around a table that they were to assess which of three unequal lines presented before 
them matched that of a separately presented line (with the correct answer being patently 
obvious).  Each was to express their assessment to the group, starting with the first subject 
and moving around the table.  However, not all was as it appeared: all except the seventh 
person in line were actors.  Sequentially the “subjects” selected the correct answers.  By 
the third trial (and randomly thereafter) each of the actors gave the same—but this time 
clearly incorrect—answer.  Asch was trying to assess whether or not the actors’ incorrect 
answers might have a conforming influence on the only actual subject.  Confronted quite 
suddenly by an internal conflict to either trust their independent assessment or yield to that 
of the seven actors, it was discovered that 32 percent of all the subjects’ assessments 
(n=50) conformed to that of the group, meaning that they were providing answers they 
probably knew to be wrong (Asch, 1958, pp. 176-177).  Asch increased his confidence that 
the individuals’ provision of incorrect answers was actually due to the group’s influence by 
presenting the line assessment exercise to randomly selected subjects in the absence of the 
group (n=37).  This simple control experiment revealed 99 percent of all line-assessments 
by lone subjects were indeed correct. 
 
In some edited notes (circa 1956-1959) Milgram cut to the crux as to exactly “Why 
Asch’s expt [sic] is a Great Experiment”: 
 
He belives [sic] that the conflict with him is a purely private issue which 
concerns no one but him, and of which all others are totally unaware.  He dares 
not betray his secret, yet by his actions, he is betrayed.  The yielding subject 
makes frantic efforts to conceal his conflict, yet by these efforts is the conflict 
betrayed (SMP, Box 43, Folder 124, Titled: “Notes and data analysis, 1956-
1959, n.d.”).   
 
The influence on Milgram of this intrinsic feature of Asch’s experiment, where subjects 
experience a seemingly private (yet, due to the choices made, scientifically observable) 
internal conflict, proved enduring.  Internal conflict was not only a subtle yet inherently 
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crucial feature of his eventual PhD thesis, its presence can be discerned in various guises in 
the OTA experiments which followed, and arguably even in his mid-career Lost Letter 
Technique experiment (Blass, 2004, p. 143).  Extending and cementing this 
methodological influence was Allport’s assignment of Milgram to be Asch’s 
teaching/research assistant during the latter’s stay at Harvard during the 1955/56 academic 
year (Blass, 2004, pp. 27, 31).  The renowned scholar went on to stamp his indelible 
intellectual influence on his new apprentice (Tavris, 1974a, p. 77). 
 
 
4.3 Milgram’s PhD Thesis 
 
Soon after his time with Asch, around the middle of 1956, Milgram conceived of 
an extremely ambitious experiment for the final part of his PhD degree.  Drawing on all of 
the factors mentioned thus far, his idea was to undertake a procedural adaptation of Asch’s 
experiment.  Instead of using pictures of lines, Milgram wanted to present subjects with an 
auditory tone that they were to try and match up correctly with one of several others that 
soon followed.  More specifically, a subject was to enter a laboratory and encounter a coat 
rack piled with jackets and a row of seemingly occupied closed booths, the sixth of which 
they were to enter.  After placing on earphones and hearing the acoustic tones, the subject 
would hear the responses of the other subjects.  In fact, the other booths were empty and 
the responses were pre-recorded by actors.  Like Asch’s experiment, initially the other 
“subjects” would sequentially all give the obviously correct answer but eventually they 
started providing the same clearly incorrect answer.   
 
In a number of ways Milgram’s adaptation was scientifically more rigorous than 
Asch’s experiment.  Unlike Asch’s prototype, the actors’ responses were uniform and had 
therefore been scientifically standardised.  Also, Milgram informed his subjects that their 
responses would contribute to the improvement of air traffic safety signals, thus investing 
into their performance potentially “life and death” consequences (Milgram, 1961, p. 48).  
This would overcome a significant limitation applicable to Asch’s original experiment in 
that it could be argued that his conforming subjects probably experienced little 
compunction in siding with the group because, due to the seemingly trivial nature of the 
line-judgment task, doing so had no significant consequences.   
 
But most innovative was Milgram’s plan to use subjects from different countries.  
Drawing on the influence of Allport and Brown, by using the adaptation on subjects of 
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different nationalities, Milgram intended to undertake a cross-cultural comparison that 
would transform “the topic of national characteristics from armchair speculation to an 
object of scientific inquiry” (Blass, 2004, p. 53). 
 
The countries that Milgram intended to include in his cross-cultural adaptation of 
Asch’s Group-Pressure-Conformity experiment were revealed in a preliminary hypothesis 
dated 24 September 1956: “(Now interms [sic] of the things I have read and seen, I would 
predict as follows: Conformity, as measured by the mean differences of pressured 
responses will be G[ermans]>E[nglish]>F[rench]” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 125, Titled: 
“Norwegian + French Study: Notes & data analysis 1956-1958 n.d.”).  Based on what he 
had “read and seen”, Milgram’s prediction that a greater proportion of Germans could 
probably be cajoled into conforming with the group than equivalent groups of English then 
French subjects is intriguing.  What Milgram had “read and seen” probably related to the 
populist post-World War Two stereotype that, as evidenced by their broad participation in 
the Holocaust, Germans were probably the easiest nationality to manipulate into 
conforming.20  It seems ironic that Milgram himself, having just undertaken a course on 
national character and stereotypes, had formulated the hypothesis for his PhD on the basis 
of a then-prevalent stereotype. 
 
On 17 October 1956 Milgram informed Allport of the idea he hoped to pursue as a 
thesis for the final leg of his PhD:   
 
In brief, I would like to write my thesis in 1957-58, on the subject of national 
character, and with you as my thesis director . . . . For a long time I have had an 
interest in psychology as it applies to national groups.  You may remember my 
somewhat tedious analysis of ‘national stereotypes’ written for your Social 
Psychology qualifying course in the spring of 1955 . . . . I would like to run a 
variation of Dr. Asch’s group pressure experiment across several European 
countries, in particular, England, France, and Germany (SMP, Box 13, Folder 183, 
Titled: “Allport, Gordon 1954-1967”). 
 
Allport’s response reveals that he agreed to be Milgram’s thesis director, saw potential in 
the initial idea but, armed with far greater research experience, ultimately deemed aspects 
of the experiment a little naïve, unrealistic, and in need of substantive revision: “The 
design you outline is not feasible, I fear.  Chiefly, the difficulty is your overly optimistic 
                                                 
20
 Dicks (1950, p. 137) study of German prisoners of war is an example of literature that may have 
encouraged this stereotype: “Conformity and ‘loyalty,’ as of a servant to his master, are rated among the 
highest of virtues, and demonstratively stressed in home and institutional life, almost synonymous with 
‘honour’ on the one hand and with unquestioning obedience on the other.” 
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view of facilities, availability of subjects, European collaboration.  These are serious 
problems and you would experience endless frustration” (Blass, 2004, p. 33). 
 
Although Milgram had already contacted government officials in England, France, 
and Germany with intentions of running “a psychological experiment in your country” 
(SMP, Box 1, Folder C, Titled: “Correspondence 1956”), upon his return to Harvard 
Allport convinced his underling to drastically scale down the initial idea to a two-nation 
comparison involving subjects from none of the above countries.  Instead Allport 
persuaded Milgram to use subjects from the United States and Norway (Blass, 2004, p. 
33).  In terms of feasibility and logistics, including an American sample made obvious 
sense, but based on these criteria the selection of Norway is somewhat perplexing.  
Norway was probably chosen because English is widely spoken and Allport was aware that 
a number of academics from Oslo’s Institute of Social Research were interested in and 
sympathetic towards experimentally-based cross-cultural research.  Allport is therefore 
likely to have suspected that sending Milgram to Norway would hold a greater probability 
of European collaboration, and thus the probable provision of facilities and aid in the 
solicitation of potential subjects (Blass, 2004, pp. 33-34). 
 
During the summer of 1956 Milgram undertook some pilot studies on a sample of 
American subjects (Harvard students) that, as he correctly guessed, produced high rates of 
conformity.  In his first official research proposal, Milgram predicted that Americans 
would conform more than Norwegians.  However, after having throughout 1957 collected 
the Norwegian data, Milgram discovered that the Scandinavians were little different from 
his American sample.  Milgram’s prediction of greater Norwegian independence was 
wrong and he needed to find a more promising comparator nation than the United States.  
According to Blass (2004, p. 41): 
 
France came immediately to mind.  His experience living in Paris during the 
summer of 1953 suggested that France was a country marked by far less social 
consensus than Norway, a country with a tradition that seemed to prize critical 
judgment and diversity of opinion.  ‘France seems to me to be a very good bet,’ he 
wrote Allport.  ‘It takes me from the Nordic to Latin system; Norwegians and 
Frenchmen regard themselves as very different (and probably inter-sterile) breeds 
of men.’ 
 
As Blass has argued, for a wide range of reasons (the most important being that Milgram 
spoke the language fluently and particularly that it might offer interesting results in the 
very opposite direction to that of his Norwegian sample): “France came immediately to 
mind”.  However, it is curious that in the sentence immediately preceding this statement 
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that “France seems to me a very good bet”, the original document held at the Stanley 
Milgram Papers (SMP) reveals that Milgram also said: “Germany would be highly 
interesting, but I cannot handle the language” (SMP, Box 13, Folder 183, Titled: “Allport, 
Gordon 1954-1967”).21  This statement is interesting because Milgram had long suspected 
that Germans would be highly conformist.  If he were right, there was a risk a German 
sample might be as dull a group as the Americans with which to compare to the conformist 
Norwegians.  Yet, irrespective of this, for some reason there was clearly still something 
that drew Milgram to again contemplate undertaking his experimental procedure on what 
he expected to be a sample of highly conforming Germans.   
 
During August of 1958 Milgram went to France (Blass, 2004, p. 48).  After his 
arrival Allport’s initial criticism of Milgram’s original research proposal came back to 
haunt him.  With respect to facilities, help in the solicitation of subjects, and collaboration, 
his suspicion of stubborn French independence unforeseeably saw Milgram experience 
what indeed must have felt like endless frustration (Blass, 2004, pp. 48, 50). 
 
Milgram wrote a letter to a friend back at Harvard during this period, the contents 
of which illustrates that the Holocaust was never far from his thoughts: 
 
I should have been born into the German-speaking Jewish community of Prague in 
1922 and died in a gas chamber some 20 years later.  How I came to be born in the 
Bronx Hospital, I’ll never quite understand [italics original] (Blass, 2002, pp. 71-
72). 
   
Milgram’s misfortunes in France, however, soon changed for the better when the highly 
respected Harvard lecturer, Jerome Brunner, suggested he contact some of his colleagues 
based at the Sorbonne.  After having done so, Milgram made more progress in collecting 
his French data (Blass, 2004, p. 50). 
 
Although Milgram undertook in both countries five subtle variations on his basic 
research idea, his results revealed that on average the Norwegians and French conformed 
about 62 and 50 percent of the time respectively, a statistically significant difference.  
Particularly impressive was that, although across each of the five experimental variations 
the degree of conformity differed, the direction of this difference (Norwegians conforming 
more than the French) remained consistent throughout.   
 
                                                 
21
 Perhaps illustrating that this was no idle comment, Milgram repeated this statement verbatim, two days 
later, in a letter to Jerome Bruner, one of his Harvard lecturers (SMP, Box 1, Folder ‘e’, Titled: 
“Correspondence 1958”). 
 40 
It is important to mention here that before having undertaken his experiments 
Milgram had felt a little uneasy that, in order to obtain his results, he had to deceive his 
subjects and expose them to a clearly stressful situation.  Milgram therefore went to great 
lengths to ensure the subsequent well-being of his subjects by undertaking thorough 
debriefings as well as administering a post-experimental check-up questionnaire.  To 
Milgram’s surprise: 
 
It appears that most subjects were glad to have participated, despite the trickery 
involved.  The reasons for this seem to be . . . they understood that any deception 
used was not primarily for personal gain, but for the advancement of knowledge 
(Milgram, 1960, pp. 175-176, as cited in Blass, 2004, p. 44). 
 
Blass (2004, p. 54) has argued that these rather unexpected responses had “carryover 
effects” which eased any remaining inhibitions Milgram might have had surrounding the 
use of deception and exposure to stressful situations in any future experiments.   
 
 
4.4 Milgram’s Experience at Princeton: the Invention of the OTA Experiments and 
Influence of the Holocaust 
 
 Upon returning to Harvard, Milgram received and accepted an offer from Asch to 
edit his latest book on the topic of conformity while on sabbatical at Princeton University.  
Away from friends and working for the exacting Asch, Milgram found October 1959 to 
June 1960 a very demanding and somewhat depressing period in his life.  Nonetheless, in 
several significant and overlapping ways, his time at Princeton ended most fruitfully for 
the young scholar’s academic career. 
 
First, far from Harvard’s many distractions, the lonely nights at Princeton enabled 
Milgram to write rapidly and submit his PhD dissertation on time.  Secondly, the 
subsequent glowing reviews of his thesis in conjunction with having referees like Allport 
(and other Harvard heavyweights), as well as the prestige of working with Asch saw both 
Harvard and Yale Universities offer Milgram academic positions.  Milgram accepted 
Yale’s offer as an assistant professor of social psychology starting the following 
September 1960.  Thirdly, Milgram started (or soon thereafter) writing an abridged version 
of his thesis that was later accepted for publication in the internationally circulated 
magazine Scientific American (see Milgram, 1961).  In the article Milgram announced a 
return of his attention to those who interested him most:   
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We are now planning further research in national characteristics.  In a recent 
seminar at Yale University students were given the task of trying to identify 
behavioral characteristics that might help to illuminate the Nazi epoch in German 
history . . . . A team of German and American investigators is planning a series of 
experiments designed to provide a comparative measure of behavior in the two 
countries (Milgram, 1961, p. 51). 
 
Not only is this statement somewhat reminiscent of the first PhD research proposal he had 
presented to Allport in 1956, it also appears to add weight to the argument that the 
Holocaust was increasingly starting to engage Milgram’s intellectual curiosity.  More than 
a year after the above project had failed to materialise (due to funding issues), Milgram 
was still trying to solicit German contacts in the hope of one day making a reality his 
cross-cultural comparison using his adaptation of Asch’s experiment on a sample of 
Germans.22 
 
Blass (2004, p. 54) has argued that the successful completion and publication of his 
PhD injected immense confidence into the young scholar, as is reflected in the bold tone of 
Milgram’s above statement in Scientific American: 
 
He now knew that he was capable of doing original research that would provide 
new insights about human behavior.  It was an accomplishment that made him aim 
high and not settle for the mundane in his future career as a scientific researcher. 
 
Milgram had a reputation for being ambitious,23 but it was around this period that he 
expressed an explicit awareness that success in academia would require that he undertake 
“an important and distinctive programme of research with which to make his mark.  He 
told Roger Brown that he hoped to find a phenomenon of great consequence, such as Asch 
had done, then ‘worry it to death [italics added]’ ” (Blass, 2004, pp. 61-62).   
 
Such ambitions were soon realised with the fourth significant outcome that 
eventuated from Milgram’s time at Princeton: the rudimentary conception of his landmark 
idea to undertake an experiment on OTA.  The following is Milgram’s own account of this 
process:   
 
                                                 
22
 See the correspondence between Robert Arndt (from Germany) and Milgram during April 1962 (SMP, 
Box 55, Folder 5, Titled: “Nationality and Conformity: Correspondence 1961-1962”). 
   
23
 For example, with respect to his PhD, on 21 December 1956, in a letter to Jerome Bruner, Milgram 
admitted: “The original plan called for a three nation study (England, France, Germany) [however] . . . .  
mostly students who have just completed their theses . . . have been trying to persuade me . . . I should not 
overstretch myself at this time.  ‘Just write a good thesis Mr., and then do your grand scale research’ ” (SMP, 
Box 1, Folder C, Titled: “Correspondence 1956”). 
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I was working for Asch in Princeton, New Jersey, in 1959 and 1960.  I was 
thinking about his group-pressure experiment.  One of the criticisms that has been 
made of his experiments is that they lack a surface significance, because after all, 
an experiment with people making judgments of lines has a manifestly trivial 
content.  So the question I asked myself is, How can this be made into a more 
humanly significant experiment?  And it seemed to me that if, instead of having a 
group exerting pressure on judgments about lines, the group could somehow induce 
something more significant from the person, then that might be a step in giving a 
greater face significance to the behavior induced by the group.  Could a group, I 
asked myself, induce a person to act with severity against another person [italics 
added]? (Evans, 1980, p. 188). 
 
Asch’s research required subjects to make mere “judgments” with ultimately “trivial” 
implications.  But, as he did with his PhD thesis, Milgram was interested in exploring 
whether or not it might be possible to raise the stakes by manipulating subjects into 
engaging in physical “act[s]” that had “humanly significant” implications.  That Milgram 
intended “exerting pressure” on subjects—a skill he had become well versed in during his 
PhD—is a very important point: he was toying with the idea of using group pressure to 
cement subjects into engaging in some other more significant behaviour.  Milgram later 
termed such sources of pressure Binding Factors (BF): powerful bonds that can entrap a 
person into doing something they might otherwise prefer not to do.   
 
Milgram then imagined a situation like Asch’s experiment, where a naïve subject 
was placed among a group of actors:  
 
instead of confronting the lines on a card, each one of them would have a shock 
generator.  In other words, I transformed Asch’s experiment into one in which the 
group would administer increasingly higher levels of shock to a person, and the 
question would be to what degree an individual would follow along with the group.  
That’s not yet the obedience experiment, but it’s a mental step in that direction 
(Evans, 1980, pp. 188-189).  
 
In an earlier interview Milgram described the next conceptual step that moved him closer 
to his OTA paradigm: 
 
I wondered whether groups could pressure a person into performing an act whose 
human import was more readily apparent, perhaps behaving aggressively toward 
another person, say by administering increasingly severe shocks to him.  But to 
study the group effect you would also need an experimental control; you’d have to 
know how the subject performed without any group pressure [italics added] 
(Tavris, 1974a, p. 80). 
 
Milgram was aware that Asch resolved the problem of requiring an experimental control 
by running the line judgment exercise on subjects in the absence of the group.  However, 
Milgram was this time unable to draw from Asch’s legacy because, as Miller (1986, p. 18) 
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observed: “it was not obvious what the inducement would be for a solitary individual to 
administer shocks in increasing intensities to another person.”  Milgram had to develop his 
own solution to this problem.  Hence, the shift from a conformity to obedience orientation:  
 
my thought shifted, zeroing in on this experimental control.  Just how far would a 
person go under the experimenter’s orders [italics added]?  It was an incandescent 
moment, the fusion of a general idea on obedience with a specific technical 
procedure.  Within a few minutes, dozens of ideas on relevant variables emerged, 
and the only problem was to get them all down on paper (Tavris, 1974a, p. 80).24 
 
Although this innovation provided Milgram with the crucial experimental control he 
desired, perhaps unwittingly it also introduced into the equation the new BF of a higher-
status authority figure trying to impose his will on a lower-status subject within a 
hierarchical chain of command (superordinate/subordinate relationship).   
 
This “incandescent” moment—believed by Blass (2004, p. 63) to have taken place 
sometime between 2 March and the end of June 1960—was a watershed event.  It initiated 
the journey that put Milgram on a path away from Asch-like group-conformity and 
increasingly towards, as Blass put it, his own “phenomenon of great consequence”: the 
individual’s response to the malevolent demands of an authority figure. 
 
But what were the origins of these completely new additions to Milgram’s ideas to 
introduce “orders” to “behaving aggressively”?  They were probably due to the influence 
of the then-popular post-World War Two perception in the United States (and elsewhere) 
that the implementation of the Holocaust was closely associated with blind OTA.  To 
clarify, immediately after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the victorious Allied forces placed 
on trial much of the surviving Nazi elite in the first of several Nuremberg war-crimes trials.  
Within the timeframe in which Milgram would have written his Bar Mitzvah speech, 
which paid homage to the “tragic suffering of my fellow Jews”, the first trial saw most of 
those in the dock attempt to evade responsibility for their crimes by arguing that they were 
“just following orders”.  Subsequent Nazi war-crimes trials produced similar responses and 
the predictable “just following orders” justification gained its now long-clichéd status.  
Reasons for an apparently heightened German propensity to obey and enact the orders of 
superiors started to emerge in populist sources of literature.  Highlighted were factors as 
diverse as the apparently ubiquitous German authoritarian style of raising children, Nazi 
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 Using different words, Milgram largely reiterated these thought processes in his later interview with Evans 
(1980, p. 189): “what would be the force that would get him to increase the shocks?  And then the thought 
occurred that the experimenter would have to tell him to give higher and higher shocks.  Just how far will a 
person go when an experimenter instructs him to give increasingly severe shocks?” 
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indoctrination surrounding pledges of obedience to Hitler, and even the magnetic draw of 
the Führer’s personality (Fromm, 1973, pp. 413-414; Koenigsberg, 2009, p. 5; Lee, 1996, 
p. 24).  Strengthening further the association of OTA with the Holocaust were certain 
influential contributions to the academic literature; the most prominent example was 
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford’s (1950) The Authoritarian Personality, 
which attributed the anti-Semitism that culminated in the Holocaust to authoritarian 
personality traits (Miller, 2004, p. 211).25  Consequently, there emerged a post-World War 
Two OTA zeitgeist: 
 
Before Milgram, creative writers had incorporated striking incidents of obedience 
into novels, poems, and screenplays.  Historians had written factual accounts of 
remarkably obedient individuals and groups.  Psychologists had developed F- and 
other scales to measure inclinations towards authoritarian tyranny and subservience 
(Elms, 1995, p. 22).     
 
In fact, it is “certainly possible” (Blass, 2004, p. 63) that the catalytic event that 
may have stimulated Milgram to incorporate “orders” into his more rudimentary idea was 
the highly publicised 11 May 1960 capture of the middle-ranking but central Nazi 
bureaucrat, Adolf Eichmann, in Argentina by Israeli secret agents (Raven & Rubin, 1983, 
p. 421).  His capture falls within the period in which Milgram experienced his  
“ ‘incandescent moment’ ” (Blass, 2004, p. 63).  It was probably no coincidence that, 
concurrently with Eichmann’s heavily publicised capture then trial26 where he too argued 
he only did as he was told,27 Milgram was radically manipulating Asch’s study into “a 
humanly more significant experiment” where subjects received “orders” to behave 
“aggressively towards another person”.   
 
Cementing the view that Milgram founded his research idea upon a stereotype 
about Germans, as he said himself: “I came across many statements which implied that 
Germans tended to obey orders more conscientious[ly] than Americans” (as cited in 
Fermaglich, 2006, p. 88).28  This remark is reminiscent of how he formulated the idea for 
                                                 
25
 See also McGranahan (1946), McGranahan and Janowitz (1946), and Footnote 20. 
 
26
 Shandler (2001, p. 91) argued that in the United States Eichmann’s trial “marked the first time that the 
Holocaust received prominent, extended television coverage in the form of news reports, public affairs 
programs, documentaries, and dramas aired over a period of months”.  
 
27
 In regard to the extermination of the European Jews, Eichmann said that he “ ‘felt something of the 
satisfaction of Pilate, because I felt entirely innocent of any guilt.  The leading figures of the Reich at the 
time had spoken at the Wannsee Conference, the ‘Popes’ had given their orders; it was up to me to obey, and 
that is what I bore in mind over the future years’ ” (Cesarani, 2004, p. 277). 
 
28
 Whilst undertaking the official experiments, Milgram stated that the “Origens [sic] of my interest in 
Obedience” was the “Problem of German Behavior” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 165, Titled: “Notes general, 
1961-1962”). 
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his PhD.  Based on “the things I have read and seen”, he predicted a sample of Germans 
were more likely to conform than otherwise comparable groups of English and French 
subjects.  The etiology of the stereotypically conformist and/or blindly obedient nature of 
Germans in populist and academic literature both can be traced back to the rationalisations 
and justifications the Nazi war criminals provided for their actions after the war (see 
Footnote 20).   
 
That Milgram’s idea to include “orders” to “hurt another person” was largely 
stimulated by stereotypes about Germans during the Holocaust is reflected in the following 
previously unpublished document, probably written during the spring of 1960, while the 
young social psychologist was at Princeton, and thus during the period he probably 
conceived of the idea of undertaking an experiment on OTA: 
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Figure 1: A document produced by Milgram during his time at Princeton University titled 
“Studies in Obedience” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 165, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962” 
[sic]).29   
 
 
Below is the independent transcription of the above document: 
 
                                                 
29
 The Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University has dated this document between 1961 and 1962 when 
Milgram was at Yale University.  Yet this sketch of a shock generator is far more rudimentary than a drawing 
Milgram (1977, p. 95) himself dated “Spring 1960”, when he was at Princeton University.  It would be 
reasonable to infer that this document was actually produced between March and June of 1960 when 
Milgram’s “incandescent moment” took place.  This document was almost certainly produced sometime 
before 14 October 1960, probably around the spring of 1960, while working for Asch at Princeton 
University. 
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Studies in Obedience 
1. Waver [sic] of responsibility—from experimenter—For Germa[n]y 
2. Panel  
 
 
 
3. The War Situation – 
2 naive S[ubject]’s.  One must shock the other – 
1 way switch.  Can be controlled by E. 
      4.    Working in teams:       
      5.    The Pledge.  Subjects pledge to obey. │Because of certain possible hazards,  
             the S. must adhere carefully to the instructions of the Exp[erimen]t[e]r.30  
 
Figure 2: An independent transcription of Figure 1.31  
 
 
Early in his eventual book, Milgram (1974, p. 14) explained why he decided upon 
such a device as his means of inflicting harm: 
 
For technical reasons, the delivery of electric shock was chosen for the study.  It 
seemed suitable, first, because it would be easy for the subject to understand the 
notion that shocks can be graded in intensity; second, its use would be consistent 
with the general scientific aura of the laboratory; and finally, it would be relatively 
easy to simulate the administration of shock in the laboratory.  
 
Therefore, Milgram’s previous experience as a student of social psychology, where the 
infliction of electrical shocks had long been common, proved influential in his selection of 
this device (see Schachter, 1959).  And obviously, Milgram intuitively sensed that, with 
some coercion, subjects might actually be willing to use such a device to inflict harm on 
another human being. 
                                                 
30
 Although there is no mention of the Nazi regime or the Holocaust in the above post hoc explanation, 
elsewhere Milgram regularly endorsed their central role in the eventual conception of his OTA idea 
(Fermaglich, 2006, p. 88; Milgram, 1964a, p. 851; Milgram, 1977, p. 92). 
 
31
 Dawn Yeabsley and Jean-Christopher Somers, at the School of Government, Victoria University of 
Wellington, independently transcribed the contents of this document. 
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Nonetheless, in this document Milgram seems to have had in mind an Asch-like 
group experiment—“working in teams”—whereby all involved were, for some yet to be 
established hazardous reason, to accept a “pledge to obey” the experimenter’s orders.  
Most of those involved would be actors with two naïve subjects (one of whom was 
presumably to be the victim and the other, using a one-way switch that could be controlled 
by the experimenter, a shock-inflictor).  It would appear that the infliction of these shocks, 
which were to increase in intensity, was meant to reflect a war-like situation, in which 
those inflicting the shocks would not be held responsible for their actions.  Only parts of 
this document resemble the eventual experimental paradigm, however.  Few of the actual 
variations involved actors working in teams, and, although there was a waiver of 
responsibility and a shock generator that inflicted gradually escalating electrical shocks, 
there was no “pledge to obey” or an apparently “LETHAL” shock switch, and only nine 
shock switches.   
 
Despite this, the catalytic event that may have stimulated Milgram to incorporate 
“orders to act with severity” into his more rudimentary idea may have been the highly 
publicised 11 May 1960 capture in Argentina by Israeli secret agents of the middle-ranking 
but central Nazi bureaucrat, Adolf Eichmann (Raven & Rubin, 1983, p. 421).  His capture 
falls within the period in which Milgram experienced his “incandescent moment”.32  Blass 
(2004, p. 63) argues that: “It’s certainly possible that this was the event that crystallized the 
obedience research in Milgram’s mind.”  It was probably no coincidence that, concurrently 
with Eichmann’s heavily publicised capture then trial33 where, like most other Nazis he too 
argued he only did as he was told,34 Milgram happened to be radically manipulating 
Asch’s study into “a humanly more significant experiment” where subjects received 
“orders” to behave “aggressively towards another person”.  
 
                                                 
32
 It has not been possible to confirm if Milgram followed closely the events surrounding Eichmann’s 
capture.  However, just over a year later he mentioned Eichmann’s name in some of his written 
correspondence (see SMP, Box 43, Folder 127, Titled: “Correspondence 1961”).  
  
33
 Shandler (2001, p. 91) argued that in the United States Eichmann’s trial “marked the first time that the 
Holocaust received prominent, extended television coverage in the form of news reports, public affairs 
programs, documentaries, and dramas aired over a period of months”.  
 
34
 In regard to the extermination of the European Jews, Eichmann said that he “ ‘felt something of the 
satisfaction of Pilate, because I felt entirely innocent of any guilt.  The leading figures of the Reich at the 
time had spoken at the Wannsee Conference, the ‘Popes’ had given their orders; it was up to me to obey, and 
that is what I bore in mind over the future years’ ” (Cesarani, 2004, p. 277). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
It seems reasonable to conclude that, over time, it was the gradual confluence of 
several key factors that contributed to the conception of Milgram’s idea to undertake an 
experiment on OTA.  In sum, they were Milgram’s long-term intellectual curiosity about 
the Holocaust; various experiences under a number of scholars during his PhD degree at 
Harvard; Solomon Asch (and his Group Pressure/Conformity experiment); and the populist 
post-World War Two zeitgeist that tended to closely associate OTA with the 
implementation of the Holocaust.35   
 
In developing his inchoate OTA idea, it appears that Milgram basically threw into 
the mix what he suspected were important key ingredients needed to produce a Holocaust-
like event: a command hierarchy of authority figures and subordinates, orders, and group 
pressure—all revolving around the infliction of harm on another person.  It is here that the 
epigraph by Blass presented at the start of this chapter best rings true: Milgram frequently 
asked questions and would then “invent methods suited for them”. 36  It is clear that (as in 
the case of the Holocaust) the base question of interest was: how might one get rather 
ordinary people to severely hurt other human beings?  However, due to the post-World 
War Two zeitgeist surrounding the association of obedience with the Holocaust, Milgram 
advanced a slightly different question.  Discernable from his use of the words “orders” and 
“behaving aggressively towards another person”, Milgram came to focus on the question: 
can orders from an authority figure lead to the infliction of harm?37  Incorporating and 
building upon all the influential factors that culminated in his PhD, Milgram went on to 
invent and then, as the following chapter will illustrate, refine an experimental method to 
produce scientific results that could help answer questions he had long held surrounding 
the extermination of the European Jews.38 
                                                 
35
 Other probably less important factors were probably involved (see Tavris, 1974a, p. 80).     
 
36
 As Tavris (1974b, p. 75) pointed out: “Most psychologists test hypotheses; Milgram asks questions.” 
 
37
 As Milgram wrote in his early notes: “Stated most simply, the basic command is to hurt another person.”  
Aware of the controversial nature of his experimental aim, he then stated: “(Don’t [s]ay this in grant)” (SMP, 
Box 46, Folder 165, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”). 
 
38
 As Milgram had said in relation to a different line of research: “Methods of inquiry must always be 
adapted to the problem at hand” (Tavris, 1974a, p. 71). 
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Chapter Five: How Milgram Induced Most Ordinary 
Subjects to Complete the Obedience to Authority 
Experiments   
 
 
Much of empirical science is exploratory, and involves a methodology not at all like the traditional 
idea of hypothesis, prediction and test.  In exploratory studies, a scientist has no very clear idea 
what will happen, and aims to find out.  He [sic] has a feeling for the ‘direction’ in which to go 
(increase the pressure and see what happens) but no clear expectations of what to expect—Harré 
and Second (1972, p. 69).  
 
 
This chapter will discuss how Milgram conceived of an experimental procedure 
that by the first official experiment produced a 65 percent completion rate.  There is little 
published information on the development of Milgram’s experimental procedure, which in 
its complete form did not leap suddenly from the depths of Milgram’s imagination.  Nor is 
it the case that, unlike all the psychiatrists he later approached, Milgram foresaw that his 
procedure would counterintuitively prove capable of producing such high completion rates. 
 
The experimental procedure was the end result of a rather protracted process that 
largely involved some combination of Milgram drawing on his past experiences, shrewd 
intuition, and a heavy reliance on the ad hoc exploratory method of discovery.  As noted in 
the above epigraphic statement, the exploratory method of discovery is where the scientist 
has an intuitive idea of the direction an inquiry should take, but little insight into what 
might happen along the way.  They deploy as their vehicle of discovery a number of ad hoc 
trial and error pilot studies—“see what happens”—in the pursuit of a vaguely delineated 
outcome.   
 
 
5.1 The First Obedience to Authority Research Proposal 
 
In September 1960 Milgram arrived at Yale University and embarked upon what 
would turn out to be a highly creative academic career.  By the first week of October he 
submitted his first official research proposal.  In light of his recent “incandescent moment” 
it is surprising that this proposal was not about obedience to authority (OTA), but 
concerned an observational study on the topic of art appreciation under the influence of the 
drug mescaline (Blass, 2004, p. 65).  If Milgram, only several months earlier, had an idea 
involving “orders” to “inflict harm”, why, upon arriving at Yale, was his first research 
proposal not on OTA?  The probable reason is that although he clearly sensed the OTA 
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idea had some potential, between its conception at Princeton and his arrival at Yale he 
probably suspected it needed further work. 
 
To capture the attention of academia, Milgram had to develop an experiment that in 
the first official trial produced eye-catching results.  Entering the academic stage with an 
experiment demonstrating a low rate of obedience to harmful orders would be unsurprising 
and hardly equate to a “phenomenon of great consequence”.  In a document headed 
“Studies in Obedience”, that like Figure 1 also probably dates back to 1960, Milgram 
highlighted the main coercive technique he intended to deploy to achieve what was 
actually his initial goal: “Integrate with group process.  In order to create the strongest 
obedience situation use findings of group dynamics [italics added]” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 
165, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962” [sic]).39  But was the idea as presented in Figure 1 
likely to have been capable of generating the dramatic results needed to make his mark?  
Were subjects likely to accept a transparently Nazi-sounding “pledge to obey” orders to 
inflict an apparently “LETHAL” shock?  The changes which followed would suggest not.  
 
On 14 October 1960 Milgram submitted to the Office of Naval Research his first 
research proposal on OTA.  This document established the young researcher’s intention to 
undertake a study on “obedience and action conformity”, whereby “Given that a person is 
confronted with a particular set of commands ‘more or less’ appropriate to a laboratory 
situation, we may ask which conditions increase his compliance, and which make him less 
likely to comply” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).  Milgram 
then went on to describe the basic experimental procedure he intended to employ which, in 
the complete absence of any pilot studies, already resembled the one he would later settle 
upon.  Specifically, the subject: 
 
operates a control panel, consisting of a series of switches set in a line.  The switch 
at the left is labelled ‘l-Very Light Shock’; the next switch is labelled ‘2-Light 
Shock’; and so on through moderate, strong, very strong, etc… the switch at the 
extreme right is labelled ‘15-Extreme Shock: Danger.’ . . . . It goes without saying 
that . . . the victim . . . does not in reality suffer, but is a confederate of the 
experimenter . . . . [and] is placed behind a semi-transluscent [sic] screen so that 
[the] subject . . . can perceive his reactions only dimly . . . . Internal resistances 
become stronger, and at a certain point he refuses to go on with the experiment.  
Behavior prior to this rupture we shall consider as obedience . . . . The point of 
rupture is the act of disobedience (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, Title: 
“Correspondence 1960”). 
 
                                                 
39
 This document was probably written before the date designated by Sterling Memorial Library as it 
discusses rudimentary ideas like the use of a “dial that reads from . . . light-to-fatal.”   
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Attached to the end of this first research proposal was, relative to Figure 1, a far more 
complicated drawing of what Milgram envisioned this shock “control panel” might look 
like (see Figure 3 below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Milgram’s “Sketch of [a] . . . control panel in studies of obedience” attached to 
the first-ever OTA research proposal dated 14 October 1960 (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, 
Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).   
 
Milgram was aware that deceiving subjects into thinking they were inflicting 
shocks on another person was likely to generate within them what he would later term 
strain: intense feelings of tension or stress.  He knew such feelings might encourage 
disobedience, detracting from the initial goal to create “the strongest obedience situation”.  
Milgram countered such feelings by introducing what he would later term Strain Resolving 
Mechanisms (SRMs).  SRMs were measures that, to varying degrees, reduced the tensions 
normally associated with inflicting harm on others.  Revealed in the proposal was an 
example of Milgram’s introduction of a SRM whereby, instead of some “pledge to obey”, 
subjects were to be provided with what he intuitively sensed might be a more subtle and 
agreeable rationale for inflicting seemingly excruciating electrical shocks on another 
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person.  As Milgram himself said, to encourage a person to willingly inflict harm on 
another: “Obviously some acceptable rationale must be provided” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 
126, Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).  The acceptable rationale was now to be “achieved 
by setting the experiment in a context of ‘social learning’ ” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, 
Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).  In Milgram’s words: “Subjects believe they are 
performing in an experiment in human learning.  In the course of the experiment one 
subject finds that it is part of his role to administer ‘negative reinforcements’ [light 
electrical shocks] to another subject” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, Titled: “Correspondence 
1960”).  By contributing to some greater good, Milgram had transformed the infliction of 
harm from “something evil” (shocking an innocent person) into something “good” 
(advancing “human learning”)—a strain-resolving conversion process Adams and Balfour 
(1998, p. xx) termed “moral inversion”.40 
 
Another change apparent within the first proposal was a different example of a 
SRM, whereby the last shock previously labelled “LETHAL” had been substituted with the 
verbal designation “15-Extreme Shock: Danger”.  This small modification was perhaps 
motivated by a suspicion that subjects were more likely to deploy a more ambiguously 
labelled final shock switch than one with a unequivocally destructive heading because, 
relative to the latter, the former less likely to stimulate as much strain.   
 
Although Milgram clearly started out with an idea that attempted to capture in the 
controlled laboratory setting what he suspected might have led to an event like the 
Holocaust, by the first proposal he had come to the realisation that presenting subjects with 
a “pledge to obey” orders to inflict an apparently “LETHAL” shock would probably fail to 
create the “strongest obedience situation”.  Consequently, he deemed it necessary to 
include a less stressful and more “acceptable” justification for participating in an action 
that, at its worst point, now had a more ambiguously labelled outcome.  Although these 
modifications to the earlier idea were more likely to aid Milgram in obtaining the initially 
high completion rate needed to make his academic mark, the basic experimental procedure 
was also transforming into something that increasingly looked less like the Holocaust (a 
potential weakness critics would later raise regarding the apparent Milgram-Holocaust 
linkage).   
 
                                                 
40
 This innovation was methodologically prudent because, as in Asch’s study, Milgram was withholding from 
the subjects the study’s actual objective of examining people’s willingness to obey authority.  Unlike other 
methodologically weaker studies (see Zimbardo et al., 1973), Milgram’s subjects were therefore prevented 
from gratifying the researcher’s wishes and/or engaging in some preconceived role-play (Nussbaum, 2007).   
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Nevertheless, Milgram still appears to have kept some of his focus on the 
Holocaust.  For example, aware of the Nazi regime’s reliance on propaganda, one of the 
four potential variations centred around the following SRM: “Obedience and Propaganda 
Concerning the Victim: To what extent can higher compliance be extracted by portraying 
the victim in unflattering terms?” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, Titled: “Correspondence 
1960”). 41  Milgram, soon after, went to some lengths to further develop this basic idea. 
 
The first proposal also mentioned that the research programme was to be divided 
into two main sections.  In the first, subjects were to be run through the procedure alone 
(that is, only in the presence of the experimenter and the partially visible learner).  The 
second was the same as the first, except that the actual subject would be one of several 
members of a group.  After describing the alone procedure, Milgram clarified what he 
meant by the second section:  
 
Now transform the situation to one in which the critical subject is but one member 
of a group, and each member faces a control panel . . . . the experiment is designed 
so that subject B receives his negative reinforcement only when all members of the 
group depress their control board switches in succession.  Unknown to the critical 
subject, the first four members of the group are confederates [actors] of the 
experimenter, and willingly comply with E’s commands on every occasion (SMP, 
Box 43, Folder 126, Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).  
 
In the absence of any pilot studies, how optimistic was Milgram that this “group 
dynamics” section would initially “create the strongest obedience situation”?   
 
My guess is, on the basis of considerable experience with experiments in group 
pressure, that certain persons will follow the group through all degrees of 
compliance, even to the point of administering a shock labelled ‘extremely 
dangerous’.  This guess awaits empirical confirmation (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, 
Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).  
 
Despite his apparent “incandescent” or eureka-like moment, Milgram was actually 
not sure at the time about the kinds of results the “alone” experiments might produce.  
However, he hazarded a guess: “Presumably, the addition of group pressure will cause the 
critical subject to comply with the experimental commands to a far higher degree than in 
                                                 
41
 Probably near the end of 1960 or early in 1961, Milgram started to develop some basic ideas surrounding 
such an experiment: “Propoganda [sic] concerning the victim [learner]: I might say [to the subject] about the 
person [learner] in there, first that he is being paid 35 dollars . . . . Secondly, he . . . wanted to be a subject 
[learner].  He said . . . those Yale fairies [as teacher/subjects] were pretty stupid . . . . This person, I might 
add, has been in court many times but has never been convicted, because of technicalities of the law, 
although it was established beyond any doubt that he had beat up and robbed an old man . . .*  Still . . .  I 
don’t see that there is any special reason to exclude him, though I have certain doubts.  Anyway, let’s begin.  
*In fact, he arrogantly boasts that he did this and that the law can’t touch him” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 165, 
Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”).  
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the ‘alone’ situation” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).  
Because Milgram was not particularly optimistic about the latter series, influenced by 
Asch, he determined that their most important function was to “serve as necessary controls 
for the group experiments.  It is only by using the alone situation as a standard that one can 
assess the strength of group pressure in the later studies” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, 
Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).  But ultimately unsure how subjects might react to the 
potentially binding force of the experimenter’s orders, Milgram cautiously added that the 
“alone” conditions were nonetheless still “important in their own right” (SMP, Box 43, 
Folder 126, Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).  Building more on Asch’s group conformity 
legacy than his own, at this time Milgram’s “Obedience and Group Process” experiments 
“constitute[d] the major concern of the present research” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 126, 
Titled: “Correspondence 1960”).   
 
The key point is that in the lead-up to the first proposal, and with the intention of 
making his mark, Milgram’s albeit initial goal was to ensure that a surprisingly large 
proportion of subjects inflicted all the shocks.  This was largely why he was continually 
adding to the inchoate experimental procedure an increasing variety of different Binding 
Factors (BFs) and SRMs.  Upon achieving this initial goal, Milgram then intended to move 
on to his more explicit goal of discovering “which conditions increase his compliance and 
which make him less likely to comply”.  
 
Hence, this first research proposal contained all the key features of what would 
become known as the OTA experiments.  All that was required was to run a pilot series.  
These would reveal the capacity of the “group” and, although less auspiciously, the 
“alone” (experimental control) versions to produce strongly counterintuitive results.  
Although this first research proposal was sent to the Office of Naval Research, a month 
later in mid-November 1960 Milgram also submitted it to the National Institute of Mental 
Health and the National Science Foundation (NSF) (Blass, 2004, p. 67). 
 
 
5.2 First Pilot Study: the Winter Pretests 1960-61 
 
Although he almost certainly would eventually have run a pilot study on his own 
volition, the impetus to do so came not from Milgram but from his students.  To give his 
Psychology of Small Groups class some practical experience in conducting an actual 
experiment, Milgram provided his students with two potential research options: the 
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obedience pilot or another idea he had on group communication patterns.  By a narrow 
margin the class opted for the obedience pilot, and then set about converting Milgram’s 
nascent idea into a concrete reality (Blass, 2004, pp. 67-68).  The initial impetus may have 
come from the students because, although Milgram sensed he was onto something 
interesting, at this time he had not yet come to appreciate the idea’s full potential.  
Irrespective of this, armed with one of Milgram’s sketches and a small budget, his students 
produced the following shock-generator prototype: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A front-on photograph of the student’s 12 switch prototype “SHOCK 
GENERATOR TYPE ZL DYSON INSTRUMENT COMPANY WALTHAM MASS.” 
which increased in 30 volt increments ending in a maximum shock of 330 volts (SMP, Box 
45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).   
 
 
Having built a shock generator, and with the intention of using Yale students as 
subjects, Milgram and his class then had to refine the basic experimental outline for both 
the “group” and “alone” conditions into a workable logistical procedure.  By late 
November 1960 the class was finally ready to undertake the first set of trial runs—termed 
the “Winter pretests” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-
1970”).  All that remained was to observe the outcome of his students’ crude pilot study.  
As Milgram said:   
 
Before an experiment is carried out it is often hard to visualize exactly what its 
flavor would be.  Thus, there was a certain amount of excitement and anticipation 
as we awaited the first subject.  The study, as carried out by my small groups class 
under my supervision, was not very well controlled (as cited in Blass, 2004, p. 68). 
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The only “group” experiment Milgram later discussed in some detail produced results that 
may have surprised the student observers.  They only confirmed, however, the accuracy of 
his earlier prediction that “certain persons will follow the group”.  As Milgram (1964c, p. 
11) said:  
 
In one of the group experiments the shock level is determined by the ‘lowest level 
suggested by any member of the group.’  Thus the naive subject can completely 
control the shock level.  Pilot studies show that subjects follow the group, or at 
most, fall one step behind the group level.  Frequently, subjects reverse themselves 
and become ardent supporters of the group action.   
 
 Although Milgram originally intended the “alone” condition to be an experimental 
control for the “group” experiment (and even before the trial run “conjectured that persons 
would not, in general, go above the level of ‘Strong Shock’ ” [150 volts]) (SMP, Box 45, 
Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”), it was the results of these first test-runs that 
really caught him by surprise.  As Milgram said: “even under these uncontrolled 
conditions, the behavior of the subjects astonished the undergraduates, and me as well” (as 
cited in Blass, 2004, p. 68; see also Evans, 1980, p. 193).  In greater detail Milgram 
elaborated: “In practice, many subjects were willing to administer the most extreme shocks 
available when commanded by the experimenter [italics added]” (SMP, Box 45, Folder 
160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).42  Something about the experimenter’s commands 
seemed to render it a far stronger BF than he had anticipated.  Other than stating that 
“many” completed the first-ever “alone” pilot run, Milgram did not specify the exact 
proportion of obedient subjects.43  However, if he initially thought that in the “alone” 
conditions “persons would not, in general, go above the level of ‘Strong Shock’ ”, “many” 
subjects completing the experiment would have greatly exceeded his expectations. 
 
While the first trial run left those present “astonished”, and for his students “there 
was a general sense that something extraordinary had happened”, Milgram did “not believe 
that the students could fully appreciate the significance of what they were viewing” (as 
cited in Blass, 2004, p. 68).  As this statement implies, however, he could.  And this was 
probably because only he would have known the original idea had evolved from his 
inclusion of a variety of variables he suspected may have played some role in producing 
                                                 
42
 Because Milgram states that subjects were reacting to the experimenter’s commands, this statement is 
clearly in reference to one of the “alone” conditions. 
 
43
 Milgram (1973, p. 64) has said: “When the very first experiments were carried out, Yale undergraduates 
were used as subjects, and about 60 percent of them were fully obedient” (see also Milgram, 1974, p. 170).  
But Milgram was not specific as to whether this percentage related to the “group” or “alone” variations. 
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the Holocaust.  In other words, what the students deemed merely to be a fascinating 
spectacle, Milgram sensed might provide insights into how something like the Holocaust 
could happen.  It was probably around this period that the ambitious young scholar thought 
that within a few months of starting his academic career he had already found, as Blass put 
it, his “phenomenon of great consequence”. 
 
The initial surprise and ease with which many students would complete the basic 
experimental procedure was soon over-shadowed by Milgram’s curiosity as to why so 
many were willing to complete the procedure: “The laboratory procedures were changed 
frequently in order to explore various possibilities of the experimental situation” (SMP, 
Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).  One change driven by this curiosity 
involved increasing the intensity of the learner’s protests because, according to Milgram 
(as cited in Meyer, 1970), the earlier more gentlemanly version “ ‘didn’t seem to have as 
much effect as I thought it would or should’ ” (p. 128).  Despite having already obtained 
completion rates beyond his initial expectations, he increased this source of strain by 
having “ ‘more violent protestation on the part of the person getting the shock.  All of the 
time, of course, what we were trying to do was not to create a macabre situation, but 
simply to generate disobedience’ ” (Meyer, 1970, p. 128). 
 
While trialing these variations the class also observed some unexpected behaviours: 
 
Subjects frequently averted their eyes from the person they were shocking, often 
turning their heads in an awkward and conspicuous manner.  One subject 
explained: ‘I didn’t want to see the consequences of what I had done.’ . . . .  
Observers write: [‘] . . . . When this fact was brought to their attention they 
indicated that it caused them discomfort to watch the victim in agony.  We note, 
however, that although the subject refuses to look at the victim, he continues to 
administer shocks[’] (SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).   
 
This was a particularly interesting observation because instead of using the SRMs provided 
by Milgram, these subjects appeared to be showing initiative in trying to reduce the tension 
associated with shocking another person by inventing then deploying their own such 
devices.   
 
The first pilot study, nonetheless, revealed two key counterintuitive findings.  First, 
how much easier it was to get many subjects to obey the experimenter’s escalating 
demands.  Secondly, and somewhat related to this, was the surprising discovery that many 
subjects in the “alone” series—the supposed control for the “group” experiments—were 
willing to inflict every shock.  Milgram considered the second finding to be especially 
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important because, should he decide not to use the “alone” series as an experimental 
control, but as a stand-alone series of experiments, he would be exploring a phenomenon 
that, in its surface features, would appear to have little or nothing to do with group 
conformity.  Thus, pursuing the “alone” series could result in the development of his own, 
rather than contributing to Asch’s, research legacy.  Furthermore, the “alone” OTA 
variation also had an obvious Asch-like control: would a lone subject complete with no 
orders to continue? 
 
Although the pilots generated some surprising results and hinted at having 
implications beyond the research laboratory, Milgram remained cautious about his 
students’ “not very well controlled” experiments.  In a document dated 6 August 1961, he 
revealed there was “something [about the student pilots] I was never conviced [sic] of” 
(SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”).  Milgram was not 
specific about the content of his doubts, but his subsequent actions hint that, due to the 
pilot study’s rather amateurishly disjointed procedure, fake-looking shock generator, and 
some of his students’ weak acting skills (Elms, 1995, p. 24; Parker, 2000, p. 110), some of 
the subjects may have sensed the experiment to have been a ruse and only completed 
because they believed the learner was not really being harmed.  Upon receiving funding, 
Milgram immediately addressed these three issues. 
 
However, one would suspect that the more believable the experiments’ seemingly 
destructive implications became, the more resistant to obeying the subjects were likely to 
become.  This potential obstacle could defeat Milgram’s initial desire to produce a 
strikingly high completion rate.  Milgram’s solution to this potential problem seems to 
have been to introduce into his basic experimental procedure even more BFs and SRMs 
that might increase the probability of completions.  One obvious example of the latter was 
a procedural innovation that can be traced back to an idea Milgram proposed in Figure 1, 
regarding a “Waver [sic] of responsibility—from experimenter—For Germa[n]y”.   
 
Upon completion of the winter pretests and in a document headed “Report on Pilot 
Resarch [sic]” dated 4 December 1960, Milgram pointed out that “One major argument of 
subjects is that the victim has volunteered for the experiment”, and consequently some 
subjects resisted completing because it was apparently the learner’s prerogative to “leave 
whenever he wants to” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 164, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”).  It 
would seem this argument may have emboldened some subjects to successfully resist the 
experimenter’s demands that they continue.  Milgram proposed:  
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Therefore: the following change should be made; . . . the assistant should report to 
the main experimenter that the subject does not want to continue . . . . The 
experimenter requires that the experiment continue.  Possible conversation: 
. . . . ASSISTANT: Sir, the subject says he will refuse to answer and 
demands to be released. 
EXPERIMENTER: I Have responsibility for this situation, and I say, let’s 
go on with the experiment.  According to the rules when the subject gives a 
wrong answer or no answer he will receive an electric shock.  Now if he 
refused to answer on every occasion he will just get shocked.  So it is in his 
interest to learn the correct responses; now, let s [sic] go on.  Proceed with 
the next question (SMP, Box 46, Folder 164, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-
1962”). 
 
Here Milgram was introducing another SRM: accepting the offer that only the 
experimenter was responsible for the subject’s actions might reduce the latter’s tension 
regarding their continued participation.  This idea was refined further in the official 
research programme to the point where the experimenter would simply respond to any 
form of subject resistance by curtly stating: “I’m responsible for anything that happens to 
him [the learner].  Continue please” (Milgram, 1974, p. 74).   
 
 
5.3 The Second OTA Research Proposal 
 
After the first pilot studies, Milgram wrote a second research proposal.  On 25 
January 1961 he sent this to the NSF, which, of the three originally approached funding 
agencies, appeared to be the most receptive (Blass, 2004, p. 69).  It began with a more 
detailed overview of the procedural technique.  The project’s potential was this time more 
powerfully bolstered by an overview of the winter pretests which “yielded unexpected 
results of considerable interest” (SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).   
 
Milgram was unsure as to why so many subjects in the pilots were totally obedient 
but “with an ultimate view towards theoretical integration”, he intended to find out (SMP, 
Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).  His approach to producing what was 
obviously to be a post hoc theoretical account was to be divided into two why phases.  The 
first why phase, actually “The crux of the study”, was to “illuminate the process of 
obedience” by “systematically vary[ing] the factors we believe alter the degree of 
obedience to the experimental commands” (SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 
1961-1967”).  This was possible because the basic experimental procedure was amenable 
to “extensive parametric variation” and, in conjunction with plenty of deductive reasoning 
would, so he believed, eventually expose the key factor/s behind the obedient subjects’ 
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behaviour (SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).  In support of these 
points, Milgram stated in the proposal: “I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of 
identifying and reducing to quantifiable form unanticipated variables as they arise in the 
course of experimentation” (SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).  
Milgram wanted to maintain a free hand that would enable him to test ad hoc then 
eliminate any emerging potential explanations: 
 
Increasing familiarity with the subjects’ performance, thoughtful consideration of 
the quantitative relationships obtained, and intensive interviewing of subjects breed 
the most penetrating hypotheses.  At this stage it is unwise to allow any narrow 
theoretical view limit the kinds of insights provided by the experiments themselves 
(SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).    
 
The second why phase was to “be considerably more focused, concentrating on 
motive processes underlying the subject’s behavior.  The inquiry remains experimental, 
though supplemented by tools of personality research” (SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: 
“Grants 1961-1967”).  It was envisaged that this line of enquiry, which was to involve the 
expertise of some of Milgram’s colleagues, might include the post-experimental analysis 
of fantasy material and the application of certain psychoanalytical techniques.  Milgram 
had little interest in such areas of personality psychology.  However, this second phase 
clearly illustrates how open-minded he was regarding the potential of other approaches in 
shedding theoretical light on why subjects might complete the experiment.   
 
The second proposal also presented several potentially fruitful variations on the 
basic experimental procedure that, after observing the winter pretests, Milgram had come 
to suspect might prove capable of altering the completion rate.  The first mentioned, 
presumably because at that time it was of most interest, was a new idea stimulated by the 
earlier observations surrounding the unexpected reaction of some subjects who looked 
away from the learner while continuing to inflict the shocks.  This observation suggested: 
 
the salience of the victim may in some degree regulate their performance.  This can 
be tested by varying the ‘immediacy’ of the victim.  Three conditions are 
suggested: 1) the victim is completely within view of the subject, without 
obstruction of any kind between them; 2) the victim is placed behind soundproof 
glass, as in the pilot studies; 3) the victim is placed in another room, and though his 
presence is assured, can neither be seen nor heard by the subject (SMP, Box 45, 
Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”). 
 
Another suggested variation related to suspicions during the winter pretests that the 
high completion rates may have been due to the highly competitive characteristics of 
Yale’s Ivy League student population (Milgram, 1974, p. 170).  Thus, as a variation, 
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Milgram suggested the possibility of “two replications . . . with adult populations” (SMP, 
Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).  Soon afterwards this was changed to 
using only adult subjects from the wider community.  A particularly prominent change was 
also discussed in the section on potential variations surrounding the issue of “obedience 
and group process”.  That is, although the “group” experiments were apparently still to 
“constitute a major concern of the present research”, since the winter pretests they had, for 
reasons mentioned, been relegated from dominating the research programme to consisting 
of a couple of minor variations (SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).  
Finally, for reasons that will later become apparent, the propaganda variation mentioned in 
the first proposal had slipped from second to last place in the line-up (and was eventually 
dropped altogether).  
 
The increasing focus on the “alone” over the “group”-type variations showed that 
Milgram’s research idea was transforming into something very different from that of his 
main intellectual mentor, Solomon Asch, and more towards that of the individual’s 
response to OTA.  However, it is important to note that the OTA idea still retained a 
central intrinsic feature that Milgram had long known was responsible for making “Asch’s 
expt [sic] . . . a Great Experiment”.  That is, Asch’s group/conformity experiment required 
the subject to encounter and then resolve a seemingly “private” internal “conflict” to 
conform with or rebel against the group.  Similarly, Milgram’s idea also required that the 
subject resolve a seemingly private internal conflict: to obey or disobey a legitimate 
authority figure demanding that they inflict increasingly intense shocks on an innocent 
person.  This internal conflict, as noted by Seibel (2005, pp. 350-351), may have produced 
Festinger-like cognitive dissonance.   
 
Even this similarity, however, was evolving into something quite different: by the 
second proposal Milgram was conveying a belief that, inherent within his but absent from 
Asch’s experiment, was a dilemma with a significant moral dimension.  To clarify, in 
Milgram’s (1974, p. 41) view, across all societies there exists a widely held axiom that it is 
a “fundamental breach of moral conduct to hurt another person against his will” (see also 
Kaufmann, 1967, pp. 321-322; Strudler & Warren, 2001, p. 157; Wilson, 1993, pp. 1-54).  
Any decision to obey would (unlike the trivial implications of conforming in Asch’s 
experiments) necessitate the violation of this moral axiom.  Milgram believed there was a 
wrong and a right way of resolving the intrinsic moral dilemma within his experimental 
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paradigm,44 and he was strongly of the opinion that total obedience was, as Miller (1986) 
has pointed out, an example of a “moral failure on the part of the subjects” (p. 45).      
 
On 3 May 1961 an obviously impressed NSF research committee informed 
Milgram of its acceptance of his second proposal.  Across a two-year period starting 1 June 
1961, Milgram received two instalments totaling about $US 60,000 (Elms, 1995, p. 26).45 
Upon receiving the funding Milgram prepared for a second and much more intensive set of 
pilot studies, which would soon be followed by the official research programme.   
 
Milgram hired a graduate psychology student, Alan Elms, as his research assistant, 
whose main task was to ensure a continuous supply of adult subjects from the wider New 
Haven Connecticut area.  In a letter to Elms dated 27 June 1961, Milgram stated that at this 
early stage: “The goal this summer is to run from 250-300 subjects in nine or ten 
experimental conditions.  Only if this is accomplished can the summer be considered a 
success” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 127, Titled: “Correspondence 1961”).  On the topic of 
subject recruitment, Milgram added: “The advertisement was placed in the New Haven 
Register and yielded a disappointingly low response.  There is no immediate crisis, 
however, since we do have about 300 qualified applicants” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 127, 
Titled: “Correspondence 1961”).  This is a little surprising because his generous research 
grant meant he could now better attract subjects with the offer of financial remuneration.  
For the official research programme, Milgram settled upon the sum of $4.50 per subject, 
which at the time was a generous but not excessive amount of money.  Whether it was 
intentional or not, it could be argued that paying the subjects introduced yet another BF—a 
contractual obligation to do as one is asked and complete the experiment.46   
 
In this letter to Elms, Milgram drew an analogy between the organisation of the 
OTA experiments and the Holocaust, while also articulating his belief that the resolution of 
the internal conflict within his experiment involved an issue of personal morality:   
 
But before long, in your role of Solicitor General, you will have to think of ways to 
deliver more people to the laboratory… I will admit it bears some ressemblence 
                                                 
44
 As Milgram said in April 1968: “Disobedience in this situation requires nothing more than activation of the 
most basic moral values in each individual” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 168, Titled: “Notes; Binding 1961-1968”).   
 
45
 Blass (2004, p. 114) states that Milgram received three grants from the NSF. 
 
46
 However, as Milgram (1963) later noted: “Forty-three subjects, undergraduates at Yale University, were 
run in the [pilot] experiment without payment.  The results are very similar to those obtained with paid 
subjects” (p. 377).  Nevertheless, as it will soon be shown, payment was still likely to have been an issue of 
importance to many eventual subjects.   
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[sic] to Mr. Eichman’s [sic] position, but you at least should have no 
misconceptions of what we do with our daily quota.  We give them a chance to 
resist the commands of malevolent authority and assert their alliance with morality 
(SMP, Box 43, Folder 127, Titled: “Correspondence 1961”).    
 
Perhaps in reference to the unauthentic appearance of his students’ prototype shock 
generator, in this letter Milgram also commented: “The apparatus is almost done and looks 
thoroughly professional” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 127, Titled: “Correspondence 1961”).  
Illustrating just how authentic the new device appeared, Milgram stated in a letter written a 
few weeks later to Henry Riecken from the NSF that: “The new device passed the acid test 
when two electrical engineers examined the instrument and failed to realize it was a 
simulated device.  Details were very carefully handled to insure an appearance of 
authenticity” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 127, Titled: “Correspondence 1961”).  The final 
device is shown in Figure 5: 
 
                         
 
 
Figure 5: Milgram’s 30 switch “SHOCK GENERATOR, TYPE ZLB, DYSON 
INSTRUMENT COMPANY, WALTHAM, MASS.  OUTPUT 15 VOLTS – 450 VOLTS” 
(Blass, 2004, p. 79).   
 
 
Apart from its more professional appearance, one obvious difference between this 
and his students’ shock generator was that the final version had 30 rather than 12 switches.  
Also, instead of increasing in 30-volt increments ending in a 330-volt shock, the newer 
version increased in 15-volt increments and ended in a much more significant 450-volt 
shock.  As the following will illustrate, these modifications probably represented an 
additional BF aimed at increasing the completion rates.   
 
In the second research proposal (dated 25 January 1961), while alluding to his 
initial goal, Milgram asked the following question: “if one is trying to maximize 
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obedience, is it better to inform a person of the worst of what he may be asked to do at the 
outset, or is compliance best extracted piecemeal?” (SMP, Box 45; Folder 160, Titled: 
“Grants 1961—1967”).  The coercive power of piecemeal compliance was, as shown in 
Figure 1, included in Milgram’s earliest drawings of his nine-switch shock generator.  
Although Milgram was aware of the probable importance of this BF in increasing the 
probability of completions (see Milgram, 1974, p. 149, 1977 p. 129), he did not discuss its 
likely implications to the extent of subsequent commentators.  For example, Gilbert (1981) 
discerned a resemblance between the OTA experiments’ gradual escalation in shock 
intensity and a method of persuasion that, several years after the OTA study, became 
known as the foot-in-the-door technique (Freedman & Fraser, 1966).  The foot-in-the-door 
technique is where persons are more likely to agree to a significant request if it is preceded 
by a comparatively insignificant request.  Gilbert (1981, p. 692) has explained, this BF:  
 
may have two important consequences: (a) it engages subjects in committing 
precedent-setting acts of obedience before they realize the ‘momentum’ which the 
situation is capable of creating, and the ‘ugly direction’ in which that momentum is 
driving them; and (b) it erects and reinforces the impression that quitting at any 
particular level of shock is unjustified (since consecutive shock levels differ only 
slightly and quantitatively).  Both consequences of the gradated shock procedure 
may conspire to deprive subjects of the credible rationale they need to quit at any 
given point before completing the experiment (see also Eckman, 1977, p. 97; 
Mooks, 2004, p. 338; Sabini & Silver, 1982, pp. 69-71).     
 
Something not discussed in the literature is that, probably with an eye towards his goal of 
initially maximising the completion rate, Milgram appears to have engaged in an extension 
of the foot-in-the-door logic.  That is, compared to his students’ 12-switch shock generator, 
the new version had many more smaller steps that ended in the infliction of a much more 
powerful final shock.  
 
The shock generator not only had design features that, via incremental entrapment, 
increased the likelihood of binding subjects into inflicting the shocks, it also potentially 
enabled them to do so from a remote distance, and was therefore another SRM increasing 
the likelihood of completions.  In Milgram’s (1974, p. 157) words some years later:  
 
Thus, creating physical distance between the subject and victim, and dampening the 
painful cries of the victim, reduces strain.  The shock generator itself constitutes an 
important buffer, a precise and impressive instrument that creates a sharp 
discontinuity between the ease required to depress one of its thirty switches and the 
strength of impact on the victim.  The depression of a switch is precise, scientific, 
and impersonal.  If our subjects had to strike the victim with their fists, they would 
be more reluctant to do so.      
 
 66 
As mentioned, Milgram invented/selected this device because he intuitively sensed and/or 
past experiences suggested that, with some coercion, most ordinary people might use it on 
another human being. 
 
 
5.4 Second Pilot Series: Summer Pre-tests 1961 
 
According to Blass (2004, p. 75), Milgram worked assiduously during the months 
of June and July 1961 to logistically organise, then “fine-tune”, the basic experimental 
procedure to his “exacting specifications”.  Upon completion of the more authentic-looking 
shock generator, Milgram (acting for the most part as the learner) and Elms (as the 
experimenter) embarked on the second series of pilot studies known as the “Summer Pre-
tests 1961” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”).  This 
time, using only adult subjects and focusing on the issue of victim proximity (first 
mentioned in the second research proposal), three separate pilot-runs were organised (27 
July, 2 and 4 August).  According to the above document dated 6 August 1961, the first 
session test-ran the “voice feedback condition” where the subject could only hear the 
learner’s verbal responses to the shocks.  In the second session, they again test-ran the 
“voice feedback” experiment, but also what Milgram termed the “no feed back” condition 
(later termed the Truly Remote Pilot).  Although in this condition the learner could not be 
seen or heard, the subject was led to believe that the learner was receiving shocks.  Initially 
there were problems—a few “subjects penetrated the cover story”.  However, after some 
minor trial and error refinements, and unlike the first pilot which procedurally he “was 
never conviced [sic] of”, by the second pilot run the “Procedure worked extremely well” 
with “No penetration”.  Blass (2004, p. 75) seems to have captured what Milgram was 
trying to achieve during these pilot sessions when he said “Pretest subjects were ‘run’ 
through the procedure until all the kinks were worked out.”     
 
Once the basic procedure was running smoothly, after running the “no feed back” 
condition it became clearer again that it was going to be difficult to get a large proportion 
of subjects to disobey:   
 
It was thought that the verbal and voltage designations on the control panel would 
create sufficient pressure to curtail the subject’s obedience.  However, this was not 
the case.  In the absence of protests from the learner, virtually all subjects, once 
commanded, went blithely to the end of the board, seemingly indifferent to the 
verbal designations (‘Extreme Shock’ and ‘Danger: Severe Shock’) (Milgram, 
1965a, p. 61).    
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By the final set of pilot studies, Milgram had achieved his initial goal of maximising the 
completion rate.  As Milgram (1965a, p. 61) noted, however, having produced near total 
obedience raised a problem:  
 
This deprived us of an adequate basis for scaling obedient tendencies.  A force had 
to be introduced that would strengthen the subject’s resistance to the 
experimenter’s commands, and reveal individual difference in terms of a 
distribution of break-off points.     
 
Milgram changed the no feed back procedure so that in the first official experiment 
subjects experienced at least some perceptual feedback—auditory stimulation—through the 
learner banging on the wall upon the infliction of the 300 and 315-volt shocks, and 
thereafter falling silent.  The intention of this procedural adaptation was (instead of his 
more typical approach of attempting to reduce tension) now to slightly increase the 
intensity of strain experienced by the subjects. 
 
The second set of pilots revealed several other potential issues.  For the learner’s 
taped responses to the shocks—where, after swapping roles, “Elms is voice” (SMP, Box 
46, Folder 163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”)—Milgram suspected he would 
need an older, probably more authentic, voice for the learner’s role.  Related to this point, 
upon later testing the “proximity condition”, where the learner was in full view of the 
subject, Milgram thought Elms’s acting (again, as the learner) was unconvincing and 
increased the probability of subjects penetrating the cover story (SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, 
Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”).  A more believable learner was needed.  
Milgram probably felt similarly about his students’ first pilot study because before the 
second set of pilots he had already hired people who he thought, after much practice, 
would appear more authentic and convincing than Elms and himself.  Around this period 
Milgram had selected John Williams and James McDonough to play the central roles of 
the experimenter and learner, respectively.  The two men had been invited to observe the 4 
August session.  Although neither were professional actors—Williams was a high school 
biology teacher and McDonough a payroll auditor—after many rehearsals, and as 
Milgram’s (1965c) Obedience (a filmed experiment) illustrated, both proved extremely 
convincing in their respective roles.47   
                                                 
47
 Mixon (1989, pp. 37-38) has suggested that McDonough “was not a very good actor” and that his screams 
“are neither convincing nor moving.”  It is true that, as Milgram (1974, p. 173) himself conceded, a small 
proportion of subjects were clearly unconvinced by the deception.  But compared with the few who suspected 
that McDonough and his screams were fake, as documents and audiotapes at the SMP illustrate, many more 
remained unsure: “Little doubt in my mind . . . whether my legs were being pulled, I was pretty sure they 
were but I wasn’t sure” (SMP, Box 153, #2301).  Also, most conceded to having been fooled: “You’re quite 
an actor, maybe you’ll get the Oscar” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2327).  Afterwards, some subjects 
remained sceptical that the learner did not receive any shocks: “Since I’m not convinced that the learner in 
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That Milgram deemed it important to obtain an experimental team who were 
competent and convincing actors makes sense, but it does not appear to have been the most 
important prerequisite.  For example, consider the following written statement made by 
Milgram during McDonough’s job interview: “* Definitely desired as victim  The only 
trouble is he cannot act to [sic] well – in my estimation” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 127, Titled: 
“Correspondence 1961”).  Milgram clarified what he meant on this document when he 
said: “Probably could not act face to face, however”.  Although Milgram clearly assessed 
McDonough’s apparent inability to act as undesirable, there was clearly something else 
about this man that made him, as Milgram said on this document, “Excellent” even 
“perfect”.  Milgram continued: “This man would be perfect as a victim” because “he is 
mild and submissive; not at all academic”.  He would later describe McDonough as 
“affable” and “unthreatening” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 174, Titled: “Notes: Method 1962”).   
It would seem that Milgram intuitively desired a benign learner because he sensed that 
subjects were more likely to continue shocking such a person, over a learner they assessed 
to be the converse (SRM).  This, it would seem, made McDonough the “perfect” learner.  
And, as Milgram noted himself during McDonough’s interview, his apparent inability to 
act face-to-face was probably not all that significant an issue because he “can train” (SMP, 
Box 43, Folder 127, Titled: “Correspondence 1961”).  On top of this, rehearsals would 
only build confidence and, anyway, because most of the learner’s role was to be pre-
recorded on tape (a procedure amenable to allowing for many rehearsals to perfect his 
lines), only a small proportion of McDonough’s role involved direct subject interaction.   
 
Milgram’s hiring of Williams as the experimenter also revolved around the latter’s 
personal characteristics: as a type of BF, subjects were surely more likely to obey a “stern, 
intellectual looking man” who played his experimenter’s “role in a cold, austere manner” 
rather than, say, a more carefree person with no semblance of intellectual authority (SMP, 
Box 46, Folder 174, Titled: “Notes: Method 1962”).   
 
After introducing many ad hoc trial and error innovations and refinements, on 7 
August 1961 Milgram was finally ready to embark on the official research programme.   
 
The first official experiment Milgram undertook was termed the Remote condition 
where, except for the banging on the wall after the 300 and 315-volt switch, the learner 
                                                                                                                                                    
the experiment was acting, I am holding off any comments until I have positive proof that it was rigged” 
(SMP, Box 44, Divider “NO LABEL”, #0820).  For a similar example, see Chapter Seven (p. 100). 
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could not be heard, seen, or need not be touched.  This experiment resulted in a 65 percent 
completion rate.  Milgram was probably expecting a higher rate of completions than this, 
considering that he introduced only subtle changes (infrequent wall-banging) to the “no 
feed back” pilot where “virtually all” completed the experiment.  Nonetheless, with most 
subjects still inflicting all of the shocks, the still surprisingly high 65 percent result ensured 
Milgram’s achievement of his initial goal of maximising the completion rate. 
   
Armed with this data, Milgram soon afterwards started writing his first article on 
the OTA research programme, titled Behavioral Study of Obedience, which was submitted 
for publication in December 1961.  The first two paragraphs of this article mentioned the 
Holocaust, hinting that there was some connection between this event and the OTA 
experiments.48  These initial paragraphs were followed by an overview of the general 
method and procedure of his experimental paradigm, and a more specific outline of the 
article’s centrepiece: the Remote condition and its counterintuitive 65 percent completion 
rate.  In the absence of any theory, the article ends with a number of potential factors 
Milgram believed “go some distance in explaining the high amount of obedience 
observed” (Milgram, 1963, p. 377).  A footnote indicates that the results from other 
experiments testing the validity of these and other factors were forthcoming.  The article 
raised “extraordinarily vital and sobering questions” (Miller, Collins & Brief, 1995, p. 4) 
but, in the absence of any concise theoretical component, it provided no answers, and this 
deficiency resulted in reviewers twice recommending its rejection.  One reviewer, Edward 
E. Jones, argued that because the article had no theoretical formulation or hypothesis, the 
Remote experiment was, at best, a “ ‘triumph of social engineering’ ” (Parker, 2000, p. 
112).  Nonetheless, after some amendments, in October of 1963 the Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology agreed to publish the piece.  Irrespective of the initial rejections, the 
article’s presentation of the Remote experiment and its surprising 65 percent completion 
rate became Milgram’s “best-known result” (Miller, 1986, p. 9).  It had its intended effect. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
How did Milgram rapidly transform a large proportion of ordinary people into 
willing torturers of other human beings?  Several key factors were presented which were 
all likely to have contributed to the achievement of what was clearly Milgram’s initial goal 
to maximise the proportion of subjects willing to complete his experiment and inflict harm 
                                                 
48
 “Obedience, as a determinant of behavior, is of particular relevance to our time.  It has been reliably 
established that from 1933-45 millions of innocent persons were systematically slaughtered on command” 
(Milgram, 1963, p. 371). 
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on other human beings.  First, Milgram drew on some of his past experiences with strain-
resolving or binding innovations.  One example was his early decision to use the inherently 
strain-resolving Shock Generator—the remote infliction of electric shocks—as his means 
of inflicting harm (a common form of punishment in psychology). 
  
Secondly, Milgram relied upon his acute intuition: the seemingly unconscious 
incorporation of strain-resolving or binding innovations that he suspected were most likely 
to work.  An example of this is manifest in his very first sketches of the then-hypothetical 
shock generator into which Milgram intuitively incorporated the idea that across a number 
of shock switches the intensification of pain should be inflicted gradually—by many small 
steps—better known as the foot-in-the-door phenomenon.   
 
A third, and particularly powerful factor contributing to the Remote condition’s 
high completion rate, was Milgram’s use during the pilot study-stage upon the also 
intuitively driven ad hoc trial and error exploratory method of discovery.  As stated in the 
epigraphic statement at the start of this chapter, the ad hoc trial and error exploratory 
method of discovery is where:  
 
a scientist has no very clear idea what will happen, and aims to find out.  He [sic] 
has a feeling for the ‘direction’ in which to go (increase the pressure and see what 
happens) but no clear expectations of what to expect (Harré & Second, 1972, p. 
69).  
 
During the extensive pilot studies, this approach saw Milgram gradually introduce to his 
increasingly more refined experimental procedure an expanding variety of increasingly 
powerful BFs and SRMs (many of which enhanced the manipulative power of some of his 
weaker intuitive binding and/or strain-resolving-type ideas or even led to the introduction 
of altogether new ideas for SRMs and/or BFs that were completely beyond the realms of 
his creative imagination49).  With regard to this method of discovering new SRMs/BFs, as 
Milgram (as cited in Evans, 1980, p. 191) said: “Many of the most interesting things we 
find out in experimentation you don’t learn until you carry it out.” 
 
Milgram’s surprising results were largely due to the creative synthesis of the above 
three factors, which gradually led to his discovery and then incorporation of the following 
BFs and SRMs: the more-likely acceptable rationale for inflicting the shocks (SRM), the 
piecemeal escalation of shock intensity (BF), the ability of the shock generator to inflict 
                                                 
49
 For example and as mentioned, after running his student’s pilot, some subjects would look away from the 
person they were shocking.  This observation led Milgram to manipulate victim proximity, the apogee of 
which led to the “no feed back” pilot study where basically every subject inflicted all the shocks. 
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harm remotely (SRM), the removal of responsibility for the subjects actions (SRM), 
providing an ambiguously labelled outcome for the last shock switch—XXX (SRM), a 
pushy experimenter (BF), and a seemingly harmless learner (SRM), to name a few.   
 
From the inception of his first inchoate ideas through to the end of the pilot studies, 
the gradual accumulation, refinement, and incorporation of these BFs and SRMs seemed to 
increase cumulatively the probability of any one subject completing the experiment (see 
Tilker, 1970, p. 100).  In fact, during the second set of pilot studies, Milgram had 
introduced so many patently powerful BFs and SRMs that he went too far resulting in 
“virtually all” subjects completing the experiment, achieving his initial goal of 
maximisation of the completion rate.  Because he required a scale to measure obedient 
tendencies, Milgram decided to introduce a potential source of strain—auditory 
stimulation—that he was confident would “strengthen the subject’s resistance to the 
experimenter’s commands” (illustrating that, when it was necessary, Milgram was clearly 
capable of engaging in the reverse).  It was this adaptation that ended in his Remote 
condition and its most (in)famous 65 percent completion rate. 
 
Having achieved his initial goal of discovering how to ensure a large proportion of 
ordinary people inflicted harm on another human, Milgram was now in a position to 
address the “crux” of his research programme.  That is, he could pursue his aim of 
explaining why so many of his subjects were willing to torture an innocent human being. 
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Chapter Six: The Obedience to Authority Research 
Programme and Milgram’s Explanation of His Findings 
 
 
He seemed to have an intuitive ‘feel’ for what would be an interesting or relevant experimental 
variation.  Thus, he would first perform the experiment and then concern himself with formally 
accounting for the result.  Given that there was virtually no previous systematic research on 
obedience, it was understandable that Milgram’s focus was essentially in a context of discovery or 
exploration rather than confirming or disconfirming specific hypotheses—Miller (1986, p.45). 
 
 
Having purposefully obtained a high completion rate in his first official 
experiment, Milgram then moved on to the crux of his study: an attempt to explain his 
subjects’ obedient behaviour.  As outlined in the second proposal, his aim was to convert 
emerging questions into a variety of testable propositions, thus generating an array of 
slight variations on the basic experimental procedure.  After having noted the direction and 
degree of (dis)obedience obtained, Milgram believed that new questions, insights and 
potential explanations (also eventually testable) would emerge.  As he said in the second 
proposal: “Increasing familiarity with the subjects’ performance . . . breed[s] the most 
penetrating hypothesis”.  Not only had Milgram used an exploratory trial and error method 
in discovering how to obtain a high completion rate, with his attention now on the “why” 
question he was expecting that this approach would illuminate all the key factors—positive 
and negative—capable of increasing the probability of (dis)obedience.  He assumed his 
advancing knowledge would provide a strong foundation from which to then engage in 
post hoc theoretical development.  Having outlined Milgram’s strategy, what was 
Milgram’s exploratory journey?  What results did he obtain?  And how did he theoretically 
explain these findings?  
 
The previous chapter pointed out that the first pilot studies immediately drew 
Milgram’s attention to the potential relationship between physical distance (separation 
between the subject and the learner) and the completion rate.  The Remote condition, the 
first official experiment, was actually the first of a set of experiments termed the Proximity 
Series.  The increasingly more proximate variations on the Remote experiment included the 
Voice-Feedback condition (where the subject could hear all the learner’s verbal reactions 
to the shocks) and then the Proximity condition (where the subject and learner were in the 
same room and so that the learner’s reactions to being shocked could directly be heard and 
seen).  As expected, increased proximity resulted in a lower completion rate, with 65, 62.5, 
and 40 percent of subjects completing the Remote, Voice-Feedback, and Proximity 
experiments, respectively.  The results may have been in the direction Milgram expected 
but, confirming the difficulty in generating disobedience, he was surprised by the large 
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proportion of subjects who were still willing to complete the Proximity experiment (where 
the screaming learner was only an arm’s length away).  Due to this result, Milgram ad hoc 
decided to devise an additional variation in this series—the so-called Touch-Proximity 
experiment.   
 
The Touch-Proximity experiment was similar to the Proximity condition until the 
infliction of the 150-volt shock, when the learner would suddenly refuse to put his hand on 
the shock plate.  The experimenter would then instruct the subject to force the learner’s 
hand on the plate so punishment for any further incorrect answers could be administered.  
As Milgram said before undertaking this variation: “I seriously doubt that many subjects 
will go allong [sic] with the command for very long” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 175, Titled: 
“Notes: Proximity”).  But, much to his surprise, even though the learner, according to 
Milgram, “ ‘was screaming his guts out’ ” and the subject “had to physically struggle with 
him in order to get his hand down on the shock generator” (Meyer, 1970, p. 130), 30 
percent of subjects completed this variation.  As he neared the completion of this specific 
condition, on 21 September 1961, Milgram made a particularly explicit statement in a 
letter addressed to Henry Riecken at the NSF, suggesting some connection between the 
experimental programme and the perpetration of the Holocaust: 
 
I once wondered whether in all of the United States a vicious government could 
find enough moral imbeciles to meet the personnel requirements of a national 
system of death camps, of the sort that were maintained in Germany.  I am now 
beginning to think that the full complement could be recruited in New Haven 
(Blass, 2004, p. 100).   
 
The Touch-Proximity condition further broadened Milgram’s earlier estimations of 
the likely parameters of blind obedience.  He had become increasingly confident that it 
would be possible to introduce other highly stressful modifications—new sources of 
strain—to the basic experimental procedure that, to the surprise of outsiders, would still 
probably generate a high completion rate.  Soon after the completion of the above series of 
experiments Milgram lost access to his laboratory facilities, and the obedience to authority 
(OTA) research programme was transferred to the basement of the same building.  This 
seems to have provided Milgram with sufficient reason to start all over again by replacing 
his intended baseline study (the Remote condition) with a new and much more disturbing 
one (Milgram, 1974, pp. 55-56).   
 
The new Baseline experiment resembled the Voice-Feedback condition (where 
subjects could hear the learner’s verbal reactions to the shocks), except for the inclusion of 
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the following strain-inducing innovations.  First, while being hooked up to the shock plate, 
the learner (in the presence of the subject) would from then onwards casually point out:  
“ ‘When I was at the Westhaven V.A. Hospital, a few years ago, they detected a slight 
heart condition.  Nothing serious, but are these shocks dangerous?’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 
56).  The experimenter explained in a dismissive tone that although the shocks may be 
painful, they caused no permanent tissue damage.  Secondly, during the standardised tape 
recordings, the learner would make explicit references to this medical condition at the 150, 
195, and 330-volt switches, with minor variations on “My heart’s bothering me” (Milgram, 
1974, p. 56).  Finally, unlike the earlier experiments (where from the 300 to 450-volt 
switch the subject refused to answer any questions and, upon being shocked, would cry out 
until all the shocks had been inflicted),50 from the 345-volt switch onwards the learner’s 
increasingly excruciating reactions to the apparent shocks would suddenly stop (giving the 
more disturbing impression that he had, at least, been rendered unconscious).   
 
These strain-inducing additions to the Voice Feedback procedure failed to raise 
levels of disobedience.  In the different laboratory premises the (new) Baseline condition 
also generated a 65 percent completion rate.  Along with the first Remote condition, this 
was to become Milgram’s other most (in)famous experiment, largely because it was the 
centerpiece of the widely viewed Obedience (a filmed experiment) (see Milgram, 1965c).   
 
Having completed the first five experiments, Milgram found himself in a position 
that, before the first pilot study, he could never have envisioned.  He had come to the 
counterintuitive realisation that obtaining high completion rates was actually the easy part, 
and what was going to be difficult was introducing sources of strain that might better 
promote disobedience.  In his words: 
   
At many points we attempted to establish a boundary.  Cries from the victim were 
inserted; not good enough.  The victim claimed heart trouble; subjects still shocked 
him on command.  The victim pleaded that he be let free, and his answers no longer 
                                                 
50
 As Milgram (1965a, p. 62) said in relation to the first four experiments: “At 300 volts the victim shouts in 
desperation that he will no longer provide answers to the memory test; and at 315 volts, after a violent 
scream, he reaffirms with vehemence that he is no longer a participant.  From this point on, he provides no 
answers, but shrieks in agony whenever a shock is administered; this continues through 450 volts.”  This 
statement is an exaggeration, as highlighted by the following learner response from the Proximity experiment 
after the penultimate 435-volt shock: “Ahhh.  What’s the use in going on with this thing?  I told you, I’m not 
going on with the experiment anymore” (SMP, Box 155, Audiotape #0303).  Upon which, the experimenter 
said, “Just relax please.  Try and concentrate on what the teacher is saying.  Please continue Teacher” (SMP, 
Box 155, Audiotape #0303).  Although these first four experiments were included in the official research 
programme, because Milgram was still refining the experimental procedure they were really extensions of his 
pilot studies (or should have been labelled as such).  He could have re-run the Proximity Series using the 
standardised (new) Baseline procedure.  It certainly would have been interesting to observe how subjects in 
the Touch-Proximity condition would have reacted at the 345-volt switch to the experimenter’s demand that 
they force the unconscious learner’s hand on to the shock plate. 
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registered on the signal box; subjects continued to shock him.  At the outset we had 
not conceived that such drastic procedures would be needed to generate 
disobedience, and each step was added only as the ineffectiveness of the earlier 
techniques became clear [italics added] (Milgram, 1965a, p. 74).   
 
Milgram wondered around this point in the experimental programme: “What is the limit of 
such obedience?” (Milgram, 1965a, p. 74).   
 
 With the intention of systematically varying the factors he suspected were most 
likely to alter the degree of obedience, Milgram introduced a score of variations on the 
(new) Baseline experiment over the next eight months.  Most of these variations were later 
presented by Milgram (1974) under the following three general categories.  First, Further 
Variations and Controls (which this thesis has broken down further into Ad Hoc Testing of 
Justifications, Conditions Stimulated by Emerging Questions, and the Proximity of 
Authority Series).  Secondly, there were the Role Permutations Series and finally the 
Group Effects Series.  The following will present Milgram’s remaining findings in this 
order. 
 
 
6.1 Further Variations and Controls: ad hoc Testing of Justifications  
 
In the first few conditions Milgram noted that subjects frequently justified their 
blind obedience on the grounds that the learner had earlier freely agreed to participate and 
had not stipulated any conditions regarding their subsequent treatment.  Therefore, 
according to some subjects, irrespective of the learner’s eventually excruciating plight, 
they felt contractually bound to complete the experiment.  Milgram therefore decided to 
test the veracity of this justification by undertaking a slight variation on the Baseline 
experiment.  He termed this variation The Victim’s Limited Contract.  From the start and in 
the presence of the subject, the learner pointed out: “ ‘I’ll agree to be in it, but only on 
condition that you let me out when I say so; that’s the only condition’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 
64).  Begrudgingly, the experimenter would agree.  Unlike the Baseline experiment, the 
learner in this variation explicitly stipulated prior conditions that were to dictate his 
continued participation.  Upon reaching the 150-volt shock switch, the learner would 
demand that the experiment be immediately discontinued.  However, the experimenter 
ignored the request and, in clear breach of the verbal contact, continued to demand that the 
subject inflict further shocks.  Irrespective of this, 40 percent of all subjects completed this 
variation.  Because this result was 25 percent lower than the Baseline condition, it was 
clearly a source of strain for many subjects.  However, for the 40 percent of obedient 
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subjects more powerful forces were clearly more influential. 
  
Another frequently encountered justification offered by subjects for completing 
was that the experiment was conducted at an elite institution of learning—Yale University.  
This “gave them confidence in the integrity, competence, and benign purposes of the 
personnel” (Milgram, 1965a, p. 69).  Many also stated that had the experiments been 
conducted by a far less distinguished institution, they would not have inflicted all the 
shocks.  Milgram decided to test the credibility of this justification in a variation termed 
Institutional Context (Bridgeport).  He moved his research programme to a rather shabby 
office block located on the main street in the industrial town of Bridgeport, Connecticut.  
With no ties to Yale (or any other recognisable organisation), and under the auspices of a 
company titled Research Associates of Bridgeport, Milgram undertook a replication of the 
Baseline experiment.  The experiment produced a 47.5 percent completion rate (clearly 
less than the Baseline’s 65 percent but not statistically significant).  Running the 
experiment under the auspices of a far less impressive institution only proved to be a weak 
source of strain. 
 
The following section will present a number of variations stimulated by some of 
Milgram’s (and others’) emerging questions.  The first of these is a rarely discussed 
experiment also undertaken at Bridgeport.  
 
 
6.2 Further Variations and Controls: Conditions Stimulated by Emerging Questions 
 
Musing over the results obtained during the Proximity Series, Milgram stated in a 
document dated March 1962:   
 
As the Victim is brought closer to the subject the relati ship [sic] between them 
strengthens.,[sic] relative to the relationship between Vand [sic] E and S and E.  He 
becomes a real person, acquires a face, stands as a concrete individual.  Proximity 
is important for relationship [sic].  Or a husband and wife team as V and S would 
have a disaterous [sic] effect on the power of E over S . . . . Only a genuine 
relationship between the Victim and the Subject, based on identification, or 
marriage, etc. couodld [sic] reverse these results.  How could this be fostered in the 
labora[t]ory? (SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, Title D: “Obedience Notebook 1961-
1970”).  
 
A few months later Milgram developed a variation that tested the importance of a 
relationship between the subject and learner.  In notes written soon after the completion of 
the Relationship experiment, Milgram provided the following brief overview:  
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RELATIONSHIP --This experiment was done in Bridgeport, and thus uses 
condition 23 [Institutional Context] as itsproper [sic] control.  Subjects were asked 
to bring a friend to the labortoy [sic].  When the subjects arrived, the [sic] did an 
actual drawing to determine who would be teacher and who would be learner.  The 
learner was then taken in the next room.  There he was caoched [sic] by Milgram 
on how to yell.  The e [sic] experimenter then conspicuously put him in the electric 
chair, and his friend looked on as instructions were given in the regular manner.  
After the teacher returned to the shock machine, Milgram unstrapped the learner, 
and stayed with him coaching him how to yell, using very closely, the Model [sic] 
of McDonough’s yelling.  Note: Our usual victim, McDonough, did notpartipate 
[sic ] in this experiment.  The purpose of the experiment was to see if the 
relationship of the teacher to the learner would be important in obedience and 
defiance [italics added] (SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 
1961-1970”).  
 
The results of this variation indicated that a positively affective relationship between 
teacher and learner was indeed a powerful source of strain.  As the Raw Score Sheet below 
in Figure 6 illustrates, in a sample of 20 pairs who were at least acquaintances, only 
three—15 percent—went on to inflict all the shocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Raw scores in the Relationship condition (SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, Titled: 
“Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”). 
 
Several comments on the audiotapes held at the Stanley Milgram Papers (SMP) 
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reveal that Milgram recognised the probable importance of a positive relationship between 
the subject and learner in undercutting the power of obedience to malevolent authority.  
For example, in one subject’s post-experimental debriefing, the experimenter, probably 
pointing in the direction of the 11th or 165-volt shock switch, stated: “This is about where 
everybody stops right here . . . in this condition with friends.”  Then Milgram added: “It 
makes quite a difference see.”  The subject responded: “I would imagine, yeah” (SMP, 
Box 153, Audiotape #2438).51  In one of his subsequent publications he briefly mentioned 
the Relationship variation (Milgram, 1965a, pp. 70-71), adding that a more comprehensive 
discussion of this condition would be forthcoming in his monograph.52     
 
Another variation on the Baseline experiment tested Milgram’s long-held suspicion 
that subjects may have been responding to the personality of the experimenter and learner.  
It was previously argued that Milgram’s selection of an unthreatening learner and a 
forceful experimenter may have had both a strain-resolving and binding impact on the 
subjects’ responses, respectively.  In an experiment termed Change of Personnel, Milgram 
attempted to reverse these personal characteristics.  He substituted his usual 
experimenter/learner team, of the “stern, intellectual looking” Williams and 
“unthreatening” McDonough, with an experimenter by the name of Emil Elges “who 
posses [sic] about him a certain soft intertness [sic], that almost borde rs [sic] on passivity” 
and a “lean, and hard looking” learner played by Robert J. Tracy who “frequently clenches 
his fist” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 174, Titled: “Notes: Method 1962”).  This variation 
resulted in 50 percent of subjects remaining obedient until the end.  Milgram concluded: 
“The personal characteristics of the experimenter and victim were not of overriding 
importance” (Milgram, 1974, p. 59).53     
 
Although Milgram selected his participants from a broad cross-section of society, 
one variable that he intended to hold constant across all variations was the use of male-
only subjects.  Could, consequently, the results of the Baseline study have been due to the 
perhaps inherently more aggressive nature of males?  Would a sample of female subjects 
                                                 
51
 In another excerpt during a different debriefing session Milgram asked: “did he [the experimenter] tell you 
about the strangers . . .?”  Teacher: “Yeah.”  Milgram: “And in that situation a lot of people will go right up 
till the end.  Cause they don’t know the person and they don’t give a damn . . . . he can be screaming his ahhh 
bloody head off” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2428). 
 
52
 The very same information was repeated in a subsequent compendium of his then work to date (Milgram, 
1977, pp. 115-117). 
  
53
 Milgram (1974, pp. 58-59) did not state whether or not this difference was statistically significant from the 
Baseline experiment. 
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react any differently to the Baseline experiment?  After running the baseline procedure 
using only female subjects, in an experiment termed Women as Subjects, Milgram found 
they were no different from the men, with 65 percent of the women inflicting all of the 
shocks. 
 
On the topic of aggression, another potential explanation of the high completion 
rates for both men and women in the Baseline experiment was that perhaps in all people 
there exists an instinctual aggressive drive, which the experiment unleashed.  The 
implication of this potential explanation was that the Baseline study’s high completion rate 
may have had nothing at all to do with OTA.  Milgram tested the potential veracity of this 
alternative explanation by running the Baseline’s Asch-like experimental control: a 
condition that eliminated the experimenter’s demands that the shock intensity be increased 
for each incorrect answer.  In a variation termed Subject Chooses Shock Level, subjects 
were informed that for any incorrect answers received they were free to inflict a shock of 
any intensity.  The results revealed that in the absence of the experimenter’s demands, 
nearly every subject repeatedly chose to inflict shocks of a very low intensity, with only 
one out of 40 subjects—2.5 percent—going on to inflict shocks of 450 volts.  Any inherent 
human aggressive impulse was clearly not responsible for the Baseline results.   
 
Whatever the reason for the Baseline’s results, this experiment appeared to be of 
central importance: in the absence of the authority figure’s demands only 2.5 percent went 
on to the end of the shock board but, in the presence of this potential Binding Factor (BF), 
65 percent did so.  One can therefore appreciate Milgram’s heightened interest in the 
authority figure of the experimenter.  As he later concluded in reference to this specific 
variation: “Whatever leads to shocking the victim . . . needs to be explained by the 
transformation of behavior that comes about through obedience to orders” (Milgram, 1974, 
p. 72). 
 
Milgram progressively eliminated his subjects’ various justifications for their 
behaviour, then developed and tested his emerging questions.  The most powerful force 
producing the high completion rates seemed to be, as the above control to the Baseline 
experiment indicated, the role of the authority figure and/or the compelling content of the 
demands.  As the following will demonstrate, this emerging conclusion was further 
reinforced by a series of experimental variations that attempted to distance the authority 
figure from the subject.  
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6.3 Further Variations and Controls: the Proximity of Authority Series 
 
In a condition termed Experimenter Absent, subjects were given the usual baseline 
instructions, except that after the practice session the usually proximate experimenter 
received a rigged phone call, ostensibly requesting his immediate presence elsewhere.  
After informing the subject of the situation, the experimenter then instructed them to 
complete the experiment in his (the experimenter’s) absence.  Before leaving the 
laboratory the experimenter gave the subject a contact phone number in case of any further 
questions.  In response to those subjects who became concerned about the learner’s 
reactions to the shocks and eventually made use of the phone, the experimenter strongly 
urged them to continue their role in the procedure (as in the Baseline).  The question being: 
even in the physical absence of any direct authority, what percentage of subjects would go 
on to complete the experiment?  In stark contrast to the Baseline experiment where the 
experimenter was only several feet away, in this variation only 9 out of 40 subjects—20.5 
percent—were willing to inflict all the shocks.  
 
The Experimenter Absent variation also generated a behaviour not observed in any 
of the other experimental conditions.  That is, it was not unusual for subjects to inform the 
experimenter over the phone that they were, as instructed, increasing the shock intensity 
for each incorrect answer, but in reality they were repeatedly undermining the 
experimenter’s authority by surreptitiously inflicting light shocks.  It seemed to Milgram 
(1965a, p. 66) that these subjects “found it easier to handle the conflict in this manner than 
to precipitate an open break with authority.”  
 
Taking this experiment a step further, in another variation termed the No-
Experimenter condition, the subject would arrive at the laboratory only to be confronted by 
a tape-recorder and a note, the latter pointing out that the experimenter was unable to 
attend and that what was required of them would be relayed to them on the enclosed 
cassette recording.  Although this condition “led to significantly lower obedience” than the 
Baseline, due to “technical difficulties that require extensive discussion”, Milgram (1965a, 
p. 66) chose not to disclose details of this variation.   
 
The results from both of these variations (as well as a third one in this series)54 
                                                 
54
 Milgram (1965a, p. 66) mentioned a “third condition”—actually the “second part” (SMP, Box 163, Titled: 
“Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”) of the Experimenter Absent condition—whereby the experimenter would 
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indicated that the physical presence of the authority figure was an important BF in the 
production of the Baseline experiment’s relatively high completion rate (Milgram, 1965a, 
p. 66).  The emerging conclusion that there was something very important about the role of 
the experimenter in procuring the Baseline condition’s high completion rate was reinforced 
by a further series of experiments, termed the Role Permutations Series.  This series 
attempted to shed more light on what it was about the authority figure that enabled him to 
bend so many of the subjects to his will.   
 
 
6.4 The Role Permutations Series 
 
Milgram undertook a series of variations on the Baseline experiment with the 
intention of answering the following question: “is the subject responding principally to the 
content of the command to shock or to the status of the person who issues it?  Is it what is 
said or who says it that largely determines his actions? [italics original]” (Milgram, 1974, 
p. 90).  Milgram’s strategy was to undertake a set of variations that, where possible and 
unlike any of the other variations, reconfigured the status (an equal ordinary man or a 
higher-status authority figure), the content of the commands (advocating shocking or stop 
shocking the learner), and the position (prescribes, administers, or receives shocks) of all 
those involved.   
 
In the first such variation, termed Learner Demands to be Shocked condition, after 
the infliction of the 150-volt switch the experimenter ordered that, in light of the learner 
having a slight heart condition, the subject cease inflicting the shocks.  However, the 
learner pointed out that irrespective of the pain, he wanted to continue receiving the shocks 
because apparently he did not want to be outdone by a friend who, having earlier been in 
the experiment, bravely endured all the shocks.  Milgram was curious as to whose 
command the subject would accept: the (higher-status) experimenter’s orders to stop or the 
(more-equal-status) learner’s request to continue?  In this variation all 20 subjects ignored 
the learner and immediately obeyed the experimenter’s request to stop inflicting the 
shocks.  Milgram (1974, p. 92) concluded: “It is not the substance of the command but its 
source in authority that is of decisive importance.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
return to the laboratory and attempt to persuade the subject to continue participating in the procedure.  
Apparently, the experimenter was frequently successful in encouraging subjects to re-engage in the 
procedure.  However, Milgram does not appear to have published any further details of the exact procedure 
and its results. 
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To confirm that status was indeed of greater importance than the command’s 
content, Milgram devised an experiment whereby the command to inflict the shocks was 
not delivered by the experimenter but by another equal-status subject.  In this variation, 
termed Ordinary Man Gives Orders, two subjects were initially involved (one being the 
naïve subject whose role was to inflict the shocks and the other a time-keeping actor).  
After providing the standard instructions (minus what levels were to be administered), a 
rigged phone call resulted in the experimenter having to vacate the laboratory immediately.  
Before departing the experimenter asked the two subjects to complete the experiment in his 
absence (which was possible because all responses could be recorded automatically).  
However, in the experimenter’s absence the actor suddenly became insistent that for each 
incorrect answer the subject inflict a shock of increasing intensity.  Thus, a person of equal 
status was issuing the orders.  The results strengthened the conjecture that status was more 
important than the content of the command: only 4 out of 20 subjects—20 percent—
completed the experiment.   
 
Milgram then ran a second experiment using the 16 resistant subjects which he 
termed the Subject as Bystander experiment.  In this, the boisterous ordinary man enquired 
whether, as a compromise, each of the 16 recalcitrant subjects would instead be willing to 
fulfil the timekeeper’s role (with the actor switching places and assuming the subjects’ 
previous role of the shock inflictor).  Although at some stage all subjects complained (with 
five trying to physically impede the actor from inflicting the shocks), 11 out of the 16 
initially resistant subjects—68.75 percent—went on to participate fully in the process by 
assuming the timekeeper’s role.  Although not prepared to inflict the shocks themselves, 
these 11 subjects were willing to allow the actor to do so.  
  
What would happen if the high-status experimenter were relegated to a lower-status 
role?  In an experiment termed Authority as Victim, the intended learner would point out 
that, before committing to the role, he wanted first to observe someone experience the 
learner’s role.  In a role-reversal, the experimenter agreed to fulfil the learner’s tasks, with 
the intended learner fulfilling the experimenter’s tasks.  Upon exposure to the shocks, the 
experimenter (as learner) soon conceded that the punishment was too painful to endure and 
demanded the subject end participation in the procedure.  The learner (as experimenter) 
would then demand that the equal-status co-worker (the subject) continue inflicting the 
shocks.  In this variation all 20 subjects stopped inflicting the shocks and immediately 
withdrew from the experiment.   
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All of the Role Permutation experiments presented thus far indicated that subjects 
obeyed the content of whatever orders (shock or not shock) were supplied by the authority 
figure (irrespective of their being in a low or high-status role).  
  
In the penultimate experiment of this series, termed Two Authorities: Contradictory 
Commands, Milgram explored what might happen if there were two equally high-status 
authorities, one of whom after the 150-volt switch demanded the subject stop and the other 
insisting they continue.  In this variation none of the 20 subjects completed the experiment 
(with one subject stopping before the 150-volt switch, 18 immediately after, and one 
following the infliction of the 165-volt switch).   
 
In the final experiment of this series termed Two Authorities, One as Victim, the 
naïve subject was told that a second subject had not turned up so, via a rigged draw, one of 
the two experimenters would fulfil the lower-status learner role.  Once under way, the 
lower-status experimenter as learner demanded after the 150-volt switch that the 
experiment be stopped, but the higher-status experimenter demanded that the subject 
ignore these orders and continue inflicting the shocks.  Milgram was interested in whose 
demands the subject would yield: the higher-status experimenter or the lower-status 
experimenter as learner?  Just as in the Baseline experiment, 13 out of 20 subjects—65 
percent—inflicted all the shocks.   
 
The results from the Role Permutation series would seem to indicate that subjects 
responded more to the status of the person issuing a command than to the command’s 
content.  Subjects tended to do whatever the authority figure demanded of them—thus 
OTA.  Having said this, if the key factor generating completions was indeed closely related 
to the authority figure’s higher-status, the fact that 20 percent of all subjects in the 
Ordinary Man Gives Orders condition followed the self-initiated orders of a person of 
equal status must have sowed some seeds of doubt in Milgram’s mind.  Nonetheless, if 
these experiments had led Milgram to the conclusion that the high rate of obedience in the 
Baseline experiment was largely a function of the authority figure’s higher-status, the next 
series of experiments should have undermined any such confidence. 
 
 
6.5 The Group Effects Series 
 
Because of his experience with Asch’s group conformity research, Milgram was 
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well-versed in the binding influences of group forces.  This was why his earliest ideas 
surrounding OTA centered on Asch-like group forces.  However, as discussed earlier, soon 
after the pilot series where the “alone” conditions demonstrated significant potential, the 
group conformity experiments were relegated from “a major concern” to a minor 
diversion.  The end result was a set of variations termed the Group Effects Series.   
 
The first in this series was termed the Groups for Disobedience (or Two Peers 
Rebel) condition.  The basic procedure was as follows: under the pretext of exploring the 
effects of punishment on collective learning and memory, via a rigged draw, the subject 
became one of three teachers (two of whom were actors).  The first actor/teacher was 
assigned the task of asking the learner questions, the second actor/teacher was then to 
assess and inform the learner of the accuracy of their response, with the naïve subject 
going on to inflict increasingly intense shocks for incorrect answers.  After the 150-volt 
switch the first actor/teacher suddenly expressed his concerns regarding the learner’s well-
being, refused to continue with the procedure, and relocated to a chair on the other side of 
the room.  Failing to persuade him to return, the experimenter then put the onus on the 
remaining teachers to complete the experiment.  However, after the 210-volt switch the 
second actor/teacher also pulled out of the experiment and joined the first actor/teacher on 
the other side of the room.  After failing to persuade the second actor/teacher to return, the 
experimenter could then rely only upon the naïve subject to complete the experiment.  
Under these conditions, most subjects pulled out and joined the two actors: only 4 out of 
40—10 percent—went on to inflict all of the shocks. 
 
The second variation of this series, termed the Groups for Obedience condition, 
was similar to the Groups for Disobedience condition, except that, instead of rebelling 
against the completion of the experiment, the two actors expressed their determination to 
finish.  If at any time during the experiment a subject expressed a desire to stop inflicting 
the shocks, the two actors would support the experimenter and express their disapproval, 
stating: “ ‘You can’t quit now; this experiment has got to get done’ ” (Milgram, 1965b, p. 
133).  There was a slight increase in obedience over the Baseline, with 29 out of 40 
subjects—72.5 percent—completing the experiment (a difference that was not statistically 
significant). 
 
The third group effects experiment was the Peer Administers Shock condition, 
where the naïve subject was assigned one of the more subsidiary teacher roles, with an 
actor fulfilling the role of shock inflictor.  Although the subjects’ participation still saw 
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them complete a necessary part of the procedure and contribute to the overall process, in 
this variation they themselves avoided having to inflict any shocks.  This variation 
produced the highest completion rate in the entire (official) experimental programme, with 
37 out of 40 subjects—92.5 percent—continuing to fulfil their minor but nonetheless 
essential role until all the shocks had been inflicted.  
 
This high completion rate was probably due to the introduction into the equation of 
another Strain Resolving Mechanism (SRM).  As in the Subject as Bystander experiment, 
even though the subject was indisputably contributing to the overall process, they did not 
directly inflict the shocks and thus did not feel responsible for the ostensibly harmful 
outcome.  This reduced their personal levels of strain (thus a SRM).  Again, it could be 
argued that Milgram captured, within a controlled laboratory setting, the potentially 
destructive bureaucratic process whereby, via the step-by-step division of labour, a 
malevolent goal had been broken down into a number of seemingly unrelated and benign 
tasks to the point where nobody felt totally responsible for the eventually destructive 
outcome.  
 
The final variation of this series was termed the Group Pressure and Action 
Against a Person experiment.  This required the naïve subject to become the shock 
inflictor (with the two actors fulfilling the two auxiliary roles).  Before starting, the 
experimenter explained that, upon receiving an incorrect answer, the three teachers were 
themselves to decide on the intensity of punishment that the learner was to receive.  
Starting with the two actors, each teacher was to suggest the degree of shock intensity, and 
the learner was to receive the lowest of the three recommendations.  However, unbeknown 
to the naïve subject, for each incorrect answer received the two actor/teachers would 
(starting with the first 15-volt switch) repeatedly increase their recommendations in 15 volt 
increments.  Again introducing the BF of group pressure into the equation, Milgram was 
interested to see whether the two actor/teachers’ suggestions would influence the subject’s 
recommendations.  Seven out of 40 subjects—17.5 percent—followed the actors’ 
recommendations and went on to the end of the shock board.   
 
This result may suggest that group pressure was not a particularly powerful 
coercive force.  However, the 17.5 percent completion rate may have been a little 
misleading.  The control of this variation was the Subject Chooses Shock Level experiment, 
where the maximum shock inflicted by 38 out of 40 subjects was 150 volts or less.  Yet, in 
the above variation only 13 out of 40 inflicted a maximum shock of 150 volts, while 15  
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subjects—37.5 percent—went on to inflict a maximum shock of at least 315 volts.  
Although a proportion of the subjects clearly proved resistant to group pressure when 
compared to the control, Milgram (1964b, p. 141) rightly concluded that many “subjects 
were substantially influenced by group pressure.” 
 
As Milgram’s trial-and-error method of discovery tended to highlight, the coercive 
influence of the authority figure appeared to be the independent variable producing the 
obedient subjects’ seemingly destructive actions.  However, the results from the above 
experiment were likely to have left Milgram a little confused.  In his procedural overview 
of this experiment, he went to some lengths to point out that because the experimenter 
gave no orders: “This is not an obedience experiment.  It is a group influence experiment” 
(SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”).  Reinforcing this 
initial assessment is the fact that on the left-hand side of this typed document is, in 
Milgram’s handwriting, the word “CONFORMITY”.  However, if many subjects in the 
absence of the experimenter’s demands were “substantially influenced by group pressure”, 
where did this leave Milgram’s increasingly confident conclusion that the high completion 
rates were due to the authority figure’s influence (Lutsky, 1995, p. 59)?55 
 
This apparent conundrum must have raised some concerns because on 27 May 
1962 the data-collection phase ended (Blass, 1998, p. 46), and Milgram was then faced 
with the task of explaining his findings.  With respect to this next phase, Milgram’s plan 
all along was that the ad hoc variations on the Baseline condition would gradually move 
him closer to identifying the most influential key factor/s affecting the completion rates.  
These would, he assumed, provide a strong platform from which to engage in theoretical 
integration.  However, statements made just a month after the completion of the last 
experiment indicated Milgram’s growing uncertainty about his previous assumptions 
regarding the emergence of some coherent theoretical model.   
 
 
                                                 
55
 This counterfactual with an apparent theory of OTA can be detected as far back as the group variations 
from the student-run pilots.  The second research proposal dated 25 January 1961 stated: “while the control 
(non-group) subjects turned beseechingly to the experimenter at various times to secure information or 
commands, the subject in the experimental group reacted much more to the group than to the experimenter” 
(SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).  So, in this variation group forces seemed to be more 
powerful than the experimenter’s orders. 
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6.6 Post-Experimental Contemplations on Theoretical Development 
 
Building on an earlier idea about the subject having been “reduced to an agent, 
through [which] . . . . forbidden acts . . . bypass his conscience and guilt system” (SMP, 
Box 13, Folder 183, Titled: “Allport, Gordon 1954-1967”), in July 1962, a month after the 
completion of the experimental programme, Milgram argued: 
 
before perfoming [sic] some novel action we would ordinarily bring to bear all our 
critical faculties and make some judgment as to whether we should perform it.  In 
obedience, these functions are now derived from the authority.  This applies not 
only to those judgments of the ego, but also of the superego.  Certain acts we would 
not perform because conscience tells us not to.  But in the obedience situations, 
there is so to speak a short circuiting of the system so that actions are no longer 
filtered though the superego or or [sic] ego, but stem from the authority (SMP, Box 
46, Folder 164, Titled: “Notes General, 1961-1962”). 
 
To illustrate his point regarding obedience situations which were somehow short-circuiting 
many subjects’ conscience, Milgram produced the following diagram juxtaposing a 
“NORMAL PERSONALITY” with one under the influence of “OBEDIENCE”:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Milgram’s early theoretical contemplations (SMP, Box 46, Folder 164, Titled: 
“Notes General, 1961-1962”). 
 
One obvious problem with this diagram is that it does not explain how 
“AUTHORITY” might have caused the short-circuiting of the subjects’ consciences.  
Putting this issue aside, the whole idea in the diagram is founded on the premise that OTA 
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was somehow central to the production of high completion rates.  Of course, a theoretical 
model centred on OTA would almost certainly struggle to account for the Ordinary Man 
Gives Orders and the Group Pressure and Action Against a Person conditions—both of 
which saw proportions (albeit small) of subjects inflicting all the shocks in the absence of 
any demands by a higher-status authority figure.  A potential solution to this problem was 
that there may have been more than one theory capable of accounting for the Baseline 
experiment’s high completion rate.  Before long Milgram started to suspect this may have 
been the case.  In a July 1962 document titled “Theory[:] One Theory or Many”, after 
making the point that in physics there were at least six discrete explanatory domains, 
Milgram stated: 
 
The most serious problem in physics now is for adequate theory to explain new 
particles: purely empirical discoveris [sic].  That does not mean that the discovery 
of each new particle is not a significant achievement in physics.  People are 
awarded Nobel prizes for such discoveries.  Now in regard to these [OTA] 
experiments also we are cnfronted [sic] with somewhat similar problems.  There 
are several explan tory [sic] schemes which cover the same findings; none covers 
all the findings; and then there are certain phenomena for which there seem to be 
no truly adequate theoretical explanaions [sic].  Itmay [sic] be that --as in physics 
several theoreticl [sic] conceptions are needed at present . . . . The discontinuity 
between them should not be too upsetting.  It is the only way that we could do full 
justic [sic] to the pomplexity [sic] of the phenomenon, while not neglecting the 
responsibility to fill the gaps with speculation (SMP, Box 46, Folder 164, Titled: 
“Notes general, 1961-1962”). 
 
Whether there existed one theoretical explanation of his findings or whether many theories 
were required to “fill the gaps”, in the same month of July 1962, a clearly puzzled Milgram 
started to question the prudence of his methodological approach.  It was clearly failing to 
pay the explanatory dividends he had earlier so confidently expected: “Sometimes the 
research does not seem to have advanced my understanding in any important way.  And 
perhaps the way we went about it was the fault” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 164, Titled: “Notes 
general, 1961-1962”).  In this same document Milgram more specifically clarified what he 
meant by this statement, using a parable about a fictitious 13th century character by the 
name of Sylvanus who had tried to develop a system of knowledge about a candle’s flame:    
 
Man with a Candle? . . . . [Sylvanus] was curious about flames and wanted to study 
them.  He decided to limit his study to the flame of a candle; and his manner of 
proceeding was as follows.  He would study the height of candle’s flame.  That was 
his primary dependent variable.  He chose it because he could conveniently obtain a 
rather exact measure of this variable; thus he could be objective and quite accurate.  
He would change those conditions which he thought affected the height of the 
candles [sic] flame (just as we chose those conditions we thought we [sic] alter the 
level of obedience) . . . . Then he took all his findings, thought about them, and 
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wrote a treatise called: The Height of a Candle’s Flame as it is Altered by Various 
Conditions.  In the treatise he had little more to report than the hard findings and 
while he knew he had contributed little, he had the feeling that there was at least 
something there, something he did not know before (SMP, Box 46, Folder 164, 
Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”).    
 
Probably reflecting his own recent experience of the repeated rejection of his first article—
Milgram (1963)—the parable then states: 
 
He took his treatise to the wisest man in the realm and asked for his judgment.  The 
wisest man read it carefully . . . .  he said to Sylvanus: I have read your treatise with 
interest, and I find your efforts admirable.  However, there is a very important 
question that you did not answer: What is the nature of burning?  Sylvanus then 
said: I am sure that is an important question, but the height of the flame is all I 
could measure, so that is all I could know.  Then the wise man adjoined: Perhaps 
Syvlanus [sic], if you had climbed fewer mountains, and explored more ideas, you 
would have found the right method; for in choisng [sic] an easy method, you have 
lost the question (SMP, Box 46, Folder 164, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”). 
 
Although his method had failed to reveal the causes, perhaps all was not lost: 
 
I would like to answer this parable.  First if the height of a cnadle’s [sic] falme [sic] 
were as important for the human society as obedience is, and if differences in its 
height were relevant to human experience, then by all means Sylvanus was 
studying someting [sic] important, and by appropriate means.  Moreoever [sic], 
although in some investigations it is important to probe the ‘nature’ of the 
phenomenon, in others what one really wants to know are the conditions under 
which it functions, or even just a model of its effects (SMP, Box 46, Folder 164, 
Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”). 
 
Now increasingly confused as to what the cause/s might have been, perhaps he was not 
interested in such things after all.  Maybe it was enough that he had captured a model of 
the effects of OTA.  In the months that followed, and as illustrated in a letter written on 28 
October 1962 to Gordon Allport, Milgram’s confidence declined further:  
 
The obedience to authority experiments are completed, and I am now writing some 
articles and a book on this work.  My secret estimate is that the material is 
illuminating, though I don’t know if I can convey its import in writing.  The 
narrative bogs down in a superfluity of technical details (SMP, Box 13, Folder 183, 
Titled: “Allport, Gordon 1954-1967”).   
 
According to Elms (1995, p. 28), one of the articles Milgram was working on 
during this difficult period in 1962 was eventually titled Some Conditions of Obedience 
and Disobedience to Authority (Milgram, 1965a) and, like his first OTA article, 
publication took a few years.  While attempting to “account for this effect” (Milgram, 
1965a, p. 62), he returned to his Asch-like style of presenting a variety of factors, including 
some insightful remarks on what he referred to as “Empathic cues”, “Denial and 
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narrowing of the cognitive field” and “Reciprocal fields [italics original]” (Milgram, 
1965a, pp. 63-64).  In some detail this article discussed all of the Proximity Series, the 
Proximity of Authority Series, and the Institutional Context (Bridgeport) condition.  
Milgram also very briefly mentioned “FURTHER EXPERIMENTS”, including the 
Woman as Subjects condition, three of the Role Permutation Series, the Relationship 
condition and the Group Effects Series (Groups for Disobedience, Obedience, Peer 
Administers Shocks and the Group Pressure and Action Against a Person conditions) 
(Milgram, 1965a, p.  71).  In the absence of any specific details or results, Milgram said of 
these experiments: “These will have to be described elsewhere, lest the present report be 
extended to monographic length.”  Milgram (1964b) later published a more detailed article 
that focused solely on this last experiment and, although he was earlier quite certain it was 
“not an obedience experiment”, he soon after came to the opposite conclusion:56  
 
Insofar as he [the experimenter] does not object to the shocks administered in the 
course of the experiment, his assent is implied.  Thus, even though the effects of 
group pressure have been clearly established by a comparison of the experimental 
and control conditions, the effects occurred within the context of authoritative 
sanction.  This point becomes critical in any attempt to assess the relative 
effectiveness of conformity versus obedience as means of inducing contravalent 
behavior (Milgram, 1963).  If the experimenter had not approved the use of all 
shock levels on the generator, and if he had departed from the laboratory at an early 
stage, thus eliminating any sign of authoritative assent during the course of the 
experiment, would the group have had as powerful an effect on the naive subject?  
(Milgram, 1964b, p. 142).   
 
Milgram may have been correct: no tacit consent by the experimenter, no completions.  
However, in the Ordinary Man Gives Orders condition the experimenter never approved 
the use of all shock levels and left the laboratory at an earlier stage.  Yet, in the total 
absence of the authority figure, 20 percent of subjects still followed the orders of a person 
of equal status to inflict all the shocks.   
 
Nonetheless, Milgram (1965b) wrote another article, titled the Liberating Effects of 
Group Pressure, which presented, as he had earlier promised, a more in-depth overview of 
the previously discussed Groups for Obedience and Disobedience conditions.  Again he 
highlighted “a number of specific factors” likely to have contributed to the experimental 
effect (Milgram, 1965b, p. 132), without an accompanying explanatory model.  Without a 
theory, this exposed the piece to the same criticism applicable to all the other OTA articles 
preceding it.   
 
                                                 
56
 Milgram (1965a) preceded Milgram (1964b), remembering that the former article was written in 1962. 
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Milgram went on to pursue some potentially fruitful theoretical avenues.57  
However, due to a combination of writer’s block, family commitments, and other academic 
pursuits (Blass, 2004, pp. 212-214; Darley, 1992, p. 206; Elms, 1995, pp. 28-29; Parker, 
2000, p. 113), he did not publish a theoretical model attempting to explain his obedient and 
disobedient subjects’ behaviour until 1974—14 years after having undertaken his first 
official experiment.  In answering the second of the five questions in this thesis, the 
following will present the eventual explanation Milgram provided for his experimental 
programme. 
 
 
6.7 Milgram’s (1974) Theory of Obedience 
 
After much pressure from his editor, in 1974 Milgram published his book 
Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View.  The book starts out by presenting 18 
experimental conditions and a survey he had undertaken over a decade earlier.  Although 
Milgram (1965a) had earlier promised to include in the monograph an in-depth overview 
of the Relationship condition, he did not do so.  This condition would remain almost 
unheard of until Rochat and Modigliani (1997) published a comprehensive overview of its 
methodological procedure and results.  Also absent from the monograph was any 
comprehensive overview of the Group Pressure and Action Against a Person condition 
(which Milgram initially believed was “not an obedience experiment” but then several 
years later decided it was).58         
 
Regardless of which experiments he had and had not decided to include, arguably 
the most important section of the monograph was Milgram’s first theoretical explanation 
of his findings.  As Milgram (1974, p. 123) said: “We must attempt to grasp the 
                                                 
57
 At one stage Milgram sought the answer to his theoretical problem in the discipline of mathematics.  For 
example,  “Probability Nets  Summary Equations, Sept 1964  I’ll bet, given the probability structures of a 
field, the entire field can be stated as an equation or set of equations that specify the field, or specify how any 
given person will respond in the field.  That is, the equation should include a variable term that represents the 
person.  What I have to do is go to a mathematician and ask him to do this work for me; thatis [sic], set up the 
integrating equations that spell out or express the probability field. * Isometric contours.  Distance and 
position.  Theoretical” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 164, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”).  It may have been a 
coincidence, but half a year later, on 15 March 1965, one of Milgram’s students in “Soc. Rel. 207b”, Colin 
Martindale, wrote a three paged document titled “Theoretical Explanation of Milgram Experiment” that 
introduced the following mathematically-based formula, “O=f(DI and LA)”.  Milgram wrote on the 
document “Excellent paper” and asked if Martindale could “…return it to me for my files” (SMP, Box 46, 
Folder 164, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”). 
 
58
 The closest the condition got to a mention in the monograph was, ironically, in the footnotes alongside 
Asch’s Group Conformity study: “Asch, 1951; Milgram, 1964” (Milgram, 1974, p. 207).  
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phenomenon in its theoretical aspect and to inquire more deeply into the causes of 
obedience.”     
 
Using evolutionary theory, Milgram began by pointing out that, like many animals, 
human beings function in hierarchical structures.  Due to the survival value of organisation 
over disorganisation, hierarchical structures have, via breeding, led humans to develop 
significant advantages over their competitors in the natural environment.  He is careful to 
point out that obedience to those higher in the chain of command—the behavioural 
currency of being in a hierarchical structure—is not innate.  “Rather, we are born with a 
potential for obedience, which then interacts with the influence of society to produce the 
obedient man [italics original]” (Milgram, 1974, p. 125).   
 
He argued that the potentially destructive impulses in mankind are frequently kept 
in check by the conscience of an autonomously acting individual.  However, when the 
individual is introduced into a hierarchical chain of command, a homeostatic-driven 
internal change can take hold in which conscience-driven control over one’s actions can be 
suppressed and supplanted by the demands from a higher authority.  Milgram termed this 
process the agentic shift, which having taken place results in the individual entering what 
he termed “the keystone of our analysis”—the agentic state (Milgram, 1974, p.  133).  The 
agentic state is a condition in which “the individual no longer views himself as responsible 
for his own actions but defines himself as an instrument for carrying out the wishes of 
others” (Milgram, 1974, p. 134).  He continued:   
 
The most frequent defense of the individual who has performed a heinous act under 
command of authority is that he has simply done his duty.  In asserting this defense, 
the individual is not introducing an alibi concocted for the moment but is reporting 
honestly on the psychological attitude induced by submission to authority.  For a 
man to feel responsible for his actions, he must sense that the behavior has flowed 
from ‘the self.’  In the situation we have studied, subjects have precisely the 
opposite view of their actions—namely, they see them as originating in the motives 
of some other person.  Subjects in the experiment frequently said, ‘If it were up to 
me, I would not have administered shocks to the learner’ (Milgram, 1974, p. 146). 
 
According to Milgram, the agentic state is likely to have several attitudinal 
consequences on the lower-status individual.  First, upon entry to a hierarchical chain of 
command an individual is more likely to accept an authority’s definition of a particular 
situation.  Secondly, they are likely to render themselves open to the demands of those of a 
higher-status.  And finally, with respect to the implementation of these demands, an 
individual is likely to attribute all responsibility for their (the individual’s) subsequent 
actions to the authority figure. 
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Milgram then identified what he termed Antecedent Conditions (ACs), which could 
impel the agentic shift, moving the individual from a state of conscience-driven autonomy 
into the instrumental agentic state.  They included pre-experimental factors affecting 
individuals, such as the long-term influence of institutional systems of authority—parental, 
school, workplace experiences—that would have rendered many subjects subservient to 
authority figures.  ACs were also inherent in the set-up of the experiment, including the 
seemingly authentic appearance of what appeared to the subjects to be a legitimate 
authority figure, as well as the overarching legitimating belief in “scientific” inquiry.  
 
Milgram argued that, having entered the agentic state, a subject could be influenced 
and maintained within this state by BFs.  Although there were probably many BFs, 
Milgram (1974, p. 149) provided only two examples.  The first was the “Sequential Nature 
of the Action”, whereby one incremental step led to the next with this process generating a 
momentum that made withdrawal from the experiment increasingly difficult.  The second 
was “Situational Obligations”, whereby subjects arrived at the laboratory with the 
intention of participating in some experimental task but, upon wishing to withdraw, came 
to feel uncomfortable about reneging on their implied contractual agreement to help the 
experimenter obtain results.   
 
Having presented the potentially powerful ACs and BFs that he believed 
accelerated the subjects’ entry into the agentic state, Milgram then argued: “If the 
individual’s submergence in the authority system were total, he would feel no tension as he 
followed commands, no matter how harsh” (Milgram, 1974, p. 155).  During the 
experiments, however, many subjects displayed what Milgram termed strain 
(sweating/trembling).  Because of strain, Milgram noted that “transformation to the agentic 
state is, for some subjects, only partial” (Milgram, 1974, p. 154).  Milgram argued that 
strain was enhanced by the cries of pain from a clearly innocent person who, in conflict 
with the experimenter, was pleading that the shocks be stopped.  These cries upset 
subjects’ self-perception as being someone with a humane disposition.  
 
Offsetting the impact of strain in encouraging disobedience, were certain buffers—
Milgram’s SRMs—that reduced feelings of stress and tension normally associated with 
hurting other human beings.  Some of the SRMs Milgram (1974, pp. 158-162) mentioned 
in his book were, first, the ability of the shock generator itself to relieve feelings of tension.  
Secondly, avoidance-type behaviours, like looking away from the learner.  Thirdly, 
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subjects blaming the learner for the predicament they (the learners) found themselves in.  
Fourthly, complying fully but reducing the accompanying feelings of tension by engaging 
in simultaneous acts of sabotage, such as signalling to the learner, via verbal emphasis, the 
correct answer.  
 
Using the following diagram, Milgram (1974, p. 154) illustrated his central concept 
of the agentic state and its close relationship with ACs, BFs, strain and the SRMs:     
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Figure 8: Factors that contribute to the agentic shift and maintain the subject within the 
obedience-generating agentic state. 
 
In explaining not only obedience but also disobedience, Milgram succinctly 
conveyed his theoretical model by way of the following formula, and its accompanying 
explanation: 
 
  O;  B > (s - r)   
    D;  B < (s - r) 
in which O represents obedience; D, disobedience; B, binding factors; s, strain; 
and r, the strain-resolving mechanisms.  Obedience is the outcome when the 
binding factors are greater than the net strain (strain as reduced by the resolving 
mechanisms), while disobedience results when net strain exceeds the strength of the 
binding forces [italics original] (Milgram, 1974, p. 154). 
 
After 14 years of contemplation, Milgram believed that this model explained most of his 
subjects’ behaviour. 
 
What did his theory have to say, if anything, about understanding the perpetrators 
of the Holocaust?  Although Milgram (1974, p. 175) readily conceded to there being 
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“enormous differences” between his experiments and the Holocaust,59 he maintained that, 
via the hierarchical chain of command, “a common psychological process is centrally 
involved in both events”—the agentic state.  As Milgram (1974, pp. 7-8) clarified early in 
his book: 
 
The most common adjustment of thought in the obedient subject is for him to see 
himself as not responsible for his own actions.  He divests himself of responsibility 
by attributing all initiative to the experimenter, a legitimate authority.  He sees 
himself not as a person acting in a morally accountable way but as the agent of 
external authority.  In the postexperimental interview, when subjects were asked 
why they had gone on, a typical reply was: ‘I wouldn’t have done it by myself.  I 
was just doing what I was told.’  Unable to defy the authority of the experimenter, 
they attribute all responsibility to him.  It is the old story of ‘just doing one’s duty’ 
that was heard time and time again in the defense statements of those accused at 
Nuremberg.  But it would be wrong to think of it as a thin alibi concocted for the 
occasion.  Rather, it is a fundamental mode of thinking for a great many people 
once they are locked into a subordinate position in a structure of authority.  The 
disappearance of a sense of responsibility is the most far-reaching consequence of 
submission to authority. 
  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the “crux” of Milgram’s research 
programme: to unravel why so many subjects completed his Baseline experiment.  
Milgram suspected his ad hoc exploratory methodological approach would, by deductive 
reasoning, eventually lead him to an all-encompassing explanation for the obedient 
subjects’ behaviour.  After systematically eliminating various alternative explanations, he 
seemed to get closer to what was behind their behaviour: something closely related to the 
higher status of the authority figure.  However, some of the variations (perhaps the 
Ordinary Man Gives Orders and the Group Pressure and Action Against a Person 
conditions) were in conflict with his main explanatory schema.  These particular 
experiments would probably have sown seeds of doubt in Milgram’s mind as to what was 
encouraging many of his subjects to complete the Baseline experiment.   
 
After the data-collection stage Milgram stalled in developing a comprehensive 
theoretical component that might help explain his subjects’ behaviour.  When, many years 
later, he finally did present a theory, it was one that he had actually toyed with before the 
completion of the official research programme.  That is, upon entering a hierarchical 
                                                 
59
 These included the absence in his experiments of victim vilification as life unworthy of life, long-term 
ideological indoctrination, and unlike the Nazi execution squads, the subjects were told that their victim 
would not receive permanent injuries (Milgram, 1964a, p. 851, 1974, pp. 175-178). 
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structure (as was apparently the case with the Germans), the lower-status subjects tended to 
lose control over their subsequent actions and, via the agentic state, came to see 
themselves as an instrument executing the wishes of a higher-status authority figure.  
Milgram was careful to point out that his subjects, just as with the Nazis, honestly did not 
feel personally responsible for their actions, and genuinely felt themselves to be 
instruments in the hands of a higher authority. 
 
In answering the third of the five research questions addressed in this thesis, with 
particular regard to the Holocaust, the next chapter will discuss the reactions of the 
academic community to Milgram’s OTA research programme and his theoretical 
explanation.   
 97 
Chapter Seven: The Response of Academia to Milgram’s 
Findings and Explanation 
 
 
A piece of literature makes its way into canon based largely on the meaning it imparts in our lives.  
Milgram’s experiments are indisputably in the canon.  And yet, no one can agree on the theme . . . . 
What message has Milgram sent us, in what sort of bottle, on which sea?—Slater (2004, p. 61). 
 
 
The first significant scholarly response to the obedience to authority (OTA) 
research programme was from Diana Baumrind (1964).  Published in American 
Psychologist, Baumrind’s article inadvertently drew further attention to Milgram’s work 
(Miller, 2004, p. 203).  Baumrind was sharply critical of Milgram’s study on multiple and 
frequently overlapping fronts.  She argued that the experiments were unethical, 
methodologically flawed, and could not be generalised to an event like the Holocaust.60  
Baumrind’s criticisms of Milgram’s (1963) article were swiftly weakened or invalidated by 
Milgram’s (1964a) rejoinder, which discussed data from the wider research programme.  
However, his response was far from conclusive and certain questions lingered.  In terms of 
the experiments’ potentially unethical nature, methodological weaknesses, and attempts to 
generalise the results beyond the laboratory walls (especially to the Holocaust), 
Baumrind’s seminal article drew other academics into the debate, both for and against.  
Thus, Baumrind’s criticisms proved the catalyst of debates that would rage for years to 
come (Miller, 1986, pp. 89, 116).  Providing a comprehensive review of this extensive 
literature is beyond the parameters of this thesis (see Blass, 2004; Miller, 1986; Mixon, 
1989).  Nonetheless, while drawing upon unpublished materials obtained from the Stanley 
Milgram Papers (SMP), this chapter will provide a brief overview of these key debates.  
Then it will explore the scholarly reaction to Milgram’s explanation for his own results.   
 
 
7.1 Ethical Issues 
 
Perhaps the most common negative reaction to Milgram’s first OTA publication 
centred upon the study’s arguably unethical treatment of subjects (Baumrind, 1964; 
Bettelheim, as cited in Askenasy, 1978, p. 131; Kelman, 1972).  Of particular concern 
were the long-term psychological and/or physiological harms potentially associated with 
participation.  Consider the following statement by one of Milgram’s (1963, p. 377) 
                                                 
60
 For more detail on the Milgram/Baumrind debate see Eckman (1977, pp. 93-94) and Miller et al. (1995, 
pp. 10-12).  
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observers: “I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory 
smiling and confident.  Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, 
who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse” (see also Parker, 2000, p. 116).  
And if there was a danger of long-term psychological and/or physiological harm, the 
experiments could also be accused of having been unethical on the grounds of not 
informing subjects of these potential risks.  Some believed the experiments were unethical 
on the basis that Milgram failed to obtain his subjects’ informed consent before proceeding 
(Baumrind, 1964, p. 423).  With participants having been told by the experimenter “you 
must continue”, others such as Schuler (1982, p. 125) considered the experiments unethical 
because Milgram had blatantly attempted to supplant the subjects’ right to withdraw.  
Miller (1986, p. 120) believed that this particular criticism was perhaps “one of the most 
convincing ethical arguments against the obedience research.”  Finally, with the 
experiments having converted some of the subjects into “stuttering wrecks” on the verge of 
“nervous collapse”, others were critical because they believed the debriefing sessions were 
at best “casual” and unlikely to be capable of restoring the subjects’ potentially damaged 
well-being (Baumrind, 1964, p. 422). 
 
In response to Baumrind, Milgram (1964a, p. 849) argued:  
 
A most important aspect of the procedure occurred at the end of the experimental 
session.  A careful postexperimental treatment was administered to all subjects.  
The exact content of the dehoax varied from condition to condition and with 
increasing experience on our part.  At the very least all subjects were told that the 
victim had not received dangerous electric shocks.  Each subject had a friendly 
reconciliation with the unharmed victim, and an extended discussion with the 
experimenter [italics added]. 
 
On top of this, six weeks after collecting the data, Milgram surveyed every participant 
(Blass, 2004, pp. 124-125) and in 1963 even had a psychiatrist interview the 40 most upset 
subjects.61  Consequently, Miller (1986) concluded: “in terms of the thoroughness of the 
debriefing, as well as the empirical assessment of subjects’ post-experimental attitudes, the 
procedures used by Milgram would seem to qualify as a model for laboratory research with 
human subjects” (p. 96).  Irrespective of this generous assessment, evidence obtained from 
the SMP hints at the possibility that the post-experimental debrief was unlikely to have 
been “a most important aspect” and far more experimental than Milgram was willing to 
publicly concede. 
                                                 
61
 In a document titled “Interviews with Forty ‘Worst Cases’ in the Milgram Obedience Experiments” dated 
20 June 1963, Paul Errera, an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, stated: “Single 50 minute interviews were 
held . . . some twelve months after the termination of the study . . . . None were found by this interviewer to 
show signs of having been harmed by their experience” (SMP, Box 45, Folder 162, Titled: “long interviews 
1963”). 
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 In the post-experimental survey later sent out to all subjects, Milgram somewhat 
mysteriously stated: “Actually, the other man did not receive any shocks.  Indeed, he was 
an actor employed by the project to play the part of the learner” (SMP, Box 45, Folder 159, 
Titled: “forms, mailing n.d.”).  If at “the very least all subjects were told that the victim 
had not received dangerous shocks”, why did Milgram feel the need to underline the above 
point in the post-experimental survey?  The answer to this question is that certainly during 
the first half of the research programme (perhaps even later), variability in the content of 
the dehoax was so great that, in conflict with Milgram’s assurances, at least some subjects 
were not informed before leaving the laboratory that the learner had not received 
dangerous shocks (Parker, 2000, p. 108). 62  As one subject stated in his response to the 
post-experimental survey:    
 
I actually checked the death notices in the New Haven Register for at least two 
weeks after the experiment to see if I had been involved and a contributing factor in 
the death of the so-called ‘learner’ - I was very relieved that his name did not 
appear in such a column (SMP, Box 44, Divider “9”, #0716). 
 
Another subject, this time from the 11th of the 24 experiments, said: “From what I’ve 
learned from others who’ve taken part, it would seem you have been somewhat 
irresponsible in permitting disturbed subjects to leave without informing them that they 
didn’t half kill the shockee [sic]” (SMP, Box 44, Divider (no label), #1137).63  Then again, 
although one subject claimed “I was not dehoaxed after the experiment” (SMP, Box 44, 
Divider “12”, #0625), reinforcing Milgram’s admission that the debrief varied, another 
subject from the same condition suggested they were partially dehoaxed.64 
 
 The important point to note is that there was probably greater variation in the 
debrief than Milgram was willing to admit.  And in conflict with his published assurances, 
                                                 
62
 After two visits to the SMP, Australian psychologist and postgraduate student at the University of 
Melbourne, G. Perry (personal communication, August 21, 2008) has obtained evidence that indicates 
Milgram did not develop and apply his model debrief until well into the second half of the research 
programme. 
 
63
 See also SMP, Box 44, Divider (no label), #0711 or SMP, Box 44, Divider “12”, #1007. 
 
64
 “I seriously question the wisdom and ethics of not completely dehoaxing each subject immediately after 
the session.  The standard ‘decompression’ treatment I received was not successful in reducing my anger and 
concern below the boiling point” (SMP, Box 44, Divider (no label), #0623).  Milgram trialed a deceptive 
instead of honest debrief, whereby the experimenter informed subjects at the end of the experiment that the 
shock designations were not as painful as the shock generator or the subjects’ reactions might have 
suggested.  This was because the machine was apparently calibrated for use on “mice and small rats.  Ahrrr 
the verbal designations on this machine ‘Slight’ to ‘Danger’ are for these small animals.  They are not exactly 
applicable to human beings” (SMP, Box 155, Audiotape # 0303).    
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this variability resulted in at least some subjects leaving the laboratory feeling that, in the 
absence of a “friendly reconciliation”, they had inflicted “serious shocks”.  It would appear 
that Milgram did not start out with a model debriefing, rather he arrived at one.  In the end, 
it is fair to conclude that Milgram was unlikely to have treated the debriefing stage with 
the degree of importance he both earlier promised65 and later claimed.66  Subject welfare, it 
would seem, was generally relegated in favour of other priorities.   
 
There were a few factors that may have contributed to Milgram’s delay in settling 
upon a model debrief.  First, the model debrief was, much like the experimental procedure, 
likely to have been invented via an ad hoc trial and error process which improved as the 
experimental programme progressed.  As it turns out, not only was the experimental 
programme at the cutting edge of social psychology, so was Milgram’s (eventual) model 
debrief—an assertion reflected in Milgram being credited with the origin of the word 
“debrief” (Harris, 1988, as cited in Blass, 2004, p. 112).67  A second factor also probably 
contributing to the variability in the debrief was what Blass earlier termed “carryover 
effects” from Milgram’s PhD research.  That is, Milgram may have suspected, as was the 
case with his PhD subjects, that the vast majority of the OTA subjects would not have 
minded, in the name of science, the variability in the debrief or even at having been 
stressfully deceived.68  Had this been the case, then Milgram perhaps assumed subjects 
would later appreciate his reasoning for also failing to obtain their informed consent (along 
with his attempt to remove their right to withdraw).  
 
The main reason why, from the start, Milgram failed to administer his model 
debrief, seek his subjects’ informed consent, and was at ease in removing their right to 
withdraw, was his firm belief that, other than experiencing “momentary excitement” 
                                                 
65
 As Milgram said in the second research proposal dated 25 January 1961: “Every effort will be made to set 
the subject at ease . . . .  An extended discussion with the experimenter, and a friendly reconciliation with the 
confederates will be an integral part of each subject’s experience.  In time all interested subjects will be 
informed of the full details of the experimental program.”  Then again, immediately after this, Milgram 
stated: “Beyond this, no rigid rules are possible: each subject must be treated individually, but always with 
the respect due to one who has aided in scientific inquiry [italics added]” (SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: 
“Grants 1961-1967”).   
 
66
 However, as Blass (2004, p. 127) has indicated, Milgram’s post-experimental survey and his having a 
psychiatrist interview some of the subjects were measures unheard of at this time (a point the influential 
professor of social ethics, Herbert Kelman, has concurred with).     
 
67
  “Milgram was a pioneer in the debriefing procedures that are now a matter of course in psychological 
experiments on human subjects” (Elms, 1995, p. 27). 
 
68
 Of course, if Milgram did suspect this, he would have been assuming that the OTA experiment were, in 
terms of infliction of psychological/physiological stress, commensurate with that generated by his PhD study 
(surely an invalid assumption). 
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(Milgram, 1964a, p. 849), the experiments were psychologically and physiologically 
harmless.  As Milgram later said in an interview with Meyer (1970, p. 132): “ ‘I had to ask 
myself, was this harming the person or not?  My judgment is that it was not.  Even in the 
extreme cases, I wouldn’t say that permanent damage results.’ ”   
 
The flaw in this logic is Milgram’s assumption he was capable of anticipating every 
possible consequence associated with participation (Schlenker & Forsyth, 1977, p. 373).  
Yet this was something he could only know in hindsight after the potential damage was 
done.  Despite Milgram’s opinion, documents obtained from the SMP suggest that there 
probably existed the potential for long-term, psychological and/or physical damage (which 
he both failed to anticipate and/or ameliorate).   
 
Regarding long-term psychological harm, it could be argued that participation 
probably impacted negatively on some subjects’ self-image/esteem (Kelman, 1972, p. 167; 
Bok, 1978, as cited in Pigden & Gillet, 1996, p. 243).  For example, it is difficult to 
imagine that completing the Relationship condition did not impact adversely on the self-
image of the 15 percent of subjects who inflicted all the shocks on someone who was at 
least an acquaintance.  That is, completing this variation may have generated a new self-
concept of being a rather treacherous and unsavoury character.  Milgram certainly sensed 
the potential of this experiment to fracture—harm?—friendships, and, in applying a 
deceptive debrief, attempted to avert any post-experimental bitterness.  As he later said to 
one subject who inflicted all the shocks on his screaming friend:  
 
the main purpose of the experiment was to see how you would react to taking 
orders.  He wasn’t really getting the shock, we just set this up this way to see . . . 
whether you would be happy to give him the shocks or whether you weren’t so 
happy about it . . . . So ahrrr ahrrrr lets tell him that ahhrrrr you knew you weren’t 
giving him the shocks . . . alright? (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2429).  
 
The criticism that the experiments were unethical seems hard to refute in the case of the 
Relationship condition.  Furthermore, on three occasions teacher/learner teams in this 
variation were, as mentioned, members of the same family: #2422 were brothers-in-law 
(maximum shock: 165 volts); #2428 were uncle and nephew (maximum shock 180 volts); 
#2435 were father and son (maximum shock: 165 volts) (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2422, 
#2428, #2435, respectively).  The Relationship condition was the last of the research 
programme and at the time Milgram was, as the audiotapes clearly indicate, struggling 
desperately to recruit teacher/learner teams for the last few trials.  In desperation to bring 
the data-collection phase to an end, in approaching 1,000 experimental trials Milgram took 
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a phenomenal risk in accepting a father and son team.  The father refused early on to 
continue but the question remains—what would the long-term implications have been if he 
had completed the experiment?69  Prioritising his pursuit of results over the subjects’ 
friendship (and the long-term psychological harm this could have generated) was 
deplorable.  And if many of Milgram’s critics were left appalled at his having undertaken 
the Remote condition, one can only imagine their reaction had they known about the 
Relationship condition.  On this note, as the ethical criticisms post-Baumrind (1964) 
intensified, this could explain why, despite promises made in 1962, Milgram never 
published a detailed account of the Relationship condition and its results.70  Although 
publishing this experiment would surely have stimulated an ethical firestorm, as will be 
argued later in this chapter, ironically it may be capable of shedding new light on what 
arguably turned out to be the most enduring methodological criticism directed at the OTA 
research programme. 
 
There were arguably other examples of potential long term psychological harm.  It 
was not unusual for obedient subjects to mention having experienced post-experimental 
episodes of guilt.71  Related to this, some obedient subjects later reported that loved ones 
went on to compare them with infamous historical figures such as the Nazi bureaucrat 
Adolf Eichmann (Milgram, 1974, p. 54).72 
 
Although subjects may have acquired potentially disturbing knowledge about 
themselves (termed inflicted insight), others construed this to have been a beneficial 
outcome.  As one subject said: “I will remember this, and will think for myself, and act on 
                                                 
69
 For evidence of Milgram struggling to recruit subjects and his desire nearing the end of the programme to 
complete the data-collection stage, see SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2440.  
 
70
 As stated in Chapter Six, Milgram promised to (but never did) provide a detailed overview of the 
Relationship condition in his book.  The reason for this could be that the experiment was too different from 
the Baseline, too uncontrolled, and therefore not worthy of inclusion (potentially poor acting by the 
acquaintance/learners; responses not standardised; no mention of a heart condition, etc).  However, these are 
unlikely to be the reasons explaining its exclusion because similar arguments are applicable to the entire 
Proximity Series, which he did publish (that were really just pilot studies that, in just as many ways as the 
Relationship condition, differed from the Baseline experiment).  It is instead suspected that Milgram did not 
publish a detailed account of the Relationship condition because, in light of Baumrind’s (1964) critical 
article, he came to fear his detractors’ irrefutable criticisms that, with total disregard for his subjects’ welfare, 
in the pursuit of results he indeed went too far.  Milgram would have had no avenues of recourse or 
redemption had Baumrind and others found out about his inclusion in the Relationship condition of a father 
(teacher)/son (learner) team.  
 
71
 As one subject stated: “I can’t understand myself for going all the way.  It’s left me with a guilty feeling” 
(SMP, Box 44, Divider “9”, #2013).  For not disobeying, another subject pointed out that he “hated” himself 
(SMP, Box 44, Divider “9”, #0116). 
 
72
 For other Eichmann comparisons, see SMP, Box 44, Divider “12”, #0328 and SMP, Box 44, Divider “10”, 
#0222. 
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my own thoughts and frindings[sic]” (SMP, Box 44, Divider “8”, #1311, see also Mantell 
& Panzarella, 1976, p. 241; Milgram, 1964a, p. 850).  As Kaufmann (1967) put it: “The 
social theory of evil may be distressing and humiliating to the stature of man, but then, 
learning to know oneself is seldom a gratifying experience, yet one which few of us would 
forego” (p. 322).  Then again, as Kelman (1972, pp. 167-168) argued: “But do we, for the 
purpose of experimentation, have the right to provide such potentially disturbing insights 
to subjects who do not know that this is what they are coming for?”  Elms (1972, p. 156, as 
cited in Miller, 1986, p. 132), who assumes that Milgram’s experiments hold significant 
insights into the Holocaust, would have demurred:  
 
Should we instead leave people to their moral inertia, or their grave moral laxity, so 
as not to disturb their privacy?  Who is willing to justify privacy on this basis?  
Who would have done so, with fore-knowledge of the results, in pre-Nazi 
Germany?73 
 
In regard to long-term (even permanent) physical harm, despite Milgram’s 
optimistic conclusion that the experiments were harmless, early potential warning signs 
were probably not treated with the seriousness they merited.  For example, Herbert Winer, 
a disobedient subject, later confronted Milgram and expressed his deep concerns 
surrounding the potentially dangerous physiological stress being imposed on subjects: 
 
But at that time, he was fresh out of his own doctoral studies, and was very much 
concerned with my somewhat inchoate but very strong talk about ethics, about 
deception, and about what struck me at the time, in view of what I felt to be my 
own physical reaction to this conflict, as imposing altogether unwarranted strain on 
people who had had no previous medical screening of any kind . . . . And I was 
very upset . . . because I felt that had I had a heart condition, I could have been 
seriously inconvenienced [italics original] (Blass, 2004, p. 117).  
 
Although other subjects echoed Winer’s concern,74 Milgram never introduced any safety 
measures involving medical screening.  This was poor judgment on Milgram’s part 
because these concerns were unlikely to have been exaggerations.  As one “IRATE” 
subject stated in the post-experimental survey: 
   
My comment to my wife on arriving home was that this had been the most 
unpleasant night of my life.  I would here inject a word of caution – since taking 
part in the experiment I have suffered a mild heart attack – the one thing my doctor 
tells me that I must avoid is any form of tension – For this reason I feel that it is 
                                                 
73
 As Pigden and Gillet (1996, p. 244) said: “If you don’t know you are sick, you can’t seek a cure.”  
 
74
 “Since I became so upset during the experiment, I’m not sure that you were entirely responsible in picking 
your subjects.  Suppose I’d had a heart condition?” (SMP, Box 44, Divider “12”, #2032; see also Blass, 
2004, p. 116).   
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imperative that you make certain that any prospective participant have a clean bill 
of health (SMP, Box 44, Divider “T.R.”, #0216). 
 
The reason nobody was “seriously inconvenienced” was probably due more to luck than 
planning.  With no medical safety-net in place, it really could have gone horribly wrong.   
 
But then again, in Milgram’s favour is that numerous replications and slight 
variations of the OTA experiments have been undertaken throughout the world and it 
seems nobody has ever suffered permanent harm.  Miller (1986, pp. 104-105) arrived at the 
same conclusion after assessing all of the evidence: “if one asks this question: ‘Is 
participation in the Milgram paradigm psychologically damaging?,’ the best evidence is 
that the answer is ‘no.’ ”—a conclusion he was still promulgating nearly two decades later 
(Miller, 2004, p. 198).  Miller draws attention to a much more complex issue: “However, if 
one asks a slightly different question: ‘Does a research psychologist have the right to 
expose subjects to intense stress and conflict?,’ the answer is less clear.”   
 
Researchers frequently resolve such dilemmas by engaging in cost/benefit analyses 
whereby they assess whether or not the probable benefits associated with a research idea 
are likely to exceed the anticipated costs.  Milgram was aware before the completion of the 
data-collection stage of the potentially unethical, albeit what he believed momentary, costs 
surrounding his experiments’ reliance on deception and infliction of intense stress.75  In 
terms of potential benefits, however, Milgram was quietly confident from the start that the 
study could provide new insights into destructive obedience (something he had long 
suspected was in some way centrally related to the extermination of the European Jews):   
 
Under what conditions does one ask about destructive obedience?  Perhaps under 
the same conditions that a medical researcher asks about cancer or polio; because it 
is a threat to human welfare and has shown itself a scourage [sic] to humanity.  
Perhaps the need to understand and conquer the disease becomes more pressing 
when a member of the family has been hurt by it.  The nightmare that engulfed 
Europe in 1933-45 claimed many victims; none was hit so hard as European Jewry 
(SMP, Box 62, Folder 126, Titled: “Drafts and Fragments.  Ethical Issues of the 
Experiment pre-1974”). 
 
Milgram’s belief was that the benefits to humanity in understanding and perhaps 
conquering the so-called “disease” of “destructive obedience” were potentially of immense 
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 In a document dated “January 1962” Milgram argued: “The ethical issue, then, boils down to two points  
. . . . a) Is it ethical to apply pressures to a person which may lead him into what he believes to be an act 
which he would otherwise not perform for reasons of personal conscience? . . . he has harmed --although 
temporarily-- another individual . . . . b) . . . is it ethical to decieve [sic] persons in spcyhological [sic] 
experiments . . . [and] subject persons to emotional stress es [sic] of an extreme sort in the course of 
experimentation?” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 165, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”). 
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importance.  One is left wondering how much greater cost Milgram, clearly with an eye on 
the Holocaust, was willing to impose on his subjects to obtain this knowledge.  With so 
much apparently at stake, how far was too far?  With variations such as the Relationship 
condition, Milgram seems to have been willing to risk the possibility of his subjects paying 
a high physical/psychological/ethical price.   
 
Offended by Milgram’s presumption in deciding what costs his subjects would pay, 
Baumrind (1964, p. 422) was the first to dispute Milgram’s view that the costs were likely 
to be outweighed by the benefits (for which she could see none): “Indeed such a rationale 
might suffice to justify the means used to achieve his end if that end were of inestimable 
value to humanity” (Baumrind, 1964, p. 422).  Like others soon after, Baumrind disputed 
Milgram’s belief that his research was likely to have provided insights into the Holocaust 
or anything else for that matter.76  
 
Was the OTA research ethical or unethical?  Producing an answer to this question 
is impossible because the ethical debate between Milgram (and his adherents) and 
Baumrind (and hers) appears irresolvable.  This is because, as Miller (1986, p. 115) noted: 
“the ethical status of a particular research project resides, to a significant extent, in the eye 
of the beholder” and that it is “a question, then, of values, of priorities, of what one views 
as important knowledge, and whether the price of that knowledge is worth paying” (Miller, 
1986, pp. 104-105).77  Having placed the Holocaust in the background, Milgram thought 
the knowledge his research would produce was important and that the potential costs to his 
subjects were worth paying.  Baumrind did not. 
 
Perhaps Miller’s (1986, p. 136) point in relation to Humphreys’ (1970) creative yet 
also highly controversial research on male sexual gratification in public toilets is pertinent: 
“Put succinctly if not delicately, the issue often seems to come to this: Either one is going 
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 There had been complaints made earlier.  On 23 November 1962 Milgram received a letter from the 
American Psychological Association informing him that his membership had been delayed because someone 
from Yale University had officially laid a complaint about his experiments (Blass, 2004, pp. 112-113). 
 
77
 The dispute between Milgram and many of those who disputed the OTA experiments on ethical grounds 
generally comes back to an irresolvable and complex philosophical debate between teleologists (whose focus 
is, as Milgram’s was, on the potentially beneficial consequences of a research project) and deontologists 
(who generally believe that it is totally unethical to use any means—like deception or the infliction of 
stress/conflict—as a vehicle to arrive at a worthy scientific end).  As Schlenker and Forsyth (1977, p. 373) 
point out: “Whenever a teleologist and a deontologist discuss morals, there will be an inevitable value 
conflict.  The fundamental moral guide for the teleologist is the test of consequences, a consideration that the 
deontologist cannot abide.”  Other than concluding that the debate between teleologists and deontologists is 
ultimately irresolvable, delving further into this complex debate is beyond the parameters of this thesis 
(Miller, 1986, pp. 110-116; Schlenker & Forsyth, 1977).  
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to do the research and pay the ethical costs, or one will remain ignorant about this 
particular arena of social life.”  Whether one agrees with him or not, Milgram decided for 
his subjects that they would pay the probably low (but actually unpredictable) participatory 
costs because he suspected humanity could not afford to remain ignorant.   
 
Milgram had taken an enormous gamble because he assumed that his results could 
be usefully generalised beyond his laboratory walls.  But had Milgram failed to consider 
the price his subjects might pay for findings that in fact might have no value to humanity, 
as subsequently claimed by Baumrind?  Perhaps in the eyes of many an impartial observer, 
Milgram’s name would be redeemed and his daring (arrogant?) decision to proceed 
mitigated if the OTA research programme could be generalised to the outside world.  Can 
Milgram’s results and eventual explanation be generalised beyond the walls of the 
laboratory and particularly to the Holocaust which stimulated them?  Before it is possible 
to assess the applicability of generalising the OTA findings and Milgram’s theories to an 
event like the Holocaust, it is important that the study be capable of overcoming the most 
resilient methodological criticisms it went on to attract.  This is because if in the first place 
the experiments are methodologically weak, then there is no use in attempting to generalise 
from a flawed foundation (Eckman, 1977, p 94; Miller, 1995, p. 34; Orne & Holland, 
1968, p. 282).  Consequently, assessing the research programme’s methodological strength 
precedes an assessment of its ability to be generalised beyond the laboratory walls. 
 
 
7.2 Methodological Criticisms 
 
The most important methodological criticism directed at the OTA research centred 
on whether or not Milgram successfully deceived his subjects into believing that the 
learner was receiving potentially dangerous electric shocks (Milgram, 1972, p. 139).  
Successfully deceiving the majority of his subjects was “absolutely critical” because, as 
Miller (1986, p. 143) pointed out: “the entire foundation of the obedience research rests on 
the believability of the victim’s increasingly mounting suffering.”  In this regard, the two 
most powerful methodological critiques directed at the internal validity of the OTA 
experiments were Orne and Holland (1968) soon followed by Mixon (1972, 1976, 1989).   
  
There were four main reasons that Orne and Holland (1968) thought Milgram’s 
attempts to deceive his subjects into believing the learner was being shocked probably 
failed.  First, these authors believed the incongruity of the stoic equanimity of the 
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experimenter in the face of the learner’s escalating screams would surely have cued most 
subjects to the reality that the learner was not actually being shocked.  Secondly, subjects 
would apparently have noticed that the experimenter could themselves have performed the 
teacher’s role, thus signalling it was all a ruse.  Thirdly, despite the learner’s persistent and 
increasingly desperate demands that the experiment be stopped, for the first two-thirds of 
the procedure (up until the 300-volt switch), they bizarrely cooperated by responding 
immediately to the subject’s questions.  Finally, subjects trusted that the experimenter 
would not knowingly allow extremely dangerous shocks to be inflicted on the learner and 
assumed that, despite any evidence to the contrary, “everything is going to be all right” 
(Orne & Holland, 1968, p. 287).  It was for these main reasons that Orne and Holland 
(1968) believed Milgram’s attempt to deceive his subjects probably failed and knowing the 
learner was not actually being shocked best explains why so many went on to complete his 
experiments. 
 
Orne and Holland (1968) were actually using Milgram’s research as an example of 
an experiment influenced by what Orne (1962) had termed demand characteristics.  
Demand characteristics are where subjects detect cues within the experimental setting to 
engage in behaviours that they suspect are most likely to please the researcher by 
confirming a hypothesis.  The implication being that most subjects would have worked out 
that the experiment was actually about OTA and, knowing the learner was only pretending 
to be under intense stress, many subjects gave Milgram the results he desired.   
 
Although conceding that a small minority did not believe the shocks were genuine, 
Milgram (1972, p. 141) responded by pointing out that in the post-experimental interviews 
56.1 and 24 percent “fully” and “probably” believed the learner was being shocked, 
respectively.  Therefore, a total of 80.1 percent seemed convinced by the procedure (a 
conclusion independently and much more rigorously confirmed by other researchers).78   
 
After listening to some of the audio tapes and considering the evidence and 
arguments, the author agrees with Eckman (1977, p. 94): “when one reads the actual 
transcripts of Milgram’s subjects’ verbal behavior, it is hard to conclude it was all a put-on.  
                                                 
78
 After undertaking a replication of the OTA experiment, David Rosenhan was cited by Milgram (1972, p. 
141) as later having had independent judges rigorously interview subjects asking them in astonishment: “ 
‘You really mean you didn’t catch on to the experiment?’ ”  In response 70 percent admitted to having been 
fooled by the deception (see also Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1985, as cited in Miller, 1986, p. 156).  As the 
largely critical Helm and Morelli (1979, p. 332) conclude: “Milgram is probably on safe grounds in 
contending that ‘the majority of the subjects accept the experimental situation as genuine, a few do not.’ ”  
But see Parker (2000, pp. 118-119) for a conflicting view. 
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There was just too much conflict and stress” (see also Pigden & Gillet, 1996, p. 236).  
Milgram (1972, p. 140) was less patient with Orne and Holland’s claim: “that the subjects 
only feigned sweating, trembling, and stuttering to please the experimenter [italics 
original]” and he responded that their argument “is pathetically detached from reality, 
equivalent to the statement that hemophiliacs bleed to keep their physicians busy.”  In sum, 
Orne and Holland’s claim struggled to account for the subjects’ patent internal conflict and 
stress. 
 
There are two other reasons why the author does not believe demand 
characteristics were the key determinant of Milgram’s results.  First, if subjects knew the 
shocks were fake yet continued on to please the experimenter, why after the completion of 
the experiment would 73 percent of obedient subjects in the Remote condition later decline 
an opportunity to experience the kind of apparently fake shock (450-volts) they had 
(supposedly) just inflicted on the learner (see Milgram, 1974, p. 57)?79  Secondly, if 
subjects were only acting to please the experimenter, why did so many go to the trouble of 
purposefully engaging in acts of sabotage?80  Again, there is believed to be much merit in 
Eckman’s (1977, p. 95) conclusion on this matter:  
 
To invoke the charge ‘demand characteristics’ against Milgram’s work is foolish.  
Most of the experimental research in social psychology is more vulnerable to the 
generation of ‘artifactual’ evidence than his work is.  The ‘demand characteristics’ 
criticism should certainly be judiciously applied to weak studies that are published.  
In the case of Milgram’s work, however, such criticisms give one the impression 
that the critics may be exploiting a controversial study to give attention to their 
favorite subject, demand character[istics.]81 
 
Although Milgram (1972, pp. 151-153) forcefully addressed three of Orne and 
Holland’s (1968) four methodological criticisms, there was one that continues to linger.  
This was the issue of trust, where apparently subjects knew all along the experimenter 
would never have allowed an innocent person to be seriously harmed, and that when the 
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 One such example obtained from the SMP being: Experimenter: “How painful to the learner were the last 
few shocks that you administered to him . . . ?” Subject: “From his reaction I would say . . . extremely painful 
. . . ”  Experimenter: “Well . . . how arrh how high a sample shock would you take on this machine right 
now?”  Subject: “I would like to say, ha ha, cautious me, alright, I’d go up to . . . 60 [volts].  I’ve had 10,000 
volts but, ha ha, it felt different to [the earlier 45-volt test shock]” (SMP, Box 155, Audiotape #0303).  In a 
replication of the OTA experiments, Rosenhan (1969, p. 142) found that every subject later refused to 
participate in another trial this time as the learner. 
  
80
 With the intention of avoiding having to inflict further shocks on the learner, it was not unusual for 
subjects to covertly attempt transmitting the correct answer to subjects by emphasising verbally the correct 
answer (for an example, see Chapter Eight, p. 152).  
 
81
 In fact Milgram’s procedure was so convincing that one subject had even been informed by a friend who 
had earlier been a subject “that the experiment was ‘a fake, the learner does not get any shocks’ but I didn’t 
believe this” (SMP, Box 44, Divider “8”, #1014).   
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experimenter demanded that the subject continue inflicting the shocks, he was also 
implying that it was safe to do so (Harré, 1979, p. 105).  As Eckman (1977, p. 94) stated: 
“This position cannot easily be dismissed, because there is a good deal of evidence to back 
it up.”  In support of the trust issue, one fully obedient subject (of potentially many) stated: 
“the way I figured it, you’re not going to cause yourselves trouble by actually giving 
serious physical damage to a body” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2430).82  The most 
prominent proponent to bolster the validity of this significant criticism was Mixon (1972, 
1976, 1989). 
 
Mixon (1972) was one of the first to replicate the OTA experiments using role-
playing (where, as an alternative to the potentially unethical use of deception in the OTA 
experiments, subjects are informed before starting that the learner is an actor, the shocks 
are not authentic, and they are to pretend the experiment is real).83  Mixon produced results 
in favour of Milgram but, irrespective of his supportive findings, with an emphasis on the 
issue of trust, he became a harsh and unyielding methodological critic of the OTA 
experiments. 
 
Mixon (1976, p. 93) argued that the reason the OTA experiments were so 
convincing to observers was the subjects’ outpouring of emotional tension.  Their palpable 
displays of stress appear to illustrate that subjects believed the shocks were real and 
harmful (and thus did not trust that the experimenter would secretly protect the learner’s 
well-being).  Where Orne and Holland failed, however, Mixon presented a more 
convincing explanation for the displays of tension.  That is, Mixon argued that Milgram’s 
subjects were tense because they were confronted with a highly ambiguous situation in 
which the information coming from both the experimenter and learner were mutually 
contradictory: the shocks were apparently harmful but not dangerous, the learner was 
screaming in agony but the experimenter looked calm.  The consequence of this being: 
“No wonder many subjects showed such stress.  What to believe?  The right thing to do 
depends on which actor is believed” (Mixon, 1989, p. 33).  His conclusion:  
 
The extreme emotional reactions of many of the participants are due not to the 
certain knowledge that they are inflicting serious harm, but to the fact that they 
cannot be certain.  The evidence of their senses tells them they are, but background 
                                                 
82
  Another example being SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2429.  
 
83
 Role-playing might eliminate the need for deception but ironically, as Miller (1986, p. 175) pointed out: 
“An even less complimentary view is that role-playing procedures increase the likelihood that demand 
characteristics will influence behavior.” 
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expectations and the expert responsible for the well-being of participants tells them 
they are not (Mixon, 1976, p. 94).  
 
According to Mixon (1989), as “increasingly large chunks of the social and physical world 
that we live in can be understood only by experts” (p. 35), most subjects resolved the 
stressfully ambiguous situation by trusting the authority figure’s word that the learner 
would not be hurt (see also Patten, 1977b, p. 357; Strudler & Warren, 2001, pp. 162-163). 
 
 Bolstering Mixon’s claim that some combination of ambiguity and trust 
encouraged most subjects to complete the experiment were the following lines of evidence.  
First, Mixon (1976, p. 95) pointed out that in Milgram’s (1974) three least ambiguous 
experiments, where it was explicitly made clear that if the subject continued the learner 
would definitely be hurt, all refused to complete the experiment.  Secondly, the more 
ambiguous the learner’s fate in Milgram’s variations, the higher the completion rates 
(Mixon, 1976, pp. 92-94).  Finally, removing any ambiguity surrounding the learner’s fate, 
Mixon (1972) undertook a role-play replication where the experimenter informed the 
subject that “The learner’s health is irrelevant . . . continue as directed” (p. 164).  
Consequently, predicted completions slumped.84   
 
That Milgram may have purposefully inserted ambiguity into his experiment to 
obtain, initially anyway, surprisingly high completion rates is an accusation supported by 
evidence presented earlier in this thesis.  For example, Milgram changed the designated 
title of the last button on his proposed shock machine from “LETHAL” to “XXX”, 
presumably because the former was unlikely to create the “strongest obedience 
situation”.85   
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 In this series of experiments the subject was provided with an overview of the Remote experiment up until 
the 300-volt switch was inflicted.  The subject was then to imagine and describe the succeeding events.  By 
manipulating this description, Mixon obtained wide variations in predicted completion rates.  When the 
descriptions clearly conveyed the learner was being harmed, predicted completions slumped.  However, 
ambiguous descriptions resulted in very high predicted completion rates.  “I used nonactive role playing 
scripts of Milgram’s study to check my assumption that if I described the experimenter in the ‘learning study’ 
behaving as if he believed the learner is being seriously harmed, participants would refuse to obey his 
commands.  The series of scripts supported my assumption; the script that made it most clear that the 
experimenter believed the consequences harmful elicited no obedience (Mixon, 1972)” (Mixon, 1976, pp. 94-
95). 
 
85
 Lending more weight to this criticism is that Milgram tended to introduce more disturbing (less 
ambiguous) innovations to his basic experimental procedure only when he was confident they were unlikely 
to detract significantly from obtaining a high completion rate.  For example, it was only after the Proximity 
Series illustrated how difficult it was going to be to get most subjects to engage in disobedience that Milgram 
decided that in his new (and even more impressive?) Baseline condition he would reduce the ambiguity by 
informing subjects that the learner had a mild heart condition.   
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 However, there are two lines of evidence which lend weight to the validity of 
Milgram’s methodology over his critics.  First, research using authentic victims—
animals—went on to produce similar high completion rates.  One such study was by 
Sheridan and King (1972) who specifically set out to test the issue of trust.  They 
replicated Milgram’s Proximity condition (victim could directly be seen and heard: 40 
percent completion rate) whereby the subject was ordered to inflict real, painful, but not 
lethal electric shocks on “a cute, fluffy puppy” (Sheridan & King, 1972, p. 165).  The 
results revealed that 54 percent of the male and 100 percent of female subjects followed all 
orders to continue increasing the shock intensity on the genuinely yelping puppy.  
Although the subjects were later reunited with the frightened but (apparently) unharmed 
puppy, during the experiment they displayed the same kinds of symptoms of stress and 
tension as Milgram’s subjects.  Sheridan and King (1972, p. 166) concluded: “The findings 
are in consonance with the view that Milgram’s findings may correctly be taken at face 
value.  Ss are willing to follow repugnant commands, even when it is clear that the victim 
is truly receiving shocks.”86  Of course the limitation with this (and all research on animals 
for that matter) is that the results are not necessarily applicable to experiments on humans 
(Miller, 1986, p. 156). 
 
The second line of evidence that lends more weight to Milgram’s claims over those 
of Mixon that subjects may not actually have trusted the experimenter comes from the 
following exchange after the 150-volt shock switch taken from the Relationship condition:   
 
Teacher:  “I, see I don’t believe this, I mean, go ahead.”   
Experimenter:  “You don’t believe what?”  
Teacher:  “Alright, go ahead, ask me a question.” 
Experimenter: “No no, what don’t you believe?” 
Teacher  “I don’t believe you were giving him the shock.”   
Experimenter:  “Then why, why won’t you continue?”  
Teacher:  “Well I, I just don’t want to take a chance, I mean I, I”  
Experimenter: “Well if you don’t believe that he’s getting the shocks, why 
 don’t you just continue with the test and we’ll finish it?”  
Teacher:  “Well I, I can’t, because I can’t take that chance” (SMP, Box  153, 
Audiotape #2439).   
 
This exchange may imply something about all the other experiments where the learner was 
a stranger: the reason many completed the non-relationship conditions relative to the 
Relationship condition may not have been because they trusted the experimenter.  Instead, 
it may have been because the learner was a stranger and consequently subjects felt they 
could afford to take the risk and trust the experimenter.  With this point in mind, Mixon’s 
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 For other studies using authentic victims that produced similar results see Foddy (1971) and Penner, 
Hawkins, Dertke, Spector and Stone (1973).  
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interpretation makes little sense: if ambiguity confused the subjects as to whether the 
learner was being shocked or not, surely it would have made the most sense, as many 
(particularly in the Relationship condition) did, to err on the side of caution and stop the 
experiment (see Coutts, 1977, p. 520, as cited in Darley, 1995, p. 133).  As a subject in one 
of the non-relationship conditions who also thought he was being deceived reasoned: 
“When I decided that I wouldn’t go along with any more shocks, my feeling was ‘plant or 
not . . . I was not going to take a chance that our learner would get hurt’ ” (SMP, Box 44, 
Divider (no label), #1106).   
 
But it would seem that because in the non-relationship variations the learner was a 
stranger, for some reason, most subjects found it relatively easier to assume it was 
probably a hoax and thus take the risk to trust the experimenter and inflict all the shocks.  
Of course, had the shocks and experiment turned out to have been real, the obedient 
subjects would always have the justification that, due to the ambiguous situation, they 
could probably only be blamed for trusting the information supplied to them by someone 
who appeared to be an expert.  The important conclusion to draw from this line of evidence 
is that Milgram’s attempts to deceive his subjects across all his variations may in actuality 
have been much greater than critics such as Orne and Holland (1968) and Mixon (1989) 
believed.  It does not discredit Mixon’s claim but, in favour of Milgram, it certainly sheds 
greater light on this otherwise protracted methodological impasse. 
 
In light of the above “methodological battle” between Milgram and Mixon (Miller, 
1986, p. 171), 87 there is one particularly good reason to conclude the OTA experiments 
were internally valid.  That is, on different types of victims (Foddy, 1971; Shanab & 
Yahya, 1977; Sheridan & King, 1972), settings (Hofling, Brotzman, Dalrymple, Graves & 
Pierce, 1966)88 and in different countries (Ancona & Pareyson, 1968; Burley & 
McGuinness, 1977; Mantell, 1971), a diverse range of replications (Martin, Lobb, 
Chapman & Spillane, 1976; Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986, 1995; Rosenhan, 1969) of the 
OTA experiments have been undertaken—nearly all of which lend weight to Milgram’s 
legacy (Miller et al., 1995, pp. 11-12).  Drawing on Donald Campbell’s observation, Miller 
et al. (1995, p. 12) add “a range of diverse methodologies that triangulate on the same 
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 With explicit reference to the methodological critiques of Orne and Holland then Mixon, the otherwise 
highly critical Helm and Morelli (1979, p.  332) have argued: “Milgram has parried quite effectively most of 
the criticisms of his work.”  
 
88
 This study—in which doctors ordered nurses to administer to patients clearly lethal dosages of medicine—
was undertaken independently of the OTA experiments (but, in the real-life setting, arguably lends weight to 
its credibility). 
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conceptual issues is a vital criterion of scientific inquiry (e.g., Brewer & Collins, 1981; 
Campbell & Fiske, 1959).”  And this methodological triangulation continues to reinforce 
the internal validity of Milgram’s research and more recently saw Miller (2004, pp. 196-
197) conclude: “Although there have been methodological criticisms of the Milgram 
paradigm . . . the current view on the part of most social psychologists is that the Milgram 
findings are a reliable phenomenon in the laboratory.”  The consequence of this conclusion 
is that the OTA experiments are likely to be internally valid.   
 
The following section explores the scholarly reaction to the Milgram-Holocaust 
linkage (M-H linkage): the generalisation of Milgram’s findings and eventual theory to the 
Holocaust.   
 
 
7.3 Generalisation: the Milgram-Holocaust Linkage 
 
In Milgram’s 1961 letter to Henry Riecken at the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) and the opening paragraph of his first article in 1963, he made explicit statements 
that early on conveyed a belief that his experiments captured, in the laboratory setting, 
behaviour synonymous with the perpetration of the Holocaust (Blass, 1993, p. 32; Miller, 
2004, p. 203).  In her critique, Baumrind (1964) was the first to engage in what Mooks 
(1983, p. 386) later facetiously termed “count-’em mechanics”: the listing of differences 
between the OTA experiments and the Holocaust in an attempt to render the former 
externally invalid.  She pointed out that, unlike the OTA experiments, the victims of the 
Holocaust were labelled subhuman and, with the perpetrators believing in the ultimate 
goal, they did not feel any guilt or conflict (Baumrind, 1964, p. 423).  Perhaps sensing he 
had gone too far, Milgram’s quickly moderated his view, and he went on to identify an 
even wider variety of differences.  These included the absence in his experiments of victim 
vilification as “life unworthy of life”, long-term ideological indoctrination and, unlike the 
Nazi execution squads, the subjects were told their victim would not receive permanent 
injuries (see Milgram, 1964a, p. 851, 1974, pp. 175-178).  In a letter dated 9 April 1964, 
Milgram went so far to say to a correspondent who saw strong parallels between the OTA 
research and Nazi Germany’s concentration camps: “ ‘it is quite a jump . . . from an 
experiment of this sort to general conclusions about the Nazi epoch, and I, myself, feel that 
I have sometimes gone too far in generalizing.  Be cautious in generalizing’ ” (Blass, 2004, 
p. 279). 
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Milgram (as cited in Blass, 2004, pp. 269-270) frequently placed distance between 
his experiments and the Holocaust, but sometimes he could not resist bridging that gap, as 
he did in the German translation of his book: 
 
It is fitting that this book be translated into German, since it has a special relevance 
to Germans.  Obedience is, after all, their favorite alibi.  My guess is, after 
conducting the experiments reported in this book, that if the same institutions arose 
in the United States—the concentration camps, the gas chambers—there would be 
no problem finding Americans to operate them. 
 
As Miller (2004, p. 204) noted: “Milgram’s views could thus be termed complex and 
diverse by his supporters or inconsistent and ambiguous by his detractors.”    
 
Particularly after the publication of Milgram’s book, by the mid-1970s and 1980s, 
more researchers than not were making generalisations from the OTA experiments to the 
Holocaust (see Askenasy, 1978, pp. 131-132; Charny, 1982, pp. 13-16; Dicks, 1972, p. 
269; Etzioni, 1968, p. 280; Rosenbaum, 1983, p. 36; Steiner, 1980, p. 431).89  But it was 
Sabini and Silver (1982) who most notably contributed to and then expanded upon this 
purported connection.  
 
Sabini and Silver highlighted that during the Holocaust cruelty and hatred were 
indisputably present but they were not necessary features.  For a goal as broad as the 
extermination of the European Jews, the capricious beast had to be replaced by the 
seemingly monolithic and emotionless bureaucratic machine: 
 
The requisite bureaucracy . . . would be responsive to the will of the ultimate 
authority through a hierarchy of responsibility . . . . It was this bureaucratization of 
evil, the institutionalization of murder, that marked the Third Reich (Sabini & 
Silver, 1982, p. 56).   
 
Central to their argument was that, in a microcosm, the OTA experiments captured 
key aspects of the bureaucratic process that, as it did for the Nazi regime during the 
Holocaust, expedited the pursuit of malevolent ends.  How might bureaucratic organisation 
do this?  In their view, functionaries in both the OTA experiments and the Holocaust used 
a variety of features inherent in the bureaucratic process that aided in reducing 
subject/perpetrator feelings of responsibility for their ultimately destructive actions.  First, 
there was the mutual presence in both the Peer Administers Shock condition (subject just 
asked the questions: 92.5 percent completion rate) and the Holocaust of the division of 
labour, whereby the larger goal had been broken into a variety of seemingly unrelated 
                                                 
89
 Those against generalisation included Fromm (1973, p. 51), Miale and Selzer (1975, pp. 7-13), Patten 
(1977a, p. 438), and Tedeschi, Lindskold and Rosenfeld (1985, pp. 211-212). 
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tasks.  In direct reference to those who organised, filled and guarded the trains, built the 
death camps, and produced the poisonous gas, Sabini and Silver (1982, p. 60) stated: “The 
vast majority of the millions implicated in the Holocaust were [just as in the Peer 
Administers Shock experiment] involved in analogous, subsidiary but essential functions.”  
Secondly, reference was made to Milgram’s discovery during the Proximity Series that the 
greater the distance separating the subject from the learner, the higher the overall 
completion rate.  In connecting this finding with the Holocaust, Sabini and Silver (1982, p. 
60) note that, due to the division of labour, most Nazi perpetrators involved were distanced 
“from the actual gassings, burnings, and shootings.”  Thirdly, also discussed was the 
entrapment process (the foot-in-the-door phenomenon) surrounding the incremental 
increase in commitment discernable in both the OTA experiments and the Holocaust 
where, as Hilberg (1961) most convincingly demonstrated: “Hitler’s program . . . similarly 
advanced by degrees” (Sabini & Silver, 1982, p. 70).  With its more concentrated focus on 
the Holocaust and bureaucracy, Sabini and Silver’s work not only seemed to strengthen the 
M-H linkage, it moved the OTA experiments much closer to Hilberg’s (1961) classic on 
the Nazi bureaucratic machine.90   
 
Two years after Milgram’s death in 1984,91 Miller (1986) published his 
comprehensive overview of the literature on the OTA research.  After praising Sabini and 
Silver (1982), Miller (1986, pp. 257-258) strongly endorsed the relevance of Milgram’s 
work in better understanding the Holocaust. 
 
Using an even wider variety of non-Holocaust examples, others expanded on the 
connection between Milgram’s findings and the potentially destructive bureaucratic 
process (see Brief et al., 1995; Hamilton & Sanders, 1995; Hamilton & Sanders, 1999; 
Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Luban, Strudler & Wasserman, 1992).  According to Miller 
(2004), it is interesting to note this literature has generated “no noticeable controversy” (p. 
199).  However, as he then also pointed out, with respect to the works of scholars such as 
Sabini and Silver and Milgram himself, when it comes to the Holocaust: “generalizing the 
obedience research . . . has been anything but noncontroversial” (Miller, 2004, p. 200).   
 
A probably significant shift detracting from the M-H linkage in psychology 
(arguably the bastion maintaining this association) came in 1993 when one of the leading 
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 Regarding the M-H linkage, Hilberg (1980) saw clear connections but was also aware of counterfactual 
evidence. 
 
91
 With his work still highly controversial, on 20 December 1984, at the age of 51, Milgram died of a heart 
attack in New York City (Blass, 2004, pp. 257-258). 
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OTA scholars started to express certain reservations.  That is, after noting Arendt’s 
awareness of the more brutal, cruel, and not so banal side of the Holocaust where, as she 
noted, in Naumann’s (1966) disturbing book, infants were used as shooting targets, Blass 
(1993, p. 35) stated:   
 
The historical evidence on the spontaneity, inventiveness, and enthusiasm with 
which the Nazis degraded, hurt, and killed their victims also argues against 
explaining their behavior as simply responses to an authority’s commands despite 
the perpetrators’ abhorrence of their own actions, and without hate towards their 
victims.  It must have come from within.  
 
That such actions must have “come from within” was reviving an old debate between 
social and personality psychologists: do the situations in which people find themselves 
determine their actions or are they determined by their dispositional characteristics?  With 
respect to the Holocaust, the OTA experiments were promoted by many social 
psychologists as the epitome of the power of situations in determining actions (Berkowitz, 
1999, p. 247; Blass, 1991, p. 399; Blass, 1993, p. 31): subjects did not want to complete 
the experiments but the manipulative external situational forces saw them act in ways 
contrary to their dispositions (not wanting to hurt an innocent other person).  This debate 
may explain why, early on in the research programme, Milgram eventually decided against 
pursuing his original plan to run the propaganda variation (that intended on igniting with 
subjects internal hostilities towards a certain type of learner—such as an arrogant petty 
thug).  Early on Milgram perhaps sensed the opportunity of his experimental programme to 
powerfully contribute to this debate by demonstrating the pure unadulterated power of 
situational forces.92  Although some were clearly impressed by this feat,93 as Blass pointed 
                                                 
92
 As stated earlier, in Milgram’s second research proposal the so-called propaganda variation had slipped 
from second place in the first proposal to last place in the intended line-up of variations he intended to 
pursue.  Milgram may have sensed that obtaining fascinating results in the absence of dispositional factors 
would more powerfully aid in the resolution of this debate (as opposed to pursuing the propaganda variation 
and injecting ambiguity into the debate).  As Elms (1995, pp. 28-29) said: “He raised the possibility of 
predispositional factors and of ‘highly complex, and possibly, idiosyncratic motive structures’ (1962a, p. 17), 
but in the research itself he directed his efforts mainly towards identifying situational factors that increased or 
decreased obedience . . . . Though he had collected demographic information on all participants and had 
supported my collection of personality data from subsamples of obedient and disobedient subjects (Elms & 
Milgram, 1965 [sic]), he gave short shrift to such data in his book, concluding that ‘It is hard to relate 
performance to personality because we really do not know very much about how to measure personality’ (p. 
205).”  Milgram (1974, p. 205) later argued: “the disposition a person brings to the experiment is probably 
less important a cause of his behavior than most readers assume.  For the social psychology of this century 
reveals a major lesson: often, it is not so much the kind of person a man is as the kind of situation in which he 
finds himself that determines how he will act” (see also SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, Titled: “Obedience 
Notebook 1961-1970”).  But he also says: “I am certain that there is a complex personality basis to obedience 
and disobedience.  But I know we have not found it” (Milgram, 1974, p. 205).  After having obtained 
fascinating results using only situational forces, Milgram (1974, pp. 9-10) could nonetheless speculate about 
the kinds of results he would have obtained if he did try to stimulate dispositional forces: “In all likelihood, 
our subjects would have experienced greater ease in shocking the victim had he been convincingly portrayed 
as a brutal criminal or a pervert.” 
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out, due to the likely importance of hostility during the Nazi regime, the unexpected 
consequence of Milgram’s purely “situational approach [is that it] does not provide a 
wholly adequate account” of this historical event (Blass, 1993, p. 37).  In the shadow of 
literature like Naumann’s (1966) then Browning’s (1992), Blass was of the opinion that 
although the OTA experiments could account for the “dutiful destructiveness” of the Nazi 
bureaucrats who transported Jews to concentration camps like inanimate objects: “it falls 
short when it comes to explaining the more zealous hate-driven cruelties that also defined 
the Holocaust” (1993, p. 37). 
 
If this did not signal a change in the tide of the mostly positive generalisations 
regarding the M-H linkage, Goldhagen’s (1996) “extremely dispositional” (Miller, 2004, p. 
226) book—a veritable litany of examples denoting zealous hate-driven cruelties by 
ordinary Germans against Jews—certainly did.  With Goldhagen having sensed the gap in 
the literature, as discussed earlier, he painted a very different picture of the Holocaust 
where, in conflict with all the conventional explanations (of which Milgram’s was one), 
the perpetrators were apparently far from “indifferent” and “passive” bureaucrats.  
 
After providing numerous examples of ordinary Germans volunteering to do cruel 
and sometimes sadistic things to Jews, Goldhagen then presented what Zangwill (2003) 
has described as “his best card” (p. 98).  That is, some of the ordinary perpetrators went 
even further again and, in conflict with Milgram’s thesis, willingly disobeyed SS-
Reichsführer Himmler’s direct orders to stop killing: 
 
On the [Helmbrecht death] march’s second day, an SS lieutenant, who was a 
courier from Himmler, found their column and communicated . . . a directive from 
Himmler regarding the prisoners . . . . Himmler had expressly forbidden that any 
more Jews be killed . . . but to release them in the woods . . . [but the march and the 
killing continued and, therefore,] their killing and cruelty was . . . in violation of 
their duty.  These Germans chose, against orders, authority, and all reason, to act as 
they did (Goldhagen, 1996, pp. 356-357).94   
 
On top of the voluntarism and acts of gratuitous cruelty, this example clearly highlighted 
that there was likely to be much more to the Holocaust than, as Milgram (1974) had 
argued: “ordinary people, simply doing their jobs . . . without any particular hostility on 
                                                                                                                                                    
93
  Saltzman (2000, p. 140) has pointed out that Milgram was “the first psychologist to propose a situational 
theory of perpetrator behavior”.  And Pigden and Gillet (1996, p. 234) were impressed: “If people were 
prepared to torture an experimental volunteer just like themselves, how much more likely would they be to 
torture a yid, a gook, a commie, or a kulak!” 
 
94
 This was not a first in Holocaust research.  Similar examples of Germans disobeying orders to not kill can 
be found in the works of Hilberg (1961) and Bartov [1986] (2001, pp. 109, 118). 
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their part” (p. 6).  Unlike other prominent Holocaust scholars, such as Hilberg (1980, pp. 
98-101) and Browning (1992, p. 174), who identified potential limitations with the OTA 
experiments, only Goldhagen (1996, p.  383) was willing to reject them: 
     
Arguments holding that Germans inflexibly obey authority—namely that they 
reflexively obey any order, regardless of its content—are untenable.  By extension, 
so are the claims by Stanley Milgram and many others that humans in general are 
blindly obedient to authority.  All ‘obedience’, all ‘crimes of obedience’ . . . depend 
upon the existence of a propitious social and political context, in which the actors 
deem the authority to issue commands legitimate and the commands themselves not 
to be a gross transgression of sacred values and the overarching moral order. 
 
The influence of Goldhagen’s challenge against Milgram and Hilberg was soon reflected in 
the psychology literature: 
 
People do not gas other people, young and old, or shoot them or smash their skulls 
out of mere obedience to orders.  People do not engage in wholesale murder out of 
administrative momentum, or in retail killing out of bureaucratic inertia” (Gonen, 
2000, p. 192).  
 
Because Sabini and Silver’s (1982) supportive views on the M-H linkage moved 
Milgram a little closer to Hilberg’s widely respected perspective, Goldhagen’s (1996) 
subsequent criticisms of Hilberg’s thesis were equally applicable to Sabini and Silver’s 
research (which only further detracted from the strength of the OTA experiments).  
Remembering from Chapter Two, however, that the vast majority of leading Holocaust 
historians eventually rejected Goldhagen’s theory of exterminationist anti-Semitism (most 
agreeing that German society was largely moderately anti-Semitic), for some psychologists 
the pendulum may have swung too far in favour of dispositionist over situationist 
explanations of the Holocaust.  Not long after the publication of Goldhagen’s book, there 
was a sudden string of articles by psychologists detracting from the M-H linkage (see 
Berkowitz, 1999; Fenigstein, 1998a, 1998b; Mandel, 1998; Mastroianni, 2002).  Having 
long ago been critical of this tendency of academics to engage in “count-’em mechanics”, 
Mooks (1983, p. 386) has argued: “Ultimately, what makes research findings of interest is 
that they help us understand everyday life.  That understanding, however, comes from 
theory or the analysis of mechanism; it is not a matter of ‘generalizing’ the findings 
themselves [italics added].” 
 
However, the theory Milgram (1974) provided to explain his findings—particularly 
the “keystone” agentic state, where subjects who completed the experiment felt they were 
mere instruments for those in positions of higher authority—failed to convince the 
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academic community.  More specifically, in their replication of the OTA experiment, 
Mantell and Panzarella (1976, p. 242) found that some subjects who completed the 
experiment continued to hold themselves responsible (as in fact did 36.3 percent of a 
sample of Milgram’s (1974, p. 203) own subjects) and therefore: “A monolithic view of 
the obedient person as a purely passive agent who invariably relinquishes personal 
responsibility is a false view” (see also Bandura, 1999, p. 197; Lutsky, 1995, p. 59).  The 
agentic state also failed to explain the variance in completion rates across Milgram’s many 
conditions (Blass, 2004, p. 216).  Russell and Gregory (2005) argued that Milgram’s 
agentic state, where obedient subjects honestly believed themselves blameless and mere 
instruments of a higher authority “obscures the fact that it is chosen behavior that is at 
issue, rather than some form of involuntary entrancement or entrapment” (p. 341).95  There 
is therefore little empirical support for the agentic state (Darley, 1992, pp. 206-207; 
Mantell & Panzarella, 1976, p. 244; Marcus, 1974, p. 2; Miller, 2004, p. 210; Russell & 
Gregory, 2005, pp. 340-341).  In his book, Milgram (1974, p. 42) also discussed an 
apparent “tendency to obey” which, according to Lutsky (1995, p. 58), saw Milgram 
explaining “that behaviour as deriving, fundamentally, from a human disposition to be 
obedient under appropriate circumstances.”  However, as Lutsky (1995, p. 56) pointed out, 
this lens is flawed: just because a particular behaviour can be described as obedience does 
not necessarily mean that “obedience to authority explains why subjects acted as they did 
[italics original].”  With the idea of “obedience” locked firmly in his head, Milgram failed 
to make this distinction.96  Milgram may not have noticed it, but his conflation of 
description with explanation was actually tautological whereby obedience was being 
explained by obedience (Lutsky, 1995, p. 58; see also Mandel, 1998, p. 82).  The 
consequence of such criticisms is that the theoretical component of Milgram’s monograph 
was the book’s “weakest” section (Blass, 2004, p. 216).  Not only does “the precise 
meaning and relevance of these experiments remains obscure” (Mantell & Panzarella, 
1976, p. 245), as Miller (2004, p. 233) more recently said, there is “no conclusive theory to 
account for destructive obedience—or defiance, either.”  Finally, in terms of others trying 
                                                 
95
 As Barnard (1968, p. 163) famously said: “the decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with 
the persons to whom it is addressed, and does not reside in ‘persons of authority’ or those who issue these 
orders.”  Although Milgram believed his findings were purely or largely determined by situational forces that 
promoted the so-called agentic state, when defending his position he would occasionally contradict himself 
with arguments that suggested subjects did make a choice to continue (inadvertently supporting the more 
dispositional perspective that detracted from his situational view).  Such an example being: “I started with the 
belief that every person who came to the laboratory was free to accept or to reject the dictates of authority.  
This view sustains a conception of human dignity insofar as it sees in each man a capacity for choosing his 
own behavior” (Milgram, 1964a, p. 851; also see Milgram, 1974, p. 134). 
 
96
 One rare exception from his earlier publications: “to obey and to disobey, as used here, refer to the 
subject’s overt action only, and carry no implication for the motive or experiential states accompanying the 
action” (Milgram, 1965a, p. 58).  
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to make sense of Milgram’s results, as Elms (1995, p. 29) pointed out, although “A number 
of alternative or additional explanations of Milgram’s results remain as operable 
hypotheses . . . none has decisively carried the day.”97  
  
And Milgram’s theoretical foundation also failed when applied to the Holocaust.  
As Mantel and Panzarella (1976, p. 245) pointed out, like some of Milgram’s subjects, 
some of the Nazi perpetrators also later believed themselves responsible for their actions.  
And in relation to “divided self theories” like the agentic state, Waller (2002, p. 126) 
indicates that most social scientists remain committed to “the notion of a unitary self in 
understanding perpetrators of human evil” because as: 
 
Berel Lang puts it: ‘It is more plausible to infer a single moral agent—one that 
granted greater conviction to evil than to good—than two independent moral 
domains that were constantly being transversed.’  In other words, there is no 
credible reason to believe that we temporarily become wholly different people . . . . 
It is more plausible to believe that we have one unitary self that is forever altered 
by participation in evil.  
 
Other scholars felt the agentic state tended to exonerate or extenuate the undeniably 
complicit actions of the Nazi perpetrators (Fenigstein, 1998b, p. 62; Mandel, 1998, p. 91).  
 
The gathering momentum detracting from the M-H linkage has recently seen 
Arthur Miller moderate significantly his earlier generous conclusions.  Although Miller 
(2004, p. 234) firmly maintains: 
 
The experiments certainly generalize to those persons in Nazi Germany who 
obeyed orders, despite having personal reservations about what was happening to 
the Jews, and who did not harbor what Goldhagen terms eliminationist, anti-
Semitic beliefs.  I do not think we would be able to understand the behavior of 
these individuals—and the countless bystanders, who may be said to have obeyed 
by omission (Staub, 1989)—as well as we do had the obedience research not been 
conducted.   
 
But then he concedes: 
 
On the other hand, the critics pose some very compelling arguments to those who 
would assert the presence of a strong inference regarding the M-H thesis.  I would 
suggest that any serious discussion of the M-H thesis that did not include a 
simultaneous consideration of the importance of dehumanization would constitute 
an inadequate coverage of the issues (Miller, 2004, p. 234).      
 
                                                 
97
 See Collins and Brief (1995), Helm and Morelli (1985, pp. 610, 618-624), Katz (1993, p. 26), Kühl (2005), 
Nissani (1990), and Strudler and Warren (2001, pp. 162-163). 
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Again, highlighting the power and influence of Goldhagen’s criticisms: 
 
Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany is simply too compelling a reality to dismiss as 
crucial simply because Milgram demonstrated that prejudice on the part obedient 
persons was not necessary to obtain extreme harm-doing (Miller, 2004, p. 234). 
 
Converging with Blass (1993, pp. 35, 37), the conclusion of Miller’s (2004, p. 226) rethink 
being: “my own views regarding the M-H thesis have become more complex or perhaps 
ambivalent.”  “Ambivalent” may be too generous a word; as Parker (2000, p. 121) stated: 
“It’s odd to hear Arthur G. Miller—one of the world’s leading Milgram scholars—
acknowledge that there have been times when he has wondered, just for a moment, if the 
experiments perhaps mean nothing at all.”  Even John Sabini who, as discussed in Sabini 
and Silver (1982), once supported the situational/bureaucratic M-H linkage, has also 
retreated in the direction of a more dispositional perspective (see Sabini, Siepmann & 
Stein, 2001a, 2001b).98 
 
After drawing upon the views of authors such as Lutsky (1995), Staub (1989) and 
Waller (2002), the present consensus with respect to the M-H linkage seems to be that 
OTA “should be given a qualified causal significance in the Holocaust” (Miller, 2004, p. 
220).  However, with reference to the dehumanisation of the Jews and other victims, the 
voluntarism, acts of sadism, cruelty, the role of obligatory obedience and a sense of duty 
“should be placed in the context of the crucial importance of many other factors” (Miller, 
2004, p. 220).  It is probably fair to say that, in terms of the larger picture that has, with 
time, emerged regarding the Holocaust, Milgram’s OTA experiments have been relegated 
to a minor explanation (Fenigstein, 1998b, p. 71; Lutsky, 1995, pp. 62-63).  
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
The ethical debate over whether or not Milgram should have run the OTA 
experiments remains an unresolved and probably irresolvable issue—an assessment of the 
research’s ethical status is based upon subjective opinions over what one constitutes as 
valuable knowledge.  Less ambiguous is that Milgram’s treatment of his subjects, 
particularly during the first half of the data-collection stage, was at best disconcerting and 
at its worst plain reckless.  In terms of the study’s methodological strength, however, 
                                                 
98
 “Sabini, Siepmann and Stein (2001a, 2001b) have recently advocated a pronounced reemphasis on the role 
of ‘the person’ and of dispositions in social-psychological theory and research” (Miller, 2004, p. 221). 
 
 122 
numerous independent replications/variations across different nations suggest that the OTA 
research programme was in all likelihood internally valid; a point few would challenge.  
Finally, neither generalising Milgram’s findings nor his eventual theory in a direction 
towards explaining aspects of the Holocaust has, with time, proven very convincing and 
thus successful.    
 
The OTA experiments continue to attract a great deal of scholarly and popular 
attention.  As Slater (2004) said in the epigraphic statement at the start of this chapter, 
“Milgram’s experiments are indisputably in the canon” (p. 61), although it has proven 
difficult to articulate exactly why.  The shortcomings of Milgram’s own explanation for his 
results afford an opportunity to develop a more convincing explanation. 
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Chapter Eight: Rethinking Milgram’s Theoretical Model - 
the State of Autonomous Denial (SAD)  
 
 
There is no question that one weakness of the obedience research resides in the lack of a 
substantiated theory—Miller (2004, p. 233). 
 
 
The lens through which Milgram continued to view his subjects’ actions restricted 
his understanding of why so many subjects completed the obedience to authority (OTA) 
experiments.  As he did during his PhD studies, Milgram originally founded the OTA idea 
on what soon after World War Two was a commonly held stereotype: “ ‘I came across 
many statements which implied that Germans tended to obey orders more 
conscientious[ly] than Americans’ ” (as cited in Fermaglich, 2006, p. 88).  The results he 
obtained in the rudimentary pilot study reinforced part of this stereotype: there indeed 
appeared to be an inclination in ordinary people to obey authority figures.  Many aspects of 
the official research programme only served to confirm his initial preconception.  For 
example, in the Baseline experiment where subjects were presented with orders to obey, 65 
percent completed.  However, in another variation where subjects were not given any 
orders and could inflict shocks of any intensity, only 2.5 percent went to the end of the 
switchboard.  Although there were some counterfactual “gaps” that detracted from the so-
called “compelling tendency to obey” (recalling Milgram’s musing over there perhaps 
being “One Theory or Many”), he still became increasingly convinced that obedience due 
to “The experimenter’s influence is the independent variable” (Schuler, 1982, p. 62).  
Milgram then struggled to appreciate how his results could be explained in any other way.   
 
What else might explain why 65 percent of subjects completed the Baseline 
experiment?  In addressing this question, this chapter is divided into three main sections.  
The first section will explain why most subjects completed this experiment.  The second 
section will advance an adaptation of Milgram’s theoretical model.  Using empirical 
examples, the third section will explore the adaptation’s credibility.  
 
 
8.1 Why Did Most Subjects Complete the Baseline Experiment? 
 
Although it is impossible to establish the probable content of the motivating force/s 
preceding the actions of any one subject, Milgram’s numerous experimental variations 
may allow for some calculated speculation as to why most subjects completed the Baseline 
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experiment.  This requires a closer look at the central junction in the experimental 
procedure: the inherent moral dilemma.  In essence, the OTA procedure is, with each 
incorrect answer received, about forcing subjects into making a decision to side with either 
the experimenter, who wants them to continue inflicting shocks, or the learner, who wants 
them to stop doing so.  The subject cannot please both parties simultaneously and must 
decide whether it is more important to inflict shocks to help the experimenter obtain 
results, or to stop inflicting increasingly strong electrical shocks on an innocent person 
with a mild heart condition: 
 
when he [the experimenter] said ‘continue’ ahh I was thinking your side of it too  
. . . you’re trying to get some scientific ahh information, and I had to balance ahh in 
my own mind . . . will there be any any real harm to to [sic] the fella on the other 
side versus ahh what value it’s going to be to you (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape 
#2306). 
 
As the learner’s pained reactions to the shocks intensified, subjects frequently gesticulated 
and/or made more explicit statements expressing their sympathetic concerns for the 
learner’s well-being (Milgram, 1974, pp. 49, 73).  These expressions of sympathy seemed 
to highlight a desire within most subjects to stop inflicting the shocks, and with this 
outcome in mind, they appeared to be seeking the experimenter’s approval to do so. But an 
unperturbed experimenter smothered immediately any such desires to alleviate the 
learner’s unfortunate predicament by firing out one, or if necessary, a sequential barrage 
from his preconceived arsenal of prods.  The experimenter’s insistence that the subjects 
continue inflicting the shocks resulted in them often making explicit statements of 
disapproval (Milgram, 1974, pp. 48, 51, 85).  As one disobedient subject stated: “Surely 
you’ve considered the ethics of this thing” and “I don’t understand why the experiment is 
placed above this person’s life” (Milgram, 1974, p. 48).  This subject seemed offended by 
the experimenter’s blatant prioritisation of collecting scientific data over an innocent 
person’s welfare.  Similarly, another disobedient subject later explained that causing pain 
offended his personal ethical philosophy: “If I have to continue to hurt another human 
being, I don’t believe in it” (Milgram, 1965c).  Such subjects located themselves in the 
State of Autonomy, they believed themselves responsible for their own actions and, 
controlling the infliction of harm, they felt an obligation to stop the experiment.  As this 
particular subject stated: “As far as I’m concerned . . . in my mind I was hurting that guy” 
and, as reflected in his disobedient actions, this was something he did not “believe in” 
(Milgram, 1965c).99   
                                                 
99
 Much of this resistance was traceable to a subjects’ ability and/or willingness to empathetically imagine 
themselves in the learner’s position (Blass, 2004, p. 106).  Disobedient subjects frequently made the 
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 Milgram (1974, p. 6) asked independent audiences of varying backgrounds “to 
render a moral judgment on what constitutes appropriate behavior in this situation”.  Much 
like the above disobedient subjects, these independent audiences “unfailingly” saw 
“disobedience as proper” (Milgram, 1974, p. 6).  This conclusion appears to have been 
stimulated by the experimenter’s “fundamental breach of moral conduct to hurt another 
person against his will” (Milgram, 1974, p. 41).  The audiences never raised Morelli’s 
(1983, pp. 187-188) argument that some subjects may have felt a competing moral 
obligation to obey legitimate authority figures.  For each of the different audiences 
Milgram approached, disobedience was clearly the right, and obedience the wrong, 
option.100 
 
However, forces invisible to outsiders were obviously at play because despite the 
numerous signs of sympathy and disapproval, 65 percent still went on to complete the 
Baseline experiment.  Milgram (1974, p. 43) observed: “in the present situation even 
where tension is extreme, many subjects are unable to perform the [disobedient] response 
that will bring about relief.”  With only a minority of subjects proving capable of 
converting their feelings of sympathy and disapproval into disobedient action, the majority 
seemed to have concluded that for some reason it was more important to side with the 
experimenter than with the learner.  What then was most likely to have held the majority of 
subjects back from acting on their feelings of sympathy and disapproval, and saw them 
instead endure a prolonged state of extreme tension?  Contemplating this issue, Milgram 
(1974, pp. 42-43) deduced:  
 
If sympathetic concern for the victim were the exclusive force, all subjects would 
have calmly defied the experimenter.  Instead, there were both obedient and defiant 
outcomes, frequently accompanied by extreme tension . . . . Therefore there must 
be a competing drive, tendency, or inhibition that precludes activation of the 
disobedient response.  The strength of this inhibiting factor must be of greater 
magnitude than the stress experienced, or else the terminating act would occur 
[italics added]. 
 
Competing with “the deeply ingrained disposition not to harm others” was what Milgram 
believed to be the apparently “equally compelling tendency to obey others who are in 
authority” (1974, pp. 42-43).  For reasons mentioned, the inhibition competing with 
                                                                                                                                                    
following kinds of comments: “if it was me I’d want to stop too if it was hurting like he claimed it was 
hurting him” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2312). 
 
100
 The only people to acknowledge the competing moral imperative that one has an obligation to follow the 
orders of a legitimate authority to hurt an innocent person were subjects who, after completing the 
experiment, tried to justify their actions. 
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sympathy cannot have been an inclination to obey.  But whatever the most common reason 
was, one can be confident that it will not be obvious and, even if identified, probably 
unbelievable.  This is because if the most common reason why most completed the 
Baseline experiment was obvious and believable, it would have become common 
knowledge long ago. 
 
 What then does this author believe the inhibition precluding disobedience to have 
been (and why 65 percent completed the Baseline experiment)?  Meeus and Raaijamakers’ 
(1995, pp. 164-165) OTA variation provides one of several clues that lead to an answer.  
They speculated whether: 
   
the subject [would] be obedient and complete his task if he were legally liable for 
the consequences of his actions? . . . . The experimenter then asked the subject to 
sign a statement to the effect that the subject was aware that the victim might be 
harmed by the experiment and that the subject accepted legal liability for possible 
damages . . . . The percentage of obedient subjects was significantly lower in the 
‘Legal liability’ condition than in Baseline I.   
 
Meeus and Raaijamakers (1995, p. 164) added that others have found that obedience to 
orders resulting in serious personal danger: 
 
such as picking up a poisonous snake (Rowland, 1939), taking a coin from a dish of 
nitric acid (Orne & Evans, 1965; Young, 1952), and carrying out a break-in at their 
own risk (West, Gunn, & Chernicky, 1975), a low level of obedience was found, 
ranging from 0 to 17%.  Subjects are clearly able to defy authority when obedience 
involves a serious risk to themselves [italics added].”101    
 
One of Milgram’s own subjects sensed this: “I feel that no one will follow distasteful 
orders, unless it causes or costs that person a personal lost [sic]” (SMP, Box 44, Divider 
“11”, #0908).  The conclusion that most subjects can and will disobey when obedience 
clearly poses some kind of personal serious risk/loss—legal, financial, physical—is 
supported by Milgram’s own Relationship condition.  In this, subjects were faced with the 
prospect of inflicting (seemingly) life-threatening shocks on someone who was at least an 
acquaintance known to the subject for two or more years (Rochat & Modigliani, 1997, p. 
238).  Completion of this variation was unlikely to be in a subject’s best interests, and this 
was reflected in both their statements and in the completion rate.  As one disobedient 
subject informed the experimenter: “it may be important to you, but it isn’t that important 
to me, for a friendship anyway” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2425).102  Contemplating the 
                                                 
101
 For counterfactual examples see Costanzo’s (1976) unpublished doctorial dissertation, Martin et al., 
(1976), Scott (1980), and Tarnow (2000).    
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potentially longer-term implications of completing, the same subject stated: “I thought, this 
guy’s my neighbour, I’m talking to his wife this afternoon . . . all of a sudden I realised, 
this is a man [Inaudible] driving me home . . . . It’s a long ride home!” (SMP, Box 153, 
Audiotape #2425).103  Despite the so-called “compelling tendency to obey”, only three out 
of 20 subjects (15 percent) completed this experiment.  Not only did most subjects 
demonstrate a remarkable ability to disobey, but 80 percent in this variation did so before 
the relatively low 195-volt switch (see Figure 6).    
 
Meeus and Raaijamakers’ observations and the Relationship condition provide 
further clues as to the nature of the inhibition that frequently precluded disobedience 
during the Baseline condition.  That is, whatever was holding back so many subjects from 
acting on their feelings of sympathy and disapproval was probably something that, as in 
the above Legal liability and Relationship conditions, did not detract from, but actually 
appealed to their self-interested desires.  And probably easing their conscience in the 
pursuit of this self-interested desire was that, unlike the Relationship condition, the victim 
in the Baseline experiment was a stranger—a person they were unlikely to really care 
about.  It may be difficult to imagine subjects would be willing to risk what might have 
been another human’s life in pursuit of some relatively trivial self-interested desire.  
However, there were post-experimental responses that clearly revealed that some subjects 
were more than willing to pursue the seemingly most trivial of self-interested desires.  For 
example, as one subject later admitted: “My only incentive [for completing the 
experiment] was the money” (SMP, Box 44, Divider “13”, #1517).104  But since Milgram’s 
pilots obtained high completion rates in the absence of pecuniary reward, payment was 
unlikely to have been the most common inhibition during the Baseline condition.  Another 
example was that some subjects in the Group Pressure and Action Against a Person 
condition seemed less concerned about the learner’s well-being and more swayed by mere 
peer pressure.  As Milgram (1964b, pp. 141-142) noted:  
 
It might have been thought that the protests of the victim and inner prohibitions 
against hurting others would have operated effectively to curtail the subject’s 
compliance.  While the experiment yields wide variation in performance, a 
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 One learner/friend eventually responded: “You and I are buddies.  Hey, no more” (SMP, Box 153, 
Audiotape #2434).  The subject then refused to continue.  
 
103
 Another example: “I have to face this guy.  I have be be [sic] with him.  He’s my neighbour and I can’t go 
on with this” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2425). 
 
104
 Obviously this subject did not realise (or believe) that irrespective of whether or not they completed, 
payment was guaranteed. 
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substantial number of subjects submitted readily to pressure applied to them by the 
confederates. 
 
However, near the end of his monograph Milgram (1974, p. 150) touched upon 
what is believed to have been the subtle self-interested desire that most frequently 
discouraged subjects from disobeying:  
 
The teacher cannot break off and at the same time protect the authority’s definitions 
of his own competence.  Thus, the subject fears that if he breaks off, he will appear 
arrogant, untoward, and rude. Such emotions . . . . suffuse the mind and feelings of 
the subject, who is miserable at the prospect of having to repudiate the authority to 
his face [italics added].  
 
Most realised that stopping the experiment required them to shoulder, on behalf of a 
stranger, the burden of engaging in a direct confrontation with the experimenter.  This is 
the concern that is believed to have been the most common inhibition that competed with 
the subjects’ feelings of sympathy for the learner.105  These two simultaneous 
consequences—fear of a confrontation with the experimenter, on the one hand, and 
feelings of sympathy for the learner, on the other—generated a moral dilemma for most 
subjects. 
 
Lending weight to this assertion is that in all of Milgram’s experimental variations 
that eliminated the risk of the subject having to initiate then engage in a confrontation with 
the experimenter, none or few inflicted all the shocks.  Put another way, with the fear of a 
confrontation eliminated, there was nothing or little competing with most subjects’ 
preference to stop inflicting the shocks.  Consequently, they rarely completed the 
experiment.  Consider the following experimental conditions: 
 
• Authority as victim: from the 150-volt switch the experimenter (as learner) 
demanded the subject stop inflicting the shocks (no risk of a confrontation with the 
authority figure: zero completion rate); 
 
• Learner demands to be shocked: after the 150-volt level, the protesting learner 
wanted to continue receiving shocks (because his friend had earlier endured more 
shocks than himself).  However, the experimenter demanded that the subject stop 
administering shocks (no risk of a confrontation with the authority figure: zero 
completion rate);  
                                                 
105
 As Miller et al. (1995, p. 9) argued, concerns about “being ‘impolite’ . . . . would seem absurd.  However, 
in the actual context of the situation, these concerns are influential.” 
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• Two authorities, each giving contradictory demands: the subject was faced with 
two options, to stop or continue.  Both options would end in a confrontation with 
the rejected experimenter, but subjects knew the remaining experimenter would 
endorse their decision.  The difference between both options is that one coincides 
with and the other conflicts with the subjects’ preference to stop harming the 
learner (all subjects side with their preference to stop harming the learner: zero 
completion rate); 
 
• Subject free to choose shock level: there was no risk of a confrontation with the 
experimenter because there were no orders to inflict increasingly intense shocks for 
each incorrect answer (no risk of a confrontation with the authority figure: 2.5 
percent completion rate); 
 
• Groups for disobedience: in the subject’s presence two actor/teachers consecutively 
confronted then disobeyed the experimenter (10 percent completion rate—probably 
because the actor/teachers had initiated then engaged in the confrontation, thus 
demonstrating the ease of doing so);  
 
• Group pressure and action against a person: two actor/teachers recommended that 
the subject increase the punishment by 15 volts for each incorrect answer received, 
with the subject controlling the casting vote regarding the actual degree of 
punishment inflicted, and the experimenter agreeing to whatever decision was 
made.  (There was no risk of a confrontation with the authority figure but a risk of 
having to confront the two equal-status actor/teachers: 17.5 percent completion 
rate.);   
 
• An ordinary man gives orders: no experimenter present, orders were issued to the 
subject by an ordinary man of equal status.  (Although there was no risk of a 
confrontation with the authority figure there was a risk of one with the equal-status 
ordinary man: 20 percent completion rate.);   
 
• Experimenter absent (but available via phone): with nobody physically present to 
ensure the experimenter’s instructions were being followed, an “interesting form of 
behavior that had not occurred under his surveillance” ensued (Milgram, 1965a, p. 
66).  Some subjects on the phone informed the experimenter that his instructions 
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were being obeyed, but had actually stopped delivering the more intense shocks 
(20.5 percent completion rate).  In this variation “Subjects seemed able to resist the 
experimenter far better when they did not have to confront him face to face” 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 62).  This was probably because disobedience in the 
experimenter’s absence precluded any risk of a confrontation.  Lending weight to 
this interpretation, Milgram (1974) then noted: “Although he had exhausted his 
power via telephone, the experimenter could frequently force further obedience 
when he reappeared in the laboratory” (p. 62).  This was probably because lying to 
the experimenter was no longer possible and, should they refuse to continue there 
was a renewed risk of a confrontation. 
 
However, siding with the learner in all the remaining experimental variations 
required subjects to initiate then engage in a direct confrontation with the experimenter.  
Conversely, relatively large percentages of subjects completed these experiments (as 
illustrated by the dark bars below in Figure 9): 
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Did Subjects Have to Initiate then Engage in a Direct Confrontation 
with the Experimenter?
30
40 40
17.5 20 20.5
5047.5
92.5
72.565656565
62.5
15
102.50.00.00.0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Le
arn
e
r D
e
m
a
n
d
s to
 b
e
 Sh
o
ck
e
d
A
u
th
o
rity as V
ic
tim
Tw
o
 A
u
th
o
ritie
s: C
o
n
tra
d
icto
ry C
o
m
m
an
d
s
Su
b
je
ct C
h
o
o
se
s S
h
o
c
k Le
ve
l
Tw
o
 P
e
e
rs R
e
b
e
l/G
ro
u
p
s fo
r D
iso
b
e
d
ie
n
ce
R
e
la
tio
n
sh
ip
G
ro
u
p
 P
re
ssu
re
 an
d
 A
ctio
n
 A
g
ain
st a
P
e
rso
n
O
rd
in
ary M
a
n
 G
ive
s O
rd
e
rs
Ex
p
e
rim
e
n
te
r A
b
se
n
t
To
u
ch
-P
ro
xim
ity
P
ro
xim
ity
V
ictim
's Lim
ite
d
 C
o
n
tract
In
stitu
tio
n
a
l C
o
n
te
x
t, B
rid
ge
p
o
rt
C
h
a
n
g
e
 o
f P
e
rso
n
n
e
l
V
o
ic
e
-Fe
e
d
b
a
ck
R
e
m
o
te
B
a
se
lin
e
W
o
m
e
n
 a
s S
u
b
je
c
ts
Tw
o
 A
u
th
o
ritie
s, O
n
e
 as V
ic
tim
G
ro
u
p
s fo
r O
b
e
d
ie
n
ce
P
e
e
r A
d
m
in
iste
rs Sh
o
ck
s
Name of Experimental Condition
%
 o
f 
S
u
b
je
ct
s 
W
h
o
 C
o
m
p
le
te
d
Yes
No
Mean for 
"Yes": 
57.9%
Mean for 
"No":
 8.8%
 
 
 
Figure 9: The disparity in completion rates between experimental conditions where siding 
with the learner did or did not require the subject to initiate then engage in a confrontation 
with the experimenter.106 
 
 
The Relationship condition was the only exception to this general rule, because 
siding with the learner did require subjects to engage in a direct confrontation, yet 85 
percent did so.  However, this was because, unlike in all the other conditions, completing 
this variation required them to inflict (seemingly) intense shocks on someone who was at 
least an acquaintance.  The strain generated from seemingly electrocuting such a person 
superseded their trivial fear of having to initiate then engage in a direct confrontation with 
the experimenter.  Therefore, unlike the other variations, the Relationship condition was 
likely to detract sharply from the subjects’ self-interests.  Excluding the unique 
Relationship condition, the average completion rate for experimental variations where 
siding with the learner did and did not necessitate subjects initiate then engage in a direct 
confrontation with the experimenter was 57.9 and 8.8 percent, respectively.  In fact, had 
                                                 
106
 This graph excludes the Subject as Bystander condition because it was only a sub-experiment (“Part B”) 
of the Ordinary Man Gives Orders experiment. 
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the Group Pressure and Action Against a Person (17.5 percent complete), Ordinary Man 
Gives Orders (20 percent complete), and Experimenter Absent (20.5 percent complete) 
variations not required the subject to engage in a direct confrontation with the less 
imposing peer teachers, ordinary man and absent experimenter (respectively), all three 
variations would almost certainly have produced much lower completion rates (detracting 
from the above 8.8 percent average).  
 
As illustrated, every experimental variation Milgram undertook (for which he 
supplied a completion rate) lends weight to the argument that most subjects in the Baseline 
experiment prioritised a self-interested desire to avoid a confrontation with the 
experimenter over the learner’s well-being, rendering this as the most common (but not the 
only) motivating force for completing this experiment.107  How then could most subjects in 
the Baseline experiment prioritise a fear of a confrontation with the experimenter over the 
learner’s personal well-being?  This question will be addressed in the following rethink of 
Milgram’s theoretical model. 
 
 
8.2 Rethinking Milgram’s Theoretical Model 
 
If most subjects completed the Baseline experiment because they feared a 
confrontation, this implies something far more sinister was at the heart of Milgram’s 
theory than the agentic state, where the subject honestly “no longer views himself as acting 
out of his own purposes” (Milgram, 1974, p. 133), a mere instrument to be used by a 
higher authority.  By contrast with Milgram’s theoretical model (see Figure 8), this thesis 
proposes that the antithesis of the State of Autonomy (where one believes themselves 
responsible for their actions) was not the agentic state, but what can be called the State of 
Autonomous Denial (SAD).  The SAD is defined as a state of mind in which subjects knew 
that they were most responsible for their own actions, but sensed the existence of 
opportunities that might enable them to avoid a confrontation with the experimenter and 
evade feeling and/or appearing personally responsible for electrocuting the learner.  Thus, 
they attempted to conceal this awareness of responsibility internally (via self-deception) 
and/or externally (via the deception of others present).  Subjects sensed that they 
could prioritise their personal desire to avoid a confrontation ahead of any need to 
withdraw from the experiment in response to the learner’s urgent pleadings.  For this 
                                                 
107
 Although fear of a confrontation was the most common reason why most subjects completed the Baseline 
experiment, there were some other reasons for completing.  Some completed for the money; and in the 
Subject Chooses Shock Level experiment there was no risk of a confrontation, yet one subject still completed. 
 133 
reason the agentic state should be removed from Milgram’s theoretical model (see Figure 
8) and replaced with the SAD (see Figure 10 below):  
 
Figure 10: An adaptation of Milgram’s theoretical model where the cumulative influence 
of the Binding Factors (BFs) and Strain Resolving Mechanisms (SRMs) promoted a shift 
from the State of Autonomy into the SAD (and not the agentic state).108 
 
 
It is important to mention here that the sense in which the term “state” is used is 
more metaphorical than literal, whereby people act as if they are in a particular “state” of 
autonomy or autonomous denial.  The State of Autonomy and SAD are not two independent 
moral domains where the subject temporarily becomes a wholly different person.  As the 
following section will demonstrate, they are single unitary moral agents who, for self-
interested reasons, sense the existence of opportunities and try to deceive themselves 
and/or others into believing they are not responsible for their harmful actions.  The SAD 
shares much in common with Katz’s (1993, pp. 74-75, 97) “autonomy” in the creation of 
barriers separating two realms, and Seibel’s (2005, p. 351) “intentional ignorance”.   
 
Drawing on many of Milgram’s insights, the next section of this chapter will both 
explain, and bolster with examples, what these opportunities were, and show how they 
aided most subjects’ shift in the Baseline experiment from the State of Autonomy into the 
SAD.  The reason so many subjects brought themselves to inflict all the shocks was 
Milgram’s “devilishly ingenious” manipulative, strain-resolving, experimental procedure 
(situational), and its efficacy in exposing most of his subjects’ otherwise well concealed 
self-interested tendencies (dispositional).  As previous chapters have demonstrated, and 
those which follow will reinforce, Milgram’s experimental procedure was a carefully  
                                                 
108
 Another adaptation to this model is the removal of Milgram’s concept of Antecedent Conditions (which 
the author believes is better subsumed under the category of SRMs).  
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designed trap—a web of obligation—that, with each subsequent shock inflicted, more 
slightly compromised the unsuspecting subjects’ moral compasses.  
 
 
8.3 Milgram’s Web: the Gradual Seduction and Systematic Ensnarement of Subjects 
  
Milgram’s experimental procedure starts out by flooding the subject with a barrage 
of subtly coercive BFs.  Their purpose is to increase the probability of subjects agreeing to 
inflict light electrical shocks on an innocent person with a mild heart condition.  Upon 
arrival, the subject was made aware of the importance of their performance, and as a result, 
most became eager for the Yale University experimenter to consider them a useful and 
worthwhile participant (BF) (Milgram, 1974, p. 59).  In conjunction with feeling 
contractually bound, the payment of $4.50 heightened this eagerness to please (BF) 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 149).  On top of this, any signs of hesitation to inflict the shocks 
stimulated an intimidating confrontation with the curt, proximate, and looming 
experimenter (BF).  Milgram (1965a, p. 73) was not exaggerating when he said the 
experiment was like being “thrown into a swift-flowing stream . . . . The individual, upon 
entering the laboratory, becomes integrated into a situation that carries its own 
momentum.” 
 
Some carefully placed reasons for concern detracted somewhat from this 
momentum.  Subjects were made well aware that they were required to inflict electrical 
shocks (albeit initially light ones) on a clearly restrained person with a mild heart 
condition.  Even at the very earliest stages of the experiment, the moral dilemma of 
whether to side with the learner or experimenter should at least have generated within the 
subject a tinge of apprehension—what Milgram termed strain.  However, with the learner 
(and his initially mild reactions to the light shocks) imposing very little, and the 
experimenter and his barrage of BFs imposing most of the tension on the subject, during 
the early stages of the experiment there was an imbalance in the intensity between these 
two sources of strain.  As depicted in Figure 11 below, for the dispositionally more 
egocentric and insensitive participants, this situationally manipulated imbalance in strain 
tended to increase the likelihood of the experimenter being at the centre and the learner 
(hidden away in another room), at the periphery of many subjects’ emotional universe: 
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Figure 11: The imbalance in strain imposed on the subject from the experimenter and 
learner in the earliest stages of the Baseline experiment.  
 
 
As Milgram (1965a) observed: “When a person is uncomfortable, tense, or 
stressed, he tries to take some action that will allow him to terminate this unpleasant state.  
Thus, tension may serve as a drive that leads to escape behavior” (p. 69).  Wanting to 
escape the strongest potential source contributing to their painful experience, the simplest 
solution to the moral dilemma was to appease the desires of the experimenter and inflict 
the next shock.  As illustrated below in Figure 12, inflicting the next shock would relieve 
the subject from the experimenter’s hounding demands.  The negative consequence was 
living with the knowledge that they were inflicting shocks on an innocent person and, as a 
result, would have to endure the learner’s gradually intensifying cries of discomfort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The outcome when the subject eliminated their strongest source of strain and 
accepted to the experimenter’s demands. 
 
 
All subjects seemed comfortable enough having sided with the experimenter 
because, in conjunction with the rationalisation that sometimes the pursuit of scientific 
knowledge requires sacrifice (SRM), at this early stage the shocks were not very painful—
“Ugh!”  And the relief from the experimenter’s demands that came with having done as 
they were told was an added bonus.  Consequently, all subjects in the Baseline experiment 
inflicted the first six shocks (15-90 volts).  This was important for Milgram because it 
meant that all his subjects had met the most important criterion of the foot-in-the-door 
phenomenon: fulfilment of one or several small requests that, unbeknown to them, were 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
                EXPERIMENTER: “Please go on”                                 LEARNER: “Ugh!”  
                                    (strain due to initial barrage of BFs)→))))))))                          ((←(strain due to contemplating the infliction of  
   light shocks on man with a mild heart  
   condition) 
                                                                                                        SUBJECT 
                                                                                                   
 
 
 
                                                                                                   
  EXPERIMENTER: (silent)                                LEARNER: “Ugh!” (louder) 
                                                  (source of strain eliminated)→                           (((←(strain due to having inflicted light shocks 
                           on man with a mild heart condition) 
                                                                                                         SUBJECT 
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about to be followed by far greater ones.  But repeatedly appeasing the experimenter from 
the 90-volt switch onwards generated an issue of rising tension: what would the subject do 
about the intensifying strain generated by the learner?  After the 90-volt switch, all but one 
of the 40 subjects in the Baseline condition went on to inflict both the 120-volt switch 
(“Ugh! Hey, this really hurts”) and the 135-volt switch (“Ugh!!”) (Milgram, 1974, pp. 56, 
58).   
 
The experimenter would attempt to keep the subject inflicting the shocks by 
responding to any signs of hesitation with one or several of the standardised prods.  For the 
subject, bearing the brunt of this volley of prods intensified the strain they felt.  Although 
doing as they were told would immediately relieve them of this strain, it also saw them 
inflict shocks on the learner that started to generate adverse reactions bordering on 
desperation.  For example, after inflicting the 150-volt switch (as 39 out of 40 subjects 
did), the learner, in obvious pain, shouted: “Ugh!!!  Experimenter!  That’s all.  Get me out 
of here.  I told you I had heart trouble.  My heart’s starting to bother me now . . . . I refuse 
to go on.  Let me out” (Milgram, 1974, p. 56).  In comparison with the earlier stages of the 
experiment, the shocks could no longer be construed as being quite harmless and the 
learner’s increasingly distressed reactions strongly affected the subjects’ emotional 
universe.  Although there would have been individual differences in sensitivity, as the 
screams gradually intensified, eventually a point was reached where the subject sensed that 
both sources of strain were of equal intensity and thus, for themselves, equally painful (as 
illustrated in Figure 13 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: The experimenter and the learner’s similar effects on the subject’s emotions. 
 
 
With the learner and experimenter imposing comparatively similar intensities of 
strain, subjects felt the urge to reassess their earlier resolution of the moral dilemma 
(repeatedly siding with the experimenter).  An important determinant of the outcome of 
this reassessment was the consequence/s on the subject associated with their siding with 
 
    EXPERIMENTER: “The experiment requires that you continue”            LEARNER: “Ugh!!! That’s all...” 
                                     (strain from more intense prods)→))))))))))))                  ((((((((((((←(strain imposed by 
 screaming learner 
 complaining of a heart 
                   condition) 
                                                                                                                                SUBJECT 
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the experimenter or learner.  That is, the subject could either choose to continue meeting 
the experimenter’s needs to obtain results (along with, perhaps more importantly, also 
satisfying their own desire to avoid a confrontation) and continue to inflict what now 
appeared to be very painful shocks on an innocent person.  Or they could convert their 
sympathy and disapproval into action by suddenly refusing to continue and instead meet 
the learner’s needs to avoid experiencing any further shocks (therefore sacrificing their 
own desire to avoid a confrontation).  Doing what independent audiences unanimously 
agreed was the morally right course of action and siding with the learner was attractive 
because it meant the subject would no longer have to inflict shocks on a clearly innocent 
person, relieving them of all the strain (or what this author would rather term guilt) 
associated with doing the wrong thing.109  Greatly elevating the attractiveness of pursuing 
the morally wrong option was the fact that, because the experimenter was urging the 
subject to continue participating in the procedure, the subject was purposefully led to 
suspect they could inflict further shocks with total impunity (and in the process evade 
having to engage in a confrontation with the experimenter).  Upon weighing up the 
consequences for the learner, experimenter and, most importantly, themselves, many 
subjects encountered an intensifying Asch-like inner conflict as to how to resolve the 
moral dilemma.  It was an Asch-like inner conflict because the internal dialogue 
surrounding the OTA experiments probably closely resembled that generated by Asch’s 
Group Pressure/Conformity experiment.  That is, the subject believes the “conflict with 
him is a purely private issue” of which “all others are totally unaware”.  Although the 
“subject makes frantic efforts to conceal his conflict” he “dares not betray his secret, yet by 
his actions, he is betrayed”. 
 
The inner conflict was stressful because subjects were contemplating whether to 
make the morally right or wrong choice.  Would they stand up for their beliefs and 
confront the Yale University employee, or would they submit to his will?  “The subject’s 
problem then is how to become disengaged from a situation which is moving in an 
altogether ugly direction” (Milgram, 1965a, p. 73).  Then again, it is also possible that 
some obedient subjects never engaged in such moral calculus (the weighing up of options) 
but, with little thought or concern for the learner, simply moved in whatever direction felt 
easiest (least stressful and/or demanding) for themselves (see Milgram, 1974, pp. 45-47).  
Either way, the OTA-trap had been set, and in his notes Milgram captured in one eloquent  
                                                 
109
 It appears that Milgram used an ambiguous word like strain to describe the tension experienced by 
subjects instead of a more specific word like guilt, because the latter would imply subjects actually knew that 
what they were doing was wrong and felt responsible for doing it.  This would have contradicted the agentic 
state, in which subjects were apparently being honest when they said they did not feel responsible for their 
actions. 
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sentence the true essence of his entire experimental paradigm: “the experimental set up 
relies . . . on seduction, the systematic ensarement [sic] of the subject into a web of 
obligation and uncritically from which he is unable to escape” (SMP, Box 46, Folder 167, 
Titled: “Notes: Antecedent conditions 1961-1963”). 
  
Some resolved the moral dilemma by refusing to inflict further shocks.  By doing 
so they stopped the learner’s strain/guilt inducing screams.  However, having apparently 
ruined the experimental trial they stimulated the experimenter’s barrage of strain/guilt 
generating prods:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: The strain/guilt imposed by the experimenter after a subject decided to stop 
inflicting the shocks in the early to middle stages of the experiment. 
 
 
It was common for those who chose this course of action to try to neutralise the above 
imbalance in strain/guilt by offering to return the $4.50 and make amends for having 
ruined the experimental trial (Milgram, 1974, p. 47).   
 
 As the results illustrated, however, most subjects instead chose to continue 
inflicting further shocks.  Doing so meant that they would pass the point of strain/guilt-
equilibrium (see Figure 13), resulting in the learner’s reactions to the shocks surpassing 
(and eventually eclipsing) the maximum strain/guilt the experimenter was capable of 
imposing on an insubordinate subject with his mere words.  Doing as they were told would 
end the experimenter’s demands, but being beyond the point of equilibrium ensured they 
would then have to experience the learner’s guilt-inducing reactions to the far more intense 
shocks (as illustrated in Figure 15 below): 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
      EXPERIMENTER: “It is absolutely essential that you continue”                         LEARNER: (silence)                                                                                                                
                     (strain/guilt from more intense prods)→))))))))))))       ← (source of strain/guilt eliminated)   
                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                   SUBJECT 
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Figure 15: The imbalance in strain/guilt that develops after the point of equilibrium, where 
the strain/guilt produced by the learner started to exceed and eventually overshadow the 
maximum strain/guilt that the experimenter was capable of generating. 
 
 
Again, as the learner’s reactions to the shocks intensified, haunted by feelings of 
sympathy, disapproval, and/or guilt, the subjects’ desire to side with the learner increased.  
But in the back of their minds was the “inhibiting” realisation that stopping the experiment 
necessitated they shoulder, on behalf of a stranger, the burden of engaging in an 
uncomfortable confrontation with the experimenter.   
 
 
8.4 The Shift from the State of Autonomy to the SAD 
 
Those subjects who resolved the moral dilemma by continuing to side with the 
experimenter dealt with the downside of their decision—having to inflict potentially life-
threatening shocks on an innocent person—by shifting into the SAD.  The shift into the 
SAD helped to neutralise the over-balance in strain generated by the learner’s intensifying 
reactions, because subjects were able to convince themselves (self-deception) and/or others 
present (deception) that they were not responsible for the pain the learner was 
experiencing.  (And if they were not responsible then they need not feel guilty for 
continuing to inflict even more painful shocks.)  The following section will demonstrate 
how, with varying degrees of success, certain BFs and SRMs provided subjects with 
opportunities to evade feeling and/or appearing responsible for their harmful actions 
(promoting the shift into the SAD).  
 
 
 
 
     
 
                                             EXPERIMENTER:  (silence)                     LEARNER: “Ugh! Let me out… My heart…You  
                                                                         have no right to keep me here!...” 
                                         (source of strain/guilt eliminated)→                ((((((((((((((((((((( 
                                                                                                             (strain/guilt imposed by screaming learner)                   
                         
                                                                                                                              
                                                                                             SUBJECT??? 
 
 
 
 
 140 
8.5 The Binding Factor of the Foot-in-the-Door Phenomenon Reducing Feelings of 
Responsibility 
 
The foot-in-the-door phenomenon—many small steps—was an important BF at the 
start of the experiment.  But throughout the entire experiment this BF had an on-going 
coercive influence on subjects (particularly in reducing feelings and/or the appearance of 
being responsible for the infliction of harm).  As Eckman (1977, p. 97) observed, 
continuing on to inflict all the shocks could protract a state of ignorance of responsibility 
for one’s actions:  
 
To interrupt a behavioral sequence one has already set in process implies that one 
has made a bad decision, and is responsible for having behaved wrongly in all the 
completed steps of that sequence.  On the other hand, to continue without stopping 
allows the individual to view the authority as responsible for the (in)correctness of 
both the past and present behavior.  The problem is, in a sense, a product of all-or-
nothing, either-or thinking: If I admit that this behavior, now, is wrong and that I 
have the power to change it, then all the behaviors I have performed from the 
beginning of this sequence are wrong, and I must accept responsibility for them.  
But if I carry out the orders of the authority now, then he, not I, must be 
responsible—for all the actions I have taken here.  
 
As the experiment progressed, and fearing a confrontation, some subjects may have sensed 
this opportunity to deny responsibility for their actions.  And, if successful at convincing 
themselves (self-deception) and/or others present (deception) then—having entered into 
the SAD—they did not need to feel and/or appear guilty/nervous while inflicting further 
shocks on the screaming learner.   
 
Before inflicting the 255-volt switch, the pseudonymous Jan Rensaleer seems to 
have sensed such an opportunity.  However, after inflicting this shock, the learner’s 
screams had become so intense that Rensaleer’s guilt feelings, and accompanying nervous 
reactions, shattered his self-deception and/or the deception of others by which he had 
convinced himself and/or the others present that he was not responsible for his own 
actions.  Having cracked under this pressure, he then rather sheepishly shouldered the 
burden of responsibility for having inflicted as many shocks as he had: “I can’t continue.  
I’m very sorry.  I think I’ve gone too far already, probably” (Milgram, 1974, p. 51).  
Acknowledging that he had “gone too far already”, Rensaleer conveyed an awareness that 
he was personally responsible for his own actions; but before extricating himself he tried to 
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convince himself and/or others that this was not the case.110  Upon accepting responsibility 
for inflicting all the previous shocks, Rensaleer then returned to the State of Autonomy.111   
 
 
8.6 The Supplied Strain Resolving Mechanism of Rationalising Away Feelings of 
Responsibility  
 
The experimenter’s many prods were a particularly powerful SRM in shifting 
subjects from the State of Autonomy into the SAD.  Initially implicitly but eventually 
explicitly, the standard then more specialised prods gradually encouraged subjects to take 
advantage of opportunities which enabled them to continue inflicting the shocks while at 
the same time evading responsibility for doing so (enabling them to avoid having to 
engage in a confrontation with the experimenter). 
 
At the first signs of hesitation in inflicting punishment on the learner, the 
experimenter would fire out one or, if necessary, several of his standardised prods: “Please 
continue”, “The experiment requires that you continue”, “It is absolutely essential that you 
continue”, and finally, “You have no other choice, you must go on” (Milgram, 1974, p. 
21).  For those subjects less concerned about their fear of a confrontation and more 
concerned about alleviating the learner of their pain, these prods were construed as a 
barrier impeding them from helping the learner.  Firmly rooted in the State of Autonomy, 
for these subjects the prods generated indignation then recalcitrance.  This is why the prods 
failed in encouraging them to complete the experiment (Saltzman, 2000, pp. 137-138). 
  
However, for those subjects less concerned about the learner, and more concerned 
about relieving themselves of their painful predicament, the standard prods were not 
perceived as a barrier but rather as an opportunity that might enable them to avoid having 
to engage in an undesirable confrontation.  For example, the standard prod, “Please 
continue”, implied that since the experimenter was asking the subject to inflict the next 
shock, the former would probably accept at least some responsibility for the latter’s 
actions.  Being reluctant to engage in a confrontation, many subjects started wanting and/or 
                                                 
110
 Milgram (1974, p. 52) overlooked this interpretation but his observations seem to validate it: “Although 
this subject defied the experimenter at 255 volts, he still feels responsible for administering any shocks 
beyond the victim’s first protest.”   
 
111
 Another subject similarly admitted: “I felt I’d gone far beyond what I should have” (SMP, Box 153, 
Audiotape #2310).  And another conceded: “In fact, I even went on after I should have stopped back here 
when he hollered ‘let me out of the chair’ ” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2428). 
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wanted others to believe that the experiment indeed “required” they continue and/or that it 
was “absolutely essential” they go on and/or that they had “no other choice”.  If accepted 
by the subject—and the temptation appears to have been great—via self-deception and/or 
the deception of others, these supplied strain-resolving rationalisations for continuing 
helped to relieve the subject of the strain/guilt associated with shocking the screaming 
learner in the early to mid-stages of the Baseline experiment.  In response to the prods, one 
subject said apparently to himself (but obviously loud enough for others present to hear): “ 
‘It’s got to go on.  It’s got to go on’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 9).  As Baumeister (1997, p. 311) 
put it: “People will settle for any vaguely plausible argument when they want badly 
enough to believe that their hurtful actions are justified.”    
 
As the experiment proceeded and the learner’s reactions intensified, these 
standardised prods sounded increasingly implausible to the subjects, and perhaps more 
importantly, to others present (“results” were clearly being prioritised over an innocent 
person’s well-being).  Trying to think on their feet, many subjects attempted to seek out 
non-confrontational ways—potential escape routes—which, without having to directly 
stand up to the experimenter, might enable them to inoffensively extricate themselves from 
the experiment.  For example, as the screams intensified, many subjects enquired into the 
shocks’ possible impact, sensing it would only be fair and reasonable to stop if the learner 
was being physically harmed.  Having learnt during the pilot studies to anticipate such 
concerns, the experimenter attempted to cut off this non-confrontational attempt to escape 
by trying to relieve the subjects of the strain they were experiencing.  He did this by 
supplying them with the following specialised prod (SRM): “Although the shocks may be 
painful, there is no permanent tissue damage, so please go on” (Milgram, 1974, p. 21).  
Even if the shocks caused no permanent injury, from the 150-volt switch onwards it was 
indisputable that the learner was experiencing alarming levels of pain that were likely to 
intensify.  Although independent audiences agree that continuing was morally the wrong 
course of action, if at face-value the subject chose to accept the experimenter at his word, 
they suspected the offer might relieve them of their responsibility of engaging in a direct 
confrontation.  This was because, as the experimenter had just said, the shocks caused no 
permanent injury.   
 
One participant in the Women as Subjects condition who accepted this strain-
resolving rationalisation was the pseudonymous Karen Dontz.  After the learner’s 
agonising and hysterical reaction to the 330-volt switch, Dontz “accept[ed] . . . the 
experimenter’s comment saying, ‘I’ll continue, providing it’s not dangerous’ ” (Milgram, 
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1974, p. 77).  Dontz seemed to accept this offer because if it turned out the shocks actually 
were dangerous, via self deception and/or the deception of others, she believed herself to 
be beyond reproach.  She may have experienced feelings of relief, safe in the knowledge 
that she could only be blamed for believing and trusting in the accuracy of the 
experimenter’s information.  Again, such reasoning aided the shift from the State of 
Autonomy into the SAD, because the experimenter said it was harmless so only he could be 
held responsible for her actions.  The experimenter’s response provided a tempting 
opportunity to avoid having to engage in a confrontation.  It is important to note that it was 
in Dontz’s self-interest to trust the experimenter’s word over and above the learner’s 
screams (which clearly suggested the possibility of “tissue damage”).  In the post-
experimental interview, Dontz enquired: “ ‘did any of the men go through and follow the 
450 volts?’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 79).  The interviewer asked for her opinion, and she 
speculated: “ ‘No, I don’t think men would comply’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 79).  Perhaps the 
reasoning behind her answer was that she thought men were braver than herself and so 
were less likely to cave into the experimenter’s seemingly inhumane demands.  As the 
results demonstrate, it would appear that men also, as one frankly admitted, frequently 
“gave in and finished the experiment [italics added]” (SMP, Box 44, Divider “Problems”, 
#1706). 
 
As the learner’s reactions intensified, the rationalisation that the shocks caused no 
permanent injury became more implausible.  Having rendered the learner at least 
unconscious, many subjects reassessed the accuracy of this rationalisation.  Since they 
were the only ones inflicting the shocks, with the intention of covering themselves many 
subjects then felt it necessary to inquire about the direct lines of responsibility.  Because 
some subjects sensed that since they were the ones inflicting the shocks, the experimenter 
probably would have been unwilling to accept all responsibility for what were clearly their 
(the subject’s) actions.  Had the experimenter refused to accept total responsibility, it 
would have enabled subjects to inoffensively extricate themselves from the experiment.  
However, when such a verbal exchange took place, it ended in the experimenter closing off 
this potential escape route by confidently responding: “I’m responsible for anything that 
happens to him.  Continue please” (Milgram, 1974, p. 74).  This response was a 
particularly powerful supplied strain-resolving rationalisation, increasing the probability of 
the subject entering the SAD.  This was because, should they accept this rationalisation, not 
only would they avoid having to engage in a confrontation, as the experimenter this time 
explicitly stated for the record, they would in no way be rendered culpable—morally or 
legally—for having inflicted all the shocks.  The experimenter’s offer to accept total 
 144 
responsibility for the subject’s actions proved extremely enticing, with many then going on 
to side with the experimenter.  The consequence of this specific exchange was that, via 
self-deception and/or the deception of others present, subjects made the shift from the State 
of Autonomy to the SAD, as they inflicted the next shock, confident they could now act 
with impunity.  Thus, many exhibited obvious signs of relief.   
  
The pseudonymous Fred Prozi, until the 180-volt switch in the Baseline 
experiment, explicitly expressed awareness that he was most responsible for the learner’s 
pain (State of Autonomy):    
 
I’m not going to kill that man in there . . . . I’m not going to get that man sick in 
there . . . . I refuse to take the responsibility . . . . I mean who’s going to take the 
responsibility if anything happens to that gentleman [italics added]? (Milgram, 
1974, pp. 73-74).     
 
When the experimenter accepted total responsibility, Prozi capitulated, slipping into the 
SAD: “ ‘All right . . . .’  LEARNER (screaming): ‘Let me out of here, you have no right to 
keep me here.  Let me out of here . . . .’ (Subject shakes head, pats the table nervously.)” 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 74).  As the screams intensified Prozi was nervously drawn back to the 
State of Autonomy: “ ‘Aw, no.  I’m not going to kill that man’ ” then, soon after the learner 
had stopped screaming and all subsequent questions were met with the ominous sound of 
silence, at the 390-volt switch he stated: “ ‘ Something’s happened to that man in there  
. . . .’ EXPERIMENTER: ‘Continue. Go on, please’ ” (Milgram, 1974, pp. 75-76).  Prozi 
then took advantage of an opportunity he had earlier sensed might enable him not only to 
avoid having to engage in a direct confrontation but also to evade responsibility for his 
actions.  Enabling him to shift back into the SAD, Prozi sought further confirmation of the 
earlier offer: “ ‘You accept all responsibility?’  EXPERIMENTER: ‘The responsibility is 
mine.  Correct.  Please go on’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 76).  Patently, Prozi did not really 
believe the experimenter was most responsible (“I’m not going to kill that man”).  Prozi 
knew he was most responsible for his actions.  But like all those who accepted this 
particularly powerful strain-resolving rationalisation, he wanted to believe it because, at 
the learner’s expense, accepting the offer would enable him to evade responsibility for 
engaging in what he anticipated would have been an emotionally uncomfortable 
confrontation with the experimenter.  Prozi may not have been willing to later admit this, 
but other subjects were more forthcoming: “I thought the ‘shocks’ might harm the other 
‘subject’ however, I mentally ‘passed the buck’ feeling the one running the experiment 
would take all responsibility” (SMP, Box 44, Divider “2”, #0608). 
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 Prozi appears to have been influenced by some “compelling tendency to obey” an 
authority figure.  But had the experimenter instead responded: “I refuse to accept any 
responsibility for your harmful actions but the experiment still requires you to continue, 
you have no other choice”, the power of “obedience” as an explanation would have been 
tested.112  Paradoxically, Milgram’s OTA experimental paradigm has less to do with 
“obedience” to an authority per se, and much more to do with the availability of 
opportunities that enabled subjects to evade then pass on responsibility for their harmful 
actions.  This explains why some variations resulted in subjects completing in the total 
absence of any authority figure.  The most obvious example was the Ordinary Man Gives 
Orders condition, where four out of 20 subjects (20 percent) were willing to “obey” in an 
experiment with no authority figure.  It will be recalled there was a second part to this 
experiment: the ordinary man asked the 16 dissident subjects if they would instead 
continue participating, but instead as a timekeeper—the Subject as Bystander condition.  
Probably sensing it would be easier to later evade being held responsible for the potentially 
harmful outcome (the ordinary man would inflict the apparent shocks), 11 of 16 (69 
percent) agreed to continue participating in the experiment until the end.  When the results 
of both experiments are combined, 15 of 20 subjects—75 percent—continued to 
participate and complete an OTA variation in which no authority figure took part. 
 
As was the case in most of the other variations, when the person who is to be 
pinned with, or is willing to accept, responsibility for the subjects’ harmful actions happens 
to be of higher authority, elevated status, or an apparent expert, the credibility of the 
excuse that the subject was not responsible sounded much more plausible to themselves 
and/or others present.  To repeat—the OTA experiments had less to do with OTA and 
much to do with the availability of opportunities that enabled subjects to evade shouldering 
responsibility for their own harmful actions.   
 
However, some subjects remained unconvinced that, having seemingly rendered 
the learner unconscious, they would be able to evade responsibility for their harmful 
actions.  What frequently eventuated was that, in conjunction with opportunistically 
accepting one or several of Milgram’s top-down supplied strain-resolving rationalisations, 
                                                 
112
 In support of this assertion see Meeus and Raaijmakers (1995).  Also see, Tilker (1970, p. 99) found that 
all observers (5 out of 5) of a replication of the proximity experiment (victim seen and heard), who were 
previously informed that they were totally responsible for the learner’s welfare stopped a teacher/actor who 
was determined to inflict all shocks.   
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as the following will illustrate, some subjects felt compelled to bolster these excuses for 
continuing by inventing, from the bottom-up, their own rationalisations. 
 
 
8.7 The Self-Invented Strain Resolving Mechanism of Blaming the Victim—the Just 
World Phenomenon—Lerner (1980)   
 
As Milgram (1974, p. 10) noted:  
 
Of considerable interest, however, is the fact that many subjects harshly devalue the 
victim as a consequence of acting against him.  Such comments as, ‘He was so 
stupid and stubborn he deserved to get shocked,’ were common.  Once having 
acted against the victim, these subjects found it necessary to view him as an 
unworthy individual, whose punishment was made inevitable by his own 
deficiencies of intellect and character.   
 
Similarly, another subject was “angry at the learner for being so slow and forcing me to 
shock him harder” (SMP, Box 44, Divider “17”, #0226).  With the learner being so 
“stupid” and “slow”, these subjects were trying to convince themselves (self deception) 
and/or others present (deception) that the learner was most responsible for their (the 
subjects’) actions.  As Staub (1989, p. 17) put it: “Blaming others, scapegoating, 
diminishes our own responsibility.”   
 
 
 
8.8 The Self-Invented Strain Resolving Mechanism of Blaming Military Service in 
Reducing Feelings of Responsibility 
 
Struggling to later explain themselves, other subjects blamed a previous life 
experience, which they felt was similar to the situation in which they found themselves in 
Milgram’s laboratory.  Some subjects invented a SRM, namely, a propensity to obey 
acquired during their time in the military.  As one obedient subject later explained:  
 
Subject:  “Guess I’m pretty good at obeying orders, I mean ahrrrr, military 
service.”   
Milgram:  “What if he were actually being murdered in there?”   
Subject:  “[Inaudible] . . . .”   
Milgram:  “Well why did you listen to this man [the experimenter] rather than 
the other guy [the learner]?”   
Subject:  “Well it’s like I say, I’m used to taking orders . . . I’ve been through 
quite a bit of combat” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2433).   
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The implication was that had he never been in the military then he would not have 
completed the experiment.  Thus, he convinced himself (self-deception) and/or tried to 
convince others present (deception), that he was not to blame for his harmful actions.  
Rather, his experiences in the military were to blame. 
 
However, all of the above supplied and self-invented opportunities that helped 
subjects to evade responsibility for their harmful actions were mind-games.  These mind-
games were used so that most subjects could evade a confrontation with the experimenter.  
The Relationship condition (especially when the subject and learner were much more than 
just acquaintances) was the best illustration of this.  Consider, for example, one subject 
who refused to continue, and then tried to justify his actions:     
 
Subject: “But since he was my brother [Inaudible] I stopped . . . . ”   
Milgram:  “Why do you think you stopped for a brother-in-law?”  
Subject:  “Well ahhrrr . . . . Why should I keep on going?  It’s not that 
necessary to keep on going right?  That’s the reason why I stopped” 
(SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2422).  
 
Irrespective of the experimenter’s prods, this subject expresses an awareness that it was not 
that necessary that he inflict every shock.  But, with respect to resolving the inherent moral 
dilemma, this subject’s response to the question of what he would have done had the 
learner instead been a stranger, is revealing:   
 
Subject:   “Well . . . they told me I should keep on going, I keep on going.”   
Milgram:  “Why?  What’s the difference?”   
Subject:  “Well . . . [Inaudible] is not dangerous, nothing will happen to me.”   
Milgram: “But that’s what you were told ahhrrr with your brother in-law.”   
Subject:  “Yeah but there’s a difference.”   
Milgram: “What’s the difference?”   
Subject:  “ . . . If it is a stranger I don’t listen.  Right?  We are doing an 
experiment . . . . They told me to do it, I keep on doing it.  He told 
me keep on going, I keep on going” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape 
#2422).  
 
The difference was that the subject anticipated that shocking his brother-in-law would 
come with consequences, while shocking a stranger probably would not.  When asked this 
same question other subjects gave similar responses.113   
 
                                                 
113
 For example, another subject stated: “if this was a complete stranger in here, to me, ahrr it would be much 
easier to continue on” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2426).  (See also SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2428 & 
#2438). 
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Another subject, faced with the prospect of inflicting a 165-volt shock on his son, 
illustrates just how obvious it was for subjects in the many non-relationship variations that 
it was “not that necessary to keep going”:    
 
Subject:  “Wrong, I’m gonna give you 165 volts.”   
Learner:  “Ahhh, let me out of here . . . . I’m gonna rip this place up!  Let ME 
OUT . . . ” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2435). 
 
The subject, trying to conjure up a non-confrontational means of ending the experiment, 
rather creatively pointed out:  
   
Now listen, he’ll he’ll [sic] do that too . . . you better let him out because he’ll do it!  
If you think any of your equipment . . . we’ll give you back your cheques and let it 
go at that, to hell with it.  Because I’m not gonna have him get hurt, and he’ll rip 
your equipment up (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2435). 
 
This strategy fails and the experimenter then insists the subject continue inflicting the 
shocks.  The subject realised there was no amiable way out, and facing the prospect of 
inflicting a 180-volt shock on his own son, the subject burst into a heated and occasionally 
incoherent tirade:   
 
 
Subject:  “I DON’T GIVE A GOD DANG WHAT ‘THE EXPERIMENT 
REQUIRES’.  IF SOMEONE’S GETTING HURT AND 
HOLLERING THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ANYONE 
GONNA MAKE CONTINUE WITH [sic] SO DON’T GIVE ME 
THAT LINE OF HOOLEY IF IF [sic] YOU’RE GETTING AN 
EXPERIMENT, AND IT’S HURTING YA [mumble] THAT’S 
GONNA MAKE YOU CONTINUE WITH IT—SO DON’T GIVE 
ME THAT LINE OF HOOLEY.  I’M NOT SO DUMB THAT I 
DON’T KNOW THAT.  AND AS I SAY, YOU CAN HAVE YOUR 
TWO DAMN CHEQUES BACK!  IF HE’S GONNA HOLLER 
LIKE THAT I’M NOT GONNA KEEP GOING THROUGH WITH 
IT!”   
   Experimenter: “You have no other choice Teacher.” 
Subject:  “WHAT DO YA MEAN I HAVE NO OTHER CHOICE!”   
Experimenter:  “If you don’t continue we’re going to have to discontinue the entire 
experiment.”   
Subject:  (suddenly calming down) “ . . . discontinue the entire thing!  I an’t 
gonna have my boy, would you have your boy hollering in there like 
that?”   
Experimenter:  “Well we’ll have to discontinue, may I ask you a few questions . . . 
?”   
Subject:  “I’m not going to sit there, after all that’s my boy, and I’m not 
gonna sit [mumbles]” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2435). 
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As this subject repeatedly emphasised, that the experiment “requires” he continue is a “line 
of hooley”.  He also highlighted that—never having attended high school114—his lack of 
formal education did not prevent him from knowing that he did not have to continue.  He 
was also aware that he had a choice, one of which was to discontinue participating in the 
experiment.  The difference was that in the Baseline experiment, helping the learner 
required subjects to engage in a confrontation on behalf of a stranger.  For most subjects, 
helping a stranger paled in comparison to satisfying their personal desire to avoid having to 
engage in a distasteful confrontation.  It is therefore suspected that the obedient subjects 
were just as capable as the independent audiences of identifying that inflicting the shocks 
was the morally wrong course of action.  This may explain why 36.6 percent of a sample 
of subjects who completed later still held themselves most responsible (Milgram, 1974, p. 
203).  As one subject admitted: “I was surprised to learn that I did a thing even though I 
knew it was wrong to do it [italics added]” (SMP, Box 44, Divider: “Problems”, #2321).  
Another subject stated: “It’s left me with a guilty feeling” (SMP, Box 44, Divider “9”, 
#2013).  As one disobedient subject said: “I was glad to find that I had the ‘guts’ to refuse 
to continue” (SMP, Box 44, Divider “14”, #0837).  With regards to all the non-relationship 
variations, Damico (1982) understood the situation well:  
 
most revealing . . . in the Milgram experiment is not the inability of his subjects to 
understand the difference between right and wrong—anxiety was often the most 
visible emotion—but their failure to care about the difference in a way that would 
have made it the controlling factor in their behavior (pp. 424-425). 
  
It would have been interesting to note how many subjects would have completed the 
experiment had they known before inflicting the first shock that they would later swap 
roles with the learner.  Irrespective of what the subject might have said—“but I don’t like 
what’s happening to that fella in there” (Milgram, 1965c)—most did not care enough about 
the learner to sacrifice their lesser important desires.  Actually, Zimbardo (1974, pp. 566-
567) went so far as to argue that most of the disobedient subjects were not all that 
concerned about the learner:  
 
what did the disobeying minority do after they refused to continue to shock the 
poor soul, who was so obviously in pain?  Did they intervene, go to his aid, 
denounce the researcher, protest to higher authorities, etc.?  No, even their 
disobedience was within the framework of ‘acceptability’; they stayed in their 
seats, ‘in their assigned place,’ politely, psychologically demurred, and they waited 
to be dismissed by the authority.115  
                                                 
114
 See SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2435. 
 
115
 Lending support to Zimbardo’s point is the Subject as Bystander condition, in which, as a compromise, 
the ordinary man asked the 16 recalcitrant subjects from the Ordinary Man Gives Orders condition to 
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This is true, with the exception of the then unpublished Relationship condition, which 
provided many examples of genuinely concerned behaviour and defiance.  After inflicting 
the 150-volt shock on his friend, one subject suddenly hesitated, and the experimenter then 
issued the prod: “It’s absolutely essential that you continue teacher.”  Ignoring the 
experimenter, the subject stood up from his chair and tried to make his way to the 
learner/friend in the adjacent room.  On encountering a locked door, he then demanded of 
the experimenter: “You gonna open up the door?”  Sensing the seriousness of the situation, 
the experimenter did not issue the final prod, “You have no other choice” and, seemingly 
fearing for his own safety, responded instead: “We’ll have to discontinue the experiment” 
(SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2424). 116   
 
 
8.9 The Self-Invented Strain Resolving Mechanism of Avoidance Behaviour in 
Reducing Feelings of Responsibility 
 
Another example of a self-invented SRM that lends weight to the argument that 
subjects knew they were acting immorally was a behaviour that Milgram termed 
avoidance.  As subjects reached the higher end of the shock board, some started to 
anticipate the learner’s excruciating screams and purposefully talked over his pained 
appeals, as if to try to neutralise their impact (see SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2301).  
Similar behaviours were observed during the pilot runs where it was noticed that some 
subjects would avert their eyes from the learner, whom they could see through a silvered 
glass, then continue delivering the shocks.  Milgram (1974, p. 158) termed such behaviour 
avoidance, whereby “the subject screens himself from the sensory consequences of his 
actions.”  He believed avoidance was a type of SRM, because those who engaged in it did 
“not permit the stimuli associated with the victim’s suffering to impinge on them  
. . . . In this way, the victim is psychologically eliminated as a source of discomfort” 
(Milgram, 1974, p.  158).  As one subject from the pilot later admitted, they looked away 
because “it caused them  discomfort to see the victim in agony [italics added]” (Milgram, 
1974, p. 34).   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
continue participating in the procedure by performing instead the timekeeper role (with 11, 69 percent, 
completing).  Most who completed this condition were not as concerned about the learner’s well-being as 
they were about the possibility of later being blamed for the destructive end result.  If they were really 
concerned about the learner, they (as a minority did) would also have refused to participate in the second part 
of the experiment. 
 
116
 Also see SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2421, #2425, #2440.    
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Like all subjects who, in fear of a confrontation, decided to resolve the moral 
dilemma by repeatedly siding with the experimenter, those who engaged in avoidance 
knew they were choosing the wrong option.  But a problem confronting these subjects was 
that with the cause (the subject flicking switches) being so closely related to an 
intensifying effect (the screaming learner), they (and others present) were repeatedly and 
more intensely reminded of the existence of this cause/effect relationship.  These subjects 
were clearly manipulating their immediate environment, so as to screen themselves from 
having to experience and react to the strain/guilt-inducing sensory consequences of their 
actions.  Paradoxically, it would seem these subjects did not want to know about the harm 
they knew they were mostly responsible for inflicting—Seibel’s “intentional ignorance”.  
As far as these subjects were concerned, if nothing were physically cueing them into 
feeling guilty or stressed about the implications associated with their harmful actions then, 
relying on self-deception, there was no need to feel responsible.  By placing the victim out 
of sight and/or neutralising their increasingly desperate screams, it became easier to keep 
them out of mind (as well as promoting the appearance to others present that because the 
subject apparently never saw/heard the learner’s reactions, they could then deceive them 
by denying having known the learner was in pain).  Therefore, via self-deception and/or 
the deception of others, avoidance-type behaviours could aid in reducing some subjects’ 
feelings and/or appearance of being responsible for their actions. 
 
 
8.10 The Self-Invented Strain Resolving Mechanism of Positive Self-Image in Reducing 
Feelings of Responsibility 
 
The pseudonymous Elinor Rosenblum was a self-styled pillar of the community, 
who believed herself “unusual; I’m softhearted, I’m a softy” (Milgram, 1974, p. 83).  Not 
long into the experiment she encountered the moral dilemma: to withdraw or continue?  
She later admitted: “I was tempted so much to stop and to say: ‘Look I’m not going to do it 
anymore.  Sorry.  I’m not going to do it’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 83).  But as her repeated 
infliction of shocks indicated, the prospect of disobedience obviously involved a burden 
that, on behalf of the learner, Rosenblum was unwilling to shoulder.  At the learner’s 
expense, it was instead easier for her, albeit marginally, to continue administering the 
shocks. 
 
Continuing to choose the path easiest for herself—and well aware of what this 
decision meant for the increasingly pained learner—seemed to have stimulated, for all to 
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see, her reaction of uncontrollable shaking.  Perhaps fearing this nervous reaction might 
convey an awareness of wrongdoing, she attempted to justify her actions to the others 
present by offering an explanation that was compatible with her positive self-image:  
“ ‘Must I go on?  Oh, I’m worried about him . . . . Can’t we stop?  I’m shaking.  I’m 
shaking’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 80).  As Milgram observed: “She construes her expressions 
of tension purely as a sign of virtue: she was nervous because she cared about the victim” 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 83).  But had Milgram’s machine been real, Rosenblum failed to 
recognise that she was professing her concern for a person on whom she nonetheless 
inflicted potentially lethal shocks.  According to Baumeister (1997, p. 307) the use of such 
“bizarre rationalizations” involves a twofold process: 
 
First, the perpetrator wants very strongly to believe them.  Second, they are 
superficially plausible enough that the person can accept them as long as he or she 
doesn’t think about them very carefully . . . . Such a combination is apparently 
necessary for biased thinking or self-deception in general.    
 
But Rosenblum’s destructive actions spoke far louder than her “worried” words.  Explicitly 
defining herself as opposed to her harmful actions had more to do with her bolstering a 
desirable positive self-image (Milgram, 1974, p. 162).   
 
Although tempted to challenge the experimenter, the most she was willing to do for 
the learner was surreptitiously sabotage the experiment.  As Rosenblum later said to the 
learner in a statement whose accuracy was corroborated by the measured recording of her 
performance: “ ‘As a matter of fact I tried to push the switch down very lightly.  Did you 
hear me stressing the [correct] word[?]  I was hoping that you would hear me.’ ” (Milgram, 
1974, p. 82).117  However, this admission of signalling to the learner only invalidated her 
justification for continuing: “It is an experiment . . . . So I had to do it.  You said so” 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 83).  If she was just following orders for the betterment of science, why 
did she purposefully try to sabotage the experiment?  It was actually common among 
subjects to inflict the briefest of shocks, in the way Rosenblum did.  But, as Milgram 
(1974, p. 159) observed:  
 
When interviewed, these subjects stress that they ‘asserted their humanity’ by 
administering the briefest shock possible.  Handling strain in this manner was 
                                                 
117
 As was the case with Rosenblum: “Some subjects could be observed signaling the correct answer to the 
victims by stressing it vocally as they read the multiple-choice words aloud.  That is, they attempted to 
prompt the learner and thus prevent his receiving shocks.  These subjects are willing to undermine the 
experiment but not to cause an open break with authority . . . . The subject is unable to act openly on his 
humane feelings, deflecting them into a trivial subterfuge of no real consequence.  Yet ‘doing something,’ 
even if of only token significance, helps preserve his self-image as a benign man” (Milgram, 1974, pp. 159-
160).  
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easier than defiance.  It permits the maximum expression of individual benignity 
within the constraints of an oppressive system.  But there is an element of self-
delusion in this type of minimal compliance.  It does not challenge authority.  It 
may diminish but does not nullify the exercise of authority’s will and is chiefly 
important as a balm to the subject’s conscience.   
 
A clearly embarrassed Rosenblum went on to justify her actions to the learner:  
 
You’re an actor, boy.  You’re marvelous!  Oh, my God, what he [the experimenter] 
did to me.  I’m exhausted.  I didn’t want to go on with it.  You don’t know what I 
went through here.  A person like me hurting you, my God.  I didn’t want to do it to 
you.  Forgive me, please.  I can’t get over this.  My face is beet red.  I wouldn’t hurt 
a fly (Milgram, 1974, p. 82).     
 
Rosenblum was left confused.  She was not the kind of person who would normally do 
such a thing; she was a volunteer who taught “dropouts . . .  . leather-jacket guys . . . . 
respect for people, respect for older people” (Milgram, 1974, p. 81).  Rosenblum was 
convinced she was a good person, but she nonetheless sensed that this experiment implied 
that she was not so.  In less than one hour, Milgram’s experiment had challenged the 
credibility of Rosenblum’s strongly positive self-image.  Or had it?  
 
In a questionnaire filled out months later, and thus with much time to reflect on the 
experiments’ wider implications, Rosenblum again relied upon her remarkable capacity for 
the deception of others and/or herself.  Apparently her “ ‘mature and well-educated brain’ 
had not believed the learner was getting shocks” (Milgram, 1974, p. 84).118  Although at 
the time she experienced uncontrollable shaking, she seems to have convinced herself that 
people like her simply do not do such things, so actually she must have known the shocks 
were fake.  The alternative explanations were simply inapplicable to a person of her 
calibre.  Slater (2004, p. 40) observed of subjects like Rosenblum: “The power of 
Milgram’s experiments lies, perhaps . . . in the great gap between what we think about 
ourselves, and who we frankly are.” 
 
Unlike Rosenblum, others were more willing to acknowledge the disconcerting gap 
between who they thought they were, and what they actually did:   
 
The thought also occurred to me that for a supposedly highly civilized and, in my 
mind, ‘soft hearted’ person I had carried the experiment on a lot longer than I 
should have were I as ‘soft hearted’ as I had led myself to believe.  (I try to make 
myself believe that it was because I had agreed to complete the experiment but 
                                                 
118
 Such post-experimental rationalisations were common.  Another example: “Briefly, I am happy to have 
been of service.  The money was donated to the cancer fund.  You see, my interest lay in being of service” 
(SMP, Box 44, Divider “T.R.”, Titled: (no label), #2205). 
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without much success).  It makes me wonder if I would be a real ‘resistance fighter’ 
in the event that our country should ever find itself in the position of a France or a 
Denmark under occupation (SMP, Box 44, Divider “9”, #0202).  
 
Another subject later observed:   
 
It has bothered me that I went all the way and obeyed the experimenter.  At times I 
threatened to stop and refuse to go further, but I gave in and finished the 
experiment . . . . I consider myself better informed, and I hope more cultured then 
[sic] the average non-college graduate . . . . In spite of all this I gave the same 
performance that the average slob, taken off the street, would probably have done.  
I consider this frightening (SMP, Box 44, Divider “Problems”, #1706). 
 
One subject more succinctly recognised: “For me, personally, it was an awakening” (SMP, 
Box 44, Divider “13”, #2001). 
 
It is important to note that of all the BFs and SRMs involved, some were much 
more powerful than others.  There was, in fact, one SRM, in particular, on which 
Milgram’s high completions rates were almost totally dependent.   
 
 
8.11 The Supplied Strain Resolving Mechanism of the Shock Generator: The Most 
Powerful Mechanism Capable of Reducing Feelings of Responsibility 
 
Milgram may have believed the shock generator to be an “important” SRM 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 157), but relative to his obsession with OTA, he never considered it 
absolutely critical in producing his results: “The precise mode of acting against the victim 
is not of central importance” (Milgram, 1974, p. 14).  Although not a sufficient condition, 
the shock generator—the means of inflicting harm—was a most necessary one, probably 
the single most powerful element in the achievement in the high completion rates (Russell 
& Gregory, 2005).  The following will explain why. 
 
Subjects were aware that in flicking the switches on the shock generator seemingly 
inflicted much pain on the learner.  The subject saw the learner strapped into a shock 
device from which they then also received a test-shock.  Subjects therefore knew their 
actions were directly responsible for causing the learner’s pain.  But because they dreaded 
a direct confrontation with the experimenter that would result if they stopped what they 
were doing, many subjects became motivated not to know what they knew they were 
responsible for.  Many sensed they might be able to avoid having to shoulder this burden 
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of responsibility, by drawing upon a variety of supplied/self-invented SRMs.  However, 
the shock generator had two characteristics that set it apart from all the other SRMs. 
 
First, the shock generator, not the subject, inflicted blows (seemingly) strong 
enough to render another human being unconscious (if not dead).  Secondly, this device 
could inflict these (supposedly) intense blows in the total physical absence of the initiating 
subject.  The simultaneous presence of these two characteristics made it possible to 
physically separate: “the act [flick switches] and its effects [seemingly rendering the victim 
unconscious]” (Milgram, 1974, p. 39) therefore ensuring: “the victim’s suffering possesses 
an abstract, remote quality for the subject.  He is aware, but only in a conceptual sense, that 
his actions cause pain to another person; the fact is apprehended but not felt” (Milgram, 
1974, p. 36).  Being only conceptually aware of the victim’s pain injected into the situation 
what this author terms ambiguous responsibility: potential confusion over who—the 
subject, experimenter, perhaps even the learner—was most responsible for the learner’s 
painful experience.  The shock generator made responsibility ambiguous because its 
separation of the act from its effect subtly prevented subjects from feeling and/or appearing 
as directly responsible as they in fact were for their harmful actions.  If they did not feel 
and/or appear most responsible for the effects of their actions then, somewhat 
conveniently, perhaps in their own and/or others’ minds, they were not responsible?  
Maximising or minimising the simultaneous use of these two characteristics most 
powerfully dictated whether Milgram obtained high or low completion rates. 
 
The only condition that maximised the effect of the shock generator’s two key 
characteristics was the Truly Remote Pilot study (initially termed the “no feed back” 
condition) in which, due to the way the shock generator was set up, from the start the 
subject never heard, could not see, and did not need to touch a person on whom they 
inflicted three consecutive 450-volt shocks.  Although Milgram (1965a, p. 61) did not 
provide the exact figure, in this variation “virtually all subjects went blithely to the end of 
the board, seemingly indifferent to the verbal designations (‘Extreme Shock’ and ‘Danger: 
Severe Shock’).” 
 
However, across the Proximity Series Milgram subtly changed the set-up of the 
shock generator, forcing subjects into hearing, seeing, and eventually feeling the harmful 
consequences of their actions.  As the subjects’ conceptual awareness that the learner was 
receiving shocks was gradually bolstered by these cumulative sources of perceptual 
information, the harder it became to convince themselves and/or others present that they 
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themselves were not most responsible for their actions.  For an increasing proportion of 
subjects, supplied and/or self invented rationalisations for continuing became, for 
themselves and/or others present, less believable.  And for an increasing proportion of 
subjects across the Proximity Series, their sense of personal responsibility for what was 
happening to the learner became much stronger and eventually unavoidable (Remote—
heard some banging on wall: 35 percent pulled out; Voice-Feedback—heard all verbal 
reactions: 37.5 percent pulled out; Proximity—saw and heard all reactions: 60 percent 
pulled out).  As it became harder to deny responsibility for one’s harmful actions, across 
the Proximity Series an increasing proportion of subjects felt a compelling obligation to 
pull out.   
 
Of all Milgram’s variations, it was the last of this series—the Touch-Proximity 
experiment—that least used the shock generator’s potential to physically separate the 
learner from the perceptual implications associated with inflicting high intensity shocks.  
Participants were not only conceptually aware that their actions were producing pain, but 
across multiple senses they also became perceptually aware of this fact by seeing and 
hearing a man screaming in pain under the force of their own hands.  The relationship 
between cause and effect—the subject’s actions and the learner’s pain—was no longer 
ambiguous; and, consequently there was no ambiguous responsibility.  Forcing the 
learner’s hand on to the shock plate made it difficult for subjects to convince themselves 
(self-deception) and/or others present (deception) that they were not most responsible for 
the learner’s painful predicament (70 percent pulled out).  What might have sounded like a 
plausible rationalisation for continuing in the Truly Remote Pilot—“I had to do it.  You 
said so”—had by the early to mid stages of the Touch-Proximity experiment become for 
most subjects totally implausible.  They had come to suspect that if blame were to be 
apportioned they could not convincingly rely upon the popular excuse that they were just 
following orders (or any other justification, whether it was supplied or self-invented)—
who would have been gullible enough to have believed them?  Not helping matters was 
that for most subjects in this variation, relative to the intense stress associated with 
continuing to inflict further shocks, engaging in a confrontation had become the easier 
option.  Particularly when faced with having to touch the learner, most subjects could not 
help but feel and/or appear most responsible for their actions.  Thus, they felt obligated to 
shift out of the SAD and return to the State of Autonomy.119 
                                                 
119
 Another inhibiting factor was that the learner in the last two experiments of the Proximity Series could see 
the subject: “the actions of the subject now come under scrutiny by the victim . . . . His surveillance of the 
action directed against him may give rise to shame or guilt, which may then serve to curtail the action” 
(Milgram, 1974, pp. 38-39). 
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Milgram incorrectly predicted that very few would complete the Touch-Proximity 
condition.  He was surprised that almost a third of subjects completed this variation.  
However, this result is less surprising when one realises that although the Touch-Proximity 
condition had removed the shock generator’s second characteristic (the potential to inflict 
pain remotely), it retained in full the first characteristic (the shock generator, not the 
subject, inflicted the seemingly forceful blows).  This gives rise to a central question: what 
kind of results might Milgram have obtained in a variation where the means of inflicting 
harm was devoid of both characteristics?  Hypothetically, speaking, it would not have been 
difficult to run what would have been the control experiment to the Truly Remote Pilot: 
simply remove the shock generator from the experimental paradigm.  When one 
contemplates such an experiment, it becomes clearer just how central a role the means of 
inflicting harm actually played.  Completing the experiment without the shock generator 
would have left subjects experiencing a physical connection between themselves (or some 
instrument/weapon) and the effects directly caused by those actions.  Furthermore, the 
subject would not only have to feel (and thus see and hear) the implications of their 
actions, they would have to produce force of sufficient intensity to render the learner at 
least unconscious.  Russell and Gregory (2005, pp. 333-334) have argued: 
 
one need only consider what results Milgram might have obtained if instead of 
requiring participants to inflict punishment by means of the shock generator the 
participant had been required to administer some other, more direct, physical 
penalty.  For example, how far would Milgram’s participants have gone if they had 
been required personally to beat, bludgeon, or whip the learner, ultimately to the 
point of unconsciousness or beyond? Under such conditions, there would have been 
no ‘lack of unity.’ 
 
 
Should any subjects have agreed to complete such an experiment, and increasingly 
beat the learner into at least a state of unconsciousness, to a far greater degree than in the 
Touch-Proximity condition, there could be no ambiguous responsibility.  It would be 
indisputably clear who was responsible for the outcome.  The shock generator was so 
central that, in fact, its absence would also have rendered all the previously mentioned BFs 
and SRMs useless.  Physically striking the learner with immense force and then later 
explaining that they were “just following orders”, that science required they do it, that the 
experimenter convinced them the learner would not be harmed, or, that the experimenter 
said he was totally responsible for the subjects actions, would most likely seem patently 
ridiculous to all involved (including the subject).  It is quite possibly because they did not 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 158 
fully consider the impact of the shock generator that the psychiatrists approached by 
Milgram before the experiment predicted that only one in a thousand, a “pathological 
fringe”, would complete the experiment (Milgram, 1974, p. 31).     
       
Clearly, the shock generator injected ambiguity into the scenario, so again, there 
may be merit in Mixon’s criticism that many a subject completed only because they were 
not exactly sure if the learner was being hurt.  If subjects were led to believe that they were 
indisputably hurting another person (as they would in the above hypothetical variation), it 
is highly unlikely many would have agreed to complete.  Although this issue will be 
addressed soon, not feeling and/or appearing responsible was of central importance.120  
  
Establishing the shock generator as the key determinant of Milgram’s high 
completion rates helps to reveal many connections beyond the laboratory walls.  Directly 
influenced by and then creatively elaborating upon Milgram’s (1974, p. 157) observation 
regarding the positive correlation between distance and the probability of subjects’ 
completing the experiment, Grossman (1995) has hierarchically ranked various types of 
military weapons on the basis of physical distance separating those deploying them from 
their eventual victim/s.121  The greater the distance that certain weapons can be deployed 
from their target, the less is the resulting strain/guilt or, what Grossman more lucidly 
termed, resistance to killing.  His thesis is succinctly captured in the graph below: 
 
 
                                                 
120
 Milgram asked one subject who completed the Relationship variation and shocked his friend, “Is there 
anything he could have said that would have gotten you to stop the experiment?”  Subject: “I don’t think so.”  
Milgram: “Um, what if we . . . gave you . . . a gun and said ‘shoot him in the head’, now seriously?”  Subject: 
“Seriously . . . if they gave me a gun to shoot him in the head I wouldn’t have done it.  I think my reasoning 
behind it . . . was this thing is set-up . . . . But the way I figured it, you’re not going to cause yourselves 
trouble by actually giving serious physical damage to a body.”  Milgram: “Um, do you think that would have 
been the point where you would have not done it, if there were any kind of physical damage?”  Subject: 
“Yeah, if it was open to my senses, as you say, if ahhrr, if a a [sic] gun [Mumble] I wouldn’t [Mumble].  No 
matter what anyone told me concerning say phony bullets or anything like that” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape 
#2430). 
 
121
 The connection between the OTA experiments and frequently relied upon methods of mass-killing has 
been made by both Milgram (1974, pp. 7-9, 38) and others (see Bandura, 1973, p. 177). 
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Figure 16: Distance versus resistance to killing (Grossman, 1995, p. 98). 
 
 
Grossman has argued that resistance to killing diminishes with longer-range 
weaponry, because this technology inhibits the stimulation of potentially powerful 
emotions such as guilt, stress, trauma, and something not explored by Milgram, 
repugnance.  As will be shown below, this may have implications for Goldhagen’s “issue 
of cruelty”.   
 
In conflict with Grossman, there is believed to be a much stronger relationship 
between resistance to killing and stimulation of an aggressor’s perceptual senses, than 
there is between resistance to killing and distance per se.  Some of Grossman’s own 
evidence lends support to this assertion.  For example, according to Grossman, during the 
trench battles of World War One the grenade was one of the most popular weapons used 
against the enemy.  It seemed to generate a lower resistance to killing than the longer-range 
rifle.  According to the above graph, however, the hand-grenade should generate a higher 
resistance to killing than the longer-range rifle because it is frequently deployed from more 
proximate distances to the intended victim/s.  In providing an explanation for this anomaly 
in his graph, Grossman points out that when attacking with a grenade the soldier must 
shield their body behind cover and close their eyes and ears to avoid being injured by their 
own attack.  As a result, when killing: “grenades were psychologically and physically 
easier to use . . . . [because] the killer does not have to look at his victims or hear them die” 
(Grossman, 1995, p. 113).  In other words, killing with a grenade is psychologically easier 
than using a more distant rifle because, not having to see or hear their victim/s die, the 
person doing the killing experiences less perceptual stimulation.  Resistance to killing 
therefore has a stronger relationship with stimulation of the aggressor’s perceptual senses 
than it does with physical distance per se.  This point may have relevance to the Holocaust: 
Germans pouring Zyclon B pellets through ceiling vents were separated from their many 
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victims by only one or two metres (victims who could not be seen, need not be touched, 
and who could not be heard dying by the perpetrators if they, the perpetrators, quickly 
vacated the scene).   
 
This author has synthesised the concept of perceptual stimulation with many of 
Grossman’s insightful observations, to produce the following innovation on his above 
graph.  At one end of what has been termed the killing method hierarchy (KMH), and 
eliciting the highest levels of resistance to killing are methods like the following martial 
arts technique.  The person killing is to:  
 
Punch a thumb through . . . [the victim’s] eye and on into the brain, subsequently 
stirring the intruding digit around inside the skull, cocking it off toward the side, 
and forcefully pulling the eye and other matter out with the thumb (Grossman, 
1995, pp. 131-132).   
 
This method is believed to produce a higher resistance to killing than, say, using a sharp 
weapon in a piercing action (such as stabbing with a knife or bayonet), because to cause a 
fatality an aggressor must directly force, internally and slowly feel, clearly see, and hear 
their victim die.  A sharp instrument used in a piercing action is likely to produce a greater 
resistance to killing on the part of an aggressor than similar instruments used in a slashing 
action (like slashing with a knife).  The reason for this difference is: “To pierce is to 
penetrate, while to slash is to sidestep or deny the objective of piercing into the enemy’s 
essence” (Grossman, 1995, p. 121).  Next, a sharp instrument used in a slashing action is 
likely to produce a greater resistance to killing than a blunt instrument (like the butt of a 
rifle) used in a bludgeoning action.  This is because bludgeoning does not require the 
victim to be attacked internally.  Blunt instruments used in a bludgeoning action are likely 
to produce a greater resistance to killing than using a firearm, which itself—not the 
shooter—generates the force of the blow.  The pulling of the trigger stimulates the firing of 
a projectile which takes a straight line path to its target.  Although a firearm requires the 
person killing to see the consequences of their actions, unlike all the previously mentioned 
weapons/methods, they do not necessitate the establishment of a direct connection between 
the victim, the weapon, and the aggressor.  Finally, a firearm involving a direct fire 
projectile is likely to produce a greater resistance to killing than a firearm involving an 
indirect fire projectile (where the projectile fired takes a curved or less direct path towards 
its target).  Indirect fire projectiles, such as artillery, or in the case of intercontinental 
missiles, clearly eliminate tactile and auditory perceptual stimulation and, depending on 
the distance from and the course towards the target, can eliminate most if not all perceptual 
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stimulation.  It should be noted that this hierarchical ranking from high to low levels of 
perceptual stimulation also, albeit generally, moves in a direction of slow to more 
instantaneous methods of killing.  
  
 Increasingly over the last several centuries, particularly in the Western World, there 
has been increasing inventiveness of, and, as a consequence, proliferation and reliance 
upon perceptually benign killing technology—the bayonet to aerial bombardment, “hung-
drawn-quartered” to the automatic lethal injection machine.  Is it possible that the 
increasingly reliance on gradually more benign methods of killing may have sensitised 
subsequent generations of modern people to the comparably bloody “hands-on” methods 
of killing so heavily relied upon by their ancestors?  The dearth of exposure to and 
experience when killing with the much more primitive technology/methods used by our 
ancestors may have increased modern people’s resistance to killing with such 
weapons/methods.  It is for this reason that the KMH probably has greater applicability to 
modern Westerners more than anybody else.      
 
Other than having implications for Goldhagen’s issue of cruelty, 122 the KMH may 
also have potential as a heuristic device that enables one to objectively identify both how 
and why some methods of killing are psychologically easier to engage in than others (by 
ameliorating a range of inhibitory emotions such as guilt, trauma, and/or repugnance).   For 
example:    
    
certain forms of killing were less liable to incur guilt.  This was particularly the 
case in the most anonymous forms of modern warfare.  In aerial warfare, for 
example, there was a strong correlation between altitude and guilt . . . . Such 
anonymity in the slaughtering process even enabled the navigator of the Enola Gay, 
which dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, to deny any adverse emotional 
reactions: he claimed to have ‘come off the mission, had a bite and a few beers, and 
hit the sack, and had not lost a night’s sleep over the bomb in 40 years’ (Bourke, 
1999, p. 209).  
 
Obviously, this member of the Enola Gay crew was conceptually aware that his mission 
had just instantly killed tens of thousands of people.  However, because he was able to 
                                                 
122
 Goldhagen provided only six examples of lethal violence where a direct physical connection was 
established between a German perpetrator, their weapon, and victim/s, causing the perpetrator/s to experience 
intense and unavoidable levels of tactile, visual, and auditory stimulation (see Goldhagen, 1996, pp. 301-302; 
307; 351; 351; 358-359; 401).  Such primitive technology, like for example the bayonet, was readily 
available (see Goldhagen, 1996, p. 217) but, relative to gassing and shooting, were rarely used to kill.  The 
likelihood that fatal stabbings, bludgeonings, whippings, and beatings were actually relatively rare appears to 
have been lost on Goldhagen, who instead presents the reader with a myriad of non-fatal bludgeonings, 
whippings, beatings, verbal assaults and “bizarre and self-abasing acts” (Goldhagen, 1996, p. 386).  This is a 
major weakness in Goldhagen’s resilient second main argument—relating to gratuitous cruelty—because 
such lethal violence in the relatively unsophisticated killing institutions was by no means the norm. 
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avoid becoming perceptually aware of all the human carnage he had just had a direct hand 
in creating, he could be a part of a team which could kill without actually feeling that they 
were killing.123 
 
The type of negative psychological repercussions being referred to are those 
elicited by methods of killing that do require the victim to be heard, seen and, to some 
degree, felt.  Consider, for example, a method of killing from the opposite end of the KMH 
spectrum: 
 
An American who joined the Foreign Legion recalled bayoneting a ‘young Fellow  
. . . as delicate as a pencil’.  For months afterwards he could not sleep ‘for 
remembering what that fellow looked like, and how my bayonet slipped into him 
and how he screamed when he fell’ (Bourke, 1999, p. 210).   
 
In greater detail, an Australian by the name of I.L. Idriess (as cited in Holmes, 1985, p. 
379) has described a bayonet attack he observed at the first battle of Gaza in 1917 as: 
 
just berserk slaughter . . . the grunting breaths, the gritting teeth and the staring eyes 
of the lunging Turk, the sobbing scream as the bayonet ripped home. . . . Bayonet-
fighting is indescribable . . . words are incapable of describing feelings.124 
 
The psychological reactions to the killing of just one person with a bayonet stands in stark 
contrast to the responses felt by those complicit in the perceptually “benign” nuclear attack 
which, according to Glover (1999, p. 99), had killed 200,000 people by 1950 (a point 
readily conceded by those involved in bombing Japan).125  
 
Obviously, means of inflicting harm like the shock generator and aerial 
bombardment are psychologically easier to deploy because they insert significant 
perceptual (but not conceptual) ambiguity into the destructive end results.  This 
observation detracts from Mixon’s (1976, 1989) criticism that ambiguity surrounding the 
outcome of the shocks on the learner contributed to Milgram obtaining high completion 
rates (and that less ambiguity would have resulted in lower completion rates).  The fact that 
                                                 
123
 As World War Two bomber pilot J. Douglas Harvey later reflected in relation to a mission that targeted 
Berlin, “ ‘I could not visualize the horrible deaths my bombs . . . had caused here.  I had no feeling of guilt.  I 
had no feeling of accomplishment’ ” (Fussell, 1989, p. 143). 
 
124
 See Grossman (1995, p. 124) for an exception to this general rule in the modern era.  
 
125
 Paul Montgomery, who was involved in the bombing of many Japanese cities during World War Two has 
said: “ ‘It’s not like I was going out and sticking a bayonet in someone’s belly, OK?’ ” (Rees, 2001, p. 119, 
as cited in Rees, 2005, p. 293).   
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Milgram purposefully created ambiguity in the experimental procedure—changing the last 
switch from saying “LETHAL” to “XXX”—may not, as Mixon would argue, mean that 
Milgram’s results were methodologically flawed.  What was important as far as the OTA 
experiments were concerned was that (1) Milgram ensured subjects believed that the 
learner was being shocked; and (2), irrespective of any purposefully inserted ambiguity, 
Milgram succeeded in ensuring a substantial majority of his subjects inflicted all the 
shocks.  He succeeded on both counts.126 
 
 
8.12 Conclusion 
 
The main (although not exclusive) reason why most subjects completed the 
Baseline experiment was that they found it easier to continue inflicting the shocks than to 
help the learner—which would have required they engage in a confrontation with the 
experimenter.  In conflict with Milgram’s agentic state, where subjects honestly did not 
believe themselves to be responsible for their actions (and were simply instruments of the 
experimenter), this explanation implies they knew they were acting immorally.  
Consequently, Milgram’s agentic state was replaced with the State of Autonomous Denial 
(SAD): a state of mind where subjects were aware that they were mostly responsible for 
their own actions, but due to the personal costs associated with shouldering responsibility 
for their actions and a suspicion they could act with impunity, they attempted to conceal 
this awareness internally (via self-deception) and/or externally (via attempts to deceive 
others present).  A variety of opportunities (supplied and/or self- invented) facilitated 
“access” to the SAD, greatly aiding subjects in evading feeling and/or appearing 
responsible for their harmful actions.   
 
However, the single most powerful mechanism, that in conjunction with an 
ideology that legitimised the infliction of harm, was undoubtedly the SRM of the shock 
generator.  It was unique in that it physically ameliorated subjects’ emotionally traumatic 
                                                 
126
 As Mixon (1972, 1976, 1989) has argued, both his role plays and even Milgram’s own results support the 
assertion that when it is made clear to subjects that the learner is being electrocuted, predicted and actual 
completions slump.  Thus, Mixon believes that Milgram’s high completion rates were due to his purposeful 
insertion of ambiguity surrounding the learner’s fate.  However, this thesis suggests that greater clarity over 
the learner’s fate reduced the completion rate because it increased the subjects’ feelings and/or appearance of 
responsibility for their harmful actions.  Greater clarity also reduced the opportunities for subjects to pass the 
“responsibility-buck” for their harmful actions.  When the consequences of our harmful actions are 
made clear (and therefore undeniable), we cannot later say that we “did not know”, because we clearly did 
know.  Of course, greater ambiguity over the learner’s fate (as in Milgram’s Truly Remote Pilot condition) 
produces the converse effect.  
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experiences.  The shock generator introduced what was termed ambiguous responsibility: 
confusion over who was most responsible for the learner’s pain.  In fact, it was the shock 
generator’s attenuation of the strain of inflicting harm that infused an air of plausibility 
into all the other BFs and SRMs, whether supplied or self-invented.  However, in the 
absence of the shock generator, there could be little if any ambiguous responsibility, and 
all the other SRMs and BFs would not have sounded nearly as plausible to the obedient 
subjects themselves and/or others present.  In sum, this re-think suggests that Milgram’s 
experimental paradigm was not about OTA per se, and much more about the subjects’ 
resolution of a moral dilemma.  Furthermore, the resolution of this dilemma meant that the 
subjects had to make a personal choice for which the outcome was strongly (although 
certainly not exclusively) determined by the availability of a wide variety of supplied 
and/or self-invented opportunities used with the intention of evading responsibility for 
their actions.   
 
This conclusion is congruent with literature on the resolution of moral dilemmas. 
For example, Bandura’s (1999, p. 194) concept of moral disengagement in the 
perpetuation of inhumanities, where “there are many social and psychological maneuvers 
by which moral self-sanctions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct.”  Bandura’s 
mechanisms of moral disengagement include Moral Justifications, Euphemistic Labeling, 
Advantageous Comparisons, Displacement of Responsibility, Diffusion of Responsibility, 
Disregard or Distortion of Consequences; Dehumanisation, Attribution of Blame, and 
Gradualistic Moral Disengagement (most of which Milgram termed SRMs).   
 
Nonetheless, a possible criticism of the above re-assessment is that, as with 
Milgram’s theory, it focuses solely on explaining obedient subjects’ actions while failing 
to explain why others, such as Milgram and his research team, also willingly participated 
in the experiments.  It should be kept in mind that unlike the subjects who thought they 
were inflicting harm, Milgram and his team repeatedly participated in the actual infliction 
of harm.  That “others” obviously condoned this duplicitous and in some ways inhumane 
experiment—particularly the experimenter and Yale University—was a significant factor 
for continuing in the eyes of most subjects.  Obedient subjects regularly pointed out they 
would never have acted as they did on their own accord—that “others” were involved was, 
for them, central in facilitating their actions.  Trying to explain the subjects’ actions in the 
OTA experiments, without at the same time explaining the actions of all people involved in 
them, may inhibit a more comprehensive understanding of the human behaviour displayed 
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therein. 
 
The following chapter will complement the above individual/psychological 
explanation for most subjects’ behaviour, offering a more group/structural/sociological 
explanation in regard to why Milgram, his research team, and their subjects did what they 
did.  The chapter will apply a broader Weberian sociological lens to the OTA experiments.  
That is, Milgram’s experimental programme will be viewed as microcosmic goal-
orientated bureaucratic process. 
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Chapter Nine: Milgram’s Obedience to Authority 
Experiments as an Emergent Organisational 
(Bureaucratic) Microcosm 
 
 
You have all heard the saying that a bureaucrat is merely a cog in the wheel—it turns whenever the 
wheel is turning.  As a political scientist, I have a different view: The bureaucrat drives the wheel—
without him, it would not turn—Hilberg (1980, p. 101). 
 
 
By the time Milgram ran his first official experiment, an extensive goal-orientated 
organisational process had already been constructed around the subjects.  The 
interdependent links in this structural chain included, among others, the inherently 
bureaucratic National Science Foundation (NSF) funding process, Yale’s provision of 
facilities, the hiring then deployment of technical specialists, research assistants, and 
numerous actors, all with prescribed roles.  Their respective contributions were to be 
coordinated by Milgram himself, the “project manager”.   
 
In the wake of insights generated by intellectual giants such as Max Weber, 
scholars have come to understand the inherently coercive power of the bureaucratic 
process in achieving particular objectives, irrespective of their moral status (Arendt, 1963, 
1970; Gerth & Mills, 1974; Hilberg, 1961; Rubenstein, 1978).  Some of these coercive 
forces can include the chain of command (top-down authorisation of an order), 
bureaucratic momentum (Milgram’s “swift-flowing stream” where individual links feel 
pressured by other links within the bureaucratic chain into performing their specialist 
role/task), and displacement/diffusion of responsibility (where responsibility for an 
eventual “negative outcome” is passed on and eventually dissipated across the numerous 
links in the bureaucratic chain). 
 
It is tempting to believe that of the three above coercive forces, the chain of 
command was of greatest relevance to the obedience to authority (OTA) experiments.  
However, as this chapter will show, across the experiment’s goal-orientated organisational 
process, of central importance was the displacement/diffusion of responsibility, whereby 
across the bureaucratic chain the person ultimately responsible for the destructive end 
result seemed to disappear.  As discussed earlier, and as this chapter will reinforce, OTA is 
not just an inadequate explanation for Milgram’s results, it may even be a misleading 
description of most subjects’ behaviour.   
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9.1 Many Subjects “Obeyed” the Experimenter but did the Experimenter “Obey” 
Milgram? 
 
Milgram’s attention throughout the experimental programme was solely focused on 
the subjects’ actions.  But scholars like Harré have wondered why, unlike large proportions 
of actual subjects, Milgram’s assistants never raised objections whilst they themselves 
were wreaking near “nervous collapse” (Milgram, 1963, p. 377) on many subjects:   
 
Milgram’s assistants were quite prepared to subject the participants in the 
experiment to mental anguish, and in some cases considerable suffering . . . . The 
most morally obnoxious feature of this outrageous experiment was, I believe, the 
failure of any of Milgram’s assistants to protest against the treatment that they were 
meting out to the subjects (Harré, 1979, p. 106).127   
 
Miller (1986, p. 123) has been critical of such arguments: “The accusation that Milgram’s 
personnel were, themselves, obedient is, to say the least, novel.  Where are the orders, the 
conflict, the tension, etc.?  Were not these individuals investigating obedience rather than 
displaying it?”  This counter argument is only valid if one views the experiments, as Miller 
does, solely through the lens of “OTA”.  Miller might have dismissed Harré’s point but 
during the data-collection stage Milgram himself sensed a similarity between the subjects’ 
seemingly harmful actions and his research team’s actually harmful ones: 
 
Consider, for example, the fact --and it is a fact indeed, that while observing the 
experiment I ---and many others-- know that the naive subject is deeply distressed, 
and that the tension caused him is almost nerve shattering in some instances.  Yet, 
we do not stop the experiment because of this . . . . If we fail to intervene, although 
we know a man is being made upset; why separate these actions of ours from those 
of the subject, who feels he is causing discomfort to another [italics added].  And 
can we not use our own motives and reactions as a clue to what is behind the 
actions of the subject.  The question to ask then is: why do we feel justified in 
carrying through the experiment, and why is this any different from the 
justifications that the obedient subject’s feel [italics added] (SMP, Box 46, Folder 
163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”).128 
 
But why stop there?  Milgram, the experimenter, and the learner were not the only ones 
involved in converting the OTA research idea into a reality.  For example, why did the 
NSF funding agency, Milgram’s employer—Yale University—and every other person and 
                                                 
127
 Brandt (1978, p. 65) pointed out that Milgram did what his subjects did—inflicted harm for “science”.  
See also Helm and Morelli (1985, p. 624). 
 
128
 This quote was largely in reference to the many observers who came to watch, but in using the collective 
pronoun “we” to “carrying through the experiment”, it was also made in reference to the research team and 
himself, who all observed the same phenomena. 
 
 168 
group involved—research assistants, technicians, and administrators—make their ongoing 
contributions?  And why did they do so when from the first pilot, or soon after, “it became 
evident” to most involved that many subjects in the official experiments “would 
experience” intense (therefore potentially dangerous) levels of “stress” (Milgram, 1974, p. 
194)—what Meeus and Raaijmakers (1986, p. 311) would call “administrative violence”?  
A useful starting point to explore why all those individuals and groups behind the subject 
felt justified in carrying through the experiment might be to examine how Milgram drew 
them all into performing their roles. 
 
 
9.2 Getting All the Necessary Parties “On Board” 
 
Not long after the conception of his idea, and especially after running the first pilot, 
Milgram had discovered an effective way to get most subjects to complete his basic 
experimental paradigm.  He convinced subjects by providing them with a 
rationale/ideology that, via moral inversion, condoned/legitimated the infliction of harm (a 
scientific study exploring the impact of punishment on learning).  He then tempted them 
into participating by appealing to their needs and/or desires (by tapping into the common 
desire to avoid having to engage in a confrontation with the experimenter).  However, the 
conversion of his idea from a rudimentary pilot study into a professional research 
programme was a large undertaking, necessitating his drawing upon the aid and expertise 
of many others.  He required a significant research grant, professional laboratory facilities, 
a range of technical experts, technical equipment, and the hiring and management of 
research assistants, actors, and administrative personnel.  If such an undertaking were not 
difficult enough, with the innocent subjects placed under immense stress, there was also a 
significant risk that at least some of the above individuals and groups might deem the 
experiments unethical and refuse to fulfil their role/s.  To ensure that all remained 
committed to the experiment, as he did with the subjects Milgram needed to alleviate any 
such concerns should they arise.   
 
Milgram drew in and eased the concerns of the following essential individuals and 
groups: (1) Milgram himself; (2) the NSF funding agency; (3) Milgram’s employer and 
provider of facilities, Yale University; (4) Milgram’s subordinate employees, specifically 
John Williams (experimenter) and James McDonough (learner).  Much as he did with the 
subjects, Milgram convinced and/or tempted all of them into fulfilling their necessary yet 
frequently harmful contributions.  Many of these human links in the bureaucratic chain 
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encountered moral dilemmas of their own because, just like the subjects, their participation 
also required them to inflict harm.  To resolve these dilemmas, it can be argued they were 
also influenced by certain Binding Factors (BFs), and drew upon various supplied and/or 
self-invented Strain Reducing Mechanisms (SRMs). 
 
 
9.2.1 Project Manager: Stanley Milgram 
 
The first person Milgram needed to draw in was, in fact, himself.  He pursued his 
idea probably because of a suspicion that the basic idea fitted both his ambition to pursue, 
as Blass earlier argued, a “phenomenon of great consequence”, and because from the first 
pilot he sensed he had tapped into something which helped to explain the Holocaust.  On 
the downside, having observed the pilots, Milgram knew subjects would experience 
intense stress.  However, he firmly believed that the experimental procedure was harmless 
(Meyer, 1970, p. 132).  Consequently, from start to finish, Milgram never publicly 
expressed any ethical or moral reservations regarding his own research programme.  For 
Milgram, the rationale/ideology that legitimated the infliction of harm seems to have been 
the contradictory belief that the experiments were actually harmless.  After observing the 
first pilot study, Milgram was sufficiently convinced and tempted into pursuing the idea to 
its eventual conclusion because (at least outwardly) he believed the seemingly negative 
effects to be benign (SRM) and potential implications on understanding the Holocaust 
immense (BF).  
 
 
9.2.2 Funding Agency: NSF 
 
As conveyed in their motto “where discoveries begin”,129 the NSF’s core 
organisational objective has long been to fund potentially innovative research (BF).  In his 
second research proposal, Milgram used keywords and phrases that probably caught their 
attention.  His idea was “a relatively unexplored domain of social behavior”, where the 
“Pilot studies . . . yielded unexpected results of considerable interest” that observers 
apparently found “startling” (SMP, Box 45, Folder 160 Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”).  The 
NSF panel was clearly impressed, describing the idea as “a bold experiment on an 
important and fundamental social phenomenon” (Blass, 2004, p. 72).  That the NSF 
committee sensed the potential significance of Milgram’s idea to perhaps shed new light 
                                                 
129
 Retrieved October, 2008, from: http://transcoder.usablenet.com/tt/www.nsf.gov/about/glance.jsp 
 170 
on how something like the Holocaust could occur, added greatly to their willingness to  
 
fund the project.130    
 
However, early on there was one major hurdle to be overcome: the NSF was 
repeatedly concerned about subject safety.  The NSF was so nervous about this issue that 
before deciding to become formally involved, they visited Milgram at Yale University.  
The NSF’s moral dilemma of whether or not to fund this potentially unethical study was 
largely resolved by Milgram’s strain-resolving assurances that no subjects would be 
harmed (Blass, 2004, p. 71) and that all would receive a thorough debriefing (SRM).131  
The NSF was convinced by the rationale/ideology that the experiments were harmless 
(SRM), which allowed them to condone the infliction of harm on people.  In the end the 
NSF appears to have felt that, in terms of subject safety, it had done all it could, that is, 
short of refusing to fund the project.  Thus, the NSF decided to financially support 
Milgram. 
 
 
9.2.3 Facilities: Yale University  
 
Yale University—Milgram’s provider of laboratory facilities, and his employer—is 
a research-based institution whose reputation had long been dependent on the continued 
production of new knowledge (BF).  This commitment to the production of new 
knowledge probably tempted Yale into supporting their employee’s experimental 
endeavors.  Milgram told Herbert Winer (a subject in the experiment and, at the time, also 
an assistant professor at Yale), that the OTA “proposal had been approved at the level of 
the president’s office, and that a lot of people knew about it, and they all felt that the 
objective justified whatever [the] risks [italics original]” (Blass, 2004, p. 117).  If Milgram 
was telling the truth, Yale saw no dilemma and, with the NSF eager to generously fund a 
project it described as “bold” and “fundamental”, the university seems to have had no 
doubts about backing Milgram’s proposal. 
 
 
 
                                                 
130
 Milgram candidly expressed this apparent connection in early correspondence with NSF committee head 
Henry Riecken (Blass, 2004, p. 100). 
 
131
 See SMP, Box 45, Folder 160, Titled: “Grants 1961-1967”.   
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9.2.4 Milgram’s Key Subordinates: John Williams (Experimenter) and James 
McDonough (Learner) 
 
Methodologically, the OTA experiments required that the same learner and 
experimenter be used throughout, lest their premature departure result in replacements 
introducing potentially confounding variables to the programme (SMP, Box 43, Folder 
128, Titled: “Correspondence 1962”).132  Milgram needed to retain McDonough and 
Williams until the end.  However, unlike the other more remote contributors, the 
experimenter and learner were proximately involved in the infliction of intense stress upon 
an innocent person, therefore rendering their own tasks inherently stressful.  The 
experimenter and learner were at greatest risk of refusing to participate or, at any stage 
during the programme, resigning.  This was particularly so for the experimenter, who was 
employed to hound subjects into inflicting further shocks on the learner (occasionally 
resulting in him being threatened with violence133).  Securing the long-term participation of 
these two key members was obviously going to be more difficult than for the above, more 
remote, groups.   
 
Milgram’s recruitment strategy for the front-line experimenter position was 
initiated on 26 July 1961, when the following advertisement ran over several days in the 
New Haven Register:  
 
ASSISTANT IN RESEARCH to supervise physcological [sic] experiments 
concerning memory and learning process.  Age requirement 30 to 50 years., [sic] 
college education preferred but not necessary, evening hours and-or weekends—
ideal for school teacher seeking additional employment.  Please apply at Yale 
University personnel office, 143 Elm St., New Haven. m-S (SMP, Box 46, Folder 
163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”).   
 
This strategy was similar to the one Milgram used to attract subjects: an offer to earn extra 
income under the pretense of participating in experiments concerning “memory and 
learning”.134  Milgram attracted his ideal person for the “experimenter” role: John 
Williams was a high school teacher presumably interested in additional employment (to 
                                                 
132
 The exception to this was obviously the Change of Personnel variation, in which Milgram tried to 
determine the power of his usual experimenter/learner team. 
 
133
 One subject later asked Williams: “Has anyone ever physically attacked you?”  Williams responded: 
“Once or twice” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2430). 
 
134
 Milgram could hardly have said in the local newspaper what his experiments were actually about.  The 
first four lines in Milgram’s (1974, p. 15) advertisement to attract subjects were: “Public Announcement  WE 
WILL PAY YOU $4.00 FOR ONE HOUR OF YOUR TIME  Persons Needed for a Study of Memory  *We 
will pay five hundred New Haven men to help us complete a scientific study of memory and learning.”   
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supplement his income).   
 
Milgram’s strong desire to select staff likely to remain until the end of the project 
was reflected in the notes he took during his interview with James McDonough, the person 
chosen to fulfil the learner role.  Milgram noted that McDonough had worked loyally for 
the “Railroad [for] 25 years and is completely reliable”, was “willing to work for 1 year” 
and, because he “has 8 Children”, even if the job was not really about “memory and 
learning”, he would presumably be desperate for the extra income (BF), and unlikely to 
leave.135   
 
After getting their foot-in-the-door into the Yale University personnel office (as the 
ad literally instructed) (BF), Milgram would soon after have to disclose to Williams and 
McDonough what the experiments actually entailed and what was required of them, 
respectively.  Although McDonough’s part was obviously quite taxing, the entire 
experimental programme hinged on the willingness of Williams to repeatedly perform his 
role.   
 
Although Milgram’s immediate research team was well aware subjects would find 
the experiments highly stressful—“we know a man is being made upset” (SMP, Box 46, 
Folder 163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”)—after observing some of the pilot 
runs, they may have been convinced by the experimental programme’s potential 
significance.  As Williams explained to one subject during the post-experimental debrief:  
 
we had to . . . set you up this way so to speak because . . . we want you to really 
think . . . you’re really paining this guy . . . but we feel that the results from the 
experiments will be ahhrr very important and actually be of tremendous value 
(SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2304). 
 
For Williams, the infliction of intense stress had been morally inverted into something 
much more positive.  Williams’ post-experimental justification reflects the 
rationale/ideology condoning the infliction of harm that Milgram instilled into his research 
team: “We don’t like to fool you this way but ahhrr it must be done” (SRM) (SMP, Box 
153, Audiotape #2433).  Milgram believed the research had to be carried out because, 
under the legitimating ideological banner of scientific inquiry, the programme was 
uncovering insights into the “disease” of “destructive obedience”.  Dannie Abse (1973, p. 
29) well captured how Williams could treat subjects so callously: “in order to demonstrate 
                                                 
135
 Hornstein’s (1986) “results show that managers who have children (and who therefore bear the heavy 
financial burdens associated with childrearing) are particularly unlikely to challenge their superiors on any 
issue” (Brief et al., 1995, p. 181). 
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that subjects may behave like so many Eichmanns the experimenter had to act the part, to 
some extent, of a Himmler.”  Milgram had unwittingly provided his research team with a 
slightly different “acceptable rationale” with which to legitimate the infliction of harm on 
an innocent other.   
 
But Milgram was aware that providing McDonough and especially Williams with a 
convincing rationale/ideology would probably, on its own, prove insufficient in securing 
their committed participation.  He needed to repeatedly bolster this rationale/ideology by 
appealing to their specific needs and/or desires.  Milgram suspected pecuniary reward 
would prove most effective in securing their long-term loyalty.  As he explained in a letter 
dated 14 February 1962 to the NSF in an eventually successful request for further funding: 
 
Why supplemental support just now?  Additional support is needed immediately to 
preserve the continuity of research.  A tightly organized experimental team has 
been functioning effectively since August, 1961 . . . . It would not be possible to 
hold this able group of workers together unless the work and salary payments were 
continuous (SMP, Box 43, Folder 128, Titled: “Correspondence 1962”). 
 
Milgram could maintain his research team by providing them with regular income (BF), 
and repeatedly raising the hourly rate would only increase this BF’s effectiveness.  Two 
weeks after sending the above letter, on 1 March 1962, Milgram offered Williams and 
McDonough their third successive pay increase in eight months.136  Yet Milgram had other 
strategies of financial reward to better ensure the unquestioning loyalty of his immediate 
research team.  Upon completing the research programme, Milgram offered McDonough 
and Williams the option of an immediate one-off $100 cash bonus, or an eventual two 
percent cut in the American book royalties (both accepted the more immediate bonus) 
(SMP, Box 43, Folder 128, Titled: “Correspondence 1962”).  But because the role of 
Williams was by far the most stressful and dangerous, Milgram had to go further.  Two 
months before the end of the data-collection phase (and heading into the particularly 
unethical and predictably highly stressful Relationship variation) Milgram awarded 
Williams (a temporary part-time casual worker) full-time Yale University employee 
benefits.137 
                                                 
136
 Williams hourly rate in September 1961 was $2, by November 1961 it was $2.20, and by March 1962 it 
had risen to $2.40.  McDonough’s hourly rate in September 1961 was $1.75 by November 1961 it was $2.00, 
and by March 1962 it had risen to $2.25 (SMP, Box 43, Folder 127, Titled: “Correspondence 1961”; SMP, 
Box 43, Folder 128, Titled: “Correspondence 1962”). 
 
137
 “March, 31, 1962 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that Mr. John Williams, residing at 
Route 6, Southbury, Connecticut, is a full-time employee at Yale University, and is entitled to the relevant 
employee benefits . . . . Yours truly, Stanley Milgram Assistant Professor” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 128, Titled: 
“Correspondence 1962”). 
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In sum, it would seem the key to Milgram implicating himself, the NSF, Yale 
University, McDonough, Williams (and in all probability, every other person involved not 
mentioned here), came by way of the provision of a sometimes different yet convincing 
rationale/ideology that legitimated the infliction of harm (the belief that the experiments 
were harmless and/or important).  This rationale/ideology was bolstered by his appealing 
to each of his team’s often different needs and/or desires.  Thus, to secure the acquiescence 
of each individual and group in fulfilling their role would seem to have had much to do 
with Milgram predicting then applying what he suspected might be the most successful 
motivational formula.  Upon agreeing to participate, there quickly followed a string of 
cementing BFs and many supplied or self-invented SRMs.  Regardless of the content of 
these BFs and SRMs, the individual contributions which followed all moved in the same 
direction—participation in the infliction of harm.  Although all the above individuals and 
groups, in some way gained from participation, they came to believe the experimental 
results would be of “tremendous value” and, despite any evidence to the contrary, they 
were told and/or believed the procedure to be harmless.  Although subjects also arguably 
benefited from participation (avoiding the burden of engaging in a confrontation), they too 
could feel justified in contributing to science (and, as they too were told, doing so was 
apparently harmless).  There existed then a common thread connecting the basic thought 
processes of the “obedient” subjects, Williams, McDonough, Yale, the NSF, through to 
even Milgram himself.  That is, via different routes, all had been convinced and/or tempted 
into making their actual or seemingly harmful contributions.138  From this perspective it 
would seem Milgram and his research team had much more in common with the 
“obedient” subjects than they ever might have imagined.   
 
Milgram required the experimenter, learner, and subject all to engage in remarkably 
similar functions.  And best illustrating this point is that, had Williams or McDonough 
expressed any ethical concerns, followed by intentions of resigning, it is not difficult to 
imagine Milgram imploring them to “Please continue”.  To preserve the research 
programme’s methodological strength: “The experiment requires that you continue”; and,  
 
 
                                                 
138
 Milgram’s approach in getting everyone onboard mirrors Breton and Wintrobe’s (1986, p. 909) model of 
bureaucracy whereby, “superiors and subordinates, in effect, trade with each other.  Superiors seek to buy 
‘informal services’—that is, services that cannot be codified in formal documents and that are the result of 
the initiative and enterprise of subordinates—to advance their own ends; in exchange they are willing to 
make ‘informal payments,’ which can include more rapid promotions, better offices, travel and signing 
privileges, use of company car, and so on, all quid pro quos that are not part of formal contracts.” 
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“It is absolutely essential that you continue”.  Concerned about the harm they were 
inflicting, Milgram might have then assured his teacher/learner team that although 
“painful” there would be no “permanent damage, so please go on”.  In fact, with respect to 
the continued provision of funding, facilities and overall management of the experiments, 
Milgram could have used the same line of reasoning with the NSF, Yale, and even himself, 
respectively.  
 
However, upon all of the above individuals and groups making their small but 
necessary contributions, something very subtle took place that was of central importance to 
the manipulative power of the experiments.  Although some subjects were on the brink of 
“nervous collapse” (strongly indicating that the experiments were harmful), Milgram’s 
reassurances to all those involved that the procedure was harmless implied that if any 
subjects were harmed, he would accept all responsibility for their contributions.  Therefore, 
all the others involved may have sensed the existence of an opportunity: they could 
probably continue reaping whatever benefits were associated with participation, and do so 
with impunity.  And although the learner appeared to the subject to eventually have been 
left at least unconscious (rendering the experiments almost certainly harmful), the 
experimenter’s prods that the shocks were not dangerous and implied/explicit acceptance 
of total responsibility conveyed the same message.  That is, the subjects sensed they too 
could continue reaping the rewards for continuing (confrontation avoidance) with 
impunity.  Ironically, upon completion many subjects probably thought the experimenter 
was most responsible, while the experimenter probably thought that Milgram was most 
responsible.  But not actually having directly hurt anyone, perhaps Milgram also did not 
feel totally responsible.  If this was indeed the case, then clearly the person ultimately 
responsible for the seeming or actual infliction of harm was always someone else and the 
person responsible had evaporated.   
 
There exists, however, a good explanation for how it is possible for the person 
responsible to disappear.  In agreeing to participate, all of Milgram’s helpers had 
unwittingly become links in an intrinsically coercive and strain-resolving goal-orientated 
organisational chain of Milgram’s making. 
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9.3 Milgram’s Unwitting Construction of and Dependence Upon the Goal-Orientated 
Organisational Process  
  
Having studied political science as an undergraduate student, Milgram had some 
understanding of the nature of bureaucracy.  In the Peer Administers Shocks condition 
(92.5 percent completion rate), Milgram came to suspect he had captured elements of this 
organisational tool in the controlled laboratory setting.  This condition was where subjects 
were ordered to perform the subsidiary task of directing questions to the learner, while for 
any incorrect answers received, another subject (actually an actor) administered the shocks.  
Those that completed often later explained that they did not believe themselves responsible 
for the learner’s painful experience because, unlike those administering the shocks, they 
did not inflict pain on anyone.  Yet in the first four variations (the Proximity Series), where 
subjects did flick the switches, those who completed were more inclined than defiant 
subjects to shift the blame to either the experimenter or learner (Milgram, 1974, p. 203).  
With its inherent characteristic of the division of labour—“fragmentation of the total 
human act”—and the person seemingly responsible having evaporated, Milgram sensed 
strong parallels between the potentially destructive bureaucratic process and the Peer 
Administers Shock condition.  Generalising beyond the laboratory, Milgram (1974) argued: 
“Perhaps this is the most common characteristic of socially organized evil in modern 
society” (p. 11). 
 
Milgram may have been aware of the coercive power of the potentially destructive 
bureaucratic process.  But he seems to have been completely oblivious to the fact that as he 
co-opted all the parties into participating, behind the subjects lay what had unobtrusively 
grown into a goal-orientated bureaucratic process (that aimed to insure that subjects at the 
last link in the chain inflicted every shock).   
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Figure 17: The OTA research programme’s goal-orientated organisational process. 
 
Fragmentation of the total act may, as Milgram (1974, p. 11) noted, aid modern 
organisational structures by obfuscating personal responsibility in a bureaucratic hierarchy; 
but this observation was equally applicable to every person working within his own 
harmful bureaucratic process.   
 
To show that the displacement/diffusion of responsibility may also have been 
applicable to every functionary involved in the OTA experiments’ bureaucratic process—
from the subject, to Milgram himself, the subordinate staff, and his superiors at Yale and 
the NSF—the following hypothetical scenario may be considered.  What would have 
happened if some ex-subjects, armed with compelling evidence, lodged a civil case against 
all of those involved in the OTA experiments, claiming that in some way they had been 
seriously harmed by having participated?  How might Milgram and all those others 
involved have responded to a thorough investigation with the sole intention of establishing 
who was to be held responsible for the harm inflicted?  Any answer to such a question 
must be speculative.  However, as was the case with most subjects’ responses to Milgram’s 
post-experimental interviews, it is hard to imagine that any of his sponsors/helpers would 
have been eager to claim total responsibility for having seriously harmed the innocent 
subject/s, especially in the face of possible civil action.   
 
It could be argued that Williams and McDonough personally gained from 
participation in the experiments, at the subjects’ expense.  However, if they had been faced 
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with an investigation, they would probably have experienced a strong temptation to argue 
that they were only doing what Assistant Professor Milgram—the expert clearly in 
charge—told them to; that they were “just following orders”.  G. Perry (personal 
communication, August 21, 2008) interviewed the learner’s son Bob McDonough who 
stated: “No one questioned the ethics of it until later saying, you know was it right for him 
[James McDonough] to put people through this?  And everybody said, Nah, it’s Milgram’s 
fault (laughs).”  Later in the interview McDonough’s son said: “I don’t think he questioned 
the ethics of it so much and maybe he was doing what he was told.” 
  
Williams and McDonough could certainly have used obedience as an explanation, 
and what they did largely fitted the description of “obedience”.  But is “obedience” really 
an accurate explanation, or even description, of what they did?  Williams and McDonough 
could point out that they would not have engaged in such actions on their own accord and 
that, as Milgram proclaimed publicly, their employer had assured them that the procedure 
was harmless.  Consequently, one could well imagine the entire research team—
particularly those nearer to the harm-infliction end of the process—pointing an accusatory 
finger of responsibility in Milgram’s direction. 
 
The Yale University president’s office and the NSF panel probably believed that 
their organisations would gain from their close association with the experiments.  
However, a burdensome civil case against them would render any such connection 
unfavourable; so it seems plausible that they too would have argued that Milgram had 
assured them that the experiments were harmless. 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that with the potentially detrimental repercussions of 
a civil case hanging over them, all links in the chain would have felt a strong inclination to 
turn on Milgram—if someone had to be held accountable, why should it be any one of 
them?   
 
Milgram could have faced financial ruin and an abrupt end to his academic career, 
so he too would have been strongly inclined to try and avoid being held culpable for 
having harmed innocent people.  He could have claimed that he should not be held totally 
responsible because he genuinely believed the experiments to be harmless.139  He could 
also have presented a number of other mitigating circumstances.  For example, he might 
                                                 
139
 Although he did so after it was clear that nobody had been hurt, Milgram (1964a, p. 852) stated: “This 
author accepts full responsibility for the design and execution of the study.” 
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have admitted that he had underestimated the dangerousness of the experiments, and that 
the harm inflicted was actually an unforeseen and unfortunate accident.  Milgram could 
even have suggested that he never intended to harm anybody and was only motivated by 
the very best of intentions: to better understand, perhaps even help prevent, a future human 
tragedy like the Holocaust.  Moreover, Milgram might have pointed out that when running 
the experiments he was a lowly assistant professor, in his late twenties.  The implication 
being that the supportive NSF and Yale University deserved some of the blame for letting 
such a person, fresh out of graduate school and totally unsupervised, pursue such a 
potentially controversial project.  In response, one might imagine a defensive NSF and/or 
Yale University retaliating that Milgram was the dominant driving force behind the study.  
Both the NSF and/or Yale could even claim that had they known what Milgram was 
actually doing they would have shut down the OTA research programme.   
 
Milgram could have suggested that the experimenter deserved some of the blame 
because, as if on a personal mission to crack the nerves of subjects, Williams frequently 
deviated from using only the seven prods that Milgram had earlier stipulated (Darley, 
1995, p. 130; Lutsky, 1995, p. 61).  As the following will show, on encountering 
insubordinate subjects Williams often invented his own, far more stressful, responses.  
Williams might have responded to this accusation by pointing out that Milgram never once 
corrected him, thus implying tacit consent.  Milgram could then have pointed out that, 
unlike Williams, he himself never actually hurt anybody, yet was being burdened with 
shouldering all the responsibility. 
 
Had there been such an investigation, and had everyone involved sought to “pass 
the buck” or run for moral cover, perhaps only then would Milgram (1974, p. 11) have 
come to realise the relevance of his words regarding not only the Peer Administers Shock 
condition, but also all those working within his organisational structure:   
 
Thus there is a fragmentation of the total human act; no one man decides to carry 
out the evil act and is confronted with its consequences.  The person who assumes 
full responsibility for the act has evaporated.  Perhaps this is the most common 
characteristic of socially organized evil in modern society.   
 
Nearing the end of the book, Milgram commented on several disconcerting historical 
events with reoccurring administrative themes (with particular reference to the trials of 
Henry Wirz, Adolf Eichmann, and the perpetration of the 1968 My Lai massacre in 
Vietnam).  Although nobody died, Milgram’s (1974, pp. 186-187) comments are still 
applicable to all those who worked within his own organisational structure:  
 180 
 
We find a set of people carrying out their jobs and dominated by an administrative, 
rather than a moral, outlook . . . .  Euphemisms come to dominate language . . . 
guarding the person against the full moral implications of his acts. . . .  
Responsibility invariably shifts upward in the mind of the subordinate . . . . The 
actions are almost always justified in terms of a set of constructive purposes, and 
come to be seen as noble in the light of some high ideological goal . . . . 
psychological adjustments come into play to ease the strain of carrying out immoral 
orders . . . . where social relationships, career aspirations, and technical routines set 
the dominant tone. 
 
Although this scenario is speculative, it does illustrate that had there been such an 
investigation, all involved in the experiments could have generated self-exculpative 
arguments.  It also demonstrates that all those involved were little different from those 
subjects who completed the experiment and then tried to justify their actions by arguing 
that they were not responsible for what they did.   
 
However, there is evidence that some of those people further up the hierarchical 
chain knew much more about the potential for harm than they were publicly willing to 
admit.  Much like the subjects who completed, the intentions of those who converted the 
experiments into a reality may not have been nearly as innocent as they might later have 
suggested.  For example, the NSF which, despite frequently raising concerns about the 
potential for harm, was eventually convinced that Milgram’s procedure was safe.  But just 
in case: “the committee raised the question with their general counsel of who would be 
responsible—the National Science Foundation or Yale—for any negative effects on the 
subjects.  The [NSF] lawyer thought that Yale would be legally responsible” (Blass, 2004, 
p. 71).  Therefore, as it turns out the NSF committee were actually aware of the possibility 
of harm being done to the experimental subjects.  But having sensed they could probably 
make their essential contributions to the process with legal impunity (Yale was 
responsible), they deemed it safe enough to risk the welfare of innocent people.  However, 
if the NSF thought Yale had intentions of shouldering full responsibility for any injurious 
effects on the subjects, they were in for a surprise because, as the last line of the following 
statement from a document dated “October 16, 1961” illustrates, Milgram deemed it 
prudent to incorporate within his experimental procedure a precautionary indemnity clause 
of his own:  
 
A fu ther [sic] small difference in this condition is this: in the 4 earlier conditions 
the payment of the check was so arranged that it was only the naive subject and not 
the victim who received payment and signed the receipt and release.  This was done 
because it was felt that many subjects would use the fact of the victim’s having 
signed the release to justify their own action, and did not want this to happen.  So 
we devised the procedure whereby--after the victim is strapped in the chair the 
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experimenter ‘rmembers’ [sic] the check, but by them [sic] it is too late so that only 
the naive subj ct [sic] can sign therelease [sic].  [The release, of course, was not 
used for experimental purposes, but to protect us against legal claims [italics 
added].] (SMP, Box 46, Folder 163, Titled: “Obedience Notebook 1961-1970”).140 
 
If Milgram genuinely believed his own public statements that the OTA experiments were 
harmless, why then did he feel the need to introduce what appears to have been such a 
patently underhanded legal measure?  In other words, he was either self-deceived or 
deliberately disingenuous.  His actions speak louder than his words: as was the case with 
the NSF, Milgram (perhaps Yale University)141 was clearly aware of the possibility that 
subjects might be harmed.  Having introduced legal protections, and consequently 
believing that his employer (Yale University, therefore himself, and his employees) would 
be legally blameless, perhaps during his quest for dramatic results Milgram also sensed an 
opportunity that he might be able to act with relative if not full impunity?   
 
 So some of those in higher positions of authority, like the NSF, Milgram (and 
perhaps Yale University), definitely knew there was a risk of harm to the 
subjects.  And nor were the lower order functionaries “just following orders”.  Williams, 
for example, as Milgram (1974, pp. 21-22) stated in his monograph, was meant to react to 
the subjects’ resistance with just a handful of clearly specified sequential prods.  Instead, it 
was not unusual for Williams to stray from his prescribed role and invent his own 
vigorously demanding lines (Darley, 1995, p. 130).  For example, so he could stop 
inflicting the shocks, one subject offered to return the $4.50, evoking Williams’ response: 
“The money is not the issue . . . it’s essential that you continue the experiment.”  The 
subject then offered to change places with the learner, eliciting a forthright rejection from 
Williams: “No we can’t do that once we’ve started . . . . You have no other choice Teacher, 
please continue . . . . The next word is ‘rich’ ” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2430).  
Another subject wanted to talk to the learner, upon which the experimenter stipulated: 
“There is to be no contact between the teacher and the learner until the test is over.”  Then, 
as the subject procrastinated, the experimenter barked: “I don’t understand what the 
problem is?” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2322).  The subject explained his concerns 
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 Milgram (1974, p. 64) mentioned a general release form signed by subjects. 
 
141
 Further research may be required to establish if this release was initiated by Milgram or whether it was a 
stipulation upon which Yale’s continued support was contingent.  If Yale officials had initiated this legal 
waiver, they probably believed that it protected the university against any legal culpability.  They therefore 
had to concern themselves only with the potential advantages of being associated with such an innovative 
project.   
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about the possibility of being held responsible for hurting the learner, to which Williams 
responded: “Well I am legally responsible” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2322). 
 
As forceful as Williams could be, he would point out to subjects during the 
debriefing that his actions were not personal—he did not “like to fool” them.  Why then, 
with such purpose, did he treat subjects during the experiments with such callous 
disregard?  Williams may have been influenced by what Friedrich (1946, p. 589) has 
termed the “rule of anticipated reactions”, which according to Brief et al. (1995, p. 180): 
 
implies subordinates may, and are expected to, ask themselves, ‘How would my 
superior wish me to behave under these circumstances?’  Thus, the implementation 
of authority does not necessarily require that a command be uttered; rather, the 
‘order’ may be implicit. 
 
About as close as the OTA experiments ever got to Orne and Holland’s (1968) demand 
characteristics, was when Williams anticipated what his employer desired: maximisation 
of the completion rate.142  Cognizant from the start of the ultimate goal, Williams 
frequently displayed great feats of bottom-up innovation in the invention of progressively 
more coercive (stressful?) prods in trying to bring about what he sensed his boss desired.  
For example, in one of the experimenter/teacher exchanges presented in Chapter Seven, a 
rather sceptical subject suspected that his friend/learner in the Relationship condition was 
not actually being shocked.  Although on this occasion his attempts to ensure that this 
subject completed the experiment failed, Williams’ response is an excellent illustration of 
just how shrewd he could be in parrying a subject’s attempt to break free:  
 
Teacher: “I don’t believe you were giving him the shock . . . ” 
 
   Experimenter:     “Well if you don’t believe that he’s getting the shocks, why don’t 
you just continue with the test and we’ll finish it?” (SMP, Box 153, 
Audiotape #2439).   
 
The regularity with which Williams strayed from his script suggests that Milgram never 
attempted to correct him, and therefore probably approved of Williams’ actions.  In any 
case, if Williams had kept faithfully to Milgram’s seven prescribed prods, it would have 
been impossible during the experiments to convincingly answer the subjects’ wide variety 
of unpredictable questions.     
 
                                                 
142
 As Darley (1995, pp. 130-131) has argued: “The experimenter’s answers to the teacher’s queries reveal 
that the experimenter had defined his role as doing whatever was necessary to get the teacher to continue 
giving the shocks [italics original].”  
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Williams’ tenacity in precluding the subjects’ escape was probably due to him 
trying to secure his employer’s desire (while both knowing he could act with impunity and 
that he would be rewarded for doing so).  Had anyone been harmed, it would no longer 
have been in Williams’ interests to mention to investigators his creative yet highly stressful 
innovations.143  Although it would have been far from the truth, Williams too may have 
found comfort in the rationalisation that he was “just following orders”. 
 
If Milgram knew from the first official condition (at least) that subjects might be 
harmed, but remained determined to complete the experimental programme, how 
throughout the data-collection stage was he able to continue with a clear conscience?  It 
could be argued that he did so by traveling a similar road to that taken by his obedient 
subjects, under the influence of certain BFs, while using various SRMs. 
 
 
9.4 “An Experimenter’s Dilemma” 
 
According to Blass (2004, p. 117), Milgram’s private memos and diary notes 
“reveal that, at least early on, he was doing some painful soul-searching” and that “These 
notes provide a window into the workings of Milgram’s mind, sometimes revealing inner 
conflicts that are not visible in his published writings or public statements [italics 
added].”144  The intensity of these conflicts would have been strengthened by the fact that 
not only did he continue with the potentially harmful experiments, but he was also well 
aware of his central manipulative role in manufacturing his “obedient” subjects’ immoral 
actions.  In an undated document titled “An Experimenter’s Dilemma” Milgram (as cited 
in Blass, 2004, pp. 117, 320) conceded: “it is not nice to lure people into the laboratory and 
ensnare them into a situation that is stressful and unpleasant to them.”  He knew this was 
indisputably his “experiment that forces the subject into a moral choice and marshals 
powerful forces against his making the right choice” (Blass, 2004, p. 118).  Closing down 
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 Even had Williams argued that Milgram had pressured him into remaining in the research programme it 
would probably have failed to impress investigators because one of the other actors hired had managed to 
quit, for ethical reasons.  G. Perry (personal communication, August 21, 2008) stated that during her phone 
interview with the son of Robert J. Tracy (the learner in the Change of Personnel condition), his father 
apparently withdrew from the experimental programme “after one of his mates from the army fronted as a 
volunteer and BT couldn’t do it to someone who’d been through the war.”  Tracy’s son was “kind of proud 
of” his father’s recalcitrance (G. Perry, personal communication, August 25, 2008).  Although the rest of the 
research team (including Tracy’s co-actor Emil Elges) is mentioned in the acknowledgements in Milgram’s 
(1974, pp. xv-xvi) book, Tracy’s name is conspicuously absent. 
    
144
 It is also important to point out that Milgram’s inner conflict did not revolve solely around his awareness 
that subjects might be harmed.  Another dilemma he faced was that his research might be used for malevolent 
purposes (see SMP, Box 46, Folder 173, Titled: “Notes: Ethics 1962-1966”). 
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the research programme would not have been an easy decision.  It would seem the further 
the curious Milgram ventured, the more he got entangled within his own “web of forces” 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 30).   
 
Much like the BF of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon, the more incremental steps 
he made in making the official experimental programme a reality—running the first pilot, 
obtaining surprising results, capturing the intrigue of his academic peers at Yale, obtaining 
funding—the harder it became to pull out.  Enhancing such feelings of entrapment was, for 
example, Milgram’s acceptance of the NSF research grant, because any sudden decision to 
prematurely end the programme would require that he renege on his contractual obligation 
to complete the project (which may have precluded him from winning any future grants) 
(BF).  On top of all this, should the experiments have turned out to be as significant as he 
suspected, in the “publish or perish” environment of the American tertiary education 
system (BF), for the sake of his academic career could he afford not to run them?  
Whatever the answer, and again reminiscent of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon, the 
further Milgram ventured the more daring his experimental variations became.  For 
example, Milgram’s relatively benign first official Remote condition (where the learner 
banged on the wall a few times), became the fifth Baseline condition (learner with a heart 
condition eventually faints), which in turn became the indisputably unethical twenty-fourth 
Relationship condition (subject brought an acquaintance who eventually faints).145  How 
did Milgram reconcile the likelihood that as his experiments became more daring 
(unethical?), so did the possibility of subjects being harmed?   
 
As Milgram’s experimental programme became both more daring and, for subjects, 
more dangerous, he drew upon a wide variety of SRMs in seeking to resolve his 
intensifying moral dilemma.  For example, in January 1962 Milgram wondered if 
participation may have been beneficial: “Can the subject derive some benefit --moral 
benefit from his participation?  Does it have some educative value[?]” (SRM) (SMP, Box 
46, Folder 165, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-1962”; see also Schuler, 1982, p. 61).  
Another potential SRM that Milgram seems to have relied upon was that of blaming the 
victim—the so-called Just World Phenomenon (Lerner, 1980).  In Chapter Five of this 
thesis a quote from a letter to Elms regarding his role as “Solicitor General” was presented 
in which Milgram stated that his (Elms’) position somewhat resembled that of Eichmann’s: 
                                                 
145
 Furthermore, if Milgram had decided to close the research programme down at any stage he would have 
had to concede that all his earlier trials had also been unethical, and that he was personally responsible for 
going as far as he had.   However, by preferring to believe that the experiments were harmless (and that he 
could therefore act with virtual impunity) he was able to continue them.   
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“but you at least should have no misconceptions of what we do with our daily quota.  We 
give them a chance to resist the commands of malevolent authority and assert their alliance 
with morality” (SMP, Box 43, Folder 127, Titled: “Correspondence 1961”).  Therefore, 
subjects were given the chance to ease their self-imposed discomfort by extricating 
themselves from the experiment.  Milgram’s conscience probably found comfort by the 
fact that those who subjected themselves to a prolonged state of near nervous collapse had 
only themselves to blame.  Although Milgram never really explored, but was aware of, the 
potentially strain-resolving power of “Euphemistic Labeling” (Bandura, 1999, p. 195), it 
did not preclude his own use of this SRM: 
 
In writings both published and unpublished, he objected to the use of the word 
‘deception’ to refer to experiments that used cover stories or other kinds of 
misinformation, because he felt it was a value-laden term whose use prevented an 
objective discussion of the ethics of that type of method.  He preferred instead 
terms such as ‘staging’ or ‘technical illusion’ (Blass, 2004, p. 128). 
 
Another example was his description of extreme stress as “momentary excitement” 
(Milgram, 1964a, p. 849).  Relative to the wording of Milgram’s (1963, p. 377) first 
article, where within 20 minutes an initially confident businessman was described as 
having been “reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck . . . rapidly approaching . . . nervous 
collapse”, this was “a most astonishing about-face” (Patten, 1977b, p. 356). 
 
 There were points during the data-collection stage where, despite Milgram’s 
unwavering public statements defending the ethical status of the experiment, he privately 
conceded they were unethical.  In a document titled “OBEDIENCE ETHICS OF 
EXPERIMENTATION” dated January 1962:  
 
Several of these experiments, it seems to me, are just about on the borderline of 
what ethically can and cannot be done with human subjects.  Some critics may feel 
that at times they go beyond acceptable limits.  These are matters that only the 
community can decide on, and if a ballot were held I am not altogether certain 
which way I would cast my vote.  An important distinction is to be drawn between 
the situation as the subject sees it, and the situation as it actually is.  It does, indeed, 
seem horrible when a man with a heart condition pleads to be let out of an electric 
chair, and the experimenter refuses.  This would surely be unethical and, to my way 
of seeing it immoral (SMP, Box 46, Folder 165, Titled: “Notes general, 1961-
1962”).146   
 
So Milgram conceded that the experiments were unethical, yet by completing them he had 
in fact cast his own “vote”.  After he had collected all his data, however, Milgram seems to 
have had regrets:   
                                                 
146
 Also see Footnote 37. 
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Moreover, considered as a personal motive of the author --the possible benefits that 
might redound to humanity --withered to insignificance alonisde [sic] the strident 
demands of intellectual curiosity.  When an investigator keeps his eyes open 
throughout a [scientific] study, he learns things about himself as well as about his 
subjects, and the observations do not always flatter (SMP, Box 46, Folder 173, 
Titled: “Notes: Ethics 1962-1966”). 
 
Despite Milgram’s frequently disparaging and prejudicial remarks about his obedient 
subjects (Bartov, 2003, pp. 182-191), he himself had acted wrongly and had sensed that he 
had more in common with them than he might originally have wanted to believe.   
 
Ironically, Milgram’s conscience was probably appeased by his belief that he was 
discovering things about the Holocaust and the apparent “disease” of “destructive 
obedience” (SRM).  So he perhaps felt that he had little choice in inflicting potentially 
harmful levels of stress because, as argued by Miller (2004, p. 211): “the apparent 
infliction of pain in the obedience research . . . added to the validity of the Holocaust 
analogy, in terms of the pain (and, of course, far worse fates) experienced by Holocaust 
victims.”    
 
With time his personal doubts progressively receded, and like Elinor Rosenblum, 
who seemed to soothe her guilty conscience by pushing the switch down very lightly (i.e. 
doing something to “help” the learner that actually did nothing other than act as a balm to 
her own guilty conscience), the most Milgram was willing to do was to vow never again to 
engage in similar research.  As he stated: “while what has been done cannot be undone, 
one can at least resolve not to repeat the performance.  There and then I decide, as a purely 
personal matter, not to do another experiment that requires illusion, or ensnarement” 
(SRM) (Blass, 2004, pp. 117-118).  Soon after the publication of his first and most 
(in)famous OTA article in 1963, Milgram left Yale to take up a position at Harvard 
University.147  Before long, “Milgram’s self-doubts evaporated—no more angst-filled self-
directed notes appear” just “statements and writings contain[ing] uniformly self-confident 
affirmations and strong arguments defending the ethics of the experiments” (Blass, 2004, 
p. 118).  As Milgram (1964a, p. 852) said at this time: “Some people may feel it should not 
have been done. I disagree and accept the burden of their judgment.”  It could be argued 
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 Even those outside the OTA’s organisational structure sensed opportunities minus the responsibility.  As 
Harvard University’s Gordon Allport noted at the time, there was a risk that concerns about the ethics of the 
OTA experiments could result in the sullying of Yale University’s good name.  With Yale responsible for 
having allowed Milgram to pursue his idea, Allport also sensed an opportunity: “WHILE MILGRAM WAS 
at Yale, Allport had told his colleague Roger Brown, in a slightly conspirational manner: ‘I’m rather glad 
he’s doing these experiments in New Haven [Yale], but we’ll hire him as soon as he finishes’ ” (Blass, 2004, 
p. 131). 
 
 187 
that this response was akin to that of his obedient subjects: “ ‘No one,’ says Milgram, ‘who 
got within five shocks of the end ever broke off.  By that point, he had resolved the 
conflict’ ” (Meyer, 1970, p. 132).   
 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
 
In converting his inchoate research idea into reality, Milgram had to draw upon the 
sponsorship, labour and expertise of many others.  He provided them with a sometimes 
different rationale/ideology to that supplied to subjects.  Via moral inversion, this 
condoned the infliction of harm and/or tempted them into participating by appealing to 
their different needs and/or desires.  However, as Milgram drew people into performing 
their specialist roles/tasks, he also unwittingly constructed a powerful organisational tool: 
the potentially destructive bureaucratic process.  The bureaucratic process is a forceful tool 
in the achievement of malevolent goals, largely because the process leading to such ends is 
divided amongst specialists who need only engage in smaller parts of the whole process.  
Because other “probably” more responsible links in the bureaucratic chain were involved, 
all came to sense they could not be held responsible for making their necessary 
contributions.  As each link in the chain made their small but important contributions, 
responsibility for both the actual and the seeming infliction of harm was displaced to and 
eventually diffused across all participants. 
 
Consequently, no one person felt and/or appeared to others present fully 
responsible for the actual/seemingly harmful outcome/s.  Thus, all came to suspect that 
they could continue to reap whatever personal benefits were associated with participation, 
and that they could do so with virtual if not full impunity.  Indeed, it could be argued that 
because of the bureaucratic process, the person ultimately responsible had disappeared.  
Arendt (1970, p. 38) termed this the “rule by Nobody” where bureaucracy makes it 
“impossible to localize responsibility and to identify the enemy.”148  Or, as Bandura (1999, 
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 In his classic novel, The Grapes of Wrath, John Steinbeck (1993, pp. 47-48) captures the essence of 
diffuse responsibility in an exchange between the dispossessed tenant farmer and the tractor driver who had 
been ordered to destroy the farm buildings:  “ ‘You even come too close and I’ll pot you like a rabbit.’  ‘It’s 
not me. . . .  There’s nothing I can do.  I’ll lose my job if I don’t do it. . . .  You’re not killing the right guy.’  
‘That’s so,’ the tenant said.  ‘Who gave you orders?  I’ll go after him.  He’s the one to kill.’  ‘You’re wrong. 
He got his orders from the bank. . . .  ‘Well, there’s a president of the bank.  There’s a board of directors.  I’ll 
fill up the magazine of the rifle and go into the bank.’  The driver said: ‘Fellow was telling me the bank gets 
orders from the east.  The orders were: ‘Make the land show profit or we’ll close you up.’ ’  ‘But where does 
it stop?  Who can we shoot?  I don’t aim to starve to death before I kill the man that’s starving me.’  ‘I don’t 
know.  Maybe there’s nobody to shoot. . . .  Anyway I told you my orders.’ ” 
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p. 206) put it: “The triumph of evil requires a lot of good people doing a bit of it in a 
morally disengaged way with indifference to the human suffering they collectively cause.”  
The eventual diffusion of responsibility, in conjunction with a means of inflicting harm 
inherently low in perceptual stimulation (itself capable of reducing feelings/the appearance 
of being responsible), were essential in generating the high completion rates.  As many 
subjects later pointed out, they would not have engaged in such actions on their own 
accord because doing so in the absence of the others would have rendered them solely 
responsible.  They therefore allowed the strain-resolving diffusion of responsibility, and 
the role of the shock generator, to determine their actions.   
 
On a small scale—a microcosm— Milgram’s unwitting construction, then use, of 
the goal-orientated bureaucratic process strongly aided the displacement and diffusion of 
each participant’s personal feelings and/or their appearance of responsibility—the NSF, 
Yale, Milgram, his employees, and even the subjects of the experiment.149  This blanket 
perception of not feeling and/or appearing responsible saw their thought processes merge.  
None personally believed that they were responsible for the end result.  They individually 
continued to participate, thereby contributing to the “organizational” goal of maximising 
the completion rate.  
    
The following quote, although originally directed mostly at subjects, is equally 
applicable to all those involved in making the experiments work: 
 
Carrying out the evil may even have been something they disliked doing while they 
did it.  For all these reasons, it was easy . . . to feel so innocent, so lacking in 
responsibility for the evil they performed.  But feelings aside, they were 
responsible . . . because in these cases the question of intent is irrelevant to the 
question of responsibility.  No matter how much the evil . . . felt accidental, it was 
not . . . . We may feel responsible only for what we intend; we are responsible for 
all that we do.  And we know it.  Because our feelings of responsibility are 
grounded in our intentions, and bureaucracies arrange that everyone need only 
intend to follow the rules, the result is that bureaucracies have a genius for 
organizing evil (Sabini & Silver, 1982, pp. 65-66).    
 
The potentially destructive bureaucratic process has a genius for organising evil because 
those deploying such means are able to get operatives to act as if they were in the SAD 
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 For example, the fact that other more prominent figures such as Milgram and Yale University had earlier 
agreed to undertake this experiment may have encouraged subjects at the end of the bureaucratic chain to 
continue inflicting shocks, because they believed that if blame were apportioned, it would be laid at the feet 
of those further up the hierarchy.  The experimenter probably suspected that Milgram was actually 
responsible for the infliction of intense stress on the subject.  As pointed out, Milgram arguably did “blame 
the victim”, by holding the obedient subjects (his focal point) responsible for their own stressful experience, 
because they did not stop the experiment.   
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(where, for self-interested reasons, people conceal their awareness of harm-infliction 
internally, via self-deception, and/or externally, via attempts to deceive others present).  
Milgram (and perhaps other central figures) were effectively able to play mind-games with 
themselves and others around them, which involved inner conflicts, coercive BFs, and the 
use of supplied and self-invented SRMs, while continuing to contribute to the goal-
orientated bureaucratic process. 
 
There are a number of elements of bureaucracy which collectively tend to enhance 
individual “psychopathology” (Gregory, 1995, p. 17), and are reflected in the OTA 
experiments:  
 
1. Moral inversion: the conversion of something evil into something good (Adams & 
Balfour, 1998, p. xx): a scientific experiment exploring the effects of punishment 
on learning (not the infliction of torture). 
 
2. Division of labour: small cogs in a “machine” following seemingly disjointed 
operational procedures (Arendt, 1963; Gerth & Mills, 1974; Hilberg, 1961). 
 
3. Separation from the consequences of one’s actions (Milgram, 1974, pp. 32-39), 
made possible by technology—the shock generator (Russell & Gregory, 2005, pp. 
333-334). 
 
4. Impersonality—the subject was referred to as the “Teacher” and Mr Wallace as the 
“Learner” (Gregory, 1995). 
 
5. Reification of roles: “The experiment requires that you continue [italics added]” 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 21). 
   
6. Use of euphemistic language (Bandura, 1999, p. 195): the experiments did not 
involve “deception”, it was a “technical illusion”. 
 
7. Careerism where to get along one must go along (Friedlander, 1998, p. 246, as 
cited in Waller, 2002, p. 254; Gregory, 1995). 
 
8. Organisational culture, mind-sets, and ideology—the so-called value of “science”. 
 
 
The arguments presented in the previous chapters suggest the following strategy 
may be fruitful in shedding new light on the fifth and final question of this thesis: how 
during the Holocaust were ordinary and mostly moderately anti-Semitic Germans so 
quickly converted into willing executioners?  First, delineate the Nazi regime’s 
construction and promulgation of the rationale/ideology that enabled so many ordinary 
Germans to condone (morally invert) the infliction of harm on Jews and others.  Secondly, 
pay particular attention to the application of intuition, previous experience and the ad hoc 
trial and error process in the evolution of the most powerful SRM—the means of 
 190 
inflicting harm—in conjunction with some of the other particularly powerful SRMs and 
BFs accompanying it (like those inherent in the bureaucratic process, such as the 
displacement/diffusion of responsibility).  The means of inflicting harm when extremely 
low in perceptual stimulation could allow seemingly trivial/self-centered concerns to 
dominate the centre of a subject’s emotional universe—such as fear of a confrontation, 
peer-pressure, and perhaps even the fear of potentially having to return their $4.50.  
Perhaps similar processes were at work in Nazi Germany?  With a central focus on the 
most powerful SRM of the means of inflicting harm, Chapters Ten and Eleven will briefly 
outline the Nazi regime’s journey of discovery to achieve their admittedly tentatively 
comparable end to ensure most ordinary people at the end of their destructive bureaucratic 
process killed other human beings.
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Chapter Ten: The “Twisted Road” to Babi Yar 
 
 
What they were being asked to accomplish was at the time totally unprecedented.  At this stage 
every step was uncharted, every policy an experiment, every action a trial run—Browning (1995, p. 
113). 
 
 
The preceding chapters have outlined how Milgram developed and implemented 
his initial quest to maximise ordinary people’s participation in his experiment to inflict 
potentially lethal shocks on another human being.  The aim of the following two chapters 
is to show that in their attempts to maximise the participation of ordinary Germans in the 
extermination of the Jews, the Nazis traveled a somewhat similar journey.  Two case 
studies will be presented involving different techniques used by the Nazi regime in its 
attempt to exterminate the European Jews.  The first, in this chapter, will address the 
evolving mass-shooting technique deployed during Operation Barbarossa—the Nazi 
regime’s 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union.  The second case study, explored in Chapter 
Eleven, is also from 1941, and explores the invention, evolution and implementation of the 
mass-gassing technique used during Operation Reinhard—the extermination of the Polish 
and other Jews.  The mutual overlap in journeys between Milgram and the Nazis in making 
the seemingly undoable doable includes the following:  
 
1. The central importance of the means of inflicting harm chosen to hurt others 
(whereby the less perceptual stimulation, experienced by the ordinary inflictors of 
harm, the easier it became to convince and/or tempt them into using these devices). 
 
2. The presence of intuition and/or previous experience in the selection or invention 
of the means of inflicting harm, and dependence upon the ad hoc trial and error 
“exploratory” method of discovery in the gradual refinement of its use (also 
applicable to the harming process in general). 
 
3. The increasing bureaucratisation of the initially rudimentary/experimental harming 
process.   
 
This chapter pays only brief attention to the significant events in German history preceding 
1941.  What is of particular interest is the question of how, upon agreeing with or feeling 
indifferent toward the Nazi regime’s intention to exterminate the Jews, over time 
moderately anti-Semitic Germans became willing executioners of Jews.   
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10.1 The Nazi’s “Jewish Problem”: An Overview of Events Leading up to 1941 
    
In 1933 the National Socialist—Nazi—party, led by Adolf Hitler was voted into 
office by the German electorate.  The Nazi regime: 
 
claimed that there is a biological basis for the diversity of Mankind.  What makes a 
Jew a Jew, a Gypsy a Gypsy, an asocial individual asocial, and the mentally 
abnormal mentally abnormal is in their blood, that is to say in their genes.  All . . . 
are inferior.  There can be no question of equal rights for inferior and superior 
individuals, so, as it is possible that inferior individuals breed more quickly than the 
superior, the inferior must be isolated, sterilized, rejected, and removed, a 
euphemism for killed.  If we do not do this, we make ourselves responsible for the 
ruin of our culture (Müller-Hill, 1988, p. 22). 
 
With total control over state finances, the Nazi regime rapidly came to fund and/or employ 
academics and scientists who were themselves willing to become National Socialists 
(Friedlander, 1995, p. 126).  This contractual arrangement inadvertently increased the 
chances of “scientific” research confirming the regime’s preconceived racist and 
prejudicial stereotypes.  Future employment opportunities dwindled for those academics 
and scientists unwilling to make such an ideological commitment (or who went further and 
challenged the regime’s beliefs), were forced to take their dissenting voices elsewhere (see 
Glass, 1997, p. 65; Glover, 1999, pp. 366, 384; Sereny, 1974, p. 62; Westermann, 2005, p. 
36).  The 1934 law against political libel and slander—the “Heimtückegesetz”—further 
suppressed anti-Nazi criticism (Johnson & Reuband, 2005, p. 347).  The result of such 
policies and laws was a progressive concentration of consenting and the diminishing 
existence of dissenting expert voices.  This process saw, throughout the mid to late 1930s, 
the heightened production of pseudo-scientific research that further reinforced the regime’s 
prejudicial stereotypes.  The Nazi propaganda machine channeled this (mis)information 
into the national educational curriculum (Schleunes, 1970, pp. 107-108), newspaper media, 
various Nazi youth movements, and films, the last of which included frequently subsidised 
screenings with titles such as Jud Süss (Jew Suess) and Der Ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew).  
The relentless deluge of propaganda, in the near absence of any conflicting information, 
over time persuaded many Germans that a society without Jews and other “inferiors” 
would be good for Germany.150  Such propaganda sought to dehumanise the Jews and, at 
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 As Oskar Groening, an office worker at Auschwitz put it: “We were convinced by our worldview that 
there was a great conspiracy of Jewishness against us” (Rees, 2005, pp. 132-133).  Rees (2005, pp. 133-134) 
argues that it was due to this worldview that Groening “carried on working at Auschwitz not just because he 
was ordered to but because, having weighed the evidence put before him, he thought that the extermination 
program was right.”   
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the very least, secured the indifference of the wider German public to their (the Jews’) 
eventual fate (Heim, 2000, p. 320; Kulka, 2000, p. 277).151   
 
Another side to these exclusionary measures was that if the so-called German race 
were to thrive and eventually replace those deemed inferior, then the ten million or so 
ethnic Germans living abroad needed to be repatriated, with the “superior” racial stock in 
the homeland.  However, the return of this “German blood” would mean less living space, 
and therefore more land would be needed—so-called “Lebensraum (living space)” 
(Rossino, 2003, p. 2).  As far as Hitler’s [1925] (1943) Mein Kampf (My Battle or My 
Struggle) was concerned, this land would have to come from that attached to the Reich’s 
Eastern national borders.  This living space could be gained only by going to war 
(Wistrich, 2001, pp. 2, 44-45).   
 
There was an obvious substantive difference between “excluding” (via, say, forced 
emigration) and “killing” the Jews, and before 1941 the preferred approach caused much 
debate between two main factions within Nazi circles.  There were those termed the 
“realists” (Schleunes, 1970, p. 216), who favoured the policy of forced emigration, on the 
one hand, and the party radicals who were termed “strong believers”, on the other 
(Wilhelm, 1997, p. 118).  The latter: 
 
were convinced that sterilization and euthanasia were the only adequate means of 
healing a badly infected ‘people’s body.’  Emigration would not work and would 
be endangered if so-called parasites and deadly foes of the German people were 
allowed to survive, and reproduce, just outside the borders of the Reich (Wilhelm, 
1997, pp. 118-119). 
 
Between 1933 and 1941 the Nazi leadership tended to favour the policy of forced 
emigration, probably because it initially showed itself to be more “realistic”.  The two 
following events, both of which occurred in 1938, strongly reinforced this initial 
preference.    
 
On 7 November 1938, a desperate Jewish teenager shot a German embassy official 
in Paris because of frustrations over a Nazi-initiated German/Polish border dispute 
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 “There is general agreement that . . . in concrete, everyday matters during the 1930s, a kind of 
depersonalized attitude towards . . . [the Jews] . . . evolved during the war period . . . . The major area of 
disagreement concerns two interpretations . . . . One interpretation holds that the silence . . . was the result of 
indifference, of not knowing or not wishing to know, or, alternatively, of a repression of such knowledge.  
The second interpretation views the absence of a pronounced reaction and the general passivity toward the 
physical annihilation of the Jews as the expression of a broad consensus on the government’s policy, a kind 
of tacit agreement that there was no need to take an active stand on the subject” (Kulka, 2000, p. 277). 
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involving his parents.  In an attempt to accelerate the forced emigration of the Jews, on 9 
November Hitler decided to capitalise on the assassination as an opportunity to promote 
anti-Semitic sentiment within Germany and instigate a nationwide pogrom against 
Germany’s Jews.152  This pogrom became known as Kristallnacht (night of crystal, or the 
“Night of Broken Glass”).  Largely at the hands of the Nazi stormtroopers, nearly 300 
synagogues were burned down, hundreds of Jewish-owned department stores/shops were 
vandalised and looted, and thousands of Jews were rounded up and sent to concentration 
camps.  There were about 100 Jewish fatalities.  Because there had not been any pogrom-
type violence on this scale in any modern industrialised Western nations for some time, 
this was a watershed event in German/Jewish relations.  Although Kristallnacht 
accelerated forced emigration, the violent approach had its drawbacks.  Hitler failed to 
foresee that the pogrom threatened the jobs of non-Jewish Germans working in the stores, 
would lead to the destruction of Jewish property insured by German and international 
insurance firms, and sent shockwaves of fear through the German stock exchange.  Also, to 
the regime’s surprise, the disorder actually disgusted significant sectors of German society 
(Kershaw, 1983, pp. 264-65).  With the pogrom having inadvertently raised the concerns 
of big business and therefore the majority of the parliamentary cabinet, the Streicher-led 
committee’s plans for similar such initiatives in the near future were immediately and 
permanently shelved (Schleunes, 1970, pp. 62-91).   
 
Simultaneously, there was a major breakthrough that reinforced the political 
acceptability of emigration as the “solution” to Germany’s “Jewish problem”.  An 
“assembly-line technique” was applied to the process of Jewish emigration (Browning, 
1978, p. 5), and within six months a relatively lowly ranked Adolf Eichmann of the SS 
became responsible for the deportation of one-quarter of all the Jews living in the recently 
annexed Austrian territory.  Eichmann’s superiors were able to boast in November 1938 of 
his emigration of 50,000 Jews, in contrast to the politically problematic Kristallnacht 
pogrom.  Consequently, there occurred a pivotal power shift within the upper echelons of 
the Nazi hierarchy: 
 
The year 1938 is marked . . . by a trend towards centralization of control over 
Jewish policy.  In part this trend reflected the newly found powers of Goering, 
Heydrich, and Eichmann; in part it reflected the final failure of the emotional anti-
Semitic wing of the Nazi movement to produce a solution to the Jewish problem 
through pogroms.  The failure of the November pogrom finally discredited the 
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 “. . . Goebbels was seen discussing this [the assignation] urgently with Hitler.  Hitler apparently gave the 
order, or his approval, to the course suggested to him . . . . It was Hitler himself, therefore, who gave the 
party and Goebbels the green light for the pogrom . . . ” (Bauer, 1991, p. 132).  With respect to Kristallnacht, 
Bankier (1988, p. 4) argued: “Hitler did not swim with the tide, he turned it.” 
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impulsive radicals and strengthened the hand of the realists whose work in 1938 
promised a more effective solution through bureaucratic means (Schleunes, 1970, 
p. 216).   
 
Although obviously Hitler saw, at least initially, merit in a combination of both approaches 
(see Bankier, 1988; Bauer, 1991; Dean, 2008), as Schleunes (1970, p. 216) added: “Most 
important of all, Hitler finally made a choice between these two approaches to the Jewish 
issue.” 
 
Clearly the “Göring-Himmler-Heydrich alliance” (Browning, 1978, p. 5), along 
with their subordinate’s (Eichmann’s) effective deployment of an assembly-line 
bureaucratic processes cemented all their roles in the future direction of anti-Jewish 
policy—whatever it might entail.  Once Hermann Goering had been placed in charge of the 
Jewish question, he soon delegated its resolution to SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard 
Heydrich, who on 24 January 1939 authorised the opening of the Reich Central Office for 
Jewish Emigration (Browning, 1978, pp. 6, 19).  Heydrich demanded that Eichmann’s 
efficient approach to mass emigration be applied to all the larger German cities, so as to 
bring “ ‘the Jewish question . . . to as favorable a solution as present circumstances permit’ 
” (Fleming, 1984, p. 43).  But the “realists” soon encountered a number of obstacles. 
 
After having already annexed the Sudetenland (and soon after, in March of 1939, 
the remainder of Czechoslovakia), in September of the same year the Nazis invaded Poland 
instigating World War Two.  The Wehrmacht (the German Army) attacked from the west 
and, by prior arrangement, the Nazi regime’s then ally, the Soviet Union, invaded from the 
east.  After defeating Poland the Germans annexed the western half and, based on the soon 
to be negotiated demarcation line, the Soviet Union appropriated the eastern half.  But this 
rapid expansion of Germany’s borders exposed a flaw in Eichmann’s emigration model.  
The more nations the Wehrmacht invaded, the more Jews Germany inherited.  This 
expansion left fewer places within Europe to which they could be expelled (Browning, 
2004, p. 37).  For these reasons, irrespective of the efforts of Eichmann and Heydrich, the 
“realists” were soon failing miserably to resolve the Nazi regime’s rapidly expanding 
“Jewish problem”.   
 
Soon after Poland’s defeat, the Germans divided their new territory into two: the 
western section which they called the Incorporated Territory, and that in the east, which 
they called the General Government.  As the Soviet border of their new Polish territory 
tightened, the Germans could no longer push any unwanted peoples in the Soviet’s 
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direction.  In relation to the massive numbers of so-called “inferiors”, it was decided to 
expel the non-Jewish Poles from the Incorporated Territory and force them into the 
General Government.  After initial chaos, it was decided to transfer the Jews to a 
reservation in the eastern corner of the General Government: the district of Lublin.  
However, the mass deportations proved to be a more difficult exercise than the Nazi 
regime had anticipated.  Contributing to these difficulties was the higher priority placed on 
repatriating and housing ethnic Germans living abroad, various economic concerns, and 
particularly major logistical issues (Browning, 2004, pp. 36-72; Cesarani, 2004, pp. 82-
83).  The regime soon realised that its aim to remove the Jews would take some time to 
implement.  According to Heydrich (as cited in Browning, 2004, p. 26), as an interim 
solution it was decided that, “ ‘in order to have a better possibility of control and later 
deportation’ ” the particularly unwanted and numerous Polish Jews were to be 
concentrated in designated ghettos within the major cities.  Many of these ghettos were 
completed during 1940.  But to where were they eventually to be deported?  The realist 
Nazi bureaucrats identified a few potential locations, the most popular of which emerged 
from the Nazis’ successful spring 1940 conquest of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, 
Luxemburg and, of particular interest, France.  This idea became know as the Madagascar 
Plan. 
   
The Madagascar Plan involved shipping Jews to the island of Madagascar, a French 
colony off the southeastern coast of Africa (Browning, 2004, pp. 81-82).  According to 
Himmler, Hitler’s response to the plan was that “ ‘The Führer read the six pages through 
and found them very good and correct’ ” (Browning, 2000, p. 14).  Browning (2004, p. 70) 
has observed: 
 
This episode is of singular importance in that it is the only firsthand account by a 
high-ranking participant—Himmler—of just how a Hitler decision was reached and 
a Führerbefehl, or Hitler order, was given in respect to Nazi racial policy during 
this period.  The initiative came from Himmler.  However, he did not present Hitler 
with a precise plan; it was rather a statement of intent, a set of policy objectives.  
The details of implementation would be left to Himmler.  Hitler indicated both his 
enthusiastic agreement and the men with whom the information could be shared      
. . . . . He simply allowed it to be known what he wanted or approved.  Presumably 
business was often conducted in such a way in the Third Reich. 
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As Himmler had long known, Hitler rewarded with power those who could both anticipate 
then convert his desires into a reality.153  However, access to Madagascar required naval 
victory over Britain, an outcome which never occurred.  Consequently, the plan was 
shelved pending a victory that never arrived.  
  
With the intention of encouraging the English to concede defeat (with the 
additional bonus of enabling access to Madagascar), as early as 31 July 1940 Hitler began 
contemplating attacking Germany’s then allies in the Soviet Union (Browning, 2004, p. 
215).  But tainting such a victory was that about five million Jews lived within the Soviet 
Union’s post-August 1939 borders (Hilberg, 1992, p. 250).  Soon after Hitler set his 
designs on the Soviet Union, potential sites to which Jews could be “migrated” were 
identified by the Nazis, including the marshes of the Ukraine and even the Siberian 
wastelands (Aly & Heim, 2002, p. 179; Cesarani, 2004, p. 92).   
 
During this period (between the start of World War Two nearing the end of 1939 
and up until half way through 1941), other events contributed to the subsequent attempt to 
exterminate the European Jews.  Germans within the “machinery of destruction”—who 
Hilberg (1961, p. 1011) believes were a “remarkable cross-section of the German 
population”—started demonstrating an ability to kill fairly large numbers of defenseless 
Jewish and non-Jewish civilians.  As the following will demonstrate, they used what by the 
end of the war became the three most common killing methods: shooting, starvation, and 
gassing.  
 
 
10.2 Shooting  
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 An excellent example of “seizing the initiative from below in response to vague signals emanating from 
above” (Browning, 2004, p. 37), was Martin Luther and his meteoric rise in the German Foreign Office.  This 
“had been due in no small part to his ability to anticipate which tasks Ribbentrop would need performed, to 
fill vacuums before others even realized they existed.  When Luther sensed a turn in Judenpolitik in the late 
summer of 1941, he quickly aligned himself with the direction events were taking” (Browning, 1978, p. 82).  
As the Führer said himself: “ ‘Where would I be . . . if I would not find people to whom I can entrust work 
which I myself cannot direct, tough people of whom I know they take the steps I would take myself.  The 
best man is for me the one who bothers me least by taking upon himself 95 out of 100 decisions” (Browning 
& Matthäus, 2004, p. 243).  The result of this management style was a fiercely competitive bureaucratic 
environment: “composed of factions centered around the Nazi chieftains, who were in perpetual competition 
to outperform one another.  Like a feudal monarch, Hitler stood above his squabbling vassals.  He allotted 
‘fiefs’ to build up the domains of his competing vassals as they demonstrated their ability to accomplish the 
tasks most appreciated by the Führer” (Browning, 1978, p. 2).  
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On 3 September 1939, during the invasion of Poland, Himmler released a shoot-to-
kill authorisation, to discourage any civilian resistance (Rossino, 2003, p. 65).  
Consequently, during a period of six weeks the German armed forces shot approximately 
16,000 civilians—about 5,000 of whom were Jewish (Roseman, 2002, p. 24).  On top of 
this, in the last few months of 1939 up to 50,000 of the Polish intelligentsia, and other 
civilian resisters (7,000 of whom were Jewish), were shot by SS forces and ethnic German 
auxiliaries (Musial, 1999, p. 106, as cited in Browning, 2004, p. 35; Rossino, 2003, p. 
234).  Possibly because of the Poles’ frequently “Germanic”-looking facial features, some 
of the execution squads started to experience what Lieutenant General Max Bock described 
as “ ‘vast agitation and powerful emotional stress’ ” (Browning, 2004, p. 74).154  The stress 
was exacerbated by the fact that shooting defenseless civilians meant that the killers 
necessarily experienced quite high levels of visual and auditory perceptual stimulation.   
 
 
10.3 Starvation 
 
Independent of the Nazi officials in Berlin, the local German authorities at the two 
largest Polish ghettos at Lodz and Warsaw—which between them contained about one 
third of all Polish Jews under Nazi control (Browning, 2004, p. 124)—decided at different 
times and for different reasons to seal off their ghettos from the adjacent non-Jewish 
communities.155  Cut off from those outside the ghetto boundaries, initially the poorest 
Jews began to perish from starvation and diseases.   
 
The effects of these locally initiated policies were first observed in the Lodz ghetto, 
which was sealed in April 1940.  By the summer of 1940 Arthur Greiser (the Governor of 
the Wartheland) stated, from the “ ‘point of view of nutrition and the control of  
epidemics’ ” life in the Lodz ghetto had already become “ ‘untenable’ ” (Mommsen, 1997, 
p. 30).  Between June 1940 and the end of January 1941 more than 7,000 Jews died (Corni, 
2002, p. 205).   
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 See also Buchheim (1968, p. 317). 
  
155
 The Lodz ghetto was sealed in April 1940 to enable the extraction of Jewish wealth in exchange for food, 
whereas the Warsaw ghetto was sealed in mid-November 1940 because of fears surrounding the possible 
spreading of disease and epidemics (Browning, 1995, pp. 32-34).    
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Alexander Palfinger, a German ghetto administration official, seized upon this 
emerging catastrophe as a partial solution to the escalating “Jewish problem”, arguing: “A 
rapid dying out of the Jews is for us a matter of total indifference, if not to say desirable”.  
According to his interpretation of Nazi ideology, such an outcome was consistent with 
what he anticipated would be the regime’s eventually “ ‘radical course’ ” (Browning, 2004, 
p. 128), because in relation to the “ ‘Jewish question the National Socialist idea . . . permits 
no compromises’ ” (Browning, 1995, p. 36).  Palfinger’s initiative is an example of what 
regional functionaries in the East referred to as “ ‘anticipatory obedience’ ” (Lower, 2002, 
p. 14)—that is, anticipating their superiors’ desires and converting them into reality.   
 
Browning (1995) labels “attritionists” as the local German bureaucrats who, like 
Palfinger, believed the Jews should be starved.  However, a more powerful group of 
German administrators were termed the “productionists”.  These people believed that 
sources of labour should not be wasted, and that making the Jews work would enable them 
to obtain food at no cost to the Reich and would avert the rapidly encroaching catastrophe.  
This policy could be carried through until Berlin decided where the Jews would be sent.  
At Lodz, Palfinger’s immediate superior, Hans Biebow (the chief of the ghetto 
administration), on 18 October 1940 argued: “ ‘everything must be done to make the 
ghetto self-sustaining’ ” (Browning, 1995, p. 36).  Biebow, and his superior, Dr. Karl 
Marder (the deputy mayor of Lodz), set up a ghetto economy in Lodz,156 indicating that at 
least in that city the “productionists” were in control (Browning, 1995, p. 36). 
 
The discontented Palfinger soon transferred to the Warsaw ghetto.  With the help of 
some like-minded local authority “attritionists” (including Waldemar Schön and Karl 
Naumann), he was able to generate what Schön euphemistically referred to as “ ‘premature 
impoverishment’ ” (Browning, 2004, p. 125).  But again Palfinger’s intentions were 
subordinated to the “productionists” in Warsaw, who also dominated the local German 
authorities.  At a meeting held on 3 April 1941 Dr. Walter Emmerich argued: “ ‘The 
starting point for all economic measures had to be the idea of maintaining the capacity of 
the Jews to live [italics original]’ ” (Browning, 1995, p. 39).  Despite protestations from the 
“attritionists”, the view of Hans Frank (the leading official in the General Government) 
was final: “ ‘The responsibility that the government took on with the creation of a Jewish 
district of 500,000 human beings [Menschen!] is very great, and a failure would always be 
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 By the summer of 1941 approximately 40,000 Jews were working in the Lodz ghetto (Browning, 2004, p. 
154). 
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blamed on the authorities of the General Government’ ” (Browning, 1995, p. 39).  Frank 
was certainly not philo-Semitic: he had made statements a few months earlier to the effect 
that he saw great merit in killing the Jews.157  But his enthusiasm for killing Jews 
diminished out of a personal concern that, if Germany lost the war, he could later be held 
responsible for what during this period of the conflict was a radical policy.  Thus, on 19 
April 1941 a new “productionist”-based policy was introduced in Warsaw.  Schön was 
replaced with Max Bischof (who was also told that if Palfinger caused any further 
problems he could have him removed).  Palfinger stopped anticipating the direction of 
Nazi Jewish policy and, having narrowly avoided dismissal, by early May 1941 was to be 
found informing Adam Czerniakow (the Judenrat chairman): “ ‘that he will do everything 
to improve the food supply’ ” (Browning, 1995, pp. 40-41). 
 
Soon after the war began the Nazi regime was struggling to meet the minimum 
food ration standards they had earlier set for the German civilian population (Aly & Heim, 
2002, pp. 243-244).  If the regime was sometimes unable to accommodate the needs of 
those at the top of the racial hierarchy, irrespective of how hard the Jews at the bottom 
were willing to work, extremely hard times most certainly laid ahead.  In the end, promises 
of more food were made but, as Biebow had pointed out in January 1941, little arrived 
because it was continually “withdrawn for allegedly more urgent needs” (Browning, 2004, 
p. 156).   
 
Although there were later periods of stabilisation, in the Warsaw ghetto during 
April then May of 1941, 2,000 then 4,000 Jews died, respectively.  It must have appeared 
that a famine of endemic proportions had taken hold (Browning, 1995, p. 47).  The German 
administrators (“productionists” and “attritionists” alike) followed directives from Berlin 
during late 1940 and early 1941 that the Jews were not to leave the ghettos in search of 
food.158  Consequently, they imposed conditions that killed growing numbers of 
defenseless civilians.  They could do so with relative ease because nobody involved—from 
those who rounded up and delivered the victims to the ghettos, to the administrators, or to 
the guards preventing their escape—had to touch, see or hear the victims in their death 
throes.  None was required to personally deliver any specific, unambiguous, death blow.  
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 See Browning (2000, p. 8). 
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 At a meeting on 19 April 1941, Frank argued: “ ‘That one cannot dissolve the ghetto and leave the Jews in 
freedom, over that there is still full agreement’ ” (Browning, 2004, p. 129).  Having said that, with so little 
food entering the Warsaw ghetto, Browning (2004, p. 130) has pointed out that, although there were some 
periods of lethal violence instigated by the ghetto administrators, it was “necessary to tolerate gaps in the 
ghetto cordon.” 
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Instead, they were able to pass responsibility on to a reified “Berlin” for imposing such 
deadly conditions.  In the absence of any reflective thinking, what they might have seen for 
themselves within the ghettos could be construed as reinforcing the Nazi stereotypes of 
Ostjuden (Eastern Jew).  Because starvation as a method of killing was generally low in 
perceptual stimulation, it could suppress within German officials feelings of strain, trauma, 
and/or repugnance.159  
 
 
10.4 Gassing 
 
During October 1939 Hitler produced a document that authorised the Kanzlei des 
Führers (KdF) to engage in “ ‘domestic purification’ ”, or the extermination of Germany’s 
physically and mentally disabled (Friedlander, 1995, p. 67).  Consequently, the KdF 
formed an organisation called Tiergartenstraße 4 (T4), which was charged with this killing 
operation.  Different killing techniques were contemplated, such as lethal injections, but 
eventually Viktor Brack, in conjunction with chemist Albert Widmann, developed the idea 
of diverting pure bottled carbon monoxide gas into a hermetically sealed room 
(Friedlander, 1995, pp. 86-87).  In December 1939 or January 1940 a T4 team tested the 
viability of Brack and Widmann’s idea on some disabled men locked in a cell disguised as 
a shower room.  From the perspective of the perpetrators—at least 17 people including 
Brack, Widmann and others who would become central figures in the extermination of the 
Jews, including Philipp Bouhler, Karl Brandt, Christian Wirth, Irmfried Ebel, and August 
Becker (Friedlander, 1995, p. 87)—the pilot test was deemed so “successful” that the 
Euthanasia gassing programme was initiated.  Before long five other permanent gas 
chambers were set up at various institutions throughout Germany. 
 
Soon afterwards, the Criminal Technology Institute invented mobile gas vans, 
which were used by a Sonderkommando, headed by Herbert Lange, to kill patients in the 
recently acquired Eastern territories (Friedlander, 1995, p. 139).  Canisters of pure carbon 
monoxide were attached to the driver’s compartment and released from valves located 
inside the van.  The roaming Lange Commando became highly proficient at killing 
“defectives”.  For example, during two weeks in May 1940 Lange and his small team 
gassed 1,558 patients from an East Prussian hospital (Browning, 1985, p. 59).   
                                                 
159
 Photos and film footage of conditions in the ghettos were taken and sent back to Germany, but this was 
only used for propaganda purposes to reinforce Jewish stereotypes.  
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Between the end of 1939 and the summer of 1941 at least 70,000 to 80,000 
disabled people in Germany were killed, most of them in the recently invented permanent 
gas chambers (Friedlander, 1995, pp. 109-110).160  None of those involved in the killings 
had to touch, see or hear the victims as they died: this gassing technique offered the 
perpetrators the option of total perceptual avoidance and generated little strain, trauma, 
and/or repugnance.   
 
Therefore, in relation to the three killing methods of shooting, starvation, and 
gassing: “The distressing fact is that mass killing as state policy had already become fairly 
widespread by 1941” (Browning, 1985, pp. 4-5).  Approaching the end of this late 1939 to 
mid-1941 period, during which ordinary Germans were demonstrating an ability to kill 
fairly large numbers of defenseless civilians, another pivotal change took place.  With the 
failure of the apparently more realistic emigration policy (such as the Madagascar Plan), 
the “realist” bureaucrats discerned potential in the previously rejected ideas of the “strong 
believers”.  Between late 1940 and mid 1941 the most powerful pro-emigration 
bureaucrats started contemplating or actually applying “strong believer”-type solutions to 
various local problems they were facing.  For example, some time after October or 
November of 1940, the Chief SS physician, Ernst Grawitz, claimed that the “realist” 
Heydrich asked him to trigger an epidemic in the Warsaw ghetto, to boost the death rate 
(Breitman, 1991, p. 139).  A few months later, Himmler started thinking about the 
application of the Euthanasia gassing method to his over-crowded concentration camps.  In 
discussions with KdF chief Philipp Bouhler (concerning prisoners who were too weak to 
be productive), in early 1941 Himmler drew on his intuition and previous experience in 
wondering “whether and how the personnel and the facilities of T4 can be utilized for the 
concentration camps” (Friedlander, 1995, p. 142).  According to Lifton (1986. p. 135): 
 
Early in 1941, T4 leader Bouhler agreed to let Himmler use T4 personnel and 
facilities to rid the camps of ‘excess’ prisoners – notably those ‘most seriously ill,’ 
physically and mentally.  Sometimes called ‘prisoner euthanasia’ or (by prisoners) 
‘Operation Invalid,’ the resultant program was officially ‘Operation [or Special 
Treatment] 14f13.’ 
 
By the spring of 1941, Lange and his T4 Sonderkommando, who had been seconded to 
Himmler’s concentration camps in Germany, embarked on this experimental killing 
                                                 
160
 Bloxham and Kushner (2005, p. 84) point out that this figure does not include the tens of thousands of 
physically and mentally disabled adults and children killed in Poland and later in the Soviet territories. 
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operation.  Exactly as they had done with the mentally ill in the annexed Eastern territories, 
Lange and his men loaded the selected concentration camp prisoners into their hermetically 
sealed vans, turned on the valves to the externally attached pure carbon monoxide gas 
cylinders, and then drove their vehicle while the victims perished inside.  The vans were 
driven to a previously specified burial site, where other prisoners were forced to unload 
and then dispose of the victims’ bodies.   
 
Soon the 14f13 killing programme was extended into the recently built 
concentration camps in the East.  For example, by the end of May 1941 ex-T4 personnel 
working in the 14f13 programme had arrived in the back-blocks of Poland, in places like 
Auschwitz.161  According to Klodzinski (1987, p. 136ff, as cited in Dwork and van Pelt, 
1996, pp. 280-281) 575 men who “ ‘were all worn out’ ”162 were selected, then transported 
by a train to the T4 gas chamber hundreds of miles away at Sonnenstein in Germany.  The 
men could not be killed at Auschwitz “without causing great commotion” (Dwork & van 
Pelt, 1996, p. 280).  According to Browning (2004, p. 192), by the end of the war nearly 
20,000 people had been killed during Operation 14f13 (Lifton, 1986, p. 142).  
 
The key Nazi “realists” like Heydrich and Himmler were only “realists” because 
the “strong believer” solutions to the Jewish problem (such as sterilisation or 
extermination) had previously appeared unrealistic (which may explain Himmler’s then 
Hitler’s initial preference for the Madagascar Plan).  Confirming his “realist” status, 
Himmler had said in the summer of 1940, that “ ‘out of inner conviction,’ he still rejected 
‘the physical extermination of a race through Bolshevik methods . . . [because they were] 
un-Germanic and impracticable’ ” (Fleming, 1984, p. 44).  In other words, it was beneath 
Germans dignity to engage in such acts.163  In any case, because they were considered 
“impracticable” such ideas were consequently ruled out from further discussion.  In the last 
part of his statement Himmler implied that if extermination suddenly became possible he 
might be willing to reconsider it.  Even for “realists” such as Himmler, Heydrich (even 
Hitler), the desire to exterminate “inferior” peoples had always been present.164  However, 
                                                 
161
 Rees (2005, p. 43) provides a slightly later date where “14f13 . . . reached Auschwitz on July 28”. 
 
162
 This is according to a political prisoner, Kazimierz Smoleń (Rees, 2005, pp. 43-44). 
 
163
 Also during the summer of 1940 Heydrich was arguing: “ ‘The Jews are considered hostile to us because 
of our standpoint on race.  For this reason they are of no use to us in the Reich.  We must eliminate them.  
Biological extermination, however, is undignified for the German people as a civilized nation.  Thus after the 
victory we will impose the condition on the enemy powers that the holds of their ships be used to transport 
the Jews along with their belongings to Madagascar or elsewhere’ ” (Aly, 1999, p. 3).   
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before 1941 a means of achieving this end did not seem to exist.  This may help explain 
why, as Bauer (2001, p. 30) has pointed out: “there certainly was no actual planning of the 
genocide before 1941.”165  Increasingly between late 1939 and mid 1941, as the Nazi 
regime’s “Jewish problem” expanded, all the apparently more realistic “solutions” like 
emigration or expulsion were failing.  During the military-style executions, within the 
ghettos, and inside the gas chambers, the ideas of the “strong believers” increasingly 
showed signs of potential.  Before long the most perceptive within the Nazi regime came 
to believe that the undoable might actually be doable, after all.  For example, on 16 July 
1941 in the Lodz ghetto the lowly ranked SS-Sturmbannführer Rolf-Heinz Höppner stated 
in a letter to Eichmann: “This winter there is a danger that it will not be possible to feed all 
the Jews.  It should therefore seriously be considered whether the most humane solution 
would not be to eliminate those Jews unfit for work by some fast-working method” 
(Krakowski, 1993, p. 74).  He concluded: “ ‘These things sound somewhat fantastic but are 
in my opinion definitely feasible’ ” (Browning, 1985, p. 4).  Browning (2004, p. 354) 
believes Höppner had the Euthanasia gassing technology in mind.  But only those in direct 
control of the machinery of destruction—Himmler and Heydrich—were in any position to 
do something about converting such ideas into a reality.  There is merit in Browning’s 
(2004) observation that, within influential Nazi circles just before the Soviet invasion: 
“Murder was in the air” (p. 320).   
 
 
10.5 Operation Barbarossa 
 
Since early in 1939 Heydrich had been placed in control of the machinery that was 
charged with resolving Germany’s “Jewish problem”.  The prospect of eventual failure in 
                                                                                                                                                    
164
 In the November 1938 publication of Das Schwarze Korps Heydrich mentioned his desire surrounding the 
“ ‘absolute annihilation’ ” of German Jewry: “ ‘The German people are not in the least inclined to tolerate in 
their country hundreds of thousands of criminals, who not only secure their existence through crime, but also 
want to exact revenge . . . . These hundreds of thousands of impoverished Jews [would create] a breeding 
ground for Bolshevism and a collection of the politically criminal subhuman elements . . . . In such a 
situation we would be faced with the hard necessity of exterminating the Jewish underworld in the same way 
as, under our government of law and order, we are accustomed to exterminating any other criminals – that is, 
by fire and sword.  The result would be the actual and final end of Jewry in Germany, its absolute 
annihilation’ ” (Breitman, 1991, p. 58).  Not long into the war, after Heydrich’s execution squads were 
experiencing “vast agitation and powerful emotional stress” while shooting mostly the gentile Polish 
intelligentsia, his earlier “strong believer” logic was relegated in favour of other apparently more realistic 
solutions.  By 24 June 1940 Heydrich was arguing: “ ‘The very size of the problem – and we have to 
consider that there are about three and a quarter million Jews in the territories now under German control – 
means that it can no longer be solved by emigration; some territorial solution will have to be found [italics 
original]’ ” (Krausnick, 1968, p. 55). 
 
165
 Since the early 1920s Hitler may have wished to exterminate the Jews.  Between 1939 and 1940 this 
seemed impossible to achieve, so Hitler probably accepted that mass emigration was the only realistic option.   
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this task would not only reflect poorly on Heydrich, but also on his superior officer, 
Himmler (who was equally concerned).166  With no obvious place to resettle the Polish 
Jews, and with about four million Soviet Jews at hand (Schleunes, 1970, p. 256), perhaps it 
might be “easier to murder than resettle” (Browning, 2004, p. 35).  But how might the 
Jews be killed?  T4 personnel had readily become proficient killers, so the most “obvious” 
method would predictably have been to gas the unwanted Soviet Jews.  In Friedlander’s 
(1995, p. 284) words: 
 
The success of the euthanasia policy convinced the Nazi leadership that mass 
murder was technically feasible, that ordinary men and women were willing to kill 
large numbers of innocent human beings, and that the bureaucracy would cooperate 
in such an unprecedented enterprise.    
 
However, Himmler had in May 1941 sent, at considerable financial cost, 575 incapacitated 
Auschwitz inmates all the way back to Germany by train to be gassed.  Unlike Höppner in 
Lodz, he was well aware that such an idea was impracticable because the T4 gassing 
technique used cylinders of pure carbon monoxide, which were too expensive to produce, 
very difficult to transport out of Germany, and/or did not exist in the quantities required to 
kill such large numbers of civilians (Breitman, 1991, p. 197; Browning, 1985, p. 59; 
Fleming, 1984, p. 48; Friedlander, 1995, p. 286; Spektor, 1993, p. 52).  
  
Perhaps the Soviet Jews could be rounded up and forced into secure ghettos and 
gradually starved to death?  Just prior to the Soviet invasion some Nazi bureaucrats were 
thinking along these lines: 
 
By the beginning of March 1941 the rationalization expert Rudolf Gater was 
already looking at ghettoization as a possible option for the ‘liquidation of the 
Jewish population’.  To avoid having to support the totally dispossessed Jewish 
minority out of public funds, he proposed a possible alternative . . . ‘Conditions of 
undernourishment could be allowed to develop without regard for the 
consequences’ (Aly & Heim, 2002, p. 180).167 
 
However, as Heydrich discovered earlier in the Warsaw ghetto, starvation was a very slow 
method of killing large numbers of people, and repeatedly gave the most resourceful and/or 
wealthy enough time to evade death.  (This may also explain Heydrich’s apparent desire to 
                                                 
166
 As Cesarani (2004, p. 92) pointed out: “As early as January 1941, Himmler applied to Heydrich for a way 
out of the dead end into which the SS had galloped when promising to resettle hundreds of thousands of 
ethnic Germans on land to be cleared of Jews and Poles for whom the SS could not find room elsewhere.” 
 
167
 From February 1941 Paul Körner (Goering’s immediate subordinate on the Four-Year Plan Authority) 
started “devising a military and economic strategy that deliberately envisaged the death by starvation of 
millions of people in the Soviet Union” (Aly & Heim, 2002, p. 33). 
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artificially introduce an epidemic to the Warsaw ghetto.)  Thus, starvation was not a viable 
option.168   
 
Because the German armed forces had shot 50,000 Polish nationals in the last few 
months of 1939, it was apparent that the only cheap, mobile, readily available, and rapid 
method was shooting.  The likelihood of men from such a modern and civilised Western 
nation like Germany—the home of Kant and Beethoven—being both willing and capable 
of shooting all Jews—not just men but also women, young children, and babies—might 
have sounded fantastical to Himmler and Heydrich.  Breitman (2000, p. 48) has argued that 
the SS-Reichsführer “was keenly aware that the execution of civilians might have 
damaging psychological effects on the police executioners—even in 1940 [during the 
invasion of Poland] he said he had been warned about this.”  That shooting children was a 
distasteful task for most perpetrators can be discerned from the Polish invasion 
(Westermann, 2005, p. 144).  If some men during the invasion had struggled to shoot men, 
how were they going to fare slaughtering women and children?   
 
In fact, the logic behind some of Himmler’s earlier decisions indicates that (putting 
the killing of women and children aside) even he was sceptical about the willingness of 
ordinary Germans to shoot defenseless men (let alone women and children).  For example, 
back in June 1940 Himmler went to great lengths to employ and promote the brutal World 
War One veteran Oscar Dirlewanger (also a convicted pedophile).  He supplied 
Dirlewanger with a battalion of previously imprisoned poachers for the kinds of human 
shooting assignments that he (Himmler) believed ordinary Germans would shy away from 
(Breitman, 1991, pp. 129-130).  But Himmler could no longer rely upon the scarce 
specialists for the massive Soviet invasion.  He would have to depend upon the more 
numerous ordinary Germans.  It should be kept in mind, however, that although not all, 
some—perhaps even many—of those from the execution squads in Poland had shown 
themselves to be capable of regularly shooting defenseless men (Roseman, 2002, p. 24; 
Rossino, 2003, p. 234).169  Also, now the victims would not be the somewhat similar 
looking Poles, but Soviet Jews, who would be ethnically, culturally, and socio-
economically very different from the Germans filling Himmler’s ranks.  As Breitman 
                                                 
168
 Then again, two million Soviet POWs perished within one year of being imprisoned by the Wehrmacht.  
Thus, when totally isolated from the resources provided by big cities, and without any assets with which to 
trade for their lives, starvation could account for a huge number of deaths.  See Browning (1985, p. 6).   
 
169
 During the invasion of Poland shooting predominantly civilian men was an unsettling experience for 
many German executioners, but it was also seen by some as a measure of manliness (Rossino, 2003, p. 70).  
But could the same be said of shooting women and children?   
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(2000, pp. 44-45) argued:  
 
Himmler, Heydrich, and, Daluege . . . [of the Order Police] did not yet know how 
smoothly the killing process would work, which leaders and units would prove 
effective, and whether there would be significant resistance, including resistance 
from the policemen themselves. 
 
If at the time Himmler and Heydrich knew that neither gassing nor starvation would work, 
at least attempting to shoot all the Jews offered a potential “solution”.   
 
The Soviet invasion, only months away, offered the perfect experimental 
opportunity to test the viability of this possible method of killing victims who in 
themselves embodied two of the most despised Nazi enemies (Jews and communists), in 
the form of “Jewish Bolshevism”.  Furthermore, if some ordinary moderately anti-Semitic 
and supposedly civilised Germans were able to murder at least some civilians in the East, it 
was not hard for Himmler and Heydrich to anticipate the violent capabilities of the more 
fiercely anti-Semitic non-Jewish Eastern Europeans.  
 
Therefore, before Operation Barbarossa, Himmler and Heydrich had to choose 
between two very different strategies in dealing with what had become their “Jewish 
problem”.  They could continue to pursue their failing strategy of expulsion; or they could 
try out a much more radical method: encouraging their men to shoot men, women, and 
children, and/or encourage the local non-Jewish Eastern Europeans to engage in lethal 
pogrom-type murder.170  With the outcome of any attempt to exterminate Soviet Jewry so 
uncertain,171 it made sense for leading figures like Himmler to start out small before 
                                                 
170
 Known as the Krausnick versus Streim debate: “There is a substantial dispute among experts over whether 
the initial instructions (before the war) included the killing of all the Jews – men, woman, and children – or 
whether a subsequent order, sometime between early August and September, added women and children to 
the targets” (Breitman, 1991, p. 290).  Because Himmler and Heydrich were not sure if their men and/or non-
Jewish locals would be willing and/or capable of killing all Jews, before Operation Barbarossa the author 
suspects they did not disclose their desired goal of total extermination.  This argument finds support in 
Longerich’s (2005, p. 214) comments: “While Krausnick’s assumption of an early, universal annihilation 
order can clearly be disproved, we should, on the other hand, go further than Streim in emphasizing that the 
task allotted to the Einsatzgruppen, prior to 22 June, involved a mass murder whose limits were unclear.  
This order already contained within it the tendency towards total annihilation, and it was deliberately left up 
to the death squads themselves to decide what limits to place on the killings.  Here we see a form of issuing 
of orders which relied upon interaction, fully in keeping with Nazi tradition.”  It was deliberately left up to 
the men in the field because Himmler and Heydrich were not confident that their men could kill all Jews (see 
also Matthäus, 2004, p. 267).  This is why Franz Stahlecker (commander of Einsatzgruppen A) stated in one 
of his reports on 15 October 1941 (that is, during the extermination campaign): “ ‘it was expected from the 
start . . . that the Jewish problem would not be solved solely through pogroms’ and ‘the security police 
cleansing work had according to basic orders . . . the goal of the most complete removal possible of the Jews 
[italics added]’ ” (Browning, 1994, p. 139). 
 
171
 As Browning (1995, p. 113) said: “they did not know – indeed could not have known – if the plans they 
had been formulating would even work.” 
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deciding whether or not to invest more manpower in this “ ‘feasibility study’ ” within the 
Soviet interior (Browning, 1995, p. 114; also see Mommsen, 1997, p. 32).   
 
Several weeks before Operation Barbarossa, during May of 1941, about 3,000 men 
were somewhat haphazardly recruited for training (originating from the SS, SD, the 
Gestapo, Sipo, Waffen SS, State Police, Reserve Police Battalion 9, and also some civilian 
draftees) (Browning, 2004, p. 225; Büchler, 1986, p. 12).  The men were divided into four 
groups called Einsatzgruppe A, B, C and D, and were to be led by carefully selected 
ideologically-minded Nazis (Wildt, 2003, pp. 546-553, as cited in Bloxham & Kushner, 
2005, p. 137).  These four groups were subdivided further into smaller units called 
Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos.  As was the case for the police battalions, the 
first part of their training involved exposure to a deluge of anti-Semitic propaganda.172  
Perhaps it was expected that if the men were subjected to enough propaganda, they might 
come to see the “necessity” of killing all of the Jews (thus the provision of a legitimising 
rationale/ideology) and eventually associate the second part of their training schedule—
shooting practice—as the means of achieving this end.173  During May of 1941 Himmler 
also organised a much larger group of disparate SS units (a total of 25,000 men), to be 
placed under his direct command.  These men were collectively known as his 
Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS (Browning, 2004, p. 233).   
 
Several days before the launching of Operation Barbarossa, Heydrich began to 
express his doubts about the willingness and/or capability of these men to shoot civilians.  
With the intention of passing such dirty work off onto the locals, in a meeting on 17 June 
in Berlin with the Einsatzgruppen commanders, Heydrich stressed: “No obstacle was to be 
placed in the way of the ‘self-cleansing efforts’ (Selbstreinigungsbestrebungen) of 
anticommunist and anti-Jewish circles” (Browning, 2004, p. 228).  On the eve of the 
attack, the German armed forces received the ambiguous “commissar order”, which made 
specific mention of the Jews and their “ ‘sub-human nature’ ” (Matthäus, 2004, p. 250).  In 
its words: “ ‘This struggle demands ruthless and energetic measures against bolshevist 
agitators, guerrillas, saboteurs, Jews, and complete elimination of any active or passive 
resistance’ ” (Browning, 2004, pp. 222-223).  As Matthäus (2004, p. 267) stated: 
                                                 
172
 Browning (2004, p. 232) has pointed out that before the invasion of Soviet Union: “Numerous materials 
were circulated among the police to provide the basis for these ideological training sessions.”  It increased as 
the campaign progressed (Westermann, 2005, pp. 8; 103-114; 118). 
 
173
 Units in the Order Police, like Battalion 322, for example, underwent similar military training and 
ideological indoctrination (Breitman, 2000, p. 45). 
 209 
 
At the time, the Nazi leadership might have shared the doubts expressed at the 
periphery that mass shootings of Soviet Jews were, as a report by the 
Kommandostab on the killings in the Baltics put it, the way in which ‘the Jewish 
problem can be fundamentally solved’ . . . . Nevertheless, Hitler and the top 
leadership refrained from addressing the issue and left it to their men in the field to 
decide how to proceed.174 
 
Operation Barbarossa was launched on 22 June 1941.  The invading Wehrmacht 
was soon after followed by the 3,000 or so members of the Einsatzgruppen, and at least 
nine thousand Order Police—about 18 battalions in all (Breitman, 2000, p. 41).175   
 
In line with Heydrich’s orders, upon entering the Lithuanian city of Kaunas (also 
called Kovno), Franz Stahlecker, the leader of Einsatzgruppe A, assessed the intensity of 
local anti-Semitic fervor by releasing violent convicts from a prison and instigating 
possibly the first pogrom of the campaign.  The released prisoners immediately began 
beating Jews with iron bars or wooden clubs in the city square.  All of the victims were 
men (Rhodes, 2002, p. 41).  On 29 June, Heydrich issued a written order to “ ‘remind’ ” 
the Einsatzgruppen commanders of his earlier verbal instruction to encourage “ ‘self-
defense circles’ ” (Browning, 2004, p. 228).  By 30 June the Lithuanian partisans in 
Kaunas had killed several thousand Jews (Arad, 1989, p. 1, as cited in Rhodes, 2002, p. 
43).  Jewish woman and children were not targeted, which might have confirmed in 
Stahlecker’s mind that even where the locals were willing to engage in pogroms, their 
selective choice of targets meant that they alone could not be relied upon to resolve the 
“Jewish problem” in the Soviet Union.  In other locations there was even less or no interest 
in killing all the Jews (Corni, 2002, p. 34; Gerlach, 1997, p. 56, as cited in Matthäus, 2004, 
p.  273; Longerich, 2005, p. 209).176  At this early stage of the invasion, it appeared that the 
only people who might have both the intention and the logistical, organisational, and 
technical capability to kill all the Jews were the German armed forces themselves.  The 
following explores how they fared. 
 
Between 22 June and mid-August 1941 the numbers of Jews shot by the 
Einsatzgruppen varied.  Jewish victims numbered in the thousands.  Unusually high was 
                                                 
174
 See also Lower (2002, p. 6). 
 
175
 In conflict with this, Browning (1995, p. 105) has stated that at “least eleven battalions of Order Police 
(each of approximately 500 men) were part of the invasion force.” 
 
176
 Having said this, there were a few places were there was a greater eagerness to kill all Jews (Matthäus, 
2004, pp. 260-261). 
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Karl Jäger’s relatively small Einsatzkommando 3, which had shot 9,188 civilians (10 
percent of whom were women, with children spared) (Streit, 1994, p. 108).  However, at 
the other end of the continuum was the much larger Einsatzgruppe D who shot 4,425 Jews 
during the same period (Streit, 1994, p. 108).  Headland (1989, pp. 401-412, as cited in 
Browning, 1995, p. 100) has calculated that by the end of July, collectively the 
Einsatzgruppen had killed a total of about 62,805 civilians, most of whom (about 90 
percent) were Jews (Gerlach, 1998, p. 58, as cited in Matthäus, 2004, p. 260).  Excluding 
Jäger’s small group, the initial progress reports leading up to mid-August indicated that 
arming far greater numbers of ordinary German men with firearms was unlikely to succeed 
as a strategy to murder all Jews in the Soviet interior.   
 
After mid-August the death toll escalated.  For example, in the two-week period 
after mid-August Einsatzkommando 3 killed a further 33,000 civilians (with the proportion 
of female victims increasing, and the statistics now including children).  The same pattern 
applied to the much larger Einsatzgruppe D.  Its death toll before the end of September had 
risen to 36,000 (Streit, 1994, p. 108).  What factors explain this change from a tentative 
reluctance to kill, to large-scale slaughter?  With reference to the Milgram-Holocaust 
linkage (M-H linkage), at least five major factors seem to have been central.  First, leading 
figures like Himmler used various Binding Factors (BFs) and supplied Strain Resolving 
Mechanisms (SRMs) to those below them.  Secondly, and particularly effective in 
increasing the probability of obtaining higher participation rates was, via the ad hoc trial 
and error “exploratory” method of discovery, a movement within the executions squads to 
reduce the stressful perceptual stimulation associated with the shootings (thus bottom-up 
innovation).  Thirdly, the mass-shooting executions were increasingly bureaucratised, 
whereby the shootings were broken down into a compartmentalised process (division of 
labour) with participants performing subsidiary specialist roles (aiding greatly the SRM of 
the displacement/diffusion of responsibility).  Finally, “hardier” Eastern Europeans—most 
prominently from Latvia, Ukraine, and Lithuania (Matthäus, 2004, p. 268)—were 
increasingly deployed as the killers.   
 
 
10.5.1 The Application of Top-Down Binding Factors and Strain Resolving Mechanisms 
 
Although just before the invasion Himmler’s men were issued with the vague 
“commissar order”, by 2 July 1941 Heydrich had issued the restricted order to shoot “ ‘all 
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Jews in state and party positions’ ” (Streit, 1994, p. 105).  On 17 July the broadest killing 
order conceivable was committed to writing for the first time—“ ‘all Jews’ ” from this date 
onwards were to be shot (Streit, 1994, pp. 108-109).  This may have been an attempt by 
Himmler and/or Heydrich to apply the BF of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon.  As 
Breitman (2000, p. 48) argued: 
 
Himmler believed that, in addition to orders, the police needed a reason to kill, and 
they needed social gatherings in the evening to reduce the strain.  Once they had 
carried out mass murder in response to an alleged crime or provocation, it would be 
easier to get them to follow broader killing orders later. 
 
According to Matthäus (2004), Heydrich too knew the men would struggle.  He is also 
believed to have held a “fear of going too far too quickly” and: 
 
instead of providing explicit orders for the rapid expansion of the killing process, 
the SS and police leadership in Berlin seems to have followed a course that can be 
described as controlled escalation (p. 263). 
 
Einsatzgruppe B commander, Artur Nebe, suggested about a month into the 
invasion, in mid-July, that with so few men, what was being asked of them was simply 
unachievable (Browning, 2004, p. 313).  However, Himmler had already anticipated the 
manpower issue when several weeks earlier, on 27 June 1941, he commandeered off the 
army his Kommandostab SS brigades, arguing: “ ‘I need these units for other tasks’ ” 
(Büchler, 1986, p. 14).  Although consisting of 25,000 men, only SS Brigade One (about 
7,000 men), commanded by Higher SS/Police Leader Friedrich Jeckeln, and the SS 
Cavalry Brigade (4,000 men) commanded by Higher SS/Police Leader Erich von dem 
Bach-Zelewski were to be used by Himmler to kill civilians en masse (Büchler, 1986, pp. 
15-18).  As Breitman (2000, p. 41) said:  
 
In spite of the gaps in the picture, it is clear that the Order Police battalions were a 
less politicized force than the Einsatzgruppen.  They may not have represented the 
average German—policeman in a police state share some characteristics and 
behavior that set them apart from the mass of the population.  Still, what we know 
of their numbers and their institution suggests that they were not part of a political-
ideological elite. 
 
By 10 July Himmler had decided to use the SS Cavalry Brigade to comb the Pripet marshes 
in the east of Lublin, and about a week later these men received their orders to kill all Jews.  
Soon after their arrival, however, they struggled to carry out their orders.  As Himmler and 
Heydrich had suspected all along, the order to shoot defenseless civilians en masse was 
generating what the German’s themselves referred to as Seelenbelastung or “ ‘burdening of 
the soul’ ” (Hilberg, 1980, p. 91).  It is tempting to argue that this is a phrase that scholars 
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such as Milgram (1974) and Grossman (1995) might describe using their own terminology, 
with words like strain, trauma, and repugnance.  The main source of this “burdening of the 
soul” seems to have been, when killing, the unavoidable and disturbing visual (and, to a 
lesser extent, auditory) spectacle associated with the killing of people at close range by 
firearms.  The stress was exacerbated when shooting women and children (Lifton, 1986, p. 
15).177   
 
Himmler’s suggestion as to how these men could overcome their initial reluctance 
to kill women and children shows how desperate the SS-Reichsführer had become.  At the 
end of July Himmler issued the following command: “ ‘Express order of the FFSS 
[Himmler].  All [male] Jews must be shot.  Drive Jewish females into the swamps’ ” 
(Breitman, 2000, p. 60).  Himmler was trying to find a way of sparing his men from having 
to directly murder women and children and thus experience the accompanying mental 
anguish.  In early August SS Sturmbannführer Franz Magill informed Himmler that his 
idea had failed: 
 
The driving of women and children into the marshes did not have the expected 
success, because the marshes were not so deep that one could sink.  After a depth 
of about a meter there was in most cases solid ground (probably sand) preventing 
complete sinking (Arad, Gutman & Margaliot, 1999, p. 415). 
 
On a daily basis the cavalry and some local militias continued to shoot at least 3,000 
Jewish males over the age of five.  But despite their orders that “the Pinsk action must be 
completed”, the men refused to follow their orders.  By the evening of 8 August the action 
was abandoned (Büchler, 1986, p. 16-17).  The remaining women and children survived 
for another year before being killed during the liquidation of the Pinsk ghetto on 27 
October 1942 (Buna, 1966, p. 350, as cited in Büchler, 1986, p. 17).  Between the end of 
July and mid-August 1941, a frustrated Himmler was regularly observed criticising his 
men for their “ ‘soft’ ” behaviour.  He demanded that they shoot more Jews (Büchler, 
1986, p. 16).178 
 
Himmler, incensed by the inability of his men to carry out his orders, and 
constantly reminded of their emotional difficulties, on 15 August 1941 asked 
Einsatzgruppe B commander Artur Nebe to organise an execution when he was in Minsk 
(Padfield, 1990, p. 342).  He wanted to “see what one of these ‘liquidations’ really looked 
                                                 
177
 See Browning (1992, pp. 72-73) for an exception to this general rule.   
 
178
 Also see Browning (1992, p. 11, 2004, p. 312), Lower (2002, p. 5), and Pohl (2000, p 143, as cited in 
Bloxham & Kushner, 2005, p. 136). 
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like” (Hilberg, 1961, p. 218).  The SS Reichsführer’s Chief of Personal Staff, Karl Wolff, 
later stated that “he knew ‘from his [Himmler’s] own mouth’ ” that Himmler had never 
seen people killed before (Padfield, 1990, p. 342).  Nebe organised for about a hundred 
people to be executed—two of whom were women.  Before the mass-shooting, Himmler 
conveyed an air of casual indifference as he asked the Jews some questions.  However, the 
SS Reichsführer’s easy attitude disintegrated as the first shots were fired, and his lack of 
experience of direct killing was exposed: 
 
Both Wolff and Bach-Zelewski remembered that Himmler was shaken by the 
murders.  ‘Himmler was extremely nervous,’ Bach-Zelewski testified.  ‘He 
couldn’t stand still.  His face was white as cheese, his eyes went wild and with each 
burst of gunfire he always looked at the ground’ (Rhodes, 2002, p. 152).   
 
Like subjects in the OTA experiments who engaged in avoidance-type behaviours, 
Himmler looked away from what was in front of him, unlike those pulling the triggers, 
who could not do so.179  When the two women lay down to be shot members of the squad 
lost their nerve, and fired badly, injuring, rather then killing them.  At that point Himmler 
“panicked [and] . . . . jumped up and screamed at the squad commander: ‘Don’t torture 
these women!  Fire!  Hurry up and kill them!’ ” (Rhodes, 2002, p. 152).  This event 
probably showed Himmler that his concept of shooting the Soviet Jews was not 
commensurate with the task’s disturbing perceptual reality.  “ ‘Almost fainting, pale, [and 
with] limbs quivering’ ” Himmler had come to understand personally the problem his men 
were facing (Adams, 1989, p. 139, as cited in Berger, 2002, p. 62).  Bach-Zelewski then 
said to Himmler:  
 
Reichsführer, those were only a hundred . . . . Look at the eyes of the men in this 
Kommando, how deeply shaken they are!  These men are finished [fertig] for the 
rest of their lives.  What kind of followers are we training here?  Either neurotics or 
savages! (Hilberg, 1961, p. 218).   
 
According to Nebe, immediately after this execution Himmler asked him to search for a 
less stressful method of killing.  Until its discovery the men in the field were expected to 
continue the mass shootings.   
 
As the leading figure present at this execution, Himmler felt compelled to try to 
resolve the men’s stressful experience by providing them with a variety of strain-resolving 
rationalisations:   
                                                 
179
 S.S.-Brigadier General Erwin Schulz behaved similarly when he organised several shooters to aim at each 
civilian and then “With a keen sense of delicacy, General Schulz would avert his head as the rifles were 
aimed.  Then, after the volley had been fired, he would turn around and see that ‘all persons were lying on 
the ground’ ” (Musmanno, 1961, p. 177). 
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He pointed out that the Einsatzgruppen were called upon to fulfil a repulsive 
(widerliche) duty.  He would not like it if Germans did such a thing gladly.  But 
their conscience was in no way impaired, for they were soldiers who had to carry 
out every order unconditionally.  He alone had responsibility before God and Hitler 
for everything that was happening.  They had undoubtedly noticed that he hated 
this blood business . . . and that he had been aroused to the depth of his soul.  But 
he too was obeying the highest law by doing his duty, and he was acting from a 
deep understanding of the necessity for this operation.  Himmler told the men to 
look at nature.  There was combat everywhere, not only among men but also in the 
world of animals and plants . . . . Didn’t bedbugs and rats have a life purpose also?  
Yes, but this has never meant that man could not defend himself against vermin 
(Hilberg, 1961, pp. 218-219). 
 
In other words, the men had no choice but to continue: it was absolutely necessary (BF), 
and anyway, they were in no way responsible for their actions; instead he, Himmler, was 
(SRM).  They were not murderers; their actions were morally inverted into those of 
defenders against insidious vermin (SRM).  For those who had already shot Jewish men, 
but were unconvinced by Himmler’s logic that it was essential that they also had to kill 
women and children, they would find themselves in a foot-in-the-door trap.  The men were 
told that if they did not kill all Jews, thereby allowing seemingly harmless victims to 
survive, future generations of Germans would later be targeted for revenge (BF).  It was 
now too late to turn back.  Having shot the men the bridges behind them had been 
burned—foot-in-the-door-like—they had to go on (BF) (Sereny, 2000, p. 281).  If 
Himmler and the shooting squad leaders who echoed his arguments failed in appealing to 
their men’s rationality that all Jews had to be killed, they could and did draw upon other 
coercive techniques.  One such “evil trick” was identified by an insightful staff officer in 
Einsatzgruppe A (BF): 
  
Himmler issued an order stating that any man who no longer felt able to take the 
psychological stresses should report to his superior officer.  These men were to be 
released from their current duties and would be detailed for other work back home  
. . . . In my view this whole order was an evil trick; I do not think I would be wrong 
to say it bordered on the malicious—for after all, which officer or SS Mann would 
have shown himself up in such a way?  Any officer who had declared that he was 
too weak to do such things would have been considered unfit to be an officer (Klee 
et al., 1988, p. 82).180 
 
Just as in the OTA experiments, where the experimenter attempted to cajole the subject 
with a barrage of BFs and/or provide them with a variety of strain-resolving 
rationalisations, Himmler also hoped that his BFs and SRMs might encourage the men to 
continue to participate in the killings.  This is reminiscent of Staub’s (1989, pp. 79-88) 
                                                 
180
 “In cases where a final determination was made by the Reichsführer against a policeman, the remark 
‘unsuited for duties in the East’ was added to his personnel file, precluding the opportunity for further 
promotion” (Westermann, 2005, p. 208).  
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“continuum of destructiveness” or Darley’s (1992, pp. 207-208) “conversion process”. 
 
It is important to note that some shooting squad leaders expressed an interest in 
saving the Jews, not because of the psychological difficulty associated with the killings, 
but because (like the Nazi “productionists” in the ghettos) they believed that by killing the 
Jews they were wasting a valuable source of labour (Longerich, 2005, p. 211).  Certain 
influential members of the Wehrmacht, and later the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern 
Territories, expressed similar concerns (Breitman, 1991, pp. 216-217; Breitman, 2000, pp. 
81, 85; Lower, 2002, pp. 8-9). 
 
However, for the shooting squad commanders, the most common concern was the 
detrimental impact the killing was having on their men’s psychological well-being.  Just as 
Bach-Zelewski had done, other leaders—for example, Police Lieutenant Colonel Max 
Montua (Breitman, 2000, p. 75)—also confronted Himmler about the impact the 
“burdening of the soul” was having on the rank and file.  In 1942, Heinz Jost, the new 
commander of Einsatzgruppe A, had became so concerned about the mental state of some 
of his men that he also felt it necessary to directly confront Himmler.  Jost got no further 
than Bach-Zelewski and Montua: “ ‘I was asked [by Himmler], ‘Are you a philosopher?  
What is the meaning of this?  What do you mean, problems?  All that is concerned are our 
orders’ ’ ” (Rhodes, 2002, p. 227).  Himmler’s response may have been strategic: by 
refusing to sympathise with his subordinates’ concerns, he ensured that most of them 
would return to their troops and just say “orders are orders”.  They would then keep 
pushing their men until they grew accustomed to their grisly tasks, or else broke down.  
When some did break down, Himmler simply advised that they be sent home and replaced 
with another shooter.  Thus, Gustave Fix of Sonderkommando 6 said: “I would also like to 
mention that as a result of the considerable psychological pressures, there were numerous 
men who were no longer capable of conducting executions and who thus had to be 
replaced by other men” (Klee, et al., 1988, p. 60).  And as Rhodes (2002, p. 154) has 
noted: “Hitler’s executioners may have been willing, but they were not always able.”   
 
Himmler’s attrition and replacement policy was likely to have had another, 
unanticipated, impact on the killing toll.  Those carrying out the slaughter may have been, 
as Browning (1992) and Goldhagen (1996) agree, “ordinary”.  But as Hannah Arendt (as 
cited in Naumann, 1966, p. xxvii) noted, time saw the attrition and replacement policy 
eventually produce a concentration of ordinary men who differed from those who dropped 
out, in that they could more regularly handle the intense strain associated with their bloody 
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tasks.  Therefore, the ordinary German men who remained differed significantly from 
those who dropped out, in that the former were not just willing, they were also able.  As 
implied in the infamous Jäger Report, written for the “realist” bureaucrats in Berlin, for the 
bigger jobs some Germans were certainly more able than others.  For example, before 
presenting a ledger-style list of over 130,000 victims killed between 7 July and 25 
November 1941 by the highly destructive Einsatzkommando 3, Jäger stated: “Following 
the formation of a raiding squad under the command of SS-Obersturmführer Hamann and 
8-10 reliable men from the Einsatzkommando the following actions were conducted in 
cooperation with Lithuanian partisans [italics added]” (Klee et al. 1988, p. 46). 
 
Somewhat like Milgram’s subjects, many of the German shooters seem to have felt 
that, short of total disobedience, they were stuck with Himmler’s seemingly relentless 
orders.  With Himmler’s rationalisations—mere words—proving incapable of relieving 
them of the anguish generated by the perceptually intense spectacle of the shootings, it 
became obvious to most that if they wanted to avoid breaking down and/or keep up the 
appearances of being “hard”, they would have to find their own ways of relieving their 
“burdening of the soul”.   
 
 
10.5.2 Application of Bottom-Up Strain Resolving Mechanisms 
 
Many perpetrators relied on alcohol to reduce the emotional stress generated by 
shooting their victims.  As Hilberg (1961, p. 249) argued: “Most of them were drunk most 
of the time—only the ‘idealists’ refrained from the use of alcohol.”  As one such non-
drinker from Reserve Police Battalion 101 stated: “ ‘Most of the other comrades drank so 
much solely because of the many shootings of Jews, for such a life was quite intolerable 
sober’ ” (Browning, 1992, p. 82).  Karl Kretschmer (from Sonderkommando 4a) explained 
in a letter to his family the effect of abstinence: “We have to eat and drink well because of 
the nature of our work, as I have described to you in detail.  Otherwise we would crack up 
[italics original]” (Klee et al., 1988, p. 168).  For some, alcohol was rationed and became a 
central part of the exterminatory process before, during, and/or after the mass-shootings.  
For example: “due to a deterioration of morale among his own men” Alfred Filbert’s of 
Einsatzkommando 9 “had to be issued with increasing rations of vodka to carry out their 
killing orders” (as cited in Dicks, 1972, p. 207).  And in relation to Police Battalion 322:  
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In Gargzdai, Kretinga and Palanga, coveted schnapps rations were distributed 
following each Judenaktion . . . . Within the framework of seelische Betreuung 
(pastoral care), social get-togethers in the evenings . . . took place in order to wipe 
out the impressions of the day (Kwiet, 1998, p. 20, as cited in Rhodes, 2002, p. 
168). 
 
Some shooters seemed to rely on alcohol’s ability to induce memory loss—“wipe out the 
impressions of the day”—something normally described as a negative side effect (Jung, 
2001, p. 323).  Other than lowering perpetrators’ inhibitions, alcohol acted as a 
pharmacological drug, dulling the senses, and reducing their ability to accurately receive 
and then respond to perceptual information (Jung, 2001, p. 322).   
 
The fact that in the early stages of the mass shootings many (although certainly not 
all) Jews went to their deaths without offering much resistance may also have reduced the 
perceptual intensity of what would otherwise have been for the executioners a much more 
emotionally disturbing task.  Consider the following quotation by a Wehrmacht cadet 
officer based in the Ukraine in August 1941: 
 
What struck me particularly was the calmness and discipline of these [Jewish] 
people . . . . The marksmen were members of the SS.  On the orders of a superior 
they fired shots at the heads of these people with their carbines . . . .  Sometimes the 
tops of their skulls flew up into the air . . . . The people who were to be shot walked 
towards this grave as though they were taking part in a procession.  They walked in 
a line, each person with their hands on the shoulders of the person in front.  They 
went composed and quietly to their deaths.  I saw only two women weep the whole 
time I observed such executions.  I found it simply inexplicable (Klee et al. 1988, p. 
140). 
 
This description may have been an attempt to “blame the victims”, but it was not an 
uncommon one.  Hermann Friedrich Graebe witnessed a similar event on 5 October 1943: 
 
Without screaming or weeping these [Jewish] people undressed, stood around in 
family groups, kissed each other, said farewells and waited for a sign from another 
S.S.-man, who stood near the pit, also with a whip in his hand.  During the 15 
minutes that I stood near the pit I heard no complaint or plea for mercy 
(Musmanno, 1961, p. 91; see also Gitelman, 1997, pp. 282-283; Johnson & 
Reuband, 2005, pp. 239-240).  
 
Other witnesses, like Alfred Metzner, suggested that some Jews went to the trouble of 
reducing the stressful nature of the executioners’ task by going to their deaths in a very 
orderly—some might say considerate—manner: “ ‘It was amazing . . . how the Jews 
stepped into the graves, with only mutual condolences in order to strengthen their spirits 
 218 
and in order to ease the work of the execution commandos’ ” (Hilberg, 1961, p. 249).181 
 
The Gypsies (Roma) frequently caused greater difficulties for the German shooting 
squads.  As Lieutenant Colonel Walther stated on 1 November 1941:  
 
Shooting the Jews is easier than shooting the gypsies [sic].  I have to admit that the 
Jews are very composed as they go to their death—they stand very calmly—while 
the gypsies wail and scream and move about constantly when they are already 
standing at the execution site (Benz, 1999, p. 86). 
 
However, the mentally ill put up most resistance.  After shooting 748 mentally ill 
Lithuanians in October 1941 because they were “a ‘danger’ to security”, Einsatzgruppe A 
were asked by the Wehrmacht to repeat the exercise in a similar institution (Hilberg, 1961, 
p. 218).  Stahlecker refused, pointing out that if the Wehrmacht deemed the task so 
necessary then they should do it themselves (Hilberg, 1961, pp. 217-218).  What 
Stahlecker and his men had discovered was that these institutionalised people refused to 
follow instructions, and became hysterical.  Consequently, they were often difficult to kill 
instantly with one shot (thus heightening and prolonging the perpetrators’ stress).  Like 
Stahlecker, other commanders encountered similar difficulties (Arad, Krakowski & 
Spector, 1989, p. 228; Headland, 1992, p. 64).  The mentally ill were suddenly no longer a 
“danger” to security, and their execution by firing squad was no longer deemed so 
“necessary” after all.  The prospective victim pool contracted, and attention shifted to those 
categories of victims who, like the Jews, generated less “burdening of the soul”.   
 
The irony in the resistance of the mentally ill and the passivity of the “sane” Jews 
has been highlighted in the literature.  For example, after Einsatzkommando 5 had shot a 
group of mentally ill patients in Kiev, the men then experienced the accompanying  
“ ‘heavy mental burden’ ”.  Headland (1992, p. 64) has drawn attention to the apparently 
“twisted thinking of these men”.  It was “much easier to kill people who were sane” 
(Headland, 1992, p. 64).   
 
However, it was the way the German executioners used their firearms that proved 
most effective in reducing the perceptual intensity generated by mass-shootings.  The 
shooting techniques evolved over time.  The pattern no doubt differed among 
                                                 
181
 Hilberg (1961) has also emphasised this issue: “The entire Jewish community, and particularly the Jewish 
leadership, now concentrated all its efforts in one direction—to make the ordeal bearable, to make death 
easy” (p. 668).  However, as the Warsaw ghetto uprising and prisoner revolts at Auschwitz and Treblinka (to 
be discussed later) showed, Jewish resistance was hardly insignificant.   
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independently operating killing squads.  But the more stressful and inefficient techniques 
were everywhere eventually replaced by less stressful and more efficient techniques that 
emerged over time through a process of trail and error and word of mouth. 
 
 
10.5.3 Strain Resolving Mechanism of the ad hoc Trial and Error “Exploratory” Shooting 
Technique 
 
When starting out on their shooting campaigns, many squad commanders employed 
the only method of killing they knew—the military execution.  That is, from a reasonably 
short distance, the executioners were assigned to shoot at one victim each (facing them in a 
line up).   
 
 
 
Figure 18: “Einsatzgruppen mass shooting-1941”.182 
 
 
As a member of Einsatzgruppe C described: “In Rovno I had to participate in the first 
shooting . . . . Each member of the firing-squad had to shoot one person.  We were 
instructed to aim at the head from a distance of about ten metres” (Klee, et al., 1988, p. 62).  
After firing at five civilians, this German pulled out due to “nervous strain” (Klee, et al., 
1988, p. 62).  In an attempt to alleviate this strain a different style of military execution 
evolved, whereby several shooters were required to fire at each victim.  Soon after the start 
of the campaign, on 12 July 1941 Einsatzkommando member Felix Landau described such 
an execution in his diary: 
 
                                                 
182
 Retrieved October, 2008, from: http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_yad/magazine/data6/Browning.html 
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Six of us had to shoot them.  The job was assigned thus: three at the heart, three at 
the head.  I took the heart.  The shots were fired and the brains whizzed through the 
air.  Two in the head is too much.  They almost tear it off.  Almost all of them fell 
to the ground without a sound (Klee, et al., 1988, p. 97). 
 
Milgram’s Peer Administers Shock condition was later reminiscent of this particular style 
of military execution.  It dispersed the nervous strain among multiple subjects (and firing 
squad members), thus diminishing any sense of individual responsibility for each person’s 
contributions.  As the commander of Einsatzgruppe D, Otto Ohlendorf, said: “I always 
gave orders for several people to shoot simultaneously, in order to avoid any individual 
having to take direct, personal responsibility” (Klee, et al., 1988, p. 60).183   
 
The earlier executions produced other problems.  Because the victims collapsed 
where they were shot, the shooting squad members had to dig graves to hide all evidence 
of the killings.  However, this meant that the perpetrators had to confront directly the 
horrific human consequences of their actions.  According to Grossman (1995, p. 112), 
confronting a person one has just killed can significantly accentuate the initial trauma 
“since some of the psychological buffer created by a midrange kill disappears upon seeing 
the victim at close range.”  The executioners learnt early in the campaign that it was both 
physically and psychologically less burdensome if some of the victims were forced to dig 
the graves before they were shot.  Then all those about to be shot were required to stand on 
an edge of the grave, from which upon being shot they would fall into the grave, and 
quickly disappear from view (Musmanno, 1961, p. 76).  The graves were then rapidly 
covered over, before the killing squads moved on.   
 
                                                 
183
 In the early stages, other squads went through a similar step-by-step learning process. Consider the 
experiences in early August 1941 of Sonderkommando 4a, where according to August Häfner: “A group of 
Jews was lined up by the edge of the grave.  There were about ten to twelve of them.  They were standing 
facing the marksmen.  There was one marksman for each Jew.  Then the platoon-leader of the Waffen-SS 
platoon gave the order to fire.  The victims fell backwards into the grave.  When it became apparent that 
many of the victims did not die immediately the method of execution was changed.  Then a discussion was 
held . . . . The outcome of this discussion was an order to the Waffen-SS platoon to aim at the head for the 
rest of the execution.  The result of this was that if the marksmen hit their target the tops of the victims’ 
skulls flew into the air and bits of their brains were spattered in the faces of the firing-squad.  Kompanie-
Führer [company commander] Grafhorst, who felt responsible for his men, was strongly opposed to this type 
of execution.  And so once again the method of shooting was changed [presumably to shoot at the heart 
which also proved inadequate] . . . . During this discussion it was said that this type of shooting was 
intolerable for both the victim and firing-squad members.  This was because when the firing squad aimed at 
the heart, in my view, about twenty-five per cent were off the mark and when the victims were shot in the 
head, not only did the victims have to look at the firing-squad but in addition five per cent were not killed 
outright” (Klee, et. al., 1988, p. 114).  Reserve Police Battalion 101 went through a similar learning process 
during their first few mass shootings (see Browning, 1992, pp. 55-87). 
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Figure 19: “Jewish men are forced to dig their own graves before being executed”.184 
 
 
Although victims quickly disappeared into the graves, the perpetrators could not 
shoot them without having to look at them relatively close-up, just before and during the 
executions.  Bauman (1989, p. 26) has pointed out that consequently the executioners were 
inclined to distance themselves as far as possible from their victims.  This strategy, 
however, only created another problem: less accurate shooting, with some victims falling 
into the graves unharmed or, more often, seriously wounded rather than dead.  After they 
had been buried alive, some would try to claw themselves out of the grave to escape. 
 
 
 
Figure 20: “An Einsatzgruppe during the execution of Soviet civilians in Kraigonev, 
USSR.  Summer 1941.”185  
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 Retrieved September, 2008, from: http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/h-einz-42.htm 
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 Retrieved October, 2008, from: http://www.nachfolgeprozesse.nuernberg.de/english/trials/trials10.html 
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Nazi commanders soon demanded changes to this shooting technique, which they found 
abhorrent.  For example, an S.S.-Commissioner-General complained in a letter to the 
Reich Minister: 
 
Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort.  
To bury seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their graves 
again, is such a base and filthy act that this incident as such should be reported to 
the Führer and Reichsmarschal (Musmanno, 1961, p. 82).186 
 
As with Himmler at the execution in Minsk, it was not the killing of innocent people that 
concerned the S.S.-Commissioner-General.  Rather, it was the method of killing that he 
found reprehensible.   
 
The firing squads’ accuracy had to be improved.  To do so the perpetrators had to 
move closer to their victims.  Of course, the closer they got, the more they could see and 
hear, intensifying their psychological burden.  It was a dilemma.  Many years later, a 
Vietnam Special Forces veteran related his own similar experiences to Grossman (1995): “ 
‘When you get up close and personal,’ he drawled with a cud of chewing tobacco in his 
cheek, ‘where you can hear ’em scream and see ’em die,’ and here he spit[s] tobacco for 
emphasis, ‘it’s a bitch’ ” (p. 117).  Because they were defenseless and often acquiescent 
civilians, the Germans had opportunities to manipulate their victims in ways that the 
Vietnam veteran could not.  To maximise accuracy, the executioners had to see exactly 
where they were shooting.  As they moved closer to their victims one of the ad hoc 
techniques commonly used to alleviate the psychological strain was to have the victims 
turn their backs to the shooters.  This enabled the shooters to avoid any eye contact with 
their victims.  Nor could the perpetrators then see the fearful expressions on the faces of 
their imminent victims.  In Grossman’s (1995, p. 128) words: 
 
The eyes are the window of the soul, and if one does not have to look into the eyes 
when killing, it is much easier to deny the humanity of the victim.  The eyes 
bulging out ‘like prawns’ and blood shooting out of the mouth are not seen.  The 
victim remains faceless, and one never needs to know one’s victim as a person.  
And the price most killers have to pay for a close-range kill—the memory of the 
‘face terrible, twisted in pain and hate, yes such hate’—this price need never be 
paid if we can simply avoid looking at our victim’s face.  
 
                                                 
186
 For other examples of victims digging themselves out of graves see Regional Commissioner Slutsk’s 30 
October 1941 report to the General Commissioner in Minsk (Browning, 1992, p. 22).  See also Klee et al. 
(1988, p. 176) and, from a survivor’s perspective, see Gitelman (1997, pp. 275-278). 
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Also, because the victims faced away from their executioners the latter were not so directly 
forced to hear any crying or screaming.   
 
 
 
Figure 21: Execution of Jews by the Einsatzkommando in Kovno (Berenbaum, 1997, p. 
115). 
 
 
This method, however, was also not without its problems.  For example, sometimes 
victims’ heads exploded when hit by a bullet, a sight the shooter could not avoid seeing.  
Such images haunted some of the shooters.  After some experimentation the Genickschuss, 
or neck-shot, method became what Goldhagen (1996, p. 217) has termed the 
“recommended shooting technique”.  This technique required the victim face away from 
the executioner, or lie face-down on the ground.  Then, from point-blank range, the shooter 
would fire a single shot into the nape of the neck (just above the shoulders).  The bullet 
would enter the back of the neck, producing only a small entrance wound and severing the 
victim’s spinal cord, thus causing instant death.  If the victim was lying face down the 
shooter could not see the larger exit wound.  Compared to some of the earlier shooting 
techniques, the Genickschuss method was un-survivable, relatively clean, and because it 
resulted in instant death, was perceived by many Nazis as being more “humane”.  
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Figure 22: A member of Einsatzgruppe D shooting a man sitting by a mass grave in 
Vinnitsa, Ukraine, in 1942.  The back of the photograph is inscribed “The last Jew in 
Vinnitsa” (Berenbaum, 2006, p. 93). 
 
 
Perpetrators came to find mass killing more easily doable, by using such techniques.  As 
Hilberg (1961, p. 218) has argued: “For many, undoubtedly, the task became just another 
job, to be done correctly and mechanically, i.e., the men made some sort of ‘adjustment’ to 
the situation”. 
 
With fewer psychologically fragile perpetrators, and more increasingly “harder” 
ordinary Germans involved in the killings, ambitious leaders in the field continued to come 
up with innovative changes to the shooting technique.  Probably the most significant 
development was Higher SS/Police Leader, Friedrich Jeckeln’s, “Sardinenpackung” 
shooting method, introduced at the end of July 1941 (Rhodes, 2002, p. 114).  A minor 
bureaucrat, August Meier, has described how this technique evolved and what it entailed:  
 
I still particularly recall an Aktion in Schepetovka which stands out in my mind as 
extraordinarily gruesome.  It involved about a hundred people.  Women and 
children were among those shot.  Jeckeln said: ‘Today we’ll stack them like 
sardines.’  The Jews had to lie layer upon layer in an open grave and were then 
killed with neck shots from machine pistols, pistols and rifles.  That meant they had 
to lie face down on those previously shot [whereas] in other executions they were 
shot standing up and fell into the grave or were dragged in . . . . I don’t know if 
Jeckeln did any shooting, but I don’t believe so (Wilhelm, 1991, p. 231, as cited in 
Rhodes, 2002, p. 114). 
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This method of mass execution proved to be very effective.  According to Hilberg (1961, 
p. 196), by the end of August 1941, Jeckeln’s 7,000 strong Kommandostab SS Brigade 
One, which Breitman (2000, p. 41) believes “were not part of a political-ideological elite” 
had shot 44,125 civilians in the Western Ukraine—a figure which Büchler (1986, p. 17) 
believes exceeded those of any other units that month.  Other shooting squads soon 
adopted this technique. 
 
 
10.5.4 Bureaucratisation of the Mass-Shootings 
 
By late September 1941, Jeckeln’s highly efficient “Sardinenpackung” method was 
used at the front end of an assembly-line process of mass murder.  During the Babi Yar 
massacre in the Ukraine, Jeckeln’s execution team showed they could kill more people 
more quickly than any other unit (see Rhodes, 2002, p. 175).  A truck driver named Höfer 
described what he saw: 
 
The Ukrainians led them past a number of different places where one after the other 
they had to remove their luggage, then their coats, shoes and overgarments and also 
underwear.  They also had to leave their valuables in a designated place.  There was 
a special pile for each article of clothing.  It all happened very quickly and anyone 
who hesitated was kicked or pushed by the Ukrainians to keep them moving . . . . 
Once undressed, the Jews were led into a ravine which was about 150 metres long, 
30 metres wide and a good 15 metres deep.  Two or three narrow entrances led to 
this ravine through which the Jews were channeled.  When they reached the bottom 
of the ravine . . . . there was a ‘packer’ at either entrance to the ravine.  These 
‘packers’ were Schutzpolizisten, whose job it was to lay the victim on top of the 
other corpses so that all the marksman had to do as he passed was fire a shot (Klee 
et al. 1988, pp. 63-66). 
 
In just two days 33,771 Jews were killed in the way.  Specialists removed clothing and 
valuables, men on cordon duty channeled the victims towards the sardine “packers” who 
prepared them for the arrival of the hardened “marksmen” who, as they passed by, could 
casually yet rapidly carry out the killing.  Such a precise division of labour in an assembly-
line of death was instrumental in generating what was, at this stage of the Holocaust, a 
staggering statistic of mass murder.   
 
 However, even some of the “ordinary” shooters who had been hardened by several 
months of killing were struggling.  For example, Kurt Werner, one of the German 
marksmen at Babi Yar, admitted: “It’s almost impossible to imagine what nerves of steel it 
took to carry out that dirty work down there.  It was horrible” (Klee, et al., 1988, p. 67).  
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With a seemingly endless supply of victims to be killed, the question was: how long could 
men like Werner keep this up?   
 
The reports submitted to Berlin by the shooting squad leaders rarely mention the 
existence of any psychological problems among the perpetrators.  But as Headland (1992) 
pointed out: “there is much proof that this was often a serious problem with these men and 
that this problem demanded constant attention” (p. 211).187  Consider Lifton’s (1986, p. 15) 
interview with a former Wehrmacht neuropsychiatrist who, after having treated many of 
those affected, believed that about 20 percent of the men suffered from psychological 
disorders associated with the shootings.  In November 1941, international lawyer Helmuth 
von Moltke (as cited in Streit, 1994) wrote in a letter to his wife that at least one hospital 
existed “ ‘where SS men are cared for who have broken down while executing woman and 
children’ ” (p. 116).  SS-Obersturmführer Albert Hartl has delved further into the concerns 
of another doctor: 
 
SS-Gruppenführer Thomas was . . . very preoccupied with the psychological 
repercussions of the Einsatz on his people.  From my conversations with him I 
know that these effects took many different forms.  There were people whose 
participation awakened in them the most evil sadistic impulses . . . . The Einsätze 
also had the reverse effect on some of the SS men detailed to the firing–squads.  
These men were overcome with uncontrollable fits of crying and suffered health 
breakdowns.  Thomas once told me that a very common manifestation in members 
of these firing-squads was temporary impotence.  It also happened that one member 
of the Einsatzgruppe who had participated in mass shootings one night suddenly 
succumbed to a type of mental derangement and began to shoot wildly about him, 
killing and wounding several men (Klee et al. 1988, pp. 83-84). 
 
Some of the commanders of these execution squads, who themselves never had to 
kill anybody, were susceptible to “burdening of the soul”.  SS-Obersturmführer August 
Häfner has described the mental breakdown of Paul Blobel (leader of Sonderkommando 
4a), in July 1941, and his desperate calls for a less stressful and more efficient killing 
method: 
 
I found my unit, they were all running around like lost sheep.  I realized that 
something must have happened and asked what was wrong.  Someone told me that 
[Standartenführer] Blobel had had a nervous breakdown and was in bed in his room 
. . . . He was talking confusedly.  He was saying that it was not possible to shoot so 
                                                 
187
 In support of this, Sereny (2000) has said: “As we know from many soldiers’ letters found over the last 
years, and hundreds of statements by German witnesses in the Einsatzgruppen trials in West Germany, the 
killings put an intolerable strain on personnel—despite liberal supplies of alcohol and sex—and provoked 
protests from the Wehrmacht” (p. 141). 
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many Jews and that what was needed was a plough to plough them into the ground.  
He had completely lost his mind (Klee et al. 1988, p. 111).188 
 
Other commanders, including Einsatzkommando 3’s Karl Jäger (Fleming, 1984, p. 98), and 
Higher SS/Police Leader Bach-Zelewski (Rhodes, 2002, p. 226), suffered similar 
breakdowns.  The shootings appear to have affected the mental well-being even of 
Einsatzgruppe B commander, Artur Nebe (Rhodes, 2002, p. 225; Rubenstein & Roth, 
1987, p. 134).  The most popular and effective means of reducing or even eliminating the 
“burdening of the soul” was to ensure that Eastern European German collaborators were 
increasingly deployed at the killing end of this bureaucratised process of mass murder. 
 
 
10.5.5 The Insertion of “End Special Units” 
 
It was obvious to Himmler that even though they did not have guns, some of the 
anti-Semitic Eastern Europeans appeared much more eager than his own men to attack 
Jews.  So he would have seen the prospective “gains” to be had from arming them.  This 
possibility seems to have been raised at a 16 July 1941 meeting in Berlin, but Hitler was 
adamant that the Eastern Europeans should never be armed (Matthäus, 2004, p. 273).  
However, in late July 1941, as his Kommandostab SS Cavalry Brigade was desperately 
herding Jewish women and children into the quicksand, in total disobedience to Hitler’s 
emphatic order Himmler “authorized the creation of auxiliary police forces from the 
reliable non-Communist elements among Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and 
Byelorussians” (Breitman, 2000, p. 52).  He apparently did so “because ‘the task of the 
police in the occupied eastern territories can not be accomplished with the manpower of 
the police and SS now deployed or yet to be deployed’ ” (Browning, 2004, p. 310).  But as 
Breitman (2000, p. 53) has observed: 
 
The creation of Schutzmannschaften and their future use as executioners reflected 
more than just a shortage of German policeman.  Whereas Himmler, Daluege, 
Bach-Zelewski, and some other high officials had some concerns for the morale of 
German police, they did not much care what happened psychologically to the non-
Germans as long as there were enough of them to carry out their appointed tasks 
[italics added]. 
 
Simply increasing the manpower was unlikely to work, but it seems Himmler suspected 
that augmenting a certain type of manpower might.  This may explain Himmler’s 
disobedience.  By the end of 1941, 33,000 native collaborators had been added to the 
                                                 
188
 Also see Browning (1992, p. 69). 
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German extermination squads (Browning, 1994, p. 140).  Six months later the number had 
risen to 165,000, and by January 1943 it had almost doubled to 300,000 (Browning, 1995, 
p. 106). 
 
However, simply arming large numbers of Eastern Europeans was, by itself, 
inadequate.  The task at hand demanded meticulous logistical and organisational 
preparation.189  Under the careful management of the German authorities, their Eastern 
European collaborators were slotted into the end of the shooting assembly line where they 
could efficiently perform their specialist type of labour. 
 
A mass shooting undertaken during August 1941 in the Ukrainian village of 
Byelaya Tserkov illustrates the way in which the collaborators were used.  Immediately 
after the initial shooting of the Jewish men, women, and two boys the Germans involved 
chose not to shoot the children who remained.  Instead, they were held in a house without 
food or water.  Most of the children were later shot by some Ukrainian auxiliaries.  
However, the Ukrainians left behind the 90 or so children under the age of seven—who 
were mainly toddlers and babies.  Having recovered from his mental breakdown, Paul 
Blobel discussed the situation with his subordinate Häfner: 
 
Then Blobel ordered me to have the children executed.  I asked him, ‘By whom 
should the shooting be carried out?’  He answered, ‘By the Waffen–SS.’  I raised 
an objection and said, ‘They are all young men.  How are we going to answer to 
them if we make them shoot small children?’  To this he said, ‘Then use your men.’  
I then said, ‘How can they do that?  They have small children as well.’  This tug-of-
war lasted about ten minutes . . . . I suggested that the Ukrainian militia of the 
Feldkommandant should shoot the children.  There were no objections from either 
side to this suggestion (Klee et al., 1988, p. 153). 
 
Regarding the proposed execution site, Häfner continued: 
 
The Wehrmacht had already dug a grave.  The children were brought along in a 
tractor . . . . The Ukrainians were standing round trembling.  The children were 
taken down from the tractor.  They were lined up along the top of the grave and 
shot so that they fell into it.  The Ukrainians did not aim at any particular part of the 
body.  They fell into the grave.  The wailing was indescribable.  I shall never forget 
                                                 
189
 According to one Einsatzgruppen report: “ ‘The Romanians proceed against the Jews without any plans.  
There would be nothing to complain about the very numerous shootings of Jews if the technical preparations 
and implementation were not so inadequate’ ” (Browning, 2004, p. 400).  Dicks (1972) has also pointed out 
that at one SS officer’s trial the prosecutor reported the former “stopped the wild shooting of the Lithuanian 
auxiliary police, but he substituted for it the routine mechanical slaughter of the Chicago stockyards at the 
rate of 500 [Jews] a day’ ” (p. 206). 
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the scene throughout my life . . . . Many children were hit four or five times before 
they died (Klee, et al., 1988, p. 154). 
 
The rejuvenated Blobel clearly held no qualms in ordering the Ukrainians to undertake this 
mass execution.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, he chose not to attend.   
 
The Eastern Europeans were increasingly given the killing tasks, like the shooting 
of women and children, that the Germans often shied away from (see Matthäus, 2004, p. 
275).  As a member of Einsatzgruppe A stated: 
 
The orders for the third or fourth Einsatz were particularly important because they 
gave instructions for members of the local population to be used to carry out the 
actual dirty work, to which end special units should be set up.  The purpose of this 
measure was to preserve the psychological equilibrium of our own people [italics 
added] (Klee, et al., 1988, p. 81). 
 
Although the German supervisors and executioners may not have liked to admit it, the 
locals in these “end special units” (that is, the last and most stressful link in the 
bureaucratic killing chain) were responsible for producing some of the bleakest statistics.  
For example, it will be recalled that the Jäger report (which listed the deaths of over 
130,000 civilians killed in less than five months) stated the massacres were undertaken by 
only eight to 10 “reliable” Germans in “cooperation with Lithuanian partisans” (Klee et al. 
1988, p. 46).  As Matthäus (2004) said of the Lithuanians under Jäger’s control: “these 
men contributed massively towards the staggering figure” (p. 273).190   
 
The most common strategy that was used to prevent members of the German 
execution squads becoming, as Bach-Zelewski stated, “neurotics or savages” was one that 
(unlike alcohol, and the evolving shooting technique) made it possible for the German 
perpetrators to engage in total perceptual avoidance.  As a security-police interpreter in 
Liepaja stated: “It was only in the early days that members of our section had to man the 
firing-squad.  Later we had a Kommando of Latvians who made up the firing-squad” (Klee 
et al., 1988, p. 126).  The reason this strategy proved so popular among the Germans—as 
Milgram’s Peer Administers Shocks experiment later demonstrated, when an actor was 
placed at the “sharp” end of the process—was that it enabled all the non-shooters to make  
                                                 
190
 As MacQueen (1997, p. 100) concluded: “Jager’s ‘achievement’ has to be considered largely as a triumph 
of managing the Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft forces (some 8,000 men by the end of 1941) and the 
Lithuanian Police, without whom this deadly work would not have been remotely possible.” 
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their own essential contributions to the killing process (victim capture, round up, cordon 
duty, and so on) without feeling personally responsible for the deadly outcome.  With the 
help of the non-Germans as shooters, “Even at the lowest level of the Nazi hierarchy, one 
could play one’s part in the ‘final solution’ without dirtying one’s hands” (Lower, 2005, 
pp. 251-252).   
 
The use of Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and others at the killing-end of the 
extermination assembly line (the most destructive of whom were, for obvious reasons, 
often deployed as specialists outside their homelands),191 raises another question.  If the 
psychological strain generated by shooting civilians was as debilitating as many Germans 
attested after the war, why did the Eastern Europeans not seem to experience comparable 
levels of strain and trauma?  One possible reason may be that in the wake of Operation 
Barbarossa, many of the Eastern Europeans in the armed forces automatically became 
prisoners of war.  Therefore, it was only after they agreed to do the Germans’ dirty work 
that their status changed and, as a result, they became less likely to die from starvation 
(Arad, 1987, pp. 20-21; Browning, 1992, p. 52).192  Therefore, they too may have struggled 
with the shootings, but continued to participate in an effort to secure their own survival.  
Another reason maybe that, as Bauer (2001, p. 103) pointed out earlier, the Germans who 
were involved in killing all of the Jews came from a mildly anti-Semitic society.  To 
ensure that the orders of those in Berlin were met, the Germans frequently required the 
help of those who more likely actually hated the Jews and, as a result, might be more 
willing to act on such feelings.193  In this regard, Breitman (1991, p. 204) has recorded:  
 
After the war Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski explained that the extermination 
camps arose because Germans and Central Europeans were not suited to be mass 
executioners.  Stalin, he said, always had people to employ for this purpose—for 
example, the Latvians.  Although the Nazis found some individuals to serve as 
killers, there was no collective eagerness to do so.  The extermination camp . . . was 
something that the Russians could not accomplish: it reflected the German gift for 
organization.  Bureaucrats created it, he concluded. 
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 For example, in Belorussia the locals were not keen to collaborate in the extermination process.  The 
Germans frequently imported shooters from Latvia and Lithuania to undertake this work (Matthäus, 2004, p. 
268).  
 
192
 The only non-Germans who were to be fed during the Soviet invasion were, as Goering himself said, 
those “ ‘performing important tasks for Germany’ ” (Herbert, 2000, p. 257, as cited in Rees, 2005, p. 44). 
 
193
 Arad (1987, p. 20) has encapsulated all of the above and other factors likely to have motivated the Eastern 
European into undertaking the shootings. 
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10.6 Conclusion 
 
A variety of top-down and bottom-up techniques were used to try and ease the 
psychological burden associated with engaging in the mass shootings.  Himmler and other 
leading figures offered a variety of BFs and SR-rationalisations.  And there were the trial 
and error discoveries within the German execution squads of methods to reduce the 
perceptual intensity of the mass-shootings.  These included the heavy consumption of 
alcohol, taking advantage of the more docile victims, the evolving shooting technique 
and—after the bureaucratisation of the shooting process (Lower, 2002, p. 7)—the almost 
exponential dependence on Eastern European collaborators to carry out the shootings.  As 
Lower (2005, p. 251) argued: 
 
The Nazi implementation of the “final solution” was an ongoing invention of 
central and peripheral leaders.  Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich defined the aim . . . . 
Yet, [once legitimised] in its implementation, the ‘process’ of mass murder 
developed from the ground up . . . . the most remarkable administrative pattern was 
one of ad hoc collaboration.  
  
In the end, although the use of guns required a large number of executioners, 
complex logistics, and was hard to keep hidden from public view, it nonetheless proved 
capable of killing people on a horrendous scale.  Despite the initially slow start to the 
shooting campaign and perhaps even to the surprise of the leading Nazis themselves, by 
the end of the war the use of this killing method ended about 1,400,000 Jewish lives 
(Hilberg, 2003, p. 1320).  About 25 percent of all the Jewish victims killed during the 
Holocaust perished in these open air shootings  
 
Nonetheless, as far as the Nazis were concerned, the major limitation with this 
means of killing was that although (like starvation) it enabled the executioners to avoid 
having to experience tactile perceptual stimulation, guns (unlike starvation) required them 
to see the connection between themselves, their act of killing, and the effects on their 
victims.  While throughout the war the Nazi regime never completely abandoned this 
killing method, as 1941 came to an end they had concluded that, despite having become 
highly efficient, the use of firearms alone could not provide any long-term “solution” to 
their European—perhaps worldwide?— “Jewish problem” (Lower, 2005, p. 245).  The 
main shortcoming with the use of guns was that they made many of the executioners feel 
directly responsible for their actions, thereby stimulating intense feelings of strain, guilt, 
trauma and, perhaps most commonly, repugnance.  What was needed instead was a more 
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impersonal (less perceptually perceivable and strain-inducing), more private, and less 
labour intensive, and even more industrially organised, method of mass extermination.   
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Chapter Eleven: Further Along the “Twisted Road” to 
Treblinka 
 
 
 [I]t was exceedingly difficult for the shooters to overlook the connection between shooting and 
killing . . . . Other murder techniques were therefore sought—such as would optically separate the 
killers from their victims—Bauman (1989, p. 26). 
 
When in December 1941 I was transferred to Rauff’s department he explained the situation to me, 
saying that the psychological and moral stress on the firing squads was no longer bearable and that 
therefore the gassing programme had been started—August Becker (as cited in Klee et al., 1988, p. 
69). 
 
 
It will be recalled that after Himmler had personally observed a mass-shooting, he 
requested that Nebe search for a new method of killing.  The intention of this chapter is to 
present the results of Himmler’s directive and the influence it had on what is referred to as 
Operation Reinhard: the extermination of all the Jews in the General Government.  The 
discussion reaffirms the importance of intuition, previous experience, and the ad hoc trial 
and error “exploratory” method of discovery in the invention and gradual refinement of the 
means of mass killing.  It also confirms the increasing bureaucratisation of the killing 
processes.   
 
 
11.1 Nebe’s Experiments  
 
After the mid-August 1941 mass-shooting in Minsk, Himmler, Wolff, Bach-
Zelewski, and Nebe visited a recently formed ghetto which had a large institution housing 
the mentally ill.  Relying on strain-resolving euphemistic language, Himmler casually 
suggested that Nebe “ ‘release’ ” (meaning “kill”) these people (Rhodes, 2002, p. 154).  
But shooting such people was extremely stressful, so Nebe informed Himmler that he 
(Nebe) “ ‘could not ask his troops to shoot these incurably insane people’ ” (Friedlander, 
1995, p. 141).  Nebe then inquired as to how he might carry out this task.  “ ‘Himmler said 
that today’s event had brought him to the conclusion that death by shooting was certainly 
not the most humane’ ” (Rhodes, 2002, p. 154).  Then, “Himmler asked Nebe ‘to turn over 
in his mind’ various other killing methods more humane than shooting” (Hilberg, 1961, p. 
219).   
 
Himmler knew that Nebe had overcome similar killing problems during the latter’s 
involvement in the Euthanasia programme (de Mildt, 1996, p. 56; Friedlander, 1995, pp. 
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54-55, 86-87).  Subsequent events reveal that this conversation came to powerfully 
influence the fate of the Jews and Gypsies who in the Polish ghettos had managed to avoid 
starvation and its related illnesses.  
 
Following Himmler’s request, Nebe soon consulted with Dr. Heess and acquired 
the help of a former colleague from the Euthanasia programme—the chemist, Albert 
Widmann (one of the inventors of the bottled (pure) carbon monoxide gassing technique).  
Both Heess and Widmann were from the Criminal Technology Unit in Berlin.  During the 
middle of September 1941 they engaged in their first ad hoc experiment.  Milgram’s 
Proximity Series would suggest that if Nebe’s and Widmann’s experiments were to 
diminish the “burdening of the soul”, they would have to reduce the perceptual intensity 
generated by the shootings.  Or, optimally, as in the Truly Remote Pilot, they would have 
to find a way for the perpetrators to avoid experiencing all sources of such stressful 
stimulation.  The duo’s first experiment, using explosives, was inadvertently a step in this 
direction.  According to Arad (1987, p. 10):  
 
Twenty-five mentally ill people were locked into two bunkers in a forest outside 
Minsk. The first explosion killed only some of them, and it took much time and 
trouble until the second explosion killed the rest.  Explosives therefore were 
unsatisfactory.   
 
It did not help that, along with the victims, explosives also tended to destroy the bunkers.  
Moreover, the victims’ body parts had to be retrieved (some of which were hanging from 
the branches of nearby trees) (Breitman, 1991, p. 201; Browning, 1985, p. 60; Friedlander, 
1995, p. 141).   
 
A group of men under Odilo Globocnik (the commander of the SS and Police in the 
districts of Lublin and Triest) were also struggling with the strain generated by the mass-
shootings.  A month later, during October 1941, they were independently experimenting 
with a similar method of killing.  Their experiment produced a killing technique, whereby 
victims were forced to lie in a ditch head-to-toe in batches of ten; and then the killers, 
while seeking cover, lobbed hand-grenades on top of them.  Again, body parts filled the 
air, and if anybody survived the perpetrators would then administer what they 
euphemistically referred to as “mercy shots”.  Globocnik’s men are believed to have 
murdered about 75,000 civilians with this killing technique (Breitman, 1991, p. 201).  
Although in the absence of these so-called “mercy shots”, this method often enabled the 
perpetrators to automatically avoid the horrific visual spectacle while killing.  Eventually, 
this method was also abandoned.  Like Nebe and Widmann before them, Globocnik’s men 
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continued to search for a less strain-inducing means of killing large numbers of victims.  
One of their experiments was even more of a failure, and for obvious reasons, was 
immediately abandoned.194 
 
The day after the failure of Nebe and Widmann’s explosives experiment, they 
moved to an asylum in Mogilev, where they embarked on a second experiment that, as it 
happened, enabled the perpetrators to avoid any disturbing visual spectacle while killing.  
Drawing on both an intuitive feeling for what Germans might willingly use, and also 
previous experiences, Nebe (with Widmann’s help) connected one end of a hose to the 
exhaust pipe of a running motor vehicle and the other end to a hermetically sealed room 
containing 20 to 30 mentally ill patients.195  A cheap, abundant, and mobile alternative gas 
to that used by the Tiergartenstraße 4 (T4) killers had been found.  Around this time, too, a 
similar experiment that led to the discovery of a second alternative gas was undertaken by 
Karl Fritzsch at the Auschwitz concentration camp.196  Also motivated by the desire for an 
alternative to the mass shootings, around this time period there were a variety of killing 
experiments being undertaken by Nazi officials, usually independently of one another.197  
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 A month later during November 1941, a number of Gestapo men, who Rhodes (2002, pp. 201-203) has 
assumed were some of Globocnik’s subordinates, poured slaked lime over a large group of Jews they had 
squeezed into a deep pit. The victims were slowly burned to death by the chemicals.  Rhodes believes the 
men were trying to combine the killing and decomposition of corpses into a single and therefore more 
efficient operation.  The experiment was deemed a failure “because the suffering of the victims was so 
extraordinary that it disturbed even perpetrators hardened by months of participation in mass shootings” 
(Rhodes, 2002, p. 203).  This method of killing increased both visual and auditory perceptual stimulation and 
extended it over a longer period.  
 
195
 Many years earlier Nebe, after having driven home drunk one evening, nearly killed himself when he 
parked his vehicle in his garage, failed to turn the motor off, and fell asleep (Browning, 2004, p. 355).   
 
196
 Soon after the start of Operation Barbarossa there was a sudden influx of Soviet POWs into the Auschwitz 
concentration camp in Poland.  Commandant Rudolf Hoess had been ordered to immediately execute the 
leaders (Breitman, 1991, p. 202; Hoess, 2001, pp. 124, 146, 185).  Hoess had them shot in small groups, but 
like other Germans elsewhere, it eventually got to the point where Hoess and his men ‘had had enough of . . . 
the mass killings by firing squad ordered by Himmler and Heydrich’ (Berenbaum, 1997, p. 184).  One day 
when Hoess was away, his deputy, Hauptsturmführer Karl Fritzsch, experimented with an extremely 
poisonous pesticide called Zyclon-B.  Zyclon-B consisted of small pellets which turned into gas when 
exposed to oxygen at a temperature of 25.7 degrees Celsius (Wellers, 1993, p. 206).  Fritzsch then came to 
the view that if Zyclon-B could easily kill vermin it probably could kill humans as well.  On 3 September 
1941 (less than two weeks before Nebe’s experiments) a large group of Soviet POWs and some Polish 
prisoners where placed in a sealed detention cell.  Pellets of the pesticide were then dropped into a small 
number of re-sealable vents in the roof.  The victims died soon afterwards (Hoess, 2001, pp. 146-147).  Upon 
Hoess’s return, Fritzsch replicated his experiment, and Hoess later admitting being surprised by the fact that 
Zyclon B killed the victims quickly: “A short, almost smothered cry, and it was all over” (Hoess, 2001, p. 
146).  Hoess was also “relieved to think that we were to be spared all those blood-baths” (Hoess, 2001, p. 
147).    
 
197
 At the Mauthausen concentration camp similar less “successful” killing experiments had taken place: 
“Construction of this basement labyrinth began in October 1941.  In the dark corridors and rooms inmates 
under sentence of death—‘special treatment’ was the euphemism—were hung after climbing onto an 
automatically operated, collapsible stool.  Others were lined up and shot from behind.  Deceived into 
believing they were to be measured or photographed (a device draped with a black cloth made to resemble a 
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Most failed or proved unviable, but the trial and error experiments by Nebe and Fritzsch 
gained prominence.  
 
Widmann’s trial after the war revealed that “Nebe discussed the technical aspects 
of the idea with Dr. Heess and together they brought the proposal before Heydrich who 
adopted it” (Arad, 1987, p. 11). 198  There is a similarity between Nebe’s invention of the 
exhaust gas chamber, and Milgram’s shock generator: both drew upon previous 
experiences and upon an intuitive hunch in the invention/selection of a means of inflicting 
harm they thought many people might use on others.  Before the end of September 1941, 
Nebe’s innovation was incorporated into one of the original gas vans.  Tests using this 
prototype were then undertaken on a group of Soviet POWs in Sachsenhausen 
concentration camp.  From the perspective of the actual killers the results were deemed so 
“satisfactory”, that it was decided to produce more killing vans than had originally been 
planned (Breitman, 1991, pp. 201-202; Browning, 2004, pp. 355-356).  A month or so after 
the tests the first vans off the production line were sent to the East, to be used on those 
victims who produced the greatest “burdening of the soul”—that is, the mentally ill, and 
women and children.  By 23 June 1942, twenty to thirty gas vans had been built, under the 
supervision of Walter Rauff in the RSHA Criminal Technical Institute (Arad, 1987, p. 11; 
Spektor, 1993, p. 54). 
 
 
11.2 Arrival of the Einsatzgruppen Gas Vans 
 
The first batch of gas vans invented by Nebe arrived in the Soviet interior and were 
immediately put to use.  A recipient of one of the vans was the leader of Einsatzkommando 
4a, Paul Blobel, who—as shown earlier—had suffered acute “burdening of the soul”.  
During his trial in 1947, Blobel stated: “ ‘In September or October 1941, I received a gas 
                                                                                                                                                    
camera stood nearby) the inmates pressed against a wall into which holes had been bored.  Through these 
openings an SS man, armed with a sub-caliber gun, fired into the victim’s neck.  After each execution, from 
behind the door of the adjoining mortuary an inmate swiftly emerged to wipe up the traces of the killing and 
drag away the body; he then closed the door just before the next victim arrived.  In this manner the inmates 
could be killed individually at a rate of 2 per minute, or up to 30 per hour [sic]” (Horwitz, 1990, p. 17).  As 
part of Himmler’s 14f13, many of the Mauthausen concentration camp members no longer capable of 
working were later sent then killed at the euthanasia gassing facility at Hartheim (de Mildt, 1996, p. 90). 
 
198
 “The Minsk-Mogilev experiments in killing with exhaust gas did not remain a local experiment for local 
purposes.  In Berlin, Reinhard Heydrich immediately turned to the head of his office for technical affairs 
within the RSHA (Amt II D), Walter Rauff . . . . The chief of this motor pool was Friedrich Pradel . . . . 
Sometime in September Rauff summoned Pradel to his office and instructed him to ask his chief mechanic if 
exhaust gas could be directed into a closed truck to kill the passengers” (Browning, 2004, p. 355). 
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van from Einsatzgruppe C (under Dr. Rasch’s command), and an execution was carried out 
using this van’ ” (Spektor, 1993, p. 60).  A member of Einsatzkommando 4a by the name 
of Lauer described the following action in Poltava in November:  
 
Two gas vans were in service.  I saw them myself.  They drove into the prison yard, 
and the Jews—men, women, and children—had to get straight into the vans from 
their cells.  I also know what the interior of the vans looked like.  It was covered 
with sheet metal and fitted with a wooden grid.  The exhaust fumes were piped into 
the interior of the vans.  I can still hear the hammering and the screaming of the 
Jews—‘Dear Germans, let us out!’ (Spektor, 1993, pp. 60-61). 
 
The gas vans enabled the perpetrators to avoid the stressful visual spectacle produced by 
guns but, as the above quotation shows, they could not shield the killers from the sounds 
made by those dying inside.  A witness, Eugenia Ostrovec, described an action that is 
reminiscent of Milgram’s subjects talking over the learner’s screams to avoid this 
remaining source of perceptual stimulation:  
 
When it was quite full, the doors were firmly locked.  The driver started the engine 
and left it running at full revs, but he couldn’t drown the cries of the prisoners and 
the trampling of feet inside the van (Spektor, 1993, p. 70). 
 
Because the Euthanasia gassing programme used canisters of pure carbon 
monoxide, which is both odourless and colourless (Rhodes, 2002, p. 155), those carrying it 
out were more likely to be spared from having to hear the sounds of the dying victims.  By 
the time the victims realised what was happening to them it was generally too late.  On the 
other hand, the malodorous and visible diesel fumes used by the Einsatzgruppen had a 
different effect.  The victims were immediately alerted to the danger they were in, and 
reacted desperately to their plight (producing frightful sounds that were difficult to ignore 
and/or avoid). 
 
After the victims of the gas van operation in Poltava had been killed, Blobel’s 
chauffeur described the consequent visual spectacle: 
 
The back doors of the van were opened, and the bodies that had not fallen out when 
the doors were opened were unloaded by Jews who were still alive.  The bodies 
were covered with vomit and excrement.  It was a terrible sight (Spektor, 1993, p. 
61). 
 
With this, Blobel used a strain-resolving technique frequently relied upon by the shooting 
squads.  As his chauffeur said: “ ‘Blobel looked, then looked away, and we drove off.  On 
such occasions Blobel always drank schnapps, sometimes even in the car’ ” (Spektor, 
1993, p. 61).  Blobel’s avoidance behaviour is reflected in a report (sent to Rauff on 5 June 
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1942) on how “improvements” might be made to the vans: “ ‘Technical adjustments on the 
basis of previous experience . . . . The observation windows that have been installed up to 
now could be eliminated, as they are hardly ever used’ ” (Spektor, 1993, p. 55).  The 
German executioners needed to know when the victims were dead, which is why these 
windows were installed.  But few executioners seemed eager to use them. 
 
Although Einsatzgruppe C came to depend on their gas vans, other squads made 
little or no use of them, preferring to continue shooting their victims.  The reason for this is 
implied in August Becker’s report to Berlin, dated 16 May 1942: 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to draw your attention to the following: some 
of the Kommandos are using their own men to unload the vans after the gassing.  I 
have made commanders of the Sonderkommandos in question aware of the 
enormous psychological and physical damage this work can do to the men, if not 
immediately then at a later stage (Klee et al., 1988, p. 70). 
 
 
Unlike Blobel’s men who from the start used Jews to unload the vans, other 
Einsatzgruppen decided, for security reasons, to deploy their own men to do this 
(Browning, 1985, p. 64). 
 
Becker also pointed out in his May 1942 report that the tendency for some gas van 
operators to accelerate their vans’ motors induced painful death: 
 
In order to get the Aktion finished as quickly as possible the driver presses down on 
the accelerator as far as it will go.  As a result the persons to be executed die of 
suffocation and do not doze off as was planned.  It has proved that if my 
instructions are followed and the levers are properly adjusted death comes faster 
and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully.  Distorted faces and excretions, such as 
were observed before, no longer occur (Arad et al., 1999, p. 420). 
 
For many perpetrators, it was important to kill the victims as quickly as possible.  In this 
respect, the gas vans were clearly inferior to a bullet in the back of the neck.  Although the 
gas vans enabled the Germans to avoid having to see the victims dying, the sound of 
screams and the visual spectacle upon the door opening made it difficult to deny the reality 
that their victims had died slow and agonising deaths.  Consequently, some of the 
Einsatzgruppen commanders, and their men formed the opinion that, compared with the 
neck shot, use of the gas vans caused even more emotional stress for the perpetrators.  As 
stated in a 1972 Munich State Court verdict: 
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The defendant Schuchart declared to a member of the commando that personally he 
would have preferred to be shot rather than gone into the truck.  When the doors 
were opened the bodies were all entangled and covered with excrement.  As a result 
of complaints from members of the commando, the defendant Schuchart later 
refused to use the gas vans again, on the grounds that it was impossible to persuade 
his men to carry out such a task (Spektor, 1993, p. 69). 
 
The reason the inventors of the gas van cared little about the cruel manner in which 
their device killed the victims was because their search for a more “humane” method 
centred on alleviating the psychological burden experienced by the executioners, not the 
victims.  For some German executioners, this was not good enough.  In the end: “the vans 
remained unpopular with the men and commanders alike [and] . . . . may therefore be 
regarded as a late and not very successful development in the course of the mobile killing 
operations” (Hilberg, 1961, p. 219; see also Chrostowski, 2004, p. 8).  Nebe’s innovation 
was not the “panacea” that many in the shooting squads had been hoping for.  They turned 
back to the mass shooting method, but in so doing they exacerbated the initial 
psychological problems, with some eventually cracking under the pressure.  However, in 
the hands of those involved in the Euthanasia extermination programme—the gassing 
professionals—Nebe’s innovation had devastating consequences on all those who had thus 
far survived deprivation in the Polish ghettos. 
 
 
11.3 The Emergence of the First Extermination Camp: Chełmno and the Gas Vans  
 
As part of Himmler’s 14f13 killing programme, the ex-T4 Lange Commando had, 
since the spring of 1941, been gassing “worn out” concentration camp prisoners.  After a 
trip to Berlin near the end of 1941, Lange returned to his team in Posen with instructions 
that they were to set up a new and permanent base close to the Lodz ghetto (Browning, 
1985, pp. 30, 63).  In late October or early November 1941, Lange selected a castle located 
in the small township of Chełmno—about 60 kilometres northwest of the ghetto.  
According to Browning (1985, p. 30): 
 
Thereafter a team of SS men was assembled from Posen and Lodz, followed by a 
guard detachment of Order Police.  A work force of Polish prisoners from Lodz 
together with local inhabitants was put to work renovating and fencing the old villa 
or Schloss, where the Jews would be undressed and loaded into the waiting vans.  
 
Wilhelm Koppe, a chief of police and SS leader based in the Warthegau, was informed by 
Lange that he had been instructed to undertake the “evacuation” of Jews in the area 
(Browning, 2004, p. 416).  As far as Koppe knew, Lange was to: 
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be employed only on an experimental basis to begin with.  This idea was based on 
the fact that a certain Dr. Brack, of Hitler’s private chancellery, had already done 
some preparatory work with poison gases, and that these were to be tried out by the 
Sonderkommando Lange . . . . Dr. Brandt told me that Dr. Brack had already 
carried out experiments with gas in Berlin, that these experiments had almost been 
completed, and that it was planned that he, Dr. Brack, would be put in charge of 
testing these gases in the Warthegau.  Sonderkommando Lange was the obvious 
choice for carrying out the gassings [italics added] (Krakowski, 1993, pp. 74-75). 
 
The Lange Commando was, as Koppe put it, the “obvious choice” in this Nazi killing 
experiment, for several reasons.  First, unlike some of the Einsatzgruppen units, Lange’s 
men had learnt a few years earlier not to unload the vans themselves.  Secondly, any 
members of Lange’s Commando who found use of the vans to be disgusting, too stressful, 
cowardly and/or inhumane, had long since left the ranks of the T4 staff.199  They had been 
replaced by others until all positions were filled by perpetrators whose actions were 
unimpeded by such beliefs, concerns, and/or feelings.  Thirdly, the men remaining in the 
Lange Commando had accumulated extensive experience and were emotionally inured to 
the killing of defenseless civilians.  The only difference was that over time the type of 
“inferior” humans to be eliminated had gradually changed.  The Commando had started out 
killing the disabled, then moved onto other so-called “useless [frequently Jewish] mouths” 
worn out in Himmler’s concentration camps, to finally eradicating almost exclusively 
“useless mouths” in the Lodz ghetto.  The bureaucrats in Berlin knew that when it came to 
killing defenseless civilians, irrespective of their type, Lange and his men were 
indisputably the “obvious choice”.  This progressive killing was analogous to the foot-in-
the-door technique inherent within the OTA experiments. 
   
From 8 December 1941, the Lange Commando started killing the Lodz ghetto’s 
predominantly Jewish, but also Gypsy, inhabitants.200  The Commando initially made do 
with Lange’s fleet of vans which used canisters of pure carbon monoxide.  But soon after, 
probably in January 1942, gas vans with Nebe’s innovation arrived (Browning, 2004, p. 
418).  With access to a much cheaper, more abundant and highly mobile source of gas, the 
end result was to become, as Hilberg (1961, p. 84) put it, the first and most “primitive” of 
the several Nazi extermination centres.  The following section will describe the actual 
                                                 
199
 One physician wrote in a 1940 letter of resignation from the Euthanasia programme: “despite my 
intellectual understanding and good will, I cannot help stating that I am temperamentally not fitted for this  
. . . . I prefer to see clearly and to recognize that I am too gentle for this work than to disappoint you later” 
(Noakes & Pridham, 1988, pp. 1014-1015, as cited in Glover, 1999, p. 347).  
 
200
 Although the great majority of the victims were Jews, among the first victims at Chełmno were 5,000 
Gypsies, who were killed during January 1942 (Krakowski, 1993, p. 91). 
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gassing process established by the Lange Commando, once they were equipped with the 
gas vans with Nebe’s innovation.   
 
A guard at Chełmno, Kurt Möbius, described what happened after the victims had 
been transported there by trains then trucks: 
 
they waited some time in the courtyard.  Then Plate or I addressed them.  We told 
them that they were to be sent to Austria to a large assembly camp, where they 
would have to work.  But, it was explained to them, they would first have to take a 
bath and have their clothes deloused.  We told the Jews this so that they would not 
know what fate awaited them, and to encourage them to obey calmly the 
instructions that they were given.  After this the Jews—men, women, and 
children—were taken to the ground floor of the castle (as cited in Krakowski, 1993, 
p. 83). 
 
SS-Hauptscharführer Walter Burmeister (as cited in Krakowski, 1993, p. 84) described the 
next part of the process: 
 
New arrivals undressed in the hall . . . . Their valuables and money were collected 
by Poles from the work detail . . . . When the Jews had undressed, they were 
ordered to go down the stairs and into the cellar . . . . signs hung bearing the words: 
‘To the Baths.’. . . .  From the cellar, the naked people continued straight on, 
leaving the building by a rear door and going up onto a wooden ramp.  One of the 
gas vans . . . was backed up to the end of the ramp with the doors open . . . . The 
people who came out of the cellar by the rear door did not have any choice but to 
climb into the van.  As soon as the interior was full, with 35 to 40 people inside, the 
door was closed. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 23: Type of gas van used at Chełmno (Fleming, 1984) and a “recreation” of the van 
attached, via a ramp, to the castle.201 
 
                                                 
201
 Retrieved September, 2008, from: http://www.pbs.org/auschwitz/40-45/killing/ 
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According to Kurt Möbius (as cited in Krakowski, 1993, p. 84):  
 
Most of the Jews got into the gas van calmly and obediently, trusting in the 
promises made to them.  The Polish workers accompanied them.  They carried 
leather whips with which they struck obstinate Jews who had become mistrustful 
and who hesitated to go further. 
 
Another guard, Theodor Malzmüller, provided more detail about this part of the process: 
 
The Jews were made to get inside the van.  The job was done by three Poles, who I 
believe were sentenced to death.  The Poles hit the Jews with whips if they did not 
get into the gas-van fast enough.  When all the Jews were inside the door was 
bolted.  The driver then switched on the engine, crawled under the van and 
connected a pipe from the exhaust to the inside of the van (Klee et al. 1988, p. 218). 
 
Just as in the mass-shootings, the most stressful jobs were assigned to non-Germans, 
who—sentenced to death—felt they had little choice but to participate.  According to 
another member of the Commando, Wilhelm Heukelbach: “ ‘Soon screams and groans 
could be heard coming from the interior.  Those inside were hammering on the sides of the 
van’ ” (Krakowski, 1993, p. 86).  Burmeister (as cited in Krakowski, 1993, p. 84) 
continued: 
 
From the time the people got out of the transport trucks in front of the castle 
courtyard to the time they were loaded into the gas vans, a little less than an hour, 
at the most one and a half hours, had passed. 
 
The van would then remain in a stationary position until the perpetrators were confident 
that the victims were dead.  Then the vehicle was driven from the castle to a burial site in 
the Maiden forest several kilometres away.   
 
Hauptscharführer Gustav Laabs (as cited in Krakowski, 1993, p. 87) described 
what happened on his first driving mission: 
 
After about three kilometers we arrived in a clearing in the wooded area that runs 
alongside the road to Warthbrücken.  In the clearing the officer told me to stop in 
front of a mass grave, where a work detail of Jews was working under the 
supervision of a police officer.  There were also several policemen spread out in a 
circle, who were obviously on sentry duty.  The police officer supervising the work 
detail ordered me to back the van up to the mass grave. 
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According to Jacob W., a non-commissioned police officer, the clearing contained several 
mass graves, shaped like very large swimming pools, each about 3 meters deep 
(Krakowski, 1993, p. 77).  Gustav Laabs (as cited in Krakowski, 1993, p. 87) continued: 
 
Then the policeman who had driven in the cab with me undid the padlock that 
fastened the doors.  A few members of the work detail were ordered to open the 
double doors.  Eight or ten corpses fell to the ground, and the rest were thrown out 
of the back by the members of the work detail. 
 
The bodies were then buried. 
 
It has been estimated that between about 35 and 150 victims (depending on the size 
of the vans) could be killed during one cycle of this process of mass extermination (Arad, 
1987, p. 11; Krakowski, 1993, p. 84).  Information from the 1962 and 1963 trial at Bonn 
has shown that between December 1941 and March 1943 at least 145,500 people were 
killed in the gas vans at Chełmno (Krakowski, 1993, p. 101).  As the Berlin-based Nazi 
bureaucrats would almost certainly have noticed, Chełmno saw the alignment of a number 
of factors that foreshadowed mass killing on an even larger scale: a cheap/mobile gas, an 
industrialised process, and a hardened/professional pool of executioners.    
 
 
11.4 The Origins of Operation Reinhard 
 
As Lange began killing those Lodz ghetto Jews who could no longer work, the 
onset of winter in 1941-42 saw the advancing Nazi war machine grind to a halt in the 
Soviet interior.  More bad news for the Nazi regime came with the 7 December 1941 
Japanese attack on Pearl Habour, which saw the United States enter the war against 
Germany.  With Germany waging war on both eastern and western fronts, the sudden 
change in military fortunes clearly signalled that from 1942 onwards, the Nazis were going 
to need all the help they could muster to win the war.  Even if the Nazi regime had wanted 
to exterminate all the Jews as rapidly as possible, their rapidly growing need for slave 
labour meant they could no longer afford to do so.   
  
On 20 January 1942 the Wannsee conference was held in Berlin.  It was here that 
Reinhard Heydrich revealed how the Nazi regime intended to simultaneously win a war on 
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two fronts and, in particular, to resolve the “Jewish problem”.  In the presence of 
representatives of the German civil service agencies, whose help Heydrich anticipated  
would be needed, it was explained that all the Jews within the German sphere of 
influence—basically all of continental Europe—were to be concentrated in a small number 
of locations.  Upon their arrival on trains from all over Europe, the Jews would then 
undergo a selection process to identify those capable of productive work.  Those selected 
would provide labour that would help to strengthen the Nazi war machine and/or the 
German economy.  They would also receive an inadequate diet.  Heydrich euphemistically 
called the consequent starvation “natural diminution” (Browning (1978, p. 78).  When 
victims were no longer capable of productive labour they were simply to be killed.  Those 
who died would then be replaced with new intakes of slaves.  This plan—referred to by 
some historians as “ ‘extermination through work’ ” (Marcuse, 2001, p. 41)—would not 
only overcome criticism by the “productionists” (regarding the wasteful extermination of 
potentially useful slave labour), it would also appease the “strong believers/attritionists”, 
by eventually bringing about the total extermination of the European Jews.202  
 
 Questions were soon raised about what was to be done with those not selected to 
work.  All these so-called “useless mouths”—the very young and old—were to be killed 
immediately.  But how?  Anticipating this question, Heydrich probably let Dr. Rudolf R. 
Lange (not to be confused Herbert Lange at Chełmno), take the floor.  Lange, the 
commander of a shooting squad, probably explained first-hand that, although there had 
been problems, since June 1941 hundreds of thousands of Jews had simply been shot.203  
And even if this method started to falter, Heydrich—probably referring to the gassing 
facilities at Auschwitz (see Footnote 196) and/or the experimental Chełmno (which by this 
time had been killing people for about five and two months, respectively)—said: “ ‘even 
now practical experience is being gathered that is of major significance in view of the 
coming Final Solution of the Jewish Question” (Dawidowicz, 1990, p. 176).  
 
                                                 
202
 The Nazi regime’s eventual arrival at “extermination through work” as the preferred final solution to the 
“Jew Problem” is reminiscent of Lindblom’s (1959, p. 79) branch method of “Muddling Through” the public 
policymaking process.  
 
203
 “Lange was . . . doubtless invited by Heydrich to the conference . . . to describe his practical experiences 
with the Final Solution to the other participants gathered . . . at . . . Wannsee” (Fleming, 1984, p. 93).  
Padfield (1990) has also concluded: “it is difficult to understand why Lange was there or why the conference 
had to be postponed for him unless he was to explain the practicalities of liquidation” (p. 357).  Further, as 
Fleming (1984) said: “When Heydrich postponed the conference from 9 December 1941 to 20 January 1942, 
it was not simply the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December and Germany’s subsequent declaration 
of war on the United States on 11 December that weighed in the balance.  On 8 December 1941, 
[Ensatzkommando 2 C Special Duties leader] Lange’s services as supervisor at the execution pits in the 
Rumbuli Forest outside Riga, and later in the Bikerniek Forest, could not be spared” (p. 94). 
 245 
 
As stated in the conference protocol, then “productionist” Hans Frank’s 
representative at the meeting:   
 
Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler announced that the General Government would welcome 
it if the final solution of this problem would begin in the General Government, as, 
on the one hand, the question of transport there played no major role and 
consideration of labor supply would not hinder the course of Aktionen . . . . 
[because] of the approximately two and a half million Jews under consideration, the 
majority were in any case unfit for work (Arad, 1987, pp. 12-13). 
 
Bühler’s request that the starving and unproductive Jews in the General 
Government should be killed was accepted—a task later termed Operation Reinhard (in 
fitting memory of Heydrich, who was assassinated a few months later).  Now that Frank 
would no longer be directly held responsible for the actual killing of the Jews in the 
General Government, he suddenly favoured their extermination.204  This decision may 
officially have been endorsed in January 1942, but earlier, in October 1941 (about the same 
time as the Lange Commando received their instructions to kill the Jews in the 
Incorporated Territory), Odilo Globocnik suggested to Himmler that the General 
Government should be “Germanized” by killing all the local Jews (Musial, 2000, p.115 
cited in Lower, 2002, p. 2).  Himmler then apparently consulted Hitler.  As shown, 
Globocnik’s own men had failed to find a more “humane” method of killing (with 
grenades and corrosive slaked lime—see Footnote 194).  This failure would explain why 
he was sent specialist in killing civilians, specialists who, after being “employed only on 
an experimental basis” might have more success in achieving the ambitious goal now 
before them.205    
 
 
 
                                                 
204
 About a month before this meeting Hans Frank had heard rumours about the forthcoming Wannsee 
Conference (Hilberg, 1961, p. 308).  His knowledge of the destruction of the European Jews was further 
confirmed by Hitler’s anti-Semitic speech on 12 December 1941.  Four days later “productionist” Frank was 
now arguing: “We must destroy the Jews wherever we meet them . . . . we can take measures that will, one 
way or another [so oder so], lead to extermination, in conjunction with the large-scale measures under 
discussion in the Reich” (Gerlach, 1997, pp. 29-30, cited in Wistrich, 2001, pp. 108-109).  Frank then must 
have realised that the “attritionist” Palfinger had correctly anticipated the Nazi inner circle’s exterminationist 
policy.    
 
205
 As Friedlander (1994) has argued: “When Himmler commissioned the Lublin SS and Police Leader Odilo 
Globocnik to kill the Polish Jews, Globocnik needed the experienced staff of T4 to carry out this assignment.  
In September of 1941 Philipp Bouhler and Viktor Brack visited Globocnik in Lublin.  Although at 
Nuremberg Brack denied that this visit had anything to do with the Final Solution, it seems likely that they 
discussed their future collaboration” (p. 54).   
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11.5 Operation Reinhard 
 
The German public became aware of the Nazi regime’s furtive T4 Euthanasia 
project, which since 1939 had been gassing physically and intellectually disabled Germans.  
Consequently, the Nazi regime began attracting heated public criticism (see Lifton, 1986, 
p. 89).  On or about 24 August 1941 and under the rising tide of public pressure, Hitler at 
least officially put an end to the Euthanasia programme (Fleming, 1984, p. 23; Friedlander, 
1995, p. 111; Lifton, 1986, p. 95).  Breitman (1991, p. 198) has argued: 
 
Because of Hitler’s decision, the gassing specialists were now available for other 
duties, and no one recognized this fact quicker than Himmler, who had just [over a 
week earlier] left the scene of the unsatisfactory police execution at Minsk. 
 
This conclusion is largely correct, except that at the time a potentially viable gas had not 
yet been discovered, so it probably took Himmler a little longer (at least until September) 
to make this connection. 
 
As 1941 came to an end (and after a viable gas had been discovered), ninety-two 
ex-T4 personnel were sent to the East by the Führer’s Chancellery (Krausnick, 1968, p. 
97).  One of them was to become Globocnik’s top aide: Christian Wirth.  Wirth had not 
only been present at the first-ever Euthanasia gassing pilot two years earlier, he had also 
recently been killing people at a permanent gas chamber located in Brandenburg in 
Germany.   
 
Although Wirth had, at least, personally observed the killing process used at 
Chełmno,206 he never contemplated using mobile gas vans.  With there being about two 
and a-half million Jews living in the General Government, his mind was focused on the 
kind of system he had relied upon in Germany: permanent gas chambers, which would—
unlike the vans—be capable of handling the large numbers of victims.  Also, he intended 
for the bodies to be disposed of on-site, which would be more efficient and—with 
reference to the surrounding local populations—more discrete (Browning, 1985, p. 65).  
Thus, with the numbers of victims having moved into the millions, Wirth’s Operation 
Reinhard plan was to build several industrialised extermination centres within the General 
Government.  These large facilities would each aim to kill then dispose of hundreds of 
                                                 
206
 “Before coming to Belzec, Wirth became acquainted with the gas vans in operation in Chełmno and in the 
eastern occupied territories of the Soviet Union and learned their advantages and disadvantages” (Arad, 
1987, p. 24).  Benz (1999, p. 144) has suggested Wirth worked at Chełmno; and Chrostowski (2004, pp. 6-7) 
and Padfield (1990, p. 372) claim that he co-designed and helped build the centre. 
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thousands of victims.  The first one was at Belzec, was to serve as the experimental 
prototype from which the subsequent extermination centres would learn then advance 
upon.207   
 
The construction of the Belzec extermination centre had started almost three 
months before the Wannsee Conference, on 1 November 1941 (Arad, 1993, p. 107).  
However, the gassing apparatus for this centre came from one of Germany’s recently 
abandoned Euthanasia facilities (Dawidowicz, 1990, p. 175).208  According to Stanislaw 
Kozak, a Polish construction worker, the gas chambers at Belzec initially had wooden 
walls: 
 
we built a third barrack, which was 12 m. long and 8 m. wide.  This barrack was 
divided by wooden walls into three sections, so that each section was 4 m. wide and 
8 m. long.  These sections were 2 m. high.  The interior walls of these barracks 
were built such that we nailed the boards to them, filling in the empty space with 
sand.  Inside the barrack the walls were covered with cardboard; in addition, the 
floors and the walls were covered with sheet zinc to a height of 1.1m. (as cited in 
Arad, 1993, pp. 107-108). 
 
When the installation had been completed at the end of February 1942, Wirth 
undertook a number of pilot studies—experimental gassings—to test and refine the killing 
process.  According to SS Unterscharführer Franz Suchomel (and much like Milgram 
during the OTA pilot studies): “Belzec was the laboratory.  Wirth was camp commandant.  
He tried everything imaginable there” (as cited in Lanzmann, 1995, p. 53).  Like Lange at 
Chełmno before him, Wirth initially used pure bottled carbon monoxide (Arad, 1987, p. 
26).  These pilots were undertaken over a period of several days and involved several 
convoys, each consisting of about four to six freight cars of Jewish victims (Arad, 1993, p. 
109).  Soon afterwards (again like Chełmno) Wirth replaced the canisters with the exhaust 
fumes generated by a 250 horsepower engine (Arad, 1987, p. 26).  At the conclusion of 
these experiments the Belzec extermination centre came into use on 17 March 1942, thus 
beginning the implementation of what was soon to become known as Operation Reinhard.   
 
According to SS-Untersturmführer Josef Oberhauser, who was Wirth’s liaison 
officer with Globocnik, for the first few months of operation: “the gassings were not yet 
                                                 
207
 “Belzec was to be the camp where these experiments would be initiated, and additional camps would be 
planned and constructed according to the results obtained there” (Arad, 1987, p. 23). 
 
208
 Treblinka also obtained some of its gassing apparatus from the recently abandoned Euthanasia gassing 
programme. 
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part of a systematic eradication action but were carried out to test and study closely the 
camp’s capacity and the technical problems involved in carrying out a gassing” (Klee et al. 
1988, p. 228).  Belzec soon proved to be capable of the efficient killing of large numbers of 
people.  The biggest technical concern for Wirth was that the wooden gas chambers might 
not be able to contain the internal pressures generated by large numbers of panicking 
victims (Arad, 1993, p. 122).  Since Belzec was the model from which further death camps 
could be developed, it was decided from the start to construct the next such facility—
Sobibor—using bricks rather than wood.  Managed by ex-T4 employee, Franz Stangl, the 
Sobibor extermination centre opened during May 1942.  The initial chambers at Belzec and 
Sobibor were capable of killing about 1,000209 and 600 people per gassing—a task that 
could readily be performed several times a day (Arad, 1987, p. 123).   
 
In mid-June 1942 Wirth suspended operations at Belzec, deciding to replace the 
original wooden structure with a structurally much stronger facility (Arad, 1993, p. 122).  
This suspension signalled the end of the first stage of exterminations at Belzec.  In its first 
three months of operations, between mid-March and mid-June 1942, it had killed nearly 
100,000 Jews (Arad, 1993, p. 122), showing itself to be clearly more effective than 
Chełmno.  One month later, Himmler visited Globocnik at the coordination headquarters 
of Operation Reinhard, presumably to receive a progress report.  Globocnik was armed 
with information about the killing capacity of both Belzec and the equally destructive 
Sobibor.210  A few days later, on 19 July 1942 Himmler (after having had some meetings 
with Hitler)211 issued to the staff of Operation Reinhard an end of year deadline: 
 
I herewith order that the resettlement of the entire Jewish population of the General 
Government be carried out and completed by December 31, 1942.  From December 
31, 1942, no persons of Jewish origin may remain within the General Government, 
unless they are in the collection camps in Warsaw, Cracow, Czestochowa, Radom, 
and Lublin.  All other work on which Jewish labor is employed must be finished by 
that date, or, in the event that this is not possible, it must be transferred to one of 
the collection camps (Arad, 1987, p 47). 
 
A week or so later, at the end of July 1942 and, again with the accumulation of 
knowledge gained from previous experience, the third and what was to be the most  
                                                 
209
 This is according to a specialist on the Belzec extermination camp, R. O’Neal (personal communication, 
March 15, 2009). 
 
210
 Like Belzec, the Sobibor centre killed 90,000 to 100,000 Jews in its first three months (Arad, 1987, p. 80). 
 
211
 See Bloxham and Kushner (2005, p. 136). 
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“ ‘perfect’ ” of the Operation Reinhard extermination centers—Treblinka—was completed 
(Arad, 1993, p. 115).  This centre was to be managed by another ex-T4 employee, Dr. 
Irmfried Eberl (also present at the winter 1939/40 Euthanasia pilot gassing).  Sharing much 
in common with some of the more ambitious leaders of the Einsatzgruppen units, 
Treblinka employee Unterscharführer August Hingst later testified: “Dr. Eberl’s ambition 
was to reach the highest possible numbers and exceed all the other camps” (Arad, 1987, p. 
87).  Eberl’s strategy in seeking to achieve this goal seems to have been to accept and/or 
solicit far greater numbers of potential victims than either Wirth or Stangl, to have the gas 
chambers running almost continuously, and to dump the bodies in mass graves dug 
mechanically by a large industrial scoop shovel, and, finally, to just hope that the centre’s 
staff and facilities were able to sustain the high killing rate.  Soon after, Eberl accepted 
312,500 potential victims during Treblinka’s first five weeks in operation (Arad, 1987, p. 
87).  However, as he soon discovered, although Treblinka was the most “perfect” of the 
three Operation Reinhard facilities, it was not per se “perfect”.  The commandant’s 
ambitions exceeded the extermination centre’s ability to absorb the deluge of victims and a 
backlog of freight cars crammed with prospective victims accumulated outside the camp 
gates.  With no access to water, many started to perish in the intense summer heat.     
 
Simultaneously, Sobibor started experiencing body disposal/burial problems.  The 
high summer temperatures caused the victims’ recently buried bodies to bloat, thus 
exposing the graves.  Stangl’s immediate solution to this problem was to start cremating 
the victims’ bodies (Arad, 1987, p. 172).  However, this was time-consuming, and slowed 
down the killing rate.  And it was soon to become a problem in the other extermination 
camps as well: the maximum killing capacity exceeded their on-site ability to adequately 
dispose of the victims’ bodies. 
 
With Eberl at Treblinka (unlike Stangl at Sobibor) unwilling to slow down, chaos 
soon reined throughout the camp.  Before long, the centre’s tight security measures began 
deteriorating.  This progressive decline in security resulted in many escapes (Arad, 1987, 
p. 87; 1993, p. 127).  These quickly attracted the attention of Globocnik and Wirth who, 
upon seeing that the camp was almost out of control, dismissed the ambitious Eberl and 
replaced him with the more competent Stangl (with Franz Rechsleitner taking over at the 
smaller Sobibor centre).  However, because Treblinka had consumed almost a third of a 
million lives in just its first five weeks of operation, Eberl’s ambitious behaviour had 
demonstrated the latest extermination centre’s phenomenal killing capacity (Arad, 1993, p. 
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127).  Eberl had not been exaggerating when he had written in a letter to his wife: “ ‘The 
pace in Treblinka is truly breathtaking’ ” (Friedlander, 1995, p. 299).  By now the mass 
slaughter had taken on a more explicitly industrialised form.  As one survivor—Abraham 
Kszepicki—noted, Treblinka was “A factory of horror whose sole product was bodies” 
(Arad, 1987, p. 94). 
 
Himmler’s grandiose deadline presented over a month earlier was now clearly in 
jeopardy.  Globocnik and Wirth were aware that, just like Belzec, the killing capacity of 
the initial gas chambers at both Sobibor and Treblinka had to be increased.  Consequently, 
additional or completely new and much larger gas chambers had to be built. 
 
Such expansion, however, produced new problems that also threatened the 
achievement of Himmler’s goal.  For example, as the dimensions of the new chambers 
increased, so did the space that had to be filed with sufficiently lethal quantities of exhaust 
fumes.  This would not only mean increased fuel costs, but it also meant that it would take 
longer to kill the victims.  Finally, because a much greater volume of exhaust fumes was 
now required, the chances of survival were likely to increase for those people who 
happened to be lying on the chamber floor.  Collectively, the much larger gas chambers 
might generate financial, temporal, and killing-related inefficiencies.    
 
To varying degrees, these problems were encountered at the second, and larger, gas 
chambers at Belzec and Sobibor.  But they were eliminated at Treblinka with one single 
innovation.  That is, at the most “perfect” of the Operation Reinhard extermination centres, 
it was decided to lower the ceiling height of their second set of gas chambers by 60 cm.  
This increased efficiency because with the reduction in cubic meter volume, less exhaust 
fumes were required, reducing fuel costs.  Secondly, with less space to fill with sufficiently 
lethal concentrations of exhaust fumes, this change “shortened the asphyxiation time” 
(Arad, 1993, p. 132).  Finally, because the reduced space was more likely to have higher 
concentrations of exhaust fumes, the survival chances were reduced.   
 
Nonetheless, the larger gas chambers installed at the three camps produced massive 
increases in killing efficiency, with the number of victims per gassing doubling at Belzec 
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and Sobibor, and quadrupling at Treblinka.212  Operation Reinhard not only went on to 
meet Himmler’s end-of-year deadline by exterminating all the Jews in the General 
Government (Arad, 1987, p. 130), but it was expanded to include the Jews of Bialystok 
and the Ostland (Arad, 1987, pp. 131, 165).  By the end of Operation Reinhard, in late 
October 1943, it had resulted in the following rates of mass murder: about 1,500,000 
(Arad, 1993, p. 137) or 1,700,000 Jews (Arad, 1987, p. 165)—approximately 600,000 at 
Belzec,213 250,000 at Sobibor,214 and between 700,000 and 800,000 at Treblinka (Hilberg, 
1980, p. 93).  Unlike the labour-intensive mass-shootings: 
 
Astounding as it may be, these three huge extermination factories [Belzec, Sobibor, 
and Treblinka] in which approximately one-third of all Nazi genocide victims were 
murdered, were never operated by more than little over 100 German camp officials 
(de Mildt, 1996, p. 16). 
 
On 19 August 1942, hygienist professor Wilhelm Pfannenstiel of the Waffen-SS, 
visited and observed the highly bureaucratised killing process at Belzec, after the 
installation of the new gas chambers.  In great detail he described the arrival of the victims, 
the means used to deceive them, and the stripping of their valuables and hair:  
 
After they had undressed, the whole procedure went fairly quickly.  They ran naked 
from the hut through a hedge into the actual extermination centre.  The whole 
extermination centre looked just like a normal delousing institution.  In front of the 
building there were pots of geraniums and a sign saying ‘Hackenhold Foundation’, 
above which there was a Star of David.  The building was brightly and pleasantly 
painted so as not to suggest that people would be killed here.  From what I saw, I 
do not believe that the people who had just arrived had any idea of what would 
happen to them.  Inside the building, the Jews had to enter chambers into which 
was channeled the exhaust of a [100(?)]-HP engine, located in the same building 
(Klee, et al. 1988, p. 241).   
 
In Pfannenstiel’s view, once locked in: 
                                                 
212
 The initial killing capacity of Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka per gassing was about 1,000, 600, and 600 
respectively (R. O’Neal, personal communication, March 15, 2009; Arad, 1987, pp. 123, 120).  However, 
after undergoing expansion, the killing capacity of Belzec and Sobibor had risen to about 2,000 and 1,300, 
respectively (Arad, 1987, pp. 73-74, 123). After renovations Treblinka’s killing capacity was either about 
2,300 or 3,800 per gassing (Arad, 1987, pp. 119-120).  At his trial Franz Stangl admitted, “the optimum 
amount of people gassed in one day, I can state: according to my estimation a transport of thirty freight cars 
with 3,000 people was liquidated in three hours.  When the work lasted for about fourteen hours, 12,000 to 
15,000 people were annihilated” (Arad, 1987, pp. 120-121). 
 
213
 Hilberg (2003, p. 1320) provides a lower figure at Belzec: 434,508. 
 
214
 Sobibor had fewer victims than Belzec and Treblinka because it was the first extermination centre to be 
closed down and it was also the first to introduce cremation facilities. 
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it was only then that the people sensed something else was in store for them.  It 
seemed to me that behind the thick walls and door they were praying and shouting 
for help.  After about twelve minutes it became silent in the chambers (Klee et al. 
1988, pp. 242, 244).   
 
Whether by accident or design, the new “thick” concrete walls obviously reduced 
the intensity of the victims’ screams.  After removing gold teeth and checking bodily 
orifices for hidden valuables, the Jewish work detail removed the bodies and burned them 
in mass graves using flammable liquid.  The personnel at Belzec, like Wirth, used some of 
the previously employed T4 techniques of deception to encourage the victims to enter the 
gas chambers on their own accord.  Fake showerheads (as used during the Euthanasia 
programme) were installed, and victims were promised work on condition that they 
undergo delousing (as at Chełmno).  With its pleasantly painted buildings and strategically 
placed pots of geraniums, so as to suggest that this could not be a killing site, Belzec had 
developed its own techniques of deception.215  Similar ones were used at both Sobibor and 
Treblinka.  As Ada Lichtmann, a survivor of Sobibor has said: 
 
We heard word for word how SS-Oberscharführer Michel, standing on a small 
table, convincingly calmed the people; he promised them that after the bath they 
would get back all their possessions, and he said that the time had come for Jews to 
become productive members of society.  They would presently all be sent to the 
Ukraine, where they would be able to live and work.  The speech inspired 
confidence and enthusiasm among the people.  They applauded spontaneously, and 
occasionally they even danced and sang (Arad, 1993, p. 122). 
 
Some of those Jews lucky enough to escape returned to the ghettos to warn the 
others of the impending danger.  Word soon spread and for those Jews being forcibly 
transferred to unknown destinations on Nazi trains, increasingly names like “Belzec”, 
“Sobibor”, and especially—considering its comparatively high number of escapees—
“Treblinka”, became signals of imminent death.  More and more Jews arriving at the 
extermination centres were no longer as easily duped by the apparent purpose of the 
“showers”, and by promises of work.  Growing numbers of those targeted for 
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 Alice Lok Cahana, who was imprisoned in Auschwitz, has provided one of the few accounts on the 
deceptive effects of flowers at the gas chambers.  On 7 October in 1944, Cahana and her sister were selected 
to go to a new barrack and, on the way, have a shower.  They found themselves at “ ‘a nice building with 
flowers at the windows’ ” (Rees, 2005, p. 254).  “ ‘I see flowers in a window—reminding you of home.  
Reminding you that mother went out when the Germans came into Hungary, and instead of being scared or 
crying or hysterical she went to the market and bought violets.  And it made me so calm.  If Mother buys 
flowers it can’t be so bad.  They will not hurt us’ ” (Rees, 2005, pp. 255-256).  Consequently: “ ‘we went in 
and an SS woman said, ‘Everyone put their shoes nicely together, your clothes on the floor.’  And we were 
taken into a room—naked’ ” (Rees, 2005, p. 254).  Quickly the door to the cold and pitch-black room was 
closed behind them and before they could work out what was going on, the door swung open and they were 
quickly ushered out of the so-called showers.  They were not gassed because just as the door had closed the 
Sonderkommando (the Jewish work detail), staged a revolt.  
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extermination not only refused to comply with their executioners’ requests, but also began 
to mount spontaneous acts of resistance.   
 
Probably the earliest significant and verified act of resistance to Operation 
Reinhard occurred, perhaps unsurprisingly, at Treblinka.  In the second week of December 
1942 a group of youths from the Kelbasin camp, near Grodno, refused to enter the gas 
chambers.  With fists, knives, and even a grenade, they resisted.  A riot ensued.  With 
superior firepower, the guards rapidly quelled the resisters, resulting in massive carnage 
(Arad, 1987, pp. 254-256).   
 
Wirth and Stangl feared the unpredictable presence of resistance because it 
removed a key ingredient that enabled them to create death on such a massive scale: victim 
docility.  From start-to-finish, the gassing operations required that the victims remain 
compliant, because any resistance would create bottlenecks in the process, which would 
threaten the system’s ability to meet Himmler’s very tight exterminationist deadlines. 
 
Thus, Franz Stangl attempted to introduce even more cunning techniques of 
deception which, he hoped, might ensure total docility.216  For example, just a few weeks 
after the revolt at Treblinka, the new commandant went to great lengths to have a façade 
built: 
 
AT CHRISTMAS 1942 Stangl ordered the construction of the fake railway station.  
A clock (with painted numerals and hands which never moved, but no one was 
thought likely to notice this), ticket-windows, various timetables and arrows 
indicating train connections ‘To Warsaw,’ ‘To Wolwonoce,’ and ‘To Bialystock’ 
were painted on to the façade of the ‘sorting barracks’; all for the purpose of lulling 
the arriving transports – an increasing number of whom were to be from the West – 
into a belief that they had arrived in a genuine transit camp (Sereny, 1974, p. 
200).217 
 
Orchestras had earlier been used as deception devices.  As Abraham Kszepicki stated:  
 
                                                 
216
 Auschwitz survivor Rudolf Vrba highlighted the centrality of deception: “ ‘The whole murder machinery 
could work on one principle: that the people came to Auschwitz and didn’t know where they were going and 
for what purpose.  The new arrivals were supposed to be kept orderly and without panic marching into the 
gas chambers . . . . The Nazis were concentrating on one thing: it should go in an orderly fashion so that it 
goes unimpeded.  One doesn’t lose time’ ” (Lanzmann, 1995, p. 113). 
 
217
 Also see Arad (1987, pp. 122-123). 
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Forty meters from the gas chambers, near the path where the Jews were led to the 
‘showers,’ a small musical ensemble stood under a tree.  Three Jews with yellow 
patches, three musicians from Stock, stood and played there on their instruments     
. . . . They played enthusiastically.  It was difficult to make out their repertoire . . . 
these were apparently the latest hit songs favored by the Germans and Ukrainians 
(Arad, 1987, p. 86).   
 
With the victims becoming increasingly alert to any evidence that might signal their arrival 
at a death camp, the primary purpose of the orchestra was: “To drown out the victims’ 
screams on their way to the gas chambers – so that they would not be heard throughout the 
camp” (Arad, 1987, p. 86).  An orchestra was also used at Sobibor.218   
 
It could also be argued that the speeches, the carefully positioned flowers, Stangl’s 
fake train station, and the jubilant orchestras were all strain-resolving avoidance 
mechanisms that ensured the perpetrators did not have to personally confront victims who 
might otherwise realise their lives were abruptly about to end.  The tools of deception—
what Clendinnen (1999, p. 147) termed “overt stage sets”219—reduced the chances of the 
Germans having to hear their victims’ cries for mercy as they ran along “the tube” or what 
little sounds that could be heard while being asphyxiated within the concrete chambers.  It 
can also be argued that another reason for the lowered ceiling in Treblinka’s second set of 
gas chambers was to further reduce the span of the victims’ now increasingly muffled 
screams.  Being able to kill the victims as quickly as possible was certainly of great 
concern to many in the Einsatzgruppen shooting squads and gas van operators. 
  
Were the above innovations introduced to reduce the intensity and/or span of the 
remaining sources of perceptual stimulation (reducing further perpetrator strain, trauma, 
guilt, and/or repugnance)?  Or were the innovations introduced solely with efficiency in 
mind?  The probable answer is that both factors played an important, even inter-related, 
role.  Whether introduced by accident or design, the more direct perpetrators were likely to 
be drawn towards those innovations that not only enhanced or maintained the required 
rates of killing efficiency, but also ensured they saw and heard much less of their victims 
(particularly when distressed).  It is therefore suggested that any efficiency-promoting 
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 See Dov Freiberg’s quotation (as cited in Arad, 1987, p. 75). 
 
219
 In regard to the deception relied upon at Auschwitz—and somewhat reminiscent of the OTA experiments 
“staging”—Clendinnen (1999) stated: “the ‘changing rooms’, the anterooms to the gas chambers [were] . . . 
overt stage sets, with their numbered pegs for clothing (‘Remember your number!’) and the signs in various 
languages advertising the benefits of hygiene.  When the episode was over and the rooms emptied, there 
would be a frantic rush to remove all traces of the last audience and to reset the scene for the next intake and 
the next performance” (p. 147). 
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innovations that happened to increase the intensity and/or duration of the only remaining 
sources of perceptual stimulation (or even introduced completely new sources) would not 
at all have been welcomed by the frontline perpetrators.  These developments were a “one-
way street” that headed continuously, with only rare and short-lived interruptions, in the 
direction of diminishing (not increasing) the levels of perpetrator strain, trauma, guilt, 
and/or repugnance.220  Compared to the shooting methods, all these technical 
developments helped the perpetrators to kill their victims more calmly, quietly, and less 
offensively than before.  The following example lends weight to this argument that the 
“overt stage sets” were not solely about maintaining or advancing killing efficiency.   
 
According to a German court investigation of events occurring at the Stutthof camp 
between August and November 1944, commandant Paul Werner Hoppe instructed his 
subordinates: “ ‘All the Jews who were old, sick, or unable to work had to be killed’ ” 
(Pingel, 1993, p. 192).  To deal with similar such requests in the past, a railway car had 
been converted into a sealed gas chamber that used a gas called Zyclon B, as an alternative 
to exhaust fumes (discovered earlier at Auschwitz, see Footnote 196).  During the above 
period, a group of Jewish women fitting this description were to be murdered.  They were 
told that they had been granted work at a stocking and darning shop and therefore had to be 
transported elsewhere by train: 
 
One of the SS men put on a railroad employee’s uniform and whistled, as is usually 
done in marshaling yards.  To make the subterfuge complete, an ordinary car was 
placed next to the gassing car . . . . The SS staff of the camp urged the twenty or 
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 For an example of an experimental killing technique that increased the levels and duration of perceptual 
stimulation, and then was rapidly abandoned, see Footnote 194.  One possible counterfactual is that lethal 
injections, during which victims were touched, seen and heard, were quite common.  Between September 
1941 until March 1942 a score of physicians and SD disguised as medics at the Kiev Pathological Institute 
killed about 100,000 people using this method (Freidlander, 1995, p. 142).  Also, at Auschwitz tens of 
thousands perished from lethal phenol injections.  They were given as “inoculations” or “ ‘an anti-typhus 
injection’ ” (Naumann, 1966, p. 295) and victims were required to place their left arm across their eyes, 
exposing the rib area.  According to Dr. Klodziński (as cited in Lifton, 1986, p. 258) the next part of the 
procedure involved “ ‘driving the long needle into the fifth [rib] space.’ ”  Apparently this was  
“ ‘inexpensive, easy to use, and absolutely effective when introduced into the heart ventricle’ ”, killing 
victims in about 15 seconds (Lifton, 1986, p. 258).  According to one survivor of Auschwitz: “As a rule, not 
even a moan could be heard.” (International Auschwitz Committee, 1986, pp. 104-105, as cited in Glass, 
1997, p. 92).  Although a Dr. Entress refined the technique, he preferred that others administer the injections.  
According to a prisoner, Dr. Glowacki, (as cited in Naumann, 1966, p. 138), Josef Klehr, a “ ‘sadistic’ ” 
German medical orderly, stood apart in the application of this technique (Lifton, 1986, p. 259).  In relation to 
the question “Who did the killing”, another prisoner, Professor Dr. Fejkiel, testified: “ ‘At first Dr. Entress 
himself, then Klehr, and then–in this order– Scherpe and Hantl.  Hantl did it rarely’ ” (Naumann, 1966, p. 
154).  Klehr’s ability to kill using this method was exposed when, in his absence, about 120 youths were to 
be killed.  Halfway through Scherpe paused and said, “I can’t any more” (Lifton, 1986, p. 267).  According 
to Glowacki: “ ‘He left, and we never saw him again after that’ ” (Naumann, 1966, p. 138).  Glowacki adds:  
“ ‘Hantl took over.  Hantl finished the murder of the children’ ” (Naumann, 1966, p. 138).  Hantl emerged:  
“ ‘in a state of total collapse’ and ‘completely went to pieces, cursed the war,’ and lost his SS demeanor” 
(Lifton, 1986, p. 267). 
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thirty victims to hurry: it was time to leave; they had to go clear to Danzig.  As 
soon as everybody was in the car, the doors were closed.  Then the gas was thrown 
[in its pellet form] through the opening in the roof (Pingel, 1993, pp. 192-193). 
 
The killing of these old, sick, and/or probably emaciated women begs the question: why 
did the perpetrators go to such inefficient lengths to deceive these powerless victims into 
entering the train carriage of their own accord?  An explanation is that these front-line 
perpetrators wanted to avoid having to experience the guilt-inducing emotions that might 
be evoked by the behaviour of victims who were aware of their fate.  Having to physically 
force these prostrate women into the gas chamber would have made the perpetrators 
actually feel like the ruthless killers they had become.  It was psychologically easier for 
them to keep the women totally oblivious of their fate, to deceive them into going to their 
deaths then—to avoid hearing their screams—make sure that once the pellets hit the floor 
they got as far away from the train carriage as quickly as possible.  Killing became much 
easier on the conscience when, having been deceived, the victims went along willingly and 
quietly.  Even better, if—as survivor Ada Lichtmann—said (above) they “danced”, “sang”, 
and “applauded” their way to their graves.  The perpetrators were, of course conceptually 
aware what they were doing, but were at pains—literally—to avoid the perceptual realities 
of their actions.  The deception helped to ensure that their consciences were less burdened 
than they otherwise would have been.  Indeed, such killing may not have felt that bad at 
all.  In short, the strong reliance on deception was not only about reducing the risk of 
victim resistance in order to maintain or increase killing efficiency. 
 
 It could be argued that this thesis overstates the importance of deception during the 
Holocaust.  Such an objection is not supported by evidence from some of the principal 
perpetrators.  For example Rudolf Hoess (2001, pp. 149-150), the commandant of 
Auschwitz, who after World War Two recalled some “shattering” events that he believed 
he would “never forget”:  
  
One woman approached me as she walked past and, pointing to her four children 
who were manfully helping the smallest ones over the rough ground, whispered: 
‘How can you bring yourself to kill such beautiful, darling children?  Have you no 
heart at all?’ . . . . I remember, too, a woman who tried to throw her children out of 
the gas-chamber, just as the door was closing.  Weeping she called out: ‘At least let 
my precious children live.’  There were many such shattering scenes, which 
affected all who witnessed them. 
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It would seem that the words of those victims who saw through the “overt stage sets” had 
an impact on the guilty consciences of some of the most destructive Nazis.  This was not, 
for Hoess, an isolated event:  
 
On one occasion two small children were so absorbed in some game that they quite 
refused to let their mother tear them away from it.  Even the Jews of the Special 
Detachment were reluctant to pick the children up.  The imploring look in the eyes 
of the mother, who certainly knew what was happening, is something I shall never 
forget.  The people were already in the gas-chamber and becoming restive, and I 
had to act.  Everyone was looking at me.  I nodded to the junior non-commissioned 
officer on duty and he picked up the screaming, struggling children in his arms and 
carried them into the gas-chamber, accompanied by their mother who was weeping 
in the most heart-rendering fashion.  My pity was so great that I longed to vanish 
from the scene: yet I might not show the slightest trace of emotion (Hoess, 2001, p. 
154). 
 
Bureaucrats like Hoess convey a tone of officiousness and stoicism, just as Milgram’s 
subjects did, like the pseudonymous Morris Braverman, when communicating with the 
learner: “ ‘Mr. Wallace, your silence has to be considered as a wrong answer’ ” (Milgram, 
1974, p. 53).  But behind the façade of the bureaucrat, and as Hoess noted, the situation 
confronting them “affected all who witnessed them”.  Behind the scenes the subject would 
frequently drop their façade enquiring, as Braverman did: “ ‘Do I have to follow these 
instructions literally?’ ” (Milgram, 1974, p. 53).  But the bureaucratic momentum at least 
implicitly, often explicitly, urges all functionaries to continue fulfilling their role.  Hoess 
(2001) added: “If I was deeply affected by some incident, I found it impossible to go back 
to my home and my family.  I would mount my horse and ride, until I had chased the 
terrible picture away” (p. 155).   
 
When the commandant of Sobibor and Treblinka, Franz Stangl, was asked several 
decades after World War Two where the worst place in the extermination camps were for 
him, his response suggests he went to great lengths to insulate his conscience from the 
realities around him:   
 
‘The undressing barracks,’ he said at once.  ‘I avoided it from my innermost being; 
I couldn’t confront them; I couldn’t lie to them; I avoided at any price talking to 
those who were about to die: I couldn’t stand it [italics added]’ (Sereny, 1974, p. 
203).221 
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 Stangl’s (and Hoess’) choice of words are similar to those of Mrs. Rosenblum in the Milgram 
experiments, who later pleaded: “You don’t know what I went through here” (Milgram, 1974, p. 82).  Stangl 
glosses over the victims’ experience, arguing instead that he could not stand it. 
 258 
Yet, it was this continual avoidance of personal encounters with his approximately one 
million victims that ensured that until Stangl was released of his duties, he was indeed able 
to “stand it”.222  Such distance allowed him to later argue: “ ‘Of course, I wasn’t ‘involved’ 
in that sense,’ he said quickly.  ‘Not in the operational sense’ ” (Sereny, 1974, p. 57).  As 
far as Stangl was concerned, not having personally killed anyone, he was not responsible 
for the massive death toll that took place under his command.  This explains why, when he 
was accused of being more directly involved and having shot into a crowd of prisoners, he: 
 
appeared to be more indignant about this accusation than about anything else, and to 
find irrelevant the fact that, whether he shot into the group or not, these very same 
people died anyway, less than two hours later, through actions ultimately under his 
control (Sereny, 1974, p. 124).  
  
A similar response might have been expected from Milgram’s Peer Administers Shocks 
experiment (subject just asked questions: actor inflicted shocks—92.5 percent completion 
rate) if, say, obedient subjects were later accused by the learner of having been the person 
who inflicted the shocks. 
 
It would seem that for Stangl and most of his German staff, if they never received 
any cues, they could simply avoid thinking about the implications of their actions.  It was 
as if the mass killing of human beings was not even happening.  The option of perceptual 
avoidance seemed to perpetuate Stangl’s and his German subordinates’ “intentional 
ignorance” (Seibel, 2005, p. 351).  Or as the Dutch Protestant theologian, Willem A. 
Visser’t Hooft, put it, they could very conveniently “ ‘live in a twilight between knowing 
and not knowing’ ” (as cited in Sereny, 1995, p. 335). 
 
 
11.6 Conclusion 
 
There are many major differences between the perpetration of the Holocaust and 
Milgram’s OTA experiments.  But the implementation of Operations Barbarossa and 
Reinhard shows that there are certain similarities that link them closer together—thus the 
M-H linkage.  Like Milgram’s, Nebe’s experiments and selection of a means of inflicting 
harm also drew on his past experiences and an intuitive feel for what he suspected might 
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 Similarly, Hoess (2001) conceded: “My inner scruples about remaining in the concentration camp, despite 
my unsuitability for such work, receded into the background now that I no longer came into such direct 
contact with the prisoners as I had done in Dachau” (p. 82).   
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“work”.  To make it all a reality, again like Milgram, Nebe drew on the expertise of 
others—Heess and Widmann—and the more specialists he drew in, inadvertently, the more 
bureaucratic the process became.  Globocnik and Wirth then took up the baton and with the 
help of the T4 personnel in conjunction with the ad hoc trial and error exploratory method 
of discovery, a seemingly monolithic bureaucratised and industrialised factory of death 
emerged (see Bartov, 1996, pp. 3-4).  As the machine grew and others were implicated, 
overall responsibility for the end result was easily displaced and eventually dissipated.   
 
This general pattern of incremental “advances” and refinements continued with 
further time and experience.  Those managing the Auschwitz-Birkenau work and 
extermination camp learnt from this ad hoc trial and error, which led to Operation 
Reinhard’s most “perfect” system.223  The use of the faster-acting Zyclon-B (crystals 
which turned into gas when exposed to oxygen at a temperature of at least 25.7 degrees 
Celsius) was the bureaucratic “zenith”—but moral “nadir”—of the Nazis’ system of 
industrialised killing (see below): 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Model of the most advanced industrialised gas chamber at Auschwitz- 
Birkenau—Crematorium II (see Berenbaum, 2006, pp. 140-141). 
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 For example, see Footnote 196.  It is interesting to note that before Wirth was killed in an ambush in Italy 
near the end of the war, he spoke of Rudolf Hoess (who had no T4 Euthanasia experience) as his  
“ ‘untalented pupil’ ” (Hilberg, 1961, p. 572). 
 
2. Undressing 
chamber 
3. Victims 
enter the 
gas 
chamber 
5. Bodies 
transferred to the 
crematoriums by 
the Jewish 
Sonderkommando 
1. 
Victims 
line up 
outside 
gassing 
facility  
4. Crystals of 
Zyclon B were 
poured through 
ceiling vents 
with the victims 
then dying below 
 260 
The last link in this humanly destructive bureaucratic process required “merely” the 
pouring of Zyclon-B crystals into the ceiling vents, which then only required sealing (see 
below): 
 
 
 
Figure 25: The opening in the roof through which Zyclon-B crystals were poured into the 
gas chamber below (this photo is actually of the Majdanek concentration camp, which used 
the same technology and technique).   
 
 
It would seem the so-called success of the more advanced gassing enterprises lay in 
their ability to render the highly destructive outcome a “purely theoretical notion” 
(Bauman, 1989, p. 25)—that is, killing which is almost devoid of any perceptual reality.  
And it was the gas chamber, as the most powerful of all SRMs that made this possible.  
Like the shock generator, as set up in Milgram’s Truly Remote Pilot condition—it, not the 
perpetrators—inflicted the forceful blow and it, not them, did so remotely.  For the 
Germans in the camps it became possible to engage in Truly Remote-like total perceptual 
avoidance, to the point that their lethal contributions closely resembled the seemingly 
benign contributions of all the paper-shuffling “desk murderers” further up the 
bureaucratic chain.224 
 
The majority of moderately anti-Semitic Germans posted to this most “advanced” of 
camps were unlikely to demur from participating in the Nazi regime’s exterminatory goals.  
After searching long and hard, the Nazi regime had finally found a method of killing that, 
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 See Schwan (2001, pp. 68-71) for a variety of avoidance-type behaviours relied upon by perpetrators at all 
levels of the Nazi hierarchy. 
 
 261 
as far as possible, removed the necessity for the Germans involved to feel, see, and hear 
the impact of their actions on their fellow human beings. 
 
The push to continue killing would come from above, but the most powerful 
innovations—which were introduced with the egocentric intention of easing the more 
front-line perpetrators’ stressful experiences—came from those below.225  What those 
further down the ranks failed to realise was that the more bottom-up innovation they 
engaged in (their invention and use of new SRMs), the more bearable for them became the 
destructive desires of their masters in Berlin.  The easier it all became, the more likely 
those at the front-line would—and could—continue participating (and the longer they 
participated, the greater the numbers of people killed).  However, the bigger the death toll, 
the more grandiose the desires of their leaders became and the more undesirables they 
found (like, for example, ugly people) for whom death was deemed necessary.226   
 
For a variety of reasons, all involved wanted the last link in the destructive 
bureaucratic chain to feel completely benign.  In this way, evil—as Arendt (1963) would 
later argue—had indeed been rendered banal. 
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 Thad Allen (2005, p. 266) has argued: “The primary question concerning the Holocaust as a crime based 
on the division of labour” is “What interrelationship existed between centralized authority and spontaneous 
initiative at the local level?”  It is believed hat this thesis may shed some light on answering this question. 
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 By 1944 even those considered to be ugly were being considered for extermination.  According to Hilberg 
(1961): “In consequence of an agreement between Himmler and Justice Minister Thierack, so-called asocials 
were transferred from prisons to concentration camps.  On November 16, 1944, after the transfer of the 
‘asocials’ had largely been completed, the judiciary met to discuss a weird subject: ugliness.  The phrase on 
the agenda was ‘gallery of outwardly asocial prisoners [Museum äusserlich asozialer Gerfangener].’  The 
summary of that conference states: ‘During various visits to the penitentiaries, prisoners have always been 
observed who – because of their bodily characteristics – hardly deserve the designation human [Mensch]; 
they look like miscarriages of hell [Missgeburten der Hölle].  Such prisoners should be photographed.  It is 
planned that they too shall be eliminated [auszuschalten].  Crime and sentence are irrelevant.  Only such 
photographs should be submitted which clearly show the deformity” (pp. 642-643).  
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Chapter Twelve: Overview and Conclusion  
 
 
. . . when I first heard of the Milgram experiments . . . . I knew I could do such a thing . . . . The 
impetus lay within me, like a little hot spot . . . . How often had I, have you, heard a racial slur and 
said nothing in order to keep the peace?  How often have I, have you, seen something wrong at 
work, maybe a mistreated colleague, and done nothing so your own job stays steady?  The little hot 
spot travels inside us.  Certain situations may make it glow brighter, and others dimmer . . . [it is]  
. . . the moral failing that lies at the heart of so many humans . . .—Slater (2004, p. 63). 
 
 
 This thesis began with an overview of the literature that led to Bauer’s (2001) “real 
question” (p. 103): how did a mostly moderately anti-Semitic society like Germany in the 
1930s become, by the early 1940s, “a reservoir of willing murderers of Jews?”  A 
commonality that Milgram shares with the Nazi regime is that both rapidly transformed 
large proportions of “ordinary” people into willing inflictors of harm.  A central aim of this 
thesis has been to delineate Milgram’s (research) journey of discovery with the intention 
that it might shed some insights into Bauer’s question of how the Nazi regime so rapidly 
converted ordinary onlookers into willing executioners.  Also, since Milgram’s own 
explanation for his results was ultimately unsatisfactory, another central aim of the thesis 
was to provide a new theoretical interpretation of the OTA experiments. 
 
To achieve these aims the thesis addressed five questions.  First, how did Milgram 
transform a large proportion of ordinary people into willing torturers of other human 
beings?  As outlined in Chapters Four and Five, Milgram’s results can be traced back to 
the cumulative inclusion within his experimental procedure of a variety of what he termed 
Binding Factors (BFs) and Strain Resolving Mechanisms (SRMs).  BFs are coercive bonds 
that aid in the entrapment of individuals into participating in otherwise distasteful 
behaviour.  SRMs are mechanisms that help reduce the feelings of tension a person 
normally experiences when engaging in distasteful behaviour.  For Milgram there were 
three main sources of BFs and SRMs.  In the first instance, he drew on past experiences, 
like the inclusion of the BF of group forces—peer pressure.  Having previously worked 
under Solomon Asch, Milgram knew before the pilot stage that such pressure would 
probably result in some subjects (ostensibly) torturing the learner.  Secondly, Milgram 
relied upon his intuition, drawing upon ideas that he thought might encourage subjects to 
complete the experiment: for example, his invention/selection of a means of inflicting 
harm—the shock generator (SRM)—that he suspected subjects might use on another 
person.  The third factor promoting high completion rates was Milgram’s use of the ad hoc 
trial and error exploratory method of discovery.  The application of this method of 
discovery throughout the pilot studies led to a refined experimental procedure along with 
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the addition of even more BFs and SRMs.  One example was increasing the coercive 
power of Milgram’s intuitive idea to incrementally escalate the shock intensity—the foot-
in-the-door technique (BF)—by increasing the number of shock switches from 12 in the 
first pilot to 30 in the official experiments.  
 
It has been argued in this thesis that Milgram’s results were largely (but not 
exclusively) due to the cumulative inclusion of the following BFs and SRMs:  
 
• the provision of a plausible rationale/ideology (exploring the potential of 
punishment on learning) that, via moral inversion, encouraged subjects to at 
least initially condone the infliction of harm (SRM),  
 
• the ability of the shock generator to enable subjects to avoid having to 
experience most of the perceptual consequences surrounding their decision 
to inflict harm (SRM),  
 
• the shock generator’s piecemeal foot-in-the-door-like escalation in shock 
intensity (BF),  
 
• the experimenter’s response that the shocks apparently caused no permanent 
injury (SRM) and his implied but especially explicit offer to accept all 
responsibility for the subjects’ actions (SRM),  
 
• the shock generator’s ambiguously labelled last switch—XXX—adding 
uncertainty to the shocks likely effect (SRM),  
 
• a proximate and coercive experimenter who obviously condoned the 
infliction of harm (BF), and a seemingly harmless and defenceless learner 
(SRM).   
 
From the inception of Milgram’s first inchoate ideas, through to the last pilot study, the 
gradual accumulation, refinement and incorporation of these and other BFs/SRMs 
progressively increased the probability of any one subject completing the experiment.  In 
fact, by the time of his last test run—the Truly Remote Pilot—Milgram had introduced so 
many patently powerful BFs and SRMs that he went too far, ensuring “virtually all” 
completed the experiment.  
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The second question the thesis addressed was: how did Milgram explain his 
results?  As discussed in Chapter Six, Milgram argued that, due to the survival value of 
organisation over disorganisation, humans have increasingly come to rely upon 
hierarchical structures, resulting in them developing significant advantages over their 
competitors in the natural environment.  He was careful to argue that obedience to those 
higher in the chain of command is not innate but that people are born with a potential for 
obedience which interacts with wider situational forces to promote potentially destructive 
obedience.  These potentially destructive impulses are kept in check by the consciences of 
autonomously acting individuals.  The problem emerges when a person is introduced into a 
hierarchical chain of command, where apparently a homeostatic-type change can occur 
which supplants local conscience-driven control in favour of the demands of a malevolent 
authority.  The individual then enters into the agentic state: a condition where “the 
individual no longer views himself as responsible for his own actions but defines himself 
as an instrument for carrying out the wishes of others” (Milgram, 1974, p. 134).  
Accelerating entry into the agentic state are potentially numerous BFs.  However, Milgram 
believed that submergence into the authority system is rarely total and, upon inflicting 
harm, subjects often experienced strain (like sweating or trembling).  Numerous SRMs are 
capable of mitigating this strain.  In sum, Milgram explained obedience as the outcome 
when BFs exceeded the ability of the SRMs to reduce strain.  And disobedience was the 
outcome when the BFs failed to exceed the capacity of the SRMs to reduce strain.  
 
Chapter Seven addressed the third question: with particular regard to the Holocaust, 
what was the scholarly reaction to the Obedience to Authority (OTA) research and 
Milgram’s explanation of it?  Although most scholars believed the experiments to be 
methodologically sound, the initial reaction centered on what most regarded as the highly 
unethical nature of the study.  With respect to Milgram’s findings and their purported 
connection to the Holocaust, scholars have largely remained unconvinced by the 
centerpiece of his theory—the agentic state.  Across the many experimental conditions, 
this explanation failed to explain the variance in completion rates, or why some 
subjects/Germans who completed the experiments/participated in the Holocaust, 
respectively, later held themselves to be primarily responsible for their own actions.  The 
agentic state also tended to exonerate obedient subjects and the Holocaust perpetrators, by 
suggesting that they believed themselves to be mere instruments of higher authority and 
were being honest when later arguing, as so many did, that they were “just following 
orders”.   
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In light of the failure of Milgram’s own theory, the fourth question of the thesis 
was: does a more convincing explanation of his results exist?  It was argued that the main 
(although not exclusive) reason subjects completed the Baseline experiment was that most 
assessed it to have been easier for themselves to continue inflicting the shocks than to help 
the learner, which would have necessitated they shoulder the burden of engaging in an 
uncomfortable confrontation with the experimenter.  Confronted by a moral dilemma to do 
what independent audiences assessed to be the wrong course of action, those who 
completed chose to prioritise their desire to avoid a confrontation over the learner’s 
obviously more important need to escape what appeared to be potentially lethal shocks.  
The reason so many subjects were willing to repeatedly make the choice they did was that 
they were led to believe that they could probably do so with impunity.  The experimental 
procedure therefore encouraged subjects to suspect that, although the learner would suffer, 
they could probably get away with it—actions without consequences.  The claim of 
OTA—“I had to do it.  You said so”—was just one of many strain-resolving 
rationalisations that allowed many subjects to do what they were tempted to do: avoid a 
confrontation.227  Over and above Milgram’s Holocaust-inspired obsession with the power 
of “obedience”, his research is much more about how ordinary people resolve moral 
dilemmas, and about the influence of situational factors—BFs and SRMs—on their 
decision-making processes.  This alternative interpretation fits well within some of the 
broader literature, bolstering the argument that the OTA experiments were actually about 
the resolution of a moral dilemma.  It is, for example, concordant with Bandura’s (1999, p. 
194) concept of moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities where, much like 
Milgram’s BFs and SRMs: “there are many social and psychological maneuvers by which 
moral self-sanctions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct.”  The experiments were 
really about the top-down provision and/or bottom-up invention of opportunities that 
provided subjects with an easy, albeit immoral, means of resolving a moral dilemma (with 
the likelihood of evading responsibility for having done so).  To reiterate, the OTA 
experiments paradoxically have less to do with “obedience” to authority per se, and much 
more to do with the availability of opportunities that enabled subjects to evade 
responsibility for the harmful actions they in fact chose to undertake.   
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 C P Snow (1961, p. 258) captured it well: “. . . I am saying that loyalty can easily turn into conformity, 
and that conformity can often be a cloak for the timid and self-seeking. So can obedience, carried to the 
limit.”  
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In Milgram’s agentic state, subjects were mere instruments who did not believe 
themselves to be responsible for their own actions.  The alternative explanation presented 
in this thesis suggests, however, that most of those who completed the experiments were 
probably in much greater control of their actions than they were willing to concede.  
Consequently, this thesis has posited the State of Autonomous Denial (SAD) in place of 
Milgram’s agentic state.  The SAD is where subjects were aware that they were responsible 
for their own actions.  However, due to their fear of having to pay some personal cost in 
order to help the learner (that is, engage in a confrontation with the experimenter) they 
attempted to conceal this awareness of responsibility internally (via self-deception) and/or 
externally (via the deception of others).  Having denied to themselves that they were 
responsible for their own actions, they could then pursue what for them was the easiest 
available option in resolving the moral dilemma: continue inflicting the shocks on the 
learner.  A variety of factors promoted access to the SAD, thus reducing the subjects’ 
feelings of responsibility.  Among these were BFs (foot-in-the-door phenomena, financial 
remuneration) and supplied and/or self-invented SRMs (strain-resolving rationalisations, 
avoidance behaviour, positive self-image).  However, this thesis has argued that the most 
powerful mechanism, in conjunction with an ideology/rationale that legitimised the 
infliction of harm, was the SRM of the shock generator used by Milgram as a vital 
component of his methodology.   
 
The central importance of the shock generator can be traced back to two key 
characteristics that, when used simultaneously, rendered this device the single most 
powerful mechanism in the entire research programme.  The first characteristic was that 
the shock generator, not the subject, inflicted blows seemingly strong enough to render 
another human being at least unconscious (engendering a loss of agency).  The second one 
was the shock generator’s capacity to inflict these (seemingly) intense blows in a situation 
in which the subject was physically separated from the recipient of the shocks.  The shock 
generator made possible the “physical separation of the act [flick switches] and its effects 
[seemingly rendering the victim unconscious]” (Milgram, 1974, p. 39).  Therefore, the 
maximum utility of these two characteristics ensured the victim’s apparent suffering came 
to possess “an abstract, remote quality for the subject.  He is aware, but only in a 
conceptual sense, that his actions cause pain to another person; the fact is apprehended but 
not felt” (Milgram, 1974, p. 36).  Because subjects did not have to feel, see, and hardly 
hear the seemingly destructive implications stemming from their actions they were only 
ambiguously responsible: there was ambiguity as to who—the subject, experimenter, or 
even the learner—was most responsible for the latter’s treatment.  The fact that the act was 
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separated from its effect meant that subjects did not personally feel and/or sensed they 
might not appear as responsible as they were for the seemingly painful outcome.  
Ambiguous responsibility gave subjects the opportunity to deceive themselves and/or 
others in the concealment of their actual awareness of personal responsibility for their own 
actions.  And, if they did not feel and/or appear most responsible for the implications 
stemming from their actions then, very conveniently, perhaps they believed they were not?  
The shock generator was a necessary but not a sufficient cause of the experimental effect—
“Obviously some acceptable rationale [for inflicting shocks] must be provided.”  
Nonetheless, without the shock generator a 65 percent completion rate in the Baseline 
experiment would have been extremely unlikely.   
 
However, there are limitations with this or any other subject-centric explanation of 
the results of the OTA experiments.  That is, subjects later often pointed out that they 
would not have completed such an experiment of their own accord, and added that their 
decision to do so was strongly influenced by the fact that other, clearly more prominent 
figures—such as the experimenter and Yale University—had been instrumental in 
developing and running this experiment.  Chapter Eight’s subject-centric explanation may 
therefore shift attention away from the intra-group forces that also played a significant role 
in the subjects’ individual decision-making processes.  This point is bolstered when the 
experiments are interpreted as a Weberian-like goal-orientated bureaucratic process.   
 
To illustrate the validity of this interpretation, it was shown that Milgram’s 
conversion of his experimental idea into a reality saw him draw upon the help and 
expertise of a wide variety of specialist groups/individuals, including, for example, the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), Yale University, John Williams, James McDonough, 
and even himself.  Since harm in the form of intense stress was to be inflicted on the 
subject, it was shown how Milgram overcame any concerns they may have expressed 
regarding the experiments’ unethical nature.  As was the case with subjects, it was argued 
that Milgram provided each individual/group with a sufficiently convincing 
rationale/ideology that also legitimated the infliction of harm (highlighting the probable 
significance of the research).  It appears that this rationalisation was greatly bolstered by 
Milgram anticipating, then appealing to each individual’s/group’s often different needs 
and/or desires.  Thus, to get all on board and secure their eventually harmful contributions, 
Milgram applied to each individual/group what he suspected would be the most successful 
motivational formula.  In one case, an employee developed reservations and refused to 
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perform his role.  He was simply replaced with someone else who would.228  Milgram’s 
anticipation of the most likely successful motivational formula also applied to the subjects.  
They were given a rationale/ideology that condoned the infliction of harm—that is, the 
exploration of the effects of punishment on learning.  Then Milgram appealed to their 
needs and/or desires (in the form of opportunities which would enable them to avoid a 
confrontation with the experimenter).  But as all these people, in their various roles, 
contributed to the infliction of intense stress on the subjects (and to the subject’s infliction 
of apparently intense shocks on the learner), a powerful force was brought into effect, one 
essential to the production of the requisite experimental results.  That is, as each party 
agreed to participate and make their necessary contributions, Milgram had unwittingly 
constructed a coercive and strain-resolving structural tool of organisation—a goal-
orientated bureaucratic process.   
 
Inherent in the bureaucratic process are a variety of BFs and SRMs.  There is the 
top-down chain of command—OTA—whereby less powerful links in the chain are to do as 
they are told by more powerful links.  Less obvious is bureaucratic momentum (BF), 
whereby individuals feel pressured by other members of the bureaucratic chain into 
performing their specialist tasks (the “in-tray” continues to fill, and upon completion of the 
work other functionaries further down the chain await the transfer of this work to their own 
“in-tray”).  Finally, the displacement/diffusion of responsibility (SRM), where 
responsibility for the malign outcomes is passed on to other, or spread across, all links in 
the chain so that no one single person feels and/or appears to be fully responsible for what 
occurs (Arendt’s (1970, p. 38) “rule by Nobody”).  The top-down chain of command 
appears most relevant to the OTA experiments, but displacement/diffusion of 
responsibility—that others were involved—was much more important in generating the 
high completion rates.  All participants—from the subject through to the NSF and perhaps 
even Milgram—appear to have sensed that even if blame were later apportioned, it could 
easily be diverted elsewhere.  For example, subjects probably suspected they could blame 
clearly more prominent links in the chain, like Milgram and Yale University, for 
undertaking such unethical experiments.  Similarly, it is likely that Williams the 
experimenter thought that Milgram was actually responsible for the former’s infliction of 
intense stress on the subject.  Finally, with so many subjects having chosen to continue to 
inflict the shocks, Milgram could (and arguably did) blame them for their own stressful 
experiences.  Because there were so many links in the organisational chain, each 
participant’s feeling of responsibility for the destructive end result eventually dissipated as 
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 See Chapter Nine, Footnote 143. 
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all came to sense blame could be shifted elsewhere—thus occurred the displacement and 
eventual diffusion of responsibility.   
 
Although not addressed in the academic literature, as shown in Chapter Nine, 
Milgram’s construction and use of the bureaucratic process played a central coercive and 
strain-resolving role in the generation of his experimental results.  The presence of a 
bureaucratic process ensures that others are involved, which then makes the diffusion of 
ultimate responsibility possible.  Any explanation that does not consider this structural 
(and sociological) feature—as do more subject-centric/individual explanations—will fail to 
achieve a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the OTA experiments. 
 
Milgram’s development of his theoretical model would seem to have been impeded 
by the fact that, as was also the case with his doctoral research, he originally founded the 
OTA idea on what soon after World War Two was a commonly held stereotype.  As he 
said: “ ‘I came across many statements which implied that Germans tended to obey orders 
more conscientious[ly] than Americans’ ” (as cited in Fermaglich, 2006, p. 88).  The 
results he obtained in the rudimentary pilot study seemed to reinforce part of this 
stereotype: there indeed appeared to be an inclination in ordinary people to obey authority 
figures.  Although there were some counterfactual “gaps” that detracted from the so-called 
“compelling tendency to obey”, with the concept of “obedience” firmly in his mind, 
Milgram failed to contemplate that an explanation for the experiments might, as this thesis 
has argued, have much less to do with OTA, per se, than he was inclined to believe.    
 
What does the above information reveal about the fifth and final question of the 
thesis?  That is, how during the Holocaust a mostly “moderately anti-Jewish” society like 
Germany in the 1930s become, by the early 1940s, “a reservoir of willing murderers of 
Jews?” (Bauer, 2001, p. 103).  The first nine chapters of this thesis suggested that a fruitful 
starting place in understanding how ordinary moderately anti-Semitic people could so 
quickly be converted into willing executioners of Jews might be to first explore the 
construction of the ideological/rationale that resulted in a moral inversion that legitimated 
the deliberate infliction of harm on some people by others.  Secondly, the thesis suggested 
that taking a close look at the potential influence of intuition, previous experience and the 
ad hoc trial and error process in the evolution of the most powerful SRM of all—the 
means of inflicting harm—in conjunction with some of the other powerful SRMs and BFs.  
Milgram’s OTA experiments illustrated that when the means of inflicting harm was 
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extremely low in perceptual stimulation, it was possible for clearly trivial/self-centered 
concerns to dominate a subject’s emotional universe—like fear of a confrontation, peer-
pressure, and even the prospect of being deprived of $4.50.  Can it be at all possible that 
similar trivial/self-centered concerns were at work during the extermination of the Jews 
and others?   
 
Chapter Ten argued that upon coming to power in 1933 the Nazi regime worked 
assiduously to promulgate an ideology/rationale promoting the need to remove or eliminate 
the Jews and some other groups (Dawidowicz, 1990, p. 195).  Most ordinary Germans 
came to accept this ideology, or at least felt indifferently towards its malevolent pursuit 
and implications, especially after the regime crushed the expression of any dissenting 
views.  The end result was that many people in Germany came to condone, or feel 
indifference towards, the infliction of harm against so-called enemies of the state.  Using a 
variety of methods, by 1941 many ordinary Germans were already demonstrating an ability 
to kill fairly large numbers of civilians.  As the German empire (and its corollary of the 
putative Jewish problem) expanded, on the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union the idea 
of killing the “inferior” populations was being considered within influential Nazi circles. 
 
The thesis then explored how leading Nazi bureaucrats, like Himmler and 
Heydrich, used a combination of Milgram-like intuition and past experience in coming to 
the view that arming local Eastern Europeans and/or ordinary Germans with firearms (as a 
means of inflicting harm) might prove effective in achieving their goal of killing the Soviet 
Jews and others.  Because so many of the Germans who manned these shooting squads 
initially experienced what they termed “burdening of the soul”, Himmler attempted, from 
the top-down, to ensure his men’s continuing participation in the shootings by supplying 
them with a variety of BFs (such as the gradual foot-in-the-door-like expansion of enemy 
targets) and SRMs (such as his accepting responsibility for their actions).  The shooters 
came to realise that the Reichführer’s strain-resolving ideas were largely ineffective in 
easing their psychologically stressful tasks.  As they felt that they were stuck with this 
work, from the bottom-up they began inventing their own, far more effective, SRMs.  
There was, for example, the wide use and abuse of alcohol, as well as a tendency to avoid 
the types of victim most difficult to shoot, such as the mentally ill.  Particularly popular 
among the shooters was the movement over time towards a less disturbing (perceptually 
benign) shooting technique.  That is, the campaign started out with the distressful military-
style execution which then moved on to the eventually most relied upon clean, quick, 
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lethal, and relatively less stressful genickschuss or “neck shot” technique.  The increasing 
bureaucratisation of the shooting process (increasing specialisation and division of labour) 
was also observable during this process.  This rapidly incorporated the least stressful 
shooting techniques, in conjunction with the most efficient means of implementation 
(Jeckeln’s “Sardinenpackung” technique).  The progressive incorporation of most of these 
BFs and SRMs were arguably all present three months into Operation Barbarossa, at the 
time of the Babi Yar massacre.  However, in the end, the only SRM capable of enabling 
the ordinary Germans to totally avoid the otherwise unavoidable repugnant visual spectacle 
generated by firearms was the increasingly popular strategy of inserting Eastern 
Europeans—“special end units”—as SRMs at the immediate killing end of the 
exterminatory bureaucratic process.   
 
After Himmler had observed an execution near the start of the campaign, he asked 
Artur Nebe to devise a more “humane” method of killing.  Chapter Eleven examined how 
Nebe and his colleagues’ search and discovery of a new method of extermination involved 
(again) a combination of Milgram-like intuition, past experience, and the ad hoc trial-and-
error method of discovery.  Following a number of pilot studies they invented the visually 
more benign exhaust-fume gas chamber technique.  Then came more ad hoc trial and error 
experimentation by other bureaucrats, until a more refined and efficient killing process 
emerged—from the mobile gas vans using carbon monoxide fumes, to the semi-permanent 
extermination camp at Chełmno, to the hugely destructive Operation Reinhard and its 
increasingly more refined industrialised factories of death at Belzec, Sobibor and then 
Treblinka).229  Eastern Europeans were frequently given the job of pushing the victims into 
the gas chambers, and then the Sonderkommandos (Jewish work groups) were required to 
remove and burn the victims’ bodies.  The more “advanced” gassing processes ensured 
that, if they so desired, most ordinary Germans within the camps had only to perform the 
less stressful tasks (devoid of most, or any, perceptual reality).   
 
This pattern of ad hoc developments, revolving mostly around the means of 
inflicting harm, continued at what became the largest killing centre the Nazi regime had 
time to devise—Auschwitz-Birkenau (with its faster-killing gas, greater efficiency, and 
even more industrialised killing/body disposal processes).    
 
                                                 
229
 Milgram did not notice that his path of experimental discovery had similarly been traversed 20 years 
earlier by the most “successful” Nazi bureaucrats. 
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In the end, most of the key bureaucrats—“desk murderers” like Himmler, Heydrich, 
Eichmann, Stangl and Hoess—probably did not feel responsible for the colossal death toll.  
They could convince themselves that they had not directly, themselves, actually killed 
anyone.230  Eichmann repeatedly argued: “ ‘I never killed a single one . . . I never killed 
anyone and I never gave the order to kill anyone’ ” (Todorov, 1999, p. 152, as cited in 
Wistrich, 2001, p. 236).  Irrespective of such self-deception—knowing without knowing—
Eichmann knew the truth: “I created a situation for myself in which I could find a spark of 
inner calm.  The main medicament was: I have nothing to do with it all personally.  They 
are not my people.  But my nervousness got worse” (Kulcsar, Kulcsar & Szondi, 1966, p. 
39, as cited in Rhodes, 2002, p. 247).  For those ordinary Germans most directly 
involved—shooting squad members and those operating the gas chambers—the majority 
knew they would never have engaged in such behaviours of their own accord—that others 
of higher rank, status or expertise desired or had approved guaranteed that those lower 
down the hierarchical chain could act with impunity.  They knew that should anyone later 
ask, they could always argue that they were “just following orders”.  As de Mildt (1996, p. 
311) wrote of those involved in the Euthanasia programme and in Operation Reinhard:  
 
Instead of . . . the paranoiac ideological warriors so often invoked when describing 
the fieldworkers of Nazi genocide, their background profile far more closely matches 
that of rather ordinary citizens with a well-developed calculating instinct for their 
private interests . . . . The key word which springs to mind . . . is not ‘idealism’ but 
‘opportunism’.   
 
The bureaucratic process, with its division of labour, helped reduce the 
perpetrators’ feeling of personal responsibility.  Just as in Milgram’s OTA experiments, 
each link in the chain could blame someone else for the destructive outcome.  Whether or 
not they agreed with what they were doing, the key was that nobody felt ultimately 
responsible.  And the bureaucratic chain, embodying a perceptually benign method of 
killing at its final link, helped all involved to diffuse their feelings of personal 
responsibility.  They could then prioritise their lesser needs and/or desires (mild anti-
Semitism, peer pressure, desire for world domination, careerism, financial reward, fear of a 
confrontation and probably many other relatively trivial motivations).231  Insulated from 
                                                 
230
 However, in 1923 Hoess had been convicted and imprisoned for his involvement in a politically-related 
murder. 
231
 Concordant with this conclusion, Mann’s (2000; 2005) study of Nazi perpetrators has yielded a similar 
typology of motivations for participating in the killings.  More specifically: “The entire group of perpetrators 
is driven by the many motives that are normally found among ordinary people participating in more mundane 
social movements. Ordinary people are brought by normal social processes behind the ethnic barricades and 
then into committing murderous ethnic cleansing . . .  Radicals at all levels are helped to kill by their sense of 
righteousness. But even you or I could do it, for reasons of career, comradeship, patriotism, work routines, 
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the perceptual realities of their seemingly benign actions enabled such trivial motivations 
to more forcefully dominate their emotional and moral universe.  Thus, in the overall 
development of this process one is able to find an answer to Bauer’s (2001, p. 103) “real 
question” of how it was that so many moderately anti-Semitic Germans could be converted 
into willing executioners. 
 
It is important to point out, of course, that there are huge differences between 
Milgram’s laboratory experiments, on the one hand, and the Holocaust, on the other 
(Waller, 2002, pp. 111-112).  Perhaps the most important is that most of Milgram’s 
subjects who refused to complete the experiments did so on ethical grounds: “I don’t think 
it’s right” (SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2305).  However, as Browning (1992, pp. 74-75) 
said of the ordinary men in Reserve Police Battalion 101: 
 
Even twenty or twenty-five years later those who did quit shooting along the way 
overwhelmingly cited sheer physical revulsion against what they were doing as the 
prime motive but did not express any ethical or political principles behind this 
revulsion. 
 
These ordinary Germans did not feel that they faced any sort of moral dilemma, as such.  
Rather, they were upset by the physical repulsiveness of having to kill.  Most of Milgram’s 
subjects at various stages of the procedures disagreed with what was being asked of them, 
whereas the ordinary Germans seemed to have agreed with, or at least felt indifferently 
about, the extermination of “inferior” human beings.232  The implication that these 
Germans faced a dilemma of revulsion was that upon the discovery of, what for the 
perpetrators was a less disturbing means of inflicting harm, there would be no dilemma (a 
conclusion borne out by subsequent events). 
  
By way of some concluding reflections, it seems relevant to think of the present 
and future, as well as the past.  The moral dilemma in the OTA experiments may not sit 
easily with the historical event that stimulated them, but it may be applicable to many other 
situations beyond Milgram’s laboratory.  Consider, for example, the moral dilemma 
surrounding global warming.  Increased greenhouse gas emissions are indispensable for 
continued economic growth.  But so much scientific data indicates that the effect of 
increasing average global temperatures will generate a world-wide environmental 
                                                                                                                                                    
and other mundane human motives. We are humans, capable of evil.” (Mann, 2005, p. 504).  In relation to 
another point, see Katz’s (1993, pp. 78-79) views on Hoess.   
232
 Perhaps Milgram could have achieved this if he had had more than one hour with the subjects and had 
gone through with his plans to dehumanise (SRM) the learner as an arrogant petty-thug. 
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catastrophe.  Independent audiences (much like the ones Milgram approached), presented 
with this moral dilemma, would probably conclude that to increase instead of decrease 
greenhouse gas emissions would be the morally wrong course of action.  So is it possible 
that if world-wide greenhouse gas emissions increase, people may find themselves caught 
in an insidiously regressive and seemingly inescapable Milgram-like trap?  Despite much 
talk about the need to take effective action, the reality may more likely be few will actually 
be prepared to do so, because of what they perceive to be their more pressing, immediate, 
interests—ever higher standards of living, continued economic growth, and the 
prioritisation of convenience over sustainability.  As we enter and pass through what many 
scientists believe to be this critical “irreversible harm” phase, perhaps we will soon reach 
that point on the metaphorical shock board where, having resolved the conflict, no one ever 
breaks off? 
 
The moral dilemma inherent in the OTA experiments may resemble the moral 
dilemma embedded in global warming more closely than it did the Nazis’ implementation 
of their “Final Solution”.  Nonetheless, the Milgram-Holocaust linkage is more apparent 
than many scholars would presently allow.  For example, Lutsky (1995, p. 63) has argued 
that the lens Milgram viewed his experimental results and their purported relationship with 
the Holocaust was severely limited: 
 
What an emphasis on obedience slights, however, are voluntary individual and 
group contributions to Nazi ideology, policy, bureaucracy, technology, and 
ultimately, inhumanity.  Historical scholarship recognizes this problem in the 
controversy between intentionalists, who view the Holocaust as the product of 
Hitler’s plans and orders, and functionalists, who see the Holocaust as evolving 
from bureaucratic developments and rivalries, improvisation, individual and group 
initiatives, and other external conditions and forces (see Marrus, 1987, chap. 3. for 
a review).  The top-down orientation of the intentionalist perspective melds well 
with social psychology’s emphasis on obedience to authority; the functionalist 
perspective, which is prominent in historical scholarship, does not.   
 
However, as this thesis has demonstrated, the OTA experiments have much to say about 
“individual” and “group” contributions to the development of a rationale or ideology that 
condones the deliberate infliction of harm on people.  They also have plenty to say about 
top-down and bottom-up “improvisation” and “initiatives” within a destructive 
“bureaucracy”, as well as shedding further insights into the relationship between 
“technology” and “inhumanity”. 
 
Finally, in regard to the potentially destructive tripartite nexus between 
bureaucracy, technology, and inhumanity, it is worth noting that just before the Cuban 
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missile crisis of October 1962,233 Hilberg (1961, p. 760) ominously observed: 
 
Before the emergence of the twentieth century and its technology, a destructive mind 
could not play in fantasy with the thoughts that the Nazis were to translate into 
action.  The administrator of earlier centuries did not have the tools.  He did not 
possess the network of communications; he did not dispose over rapid small arms fire 
and quick-working poison gases.  The bureaucrat of tomorrow would not have these 
problems; already, he is better equipped than the German Nazis were.  Killing is not 
as difficult as it used to be. The modern administrative apparatus has facilities for 
rapid, concerted movements and for efficient massive killings.  These devices not 
only trap a larger number of victims; they also require a greater degree of 
specialization, and with that division of labor the moral burden too is fragmented 
among the participants. The perpetrator can now kill his victims without touching 
them, without hearing them, without seeing them.  
 
It is certain that at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, neither the American nor the 
Soviet leadership would have had any difficulty in finding bureaucratic compliance with 
commands to push the buttons that would have released a nuclear Armageddon.  
 
Therefore, it is not difficult to understand Milgram’s (1974, p. 188) concern over 
the phenomenon he demonstrated in his laboratory—a strong propensity for people to 
prioritise relatively trivial personal interests over the need to act in response to their sense 
of more urgent moral propriety.  His words of warning may prove to be prophetic: 
 
The behavior revealed in the experiments reported here is normal human behavior 
but revealed under conditions that show with particular clarity the danger to human 
survival inherent in our makeup . . . . This is a fatal flaw nature has designed into 
us, and which in the long run gives our species only a modest chance of survival. 
                                                 
233
 See Allison and Zelikow (1999).  
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